Greg R. Lawson's Blog

Does Fear Prevent Peace?

Greg R Lawson — Sun, 24 Jun 2012 20:22:55 GMT

When looking at the likely future pathways for world order, the fundamental question is this: does fear prevent peace?

I spoke highly of Thomas PM Barnett's book, Great Powers, in a recent post. I concluded by saying his vision was quintessentially American and optimistic to the core. I admire that.

However, I concluded with this,

"We are an ideal. Beautiful and aspirational. The world is tragic. America sees hope around every corner. History is tale of zigzagging progress, dizzying heights and precipitous falls. Americans assume that tomorrow will be better than today and much better than yesterday. Despite our periodic bouts of self doubt, hope and optimism are baked into our DNA.

Barnett taps this deep reservoir and offers a grand vision of a world that could be. The problem becomes whether what could be will be. Has America allowed the world to finally break the cycles of rise and fall? That would be a gift too exquisite to articulate in mere words. Or is America living on the fumes of its past greatness at just the time where disorder re-enters history on a scale not seen since the beginning of the last century?

Hope vs. tragedy. American, New World idealism vs. Old World pessimism. We may not face such a clean, binary situation, but it is on the horns of these perceptions that I find myself touching ever so gingerly hoping not to become fully impaled by falling on the wrong side."

Today I read this interview with John Mearsheimer. He is a famous International Relations theorist most famous for his pre-9/11 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

He concludes the interview with this,

"The sad fact is that you can have a situation where two countries are satisfied with the status quo and have no interest in using military force to alter it, but they still are doomed to compete with each other for power. The reason is that neither side can be certain about the other side's intentions. Therefore leaders on both sides have to assume the worst case; they have to assume the other side is a revisionist state, not a status quo power, and compete for power with the other side. That is the tragedy of great power conflict."

While that comment is specifically about US-Chinese relations, it has a universal quality to it with which one must intellectually grapple. A lack of trust breeds fear and fear breeds a vicious cycle. Ultimately, this is what drives international relations. While agreements can be reached and peace secured under certain circumstances, usually under balances of power, it will all crumble.

Every nation seeks to secure itself against this inevitability even if those efforts are exactly the actions that make such an undesired outcome come to fruition.

Ultimately fear prevents peace by destroying the needed balances and shredding idealism.

Can that be conquered? That continues to be mankind's most pressing question.

American Idealism vs. Old World Pessimism

Greg R Lawson — Sat, 23 Jun 2012 21:12:47 GMT

I have just completed reading one of two books I recently won as a contributor to the new global, multi-player geopolitical consultancy Wikistrat. It was their Chief Strategist, Thomas PM Barnett's Great Powers. Barnett is a defense intellectual who gained great fame in Pentagon circles with his 2004 book, the Pentagon's New Map.

It was one of the most refreshing reads I have had in a long time. Indeed, it made me more optimistic about the future of the world than I have been in a long time. It is filled with an overwhelming spirit of American "can do"ism. Barnett believes very strongly that "Globlization" is America's gift to the world and that it can help facilitate, actually that it must facilitate, a massive new global middle class unprecedented in the history of mankind. He sees the challenges of the future as being more the problems of abundance than some neo-Malthusian struggle.

To Barnett, our grand strategy is to shrink the "Gap" of nations that have yet to fully plug into our global economic system while helping rising great powers like China and India become even more full fledged stakeholders in the system. In essence, the "West" and now East Asia are the "Core" of a new global economy while Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are still struggling to plug in and as they do, traditional societies will suffer a great amount of tumult that must be managed so as to mitigate backlash like 9/11.

This is a vision everyone should in many ways hope for. It is as optimistic as most any vision that you are likely to encounter. Yet, I find myself not quite believing.

As I finished it, I also was reading Ian Bremmer's new book on the so-called G-Zero world which largely mirrors much of what I have written about previously on a neo-Middle Ages of global non-polarity, regional multipolarity, national angst, subnational turmoil, and proliferating WMD technology. Indeed, I walk a more Morgenthau inspired classical realist path with sprinklings of Kissingerian and Spenglerian pessimism.

The brilliance of Barnett's work is he almost made me escape that mindset. Yet once I distance myself from his skillful and playful prose, I find myself ever drawn to the melancholy ruminations of Kissinger and the great 20th Century cyclical historians. Throwing in little of Niall Ferguson's new kick on rapid collapse due to cascading systemic failures (as opposed to long-term Spenglerian or Gibbonesque decline) and even some Kurzweil Singularity based concerns and Barnett's vision begins to seem more like a wonderful aspirational hope, but also a chimera.

At some level Barnett believes all men will eventually be satisfied with some form of the American lifestyle. While he agrees that it may take a long time for this to happen, he is ultimately very much in line with Fukuyama's End of History.

Yes, Barnett is quintessentially American and this is a wonderful thing. Yet, America is so used to not experiencing the deep tragedies so pervasive throughout world history. It is not surprising Americans are pragmatists and, typically, though not always, optimists, if not outright idealists. Our history, with the obvious exception of the Civil War, has been predominately one of upward ascent from little colonies to unprecedented global superpower.

We have not tasted the bitterness wrought by the fall of Rome, or that of Byzantium, or that of any number of Chinese dynasties, or the Incas, or the Aztecs, or the Harrapan civilization India, or the Minoans, etc.

We are an ideal. Beautiful and aspirational. The world is tragic. America sees hope around every corner. History is tale of zigzagging progress, dizzying heights and precipitous falls. Americans assume that tomorrow will be better than today and much better than yesterday. Despite our periodic bouts of self doubt, hope and optimism are baked into our DNA.

Barnett taps this deep reservoir and offers a grand vision of a world that could be. The problem becomes whether what could be will be. Has America allowed the world to finally break the cycles of rise and fall? That would be a gift too exquisite to articulate in mere words. Or is America living on the fumes of its past greatness at just the time where disorder re-enters history on a scale not seen since the beginning of the last century?

Statesman as "Ubermensch?"

Greg R Lawson — Fri, 18 May 2012 20:47:50 GMT

"When you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you."

Friedrich Nietzsche

From a fascinating outline of Kissinger's writings I stumbled on this statement which I think encapsulates Kissinger's views of statecraft and also raises interesting questions about statesmanship, artistry and a Nietzschean conception of order.

"The heroic figures are those who construct new worlds for themselves, who look into the abyss and choose t try to bring order out of chaos or die trying. Yet, even those who successfully establish new codes, new laws, new orders cannot truly overcome the fundamental purposelessness of the cosmos. The tragic element of human life is that there is no cure for humanity's condition."

The implication here to me is similar to one I have long thought about Kissinger, namely that he had a perception of the statesman as an almost Nietzschean, "Ubermensch" like creature that has to create new values after staring into the proverbial abyss. They must confront the chaos of disorder in international relations which, not surprisingly is the core of "realism" as an intellectual idea (the very school Kissinger is so often considered the grand master of).

This is a fascinating concept, that a statesman is must have artistic inclinations or as Nietzsche says,

"I tell you: one must still have chaos within oneself to give birth to a dancing star."

Think about that for just a moment.

To give birth to a dancing star, a rhetorically extravagant way of saying one is creating an art, philosophy, or even a religion, means one must be chaotic. Is it through a sense of the chaotic and tragic, that one can understand how to create?

Kissinger, in his doctoral thesis, A World Restored, stated this:

"But the claims of the prophet are sometimes as dissolving as those of the conqueror. For the claims of the prophet are a counsel of perfection, and perfection implies uniformity. Utopias are not achieved except by a process of leveling and dislocation which must erode all patterns of obligation. These are the two great symbols of the attacks on the legitimate order: the Conqueror and the Prophet, the quest for universality and for eternity, for the peace of impotence and the peace of bliss.

But the statesman must remain forever suspicious of these efforts, not because he enjoys the pettiness of manipulation, but because he must be prepared for the worst contingency."

In his first set of memoirs, the White House Years, which I quoted in my post on History knowing no plateaus

"History knows no resting places and no plateaus. All societies of which history informs us went through periods of decline; most of them eventually collapsed. Yet there is a margin between necessity and accident, in which the statesman by perseverance and intuition must choose and thereby shape the destiny of his people. To ignore objective conditions is perilous; to hide behind historical inevitability is tantamount to moral abdication; it is to neglect the elements of strength and hope and inspiration which through the centuries have sustained mankind. The statesman's responsibility is to struggle against transitoriness and not to insist that he be paid in the coin of eternity. He may know that history is the foe of permanence; but no leader is entitled to resignation. He owes it to his people to strive, to create, and to resist the decay that besets all human institutions."

I think those are windows into his views and I think they paint a portrait of a person long struggling to find meaning in life and a sense of transcendence. Yet, if all human existence is transitoriness, or as Kissinger says in his undergrad thesis (The Meaning of History: Reflection of Spengler, Toynbee and Kant),

“Transitoriness is the fate of existence. No civilization has yet been permanent, no longing completely fulfilled. This is necessity, the fatedness of history, the dilemma of mortality.”

does not a man become quite mired in the muck of human experience? Can he escape? Nietzsche tried through creativity. So, in his way, I posit did Kissinger through the canvas of geopolitics and grand diplomacy.

Kissinger attempted to connect philosophy and statesmanship in a meaningful way, something that many policymakers do not do in an age where empiricism and technicism seem paramount.

Yet, even if this is tragic, the wise statesman, the true "realist", understands the limits of what he alone can do and hopes to follow Bismarck in waiting "until he hears the steps of God sounding through events, then leap up and grasp the hem of his garment."

A statesman is an artist, not a technocrat. Temporary as his work might be, it remains his duty to create anew structures and patterns of relative peace and stability despite the vagaries of historical contingency.

So even if haunted by the specter of no transcendence, trudge along like Nietzsche's Zarathustra they must.

Beyond the Reset: Reverse “Nixon Goes to China”

Greg R Lawson — Fri, 18 May 2012 18:28:41 GMT

Based off some work I have done over at Wikistrat, the editor of the Atlantic Sentinel suggested I do an op-ed on some policy changes that the US should consider vis a vis Russia. I modified my Wikistrat work and came up with the below work. Here is the link to the Atlantic Sentinel piece too.

When President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger opened up relations with China in the 1970s, it was done in the context of needing a new lever in the Cold War, especially when the United States was still mired in Vietnam. The goal was for the United States to be closer to both China and the Soviet Union than either was to each other and to be able to swing back and forth between the two powers as needed depending on what the exigencies of the balance of power dictated.

At that time, China was clearly the lesser power and required bolstering. The time for the United States to consider an inversion of that policy may soon become ripe.
The strategic environment today is vastly different than when Nixon met Mao. The Cold War is over, the Soviet Union is no more and China is rapidly ascending to the position of a global superpower. Under these conditions, the United States are struggling to manage a multiplicity of strategic interests in every major region of the world. Paramount among those are relations with China.
While no one disputes outgoing World Bank President Robert Zoellick’s statement that it would be advantageous for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in global affairs, the prospect of this not happening means that the United States need additional levers to balance against China in the soon to be economically dominant Asia.
The Obama Administration’s vaunted “pivot” shows Washington’s recognition of this need. To fully embrace this strategy, though, the United States must secure its Western flank from instability. This means securing Europe.
Inconveniently for the United States as it seeks to shift its focus to Asia, the ongoing European fiscal crisis opens the door to all kinds of medium to long term challenges. It also opens the door for Russian mischief under the nationalistic president Vladimir Putin.
Left unattended and unresolved, the Russian question could become a significant enough distraction that the United States find themselves unable to be decisive in Asia.
To the extent that the Obama Administration realized building better relations with the Russians would be essential for European stability, it should be commended. Yet, its much vaunted “reset” looks set to run aground as Putin reassumes his undisputed position on the top of the Kremlin’s power pyramid.
This can be confirmed from recent news of Russian threats of preemption against NATO missile defense sites in Europe. If the United States are not to be squeezed by a perennially dissatisfied Russia in Central Asia and Eastern Europe while trying to deal with China, they are going to have to move beyond the “reset” and seek a more comprehensive engagement.
This entails opening the door to a legitimate and wide ranging understanding with Russia that can finally deal with the lingering aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and President Putin’s taste for revanchism.
Discarding the mere symbolism of the “reset,” the United States should consider a broader and deeper outreach to Russia in order to pull it into a far less bellicose attitude vis-à-vis the West. In essence, much as Nixon and Kissinger sought the “dragon” to balance against the stronger “bear,” the United States must consider the reverse.
Doing so could minimize Russian aggression toward Europe. Even more important, having Russia ensconced in the West will offer the United States an additional lever it can employ to force China to divert its military focus from Asia.
Such a move could also expand the economic base of the West by capturing the huge hydrocarbon wealth of both Russia and Central Asia while having more ability to squeeze China’s energy supply if it is ever seen as necessary due to geopolitical tensions with the Middle Kingdom.
Such a policy has many possible pitfalls.
First, distrust pervades Western and, particularly, NATO relations with Russia. Moscow continues to believe that NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe violates promises made in the George H.W. Bush Administration and during the immediate aftermath of the Soviet implosion. It is essential to address this substantively, through mechanisms such as American support for NATO opening missile defense cooperation to Russia rather than insisting on two separate systems.
In addition, the United States should reduce funding to nongovernmental organizations in critical countries such as Ukraine and Georgia and quietly move from supporting the mercurial Mikheil Saakashvili.
The United States should also encourage President Putin’s push for a “Eurasian Union.” This would entail the United States no longer hectoring Russia over the slow pace of political reform. By contrast, it should simply argue for an “eventual transition to genuine multiparty democracy founded on generally liberal principles.”
Other policy options over the longer term could include an expansion of a free trade zone to encompass not only the traditional “transatlantic” partnership with the European Union but also an eventual “Eurasian Union.”
Finally, a real invitation for Russia to join NATO should eventually be considered but not made contingent upon the domestic political evolution of the Russian state.
Fundamentally, this is about changing Lord Ismay’s comments on NATO and changing its raison d’être from “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down” to “keeping both the Americans and Russians in and the rest of Europe quiet” while Asia rises.
In light of current headlines, these policy proposals seem fanciful. Yet, it is important to recollect the arc of Russian history.
Russia has long been torn between its desire enter a more Western orbit, something Russian modernizers since Peter the Great have desired, and its Byzantine based Orthodox Christian heritage, as well as a tendency towards “Oriental Despotism” as inherited from its time under the Mongol Yoke.
With its current demographic challenges and the return to great power status of multiple Asian states, Russia faces several choices: attempt to compete with China and maintain an independent pole of power based on Central Asia, embrace China and become a junior partner, or join the West. Each of those options appeals to one of Russia’s historical self images while also raising fears in certain segments of Russian society.
The jury is out as to which direction Russia will ultimately choose. It is up to the United States to incentivize Russia to make the final decision of tilting toward the West, which will also enable it to more fully realize its Central Asian goals.
A new global reality demands creativity and flexibility as opposed to rigidity. Moving to bring Russia into the West could be the most dramatic diplomatic move in a generation. Such a policy clearly runs against many American traditions. Yet, so did the Nixon policy when he traveled to Beijing in 1972. That move is now considered a powerful triumph.

Will Communism be Recycled from the Ash Heap of History?

Greg R Lawson — Thu, 05 Apr 2012 15:08:21 GMT

Walter Russel Mead continues to write provocative blogs concerning the decline of what he terms the "Blue State model." They are always insightful even if one does not necessarily subscribe to every component piece.

On his latest regarding a "Crisis of Civilization," I left the bellow comment. Keep in mind this comment is meant to initiate a dialog and does not mean I subscribe to any particular outcome posited, just that we have to be open to various potentialities.

"There are many paths the developments WRM discusses can take. One thing that concerns me is the potential renewed rise of Marxist thinking. I think a case could be made that “Communism” was never really tried. Marxist-Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, Castoism, the Khmer Rouge; these were not what Marx predicted. None of these regimes we think commonly of as “Communist” were the result of the mechanistic laws of history as Marx described them.

Rather, they were “accelerated” by revolutionary vanguards who just then happened to be authoritarian in order to impose what was supposed to happen inexorably and without necessarily the application of force, or at least force of the kind those murderous regimes utilized.
Communism was only supposed to happen once capitalism made labor superfluous and bounty abound. Under present trends, we are closer to that vision than when Lenin led the Bolsheviks.
I am not saying it is inevitable for Communism to make a renewed appearance on the historical stage, but it cannot be discounted.
In essence, “Communism” as properly understood is an experiment that actually has yet to be run and could only be run as we get nearer to the plenty we are now becoming fully capable of achieving'
Of course, Communism seems to forget human nature and human acquisitiveness. So it is possible that capitalism will be a perpetual whirlwind of Schumpeterian “Creative Destruction” so there will be no period where people will stop to partake of the fruits of their machines labor, because new machines will need to be built for new products. As Kissinger says, “History knows no plateaus” and Communism would, in theory, be a plateau.
I just wonder if there is more of an ideological battle to emerge than we think, which could lay question once more to Fukuyama’s “End of History” as that which was consigned to the “Ash Heap of History” recycles itself a bit in a new age."

How About Non-Polarity?

Greg R Lawson — Thu, 05 Apr 2012 14:58:00 GMT

I commented over at the Lowy Institute's blog regarding an outline one of their authors is putting together for a possible academic piece about the return of global bipolarity. I suggested we are entering a phase of non-polarity instead. Here is my comment and here is the article prompting it.

"Great idea regarding bipolarity, but looking at it from a larger standpoint than individual nations. You are right that Asian conceptions of Westphalian norms are far more rigid than 'Western' ideas. The whole 'Right to Protect' is very much a Western conceit that is destabilizing and deeply worrisome for many, obviously with China being the most concerned.

The interesting long-term question about this is whether Europe will eventually fall into constituent pieces in a de facto as opposed to du jure sense. If its internal problems lead to a two-track Eurozone or to a slow and partial, but nonetheless real, reintroduction of internal European animosities, bipolarity could turn into something closer to Richard Haas' notion of 'non-polarity'. Even Brzezinski has begun sounding the alarm about non-polarity in his new tome 'Strategic Vision', as have authors like Gideon Rachman from the Financial Times with'Zero-Sum Future'.

Personally, I think signs are pointing more and more in that direction. Watch also Chinese counters to the American pivot. Will China begin buying Euro Treasuries to diversify away from America as it gets more concerned about encirclement? Obviously, that may make little economic sense currently, but it could make strategic sense over time and could enhance these non-polar type trends by peeling 'Western' nations into strange power configurations."

Psychology and the Persian Puzzle

Greg R Lawson — Thu, 05 Apr 2012 14:53:30 GMT

I commented on this great article over at the Atlantic Community. This particular piece was great by showcasing a different angle than much contemporary commentary on geopolitical events. Here is the main thrust of the piece,

"Considering the confrontation between Israel and Iran in the present, we have a highly traumatized people on the one hand who are scared by the idea that their enemies might use an opportunity to annihilate as many of their group as possible. Taking the emotional perspective of the descendants of a Holocaust victim, it seems "natural" to assume that if the enemy acquires nuclear weapons, it will not miss the opportunity to eradicate Israel and as many Jews as possible, regardless of the consequences.

Considering Iranian psychology, we have a proud nation on the other hand that in the distant past ruled one of the greatest empires of the world but has suffered repeated humilitations from Alexander over the Romans to the colonial powers of the modern age. For many Muslims, the emergence of Israel resembles (at least emotionally) a resurrection of the Crusaders. Last but not least, the fact that Iran is mainly Shi'a means that Iranians are sometimes treated as underdogs in the Muslim world. In summary, many Iranians may feel they are being humilitated again although following all laws and staying on the path of justice. A matching survivor myth is present as well, as this time the Mahdi may finally return and restore justice after the armageddon."

My comment below,

"I like this piece a great deal. All too often I think our policymakers fail to understand the full context within which policies must be constructed. In the case of the actual conflict as it presently exists, and the larger looming potential one as well, between Iran and Israel, it is impossible not to appreciate the psychological aspects.

I agree that Israel will remain traumatized by the Holocaust. Who can reasonable blame them? Anti-semitism precedes Hitler, but its ultimate virulence can only be fully understood when when feeling the coldness of Auschwitz or Treblinka.

For the Iranian/Persian mindset, which I think undergirds much of the Shiite ideology, how could one not appreciate leaders like Cyrus the Great or Darius (perhaps, Xerxes a bit less)?

These self-images and perceptions are what drive many conflicts throughout the world and, in my estimation, transcend economics and all the varying deterministic strands that flow from those that focus too much on economics. Thucydides still matters and you intimate that well here.

The only problem is... what can be done? Do tragic circumstances force tragic outcomes? How do we cut this apocryphal- like Gordian Knot (since we are not Alexander)?

I once wrote here this article and though much has changed due to the intervening Arab Spring, I think there is still something here to consider:

'Should an aggressive sense of deterrence be established psychologically where the concept actually resides, then a "deal" can be possible allowing Iran a certain degree of security within well defined limits. The regime can be assured that no external forces or externally supported internal forces will overthrow it. It may even be possible to envision allowing it to openly develop nuclear power (and even a limited weapon) capability.

Conceptually, this is no more shocking an idea than having the arch-anti-Communist Richard Nixon work with Mao in order to balance the Soviet Union. That Nixon-Kissinger policy of triangulation is generally considered to have paid handsome dividends. While this diplomatic gambit would be different in many ways, it would operate similarly by opening the door to flexible diplomacy in the region.

If the US and Iran can come to some terms, the ability to tilt between the Sunni Saudi regime and the Shia ascendancy in Iran and Iraq will be possible. Additionally, this flexibility will have to be taken into consideration by a resurgent Turkey which currently appears as though it is attempting to regain influence within the region.

Today the US is stuck trying to contain Iran without the military flexibility to be serious, thus looking a bit like a paper tiger. Tomorrow, it could seize the geopolitical initiative by being the decisive weight on the scale of Sunni-Shia relations. Both would be forced to cultivate relations with the US in order to maintain its support.

Obviously, for this to work the US must allay the most pressing fears of present allies in the region, notably Israel. The US's stance on deterrence must be clear enough that Israel understands that any attack upon it by Iran would be answered with the most aggressive of responses. Additionally, continued missile defense and other technology trade with Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well as with Israel should be enhanced.'"

The Cardinal and the Slaughter

Greg R Lawson — Thu, 08 Mar 2012 18:11:07 GMT

David P. Goldman who writes the psuedonymous "Spengler" columns I have frequently cited, recently wrote an article for Asia Times that is simultaneously over the top, amusing, cold and erudite. In it, he conjures the ghost of Cardinal Richelieu.

Other than those who read Alexander Dumas' Three Musketeers story, Richelieu probably means little to most people. And even those readers see him as a laregly one-dimensional villain.

The real Richelieu, however, is considered the main power behind the creation of modern France. He is considered the man who paved the way for the "Sun King", Louis XIV. He is the man who made the phrase "raison d'etre" meaningful. He has even earned high praise from the grand master of realism, Henry Kissinger as the founder of the modern state system.

The point here is that Richelieu is a big figure who might be obscure for many but played a significant role in the creation of the Europe, and by extension, the world we now know. His diplomacy aided by the original eminence grise, Father Joseph (whose biography by Aldous Huxley I am currently reading) prolonged the Thirty Years War.

That conflict which left a what would eventually become Germany, a loose batch of rather weak principalities. It also, upon its conclusion, led to the current "Westphalian" order of international relations which asserted the primacy of nation-state sovereignty.

Yet, for all these accomplishments, the Cardinal was largely responsible for a slaughter that left 15-20 percent of the German population dead as well as up to an estimated third of Czech lands. In percentage terms, it was actually comparable to WWII. Consequently, the Cardinal and his accomplishments can never be divorced from its costs.

Yet there is a lesson here for statesmanship. Often, there are consequences for pursuing one's interests.

Richelieu was French through and through and pursued its interests to the exclusion of other considerations. Only a true believer in one's nation could stomach what he apparently stomached. But we must always ask whether we may become less than human if we acquiesce to this.

As Goldman's piece argues, he seems to be willing to embrace this mindset in the contemporary miasma of opaque Middle Eastern politics and looks, ironically it might seem, to Richelieu for guidance.

Are we willing to follow? Should we follow? These are the questions of high statescraft.

Battling Complacency to Reinvigorate Trans-Atlanticism

Greg R Lawson — Thu, 08 Mar 2012 16:46:00 GMT

Below is the text of my op-ed for the Atlantic Community on the need for reinvigorating trans-Atlanticism.

You can also read it here as well as a thoughtful response from a reader and my subsequent follow-up.

Henry Kissinger once said, "the statesman's duty is to bridge the gap between his nation's experience and his vision." This remains a truism today.

There are many conversations about the need to confront proliferation of WMDs, trans-national terrorism, global warming, health pandemics, and even economic pandemics but the one unifying challenge that exacerbates each of these threats is complacency. A newly reinvigorated transatlantic partnership must focus on banishing post-Cold War complacency. Unfortunately, so much focus is spent on these other international agenda items, that it is often overlooked and papered over. The end of the Cold War did not usher in a purely cosmopolitan, quasi-Hegelian "End of History" as postulated famously by Francis Fukuyama. Rather. Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis has been more on target for describing the new era of both unprecedented international cooperation as well as a new era of competition.

Unfortunately, many in the U.S, and Europe, the twin pillars of the transatlantic alliance, have not found ways to cooperate as fully as when they were confronted by the Soviet leviathan. Instead, the alliance has been allowed to become too much of a "talking shop" where grandiose rhetoric and economic competition displace a strategic vision for confronting the real evil of global order- the "anarchy" at the heart of the international system.
The United States is an offshoot of Europe. Its founding fathers were avowed disciples of thinkers like Locke and Montesquieu.

The United States was founded predominately by European immigrants. This means there was, is, and should be a cultural affinity between these two regions that transcends the transitoriness of mere geopolitical advantage. In fact, the true geopolitical advantage is to understand that as economic power shifts from its Western locus to the East; the U.S. and Europe must truly hang together or hang separately. Not appreciating this fact is the core reason for transatlantic complacency.

While technology has facilitated instant communication and long-distance travel, it has not eliminated geography as a highly influential factor in economic and political relations. Culture also, as Huntington made clear, also matters. Indeed, geography and culture could well be the defining characteristics of a new form of regionalism. It will be up to the next generation of transatlantic leaders to realize that globalization could easily devolve into a world of competing regionalisms.

To confront this possibility, a reinvigoration of cultural exchange programs would be wise. Yet, ultimately, a Transatlantic Free Trade Zone (FTZ) should fix the advantages of size and scope while underlining cultural ties. Additionally, NATO member states (with the possible of exception of Turkey) should set aside a set percentage of the revenue growth achieved after the adoption of the FTZ for NATO hardware and training. Such an effort would show that complacency is dead and that the transatlantic relationship is prepared to recognize its truly existential challenges.

The next generation of transatlantic leaders need not reinvent the wheel, but they do need to dust off the old one. If a statesman must bridge the gap between experience and vision, for Americans and Europeans; the collective vision is of an experience that has already taken place, it just needs rejuvenation.

Two Days that Shook the World

Greg R Lawson — Tue, 21 Feb 2012 14:53:54 GMT

Today, February 21 is the 40th anniversary of the day President Nixon met Chairman Mao in China. Clearly, geopolitics had a tectonic shift on that day and we still are living with the ramifications today with the rise of China and the feelings of concern so manifest in daily American life.

Tomorrow, February 22, will be the 66th anniversary of George F. Kennan's famous "Long Telegram" which is generally considered one of the founding documents of the Cold War's "Containment" policy that would guide the U.S. for over 40 years. It, and Kennan's famous "X" article in a 1947 edition of the journal Foreign Affairs, are two documents that any aspiring State Department hand or geopolitician hold in high regard and hope to at some point emulate.

Wikistrat's Ten Paths to Israel-Iran War

Greg R Lawson — Fri, 17 Feb 2012 16:45:33 GMT

As a researcher over at Wikistrat, the world's first multiplayer strategic risk and geopolitical forecasting firm, I have participated in several collectively written articles that run on the popular website of CNN's Fareed Zakaria.

Given the tit-for-tat assassinations that seem to be happening between Iran and Israel along with the multiple pressures being placed on Tehran by the US and the West in general, forecasting war scenarios seems like a worthwhile exercise.

Here is the final article over Zakaria's site. I largely came up with Path #4.

Essentially, it has the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt breaking the Camp David Peace Accords and threatening a second front (Hezbollah as Iran proxy in Lebanon being the first). By the way the MB has already threatened to break the Camp David Accords if the US refuses to keep throwing aid its way...

The Tower of Babel Remains Unbuilt

Greg R Lawson — Fri, 17 Feb 2012 15:05:07 GMT

There may be no final, best form of governance as per Fukuyama. I don't think all people want the same "recognition." That was the core of his message in the End of History.

Rather, as per Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations thesis would argue that perceptions of recognition differ based on culture which ultimately triumphs over universality. To that end the Tower of Babel remains incomplete.

Just read this on post-Qadaffi Libya as one small example of the point.

American Order and Anarchy

Greg R Lawson — Mon, 13 Feb 2012 16:44:20 GMT

Robert Kagan is a big name in foreign policy circles. This op-ed, which I assume mirrors much of the tenor of his new book, outlines a full throated endorsement of the American backed international order of the day. I have long written that absent American power, the order will atrophy and we will be in a "neo-Middle Ages" where no power is stabilizing. This would be a world of "non-polarity" to use the CFR President Richard Haas' phrase. Kagan seems to think this. So should a lot of others. Great power peace is not pre-ordained.

Check this quote,

"But international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others—in America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it.

There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to champion it.

If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe—which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being."

How well does this dovetail with what I wrote over at the Atlantic Community over a year and a half ago?

"However, we are entering an uncharted time where new powers are rising and America's star seems to be fading. It is in this contextual milieu that the recent speech by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, at the United States Navy League's "Sea, Air and Space" Exposition, becomes deeply troubling. While he certainly does not indicate an abandonment of American naval supremacy, one of the keys, along with nuclear weapons, to America's post-World War II military dominance, it is evident that he is willing to allow a relative decline based on the assumption that Great Power conflict is a thing of the past.

This policy, combined with President Obama's almost pollyannaish vision of a nuclear-free world, is a toxic view to maintain at a time of great uncertainty. It also takes for granted that the relatively peaceful conditions of the present day can be projected into the future. Sadly, this is misguided. A lack of knowledge about the future means one should hedge their bets. Today's prognostications of what types of threats will emerge and where they will emerge from can look decidedly myopic within a matter of moments, much less years or decades. The U.S. cannot allow itself to become tired of its global responsibilities.

Credibility matters. If the US is perceived as declining, we really cannot be sure what will happen if others test our resolve. This could pave the way for the destabilization of the regional balances of power. It is through that door that renewed Great Power conflict could step and shock a world that has forgotten that relative peace is secured through strength."

I riffed on this in an op-ed I wrote called "Beyond the Great Illusion" as well,

"Every generation thinks itself the one to "end war" for all time and create a "just" world order. Each generation is disabused of these notions as reality stares them in the face.

The current American generation needs to become disabused sooner than previous ones for the storms brewing beneath the surface of our false tranquility (even after the economic crisis) are real and will not be tamed by rhetoric, resolutions, and vague concepts of hopeful cooperation. They will be tamed by eternal vigilance and recognition that even as the world undergoes profound transformations, fundamentally, man is still man. The old emotions, so well described by Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, of envy, fear, and greed are just as present now as love, respect, and humility.

While more of the latter is to be hoped for, more of the former should be prepared for. We must move beyond our own “great illusion” and defend order rather than expecting it to spontaneously emerge through economics and international treaties that are unable to be backed up."

These are the stakes when we vote. Elections may seem to be glorified beauty contests these days, but look above, there are real stakes when we vote. History seems to indicate oscillations between order, or at least relative order, and chaos. When even elites like Kagan and Haas start talking this way, it is time to pay attention. Especially, as the Syrian situation and the Iranian situation morph into one potentially Sarajevo 1914 type moments...

Tradition and the Road to a "Brave New World"

Greg R Lawson — Sat, 04 Feb 2012 21:38:54 GMT

I recently blogged about how technology and the rampant increase in tis capacity may lead to a long-term structural unemployment challenge. In many ways this is already happening. For all the gnashing of teeth regarding outsourcing and illegal immigration, the greatest long-term challenge to employment is the simple fact that machines and computers will, overtime, obviate the need for typical employment.

The recent numbers showing a decline in unemployment are positive but hide the fact that the labor pool itself has decreased. This is serious and could well be an indicator of the future of employment. Rather than the temporary result of an economic crisis, it might become a new structural feature of our entire economic landscape. I suspect a major reason for this, paradoxically, is technology advances.

When robots can act as waiters and baristas, you'll realize that even the service economy is no longer safe. Indeed, computer programs are already being using to do certain legal tasks and "Watson" an IBM supercomputer (the one that beat a whole bunch of human Jeopardy champions) is now being used by a major insurance company to facilitate plans of care for clinical patients.

Think about it, drones are now expected to be deployed in the US cities (not just killing terrorists overseas). These changes are happening at an ever rapid pace and while this is advantageous for many, it is not so good for those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. To be blunt, those with lower educational attainment levels are simply going to be passed right on by.

With the contemporaneous breakdown of union and public sector jobs, traditional careers for blue collar workers simply won't be there in the same way to pick up the slack for the other areas where displacement will take place.

If this sounds increasingly dystopian, it is. It is not inconceivable that there will be a day where the iPhone and Droids will be a harbinger not of instant communication and accessibility, but will have been the pivot to where man as man is no longer really necessary.

Of course, these were the same arguments used by Luddites against the Industrial Revolution and, up to this point, it would seem the Industrial Revolution, despite its early pains, was an unambiguous success for helping humankind achieve unprecedented and even unimaginable standards of living. The question now, however, is- will history largely repeat itself, or are we at a fundamentally different point.

There are many reasons to be thankful for all of this achievement. It is a testament to human ingenuity and it has made our lives incomparably easier than it has been for any other generation. Yet, there is also plenty of reason for unease.

I have argued that tradition is the brake we apply so we can look both ways before we cross the street. It should not stop all movement, much less should it be reactionary and drive us backward to an imagined utopia of days gone by. Yet, it SHOULD stop us from hurtling headlong into the future with no real cognition of what consequences may be confronting us.

I think many who advocate for technology and progress for progress sake seek to dive into a black hole without appreciated how the gravity of a black hole may crush us on the way through. We must be careful and prudent.

So I submit tradition is the needed brake so we can catch our breath before fundamentally changing what it means to be human. The possibility of a Brave New World is real.

The Once Again New Specter... War

Greg R Lawson — Sat, 04 Feb 2012 20:39:49 GMT

The specter of war in Europe is certainly off stage for now. Time will tell if it raises itself yet again, however. For not all specters banished by light one day are gone forever, they tend to return when the light (in this case economic growth and stability) fades...

This article describes how what seems impossible today is far from impossible under the right set of circumstances. This is why the wheel of history keeps turning,

Rome as Past, Present and Future?

Greg R Lawson — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 03:32:10 GMT

Given that I have made this analogy many times myself, I can admit that it s a bit tired, but the America/Rome analogy is not just the product of a feverish imagination infected by too much historical innuendo.

This National Review piece paints a picture of what such an analogy could indeed look like. Essentially, Michigan shows how this may look with governor appointed "emergency managers" taking over for elected officials to get bankrupt cities on track. Are these akin to the elected position of "dictator" that the Roman Republic allowed to confront dire circumstances?

And who was the last "Dictator or Life...?" Julius Caesar.

"The Clash at the End of History?"

Greg R Lawson — Thu, 19 Jan 2012 22:29:57 GMT

The immediate post-Cold War period proved fertile for imaginative scholars looking to set the terms of the debate over what the future world order would look like. From Charles Krauthammer's "Unipolar Moment" to Robert Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy" and John Mearsheimer's "Tragedy of Great Power Politics," each tried to forecast what the world could expect.

Would it be a colossus unleashed in Krauthammer's vision? A neo-Hobbesian state of nature in Kaplan's? A resumption of great power conflict amidst a world of renewed multipolarity as Mearsheimer envisioned?

However, the two theses that attracted by far the most attention were Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations"and Francis Fukuyama's "End of History." These were the defining texts and chances were that which one you gravitated to would pigeonhole you as either a "liberal capitalist triumphalist" or a "pessimistic cultural determinist."

I have blogged on this at length over the years because these two ideas cut to the core of where we see the world evolving. Is it towards a universal political culture (even if it takes a myriad of detours over time) or is it towards a cacophony of differing perspectives jostling around the world with varying degrees of intersubjective penetration?

Quite frankly, no one knows. It could even be a strange combination of the two, at least in the short to medium term.

Personally, I started off a believer in the Fukuyama vision, not necessarily over night, but as an eventual end state. Over time, I have become far more enthralled by Huntington. Again, I don't think he got it 100 percent right, but I think he captured in broad brushstrokes some very accurate ways for seeing the future.

Of course, Huntington is now deceased, while Fukuyama just published the first of what promises to be a magisterial two volume history on the foundations of political society, the Origins of Political Order. Consequently, Fukuyama will continue to be able to defend and update his thesis. It is too bad Huntington can no longer do the same because these two competing visions represent the battle for the soul of the future of mankind. From which perspective you view the world flows so much of how one will respond to the challenges one faces.

This is especially true of policymakers. Granted, few leading politicians are likely have read either of these books or wrestled intellectually with them, but they should. Both are incredibly nuanced (unlike the critiques of both), but are so important.

I find myself struggling internally at all times. Much like the struggle that Kissinger says with respect to George Kennan,

"The debate in America between idealism and realism, which continues to this day, played itself out inside Kennan’s soul."

The outcome of this struggle in each person will determine our world.

Wikistrat and Obama's "Pivot"

Greg R Lawson — Mon, 16 Jan 2012 15:18:09 GMT

First, let me say, I am very pleased to be a part of Wikistrat. This is a new type of consultancy that is best described as a combination of Facebook and Wikipedia merging with geopolitics. Eventually clients, which will include governments, think tanks, and private corporations will be able to suggest scenarios for the consultancy to game out for them as they look to uncover potential outcomes. In fact, it is my understanding there will be a lot of interplay where clients can even introduce "shocks" into a scenario. So a group could be analyzing the outcome of the North Korean power transition after Kim jong-Il's death and a client could ask the group to game out the impact of an assassination attempt on successor Kim jong-Un.

The potential is limitless.

There are many truly talented people involved in producing great analysis on a myriad of possible major geopolitical issues.

To give an idea of the talent assembled here- Wikistrat's chief strategist is Thomas PM Barnett. Barnett is a well known Pentagon consultant and has columns and blogs that are read in the geopolitical community on a regular basis. Examples include:: a regular Vanity Fair column on foreign policy, a regular column at World Politics Review, an occasional blogger for Time, has written numerous books including the well regarding "Pentagon's New Map."

That's just one.

Anyway, the power of Wikistrat is just now at the first stages of being harnessed. CNN's Fareed Zakaria (and the well known author of books including the controversial "Post-American World") recently asked Wikistrat to outline ten trade-off's resulting from the much ballyhooed Obama "Pivot" to Asia. The Wikistrat opened the question up to us and then Barnett synthesized the information for this piece that ran on Zakaria's CNN webpage to devoted to his TV show, GPS.

I was one of the numerous analysts that contributed ideas for the article and while I think my more "realist" take is a bit of an anomaly among the group, I think my contributions added some value and I am very much looking forward to continuing with this.

In the meantime, I urge anyone interested in geopolitics to check out Wikistrat. I think this is a model that will catch fire over time in terms of helping decision makers in many different arenas navigate their way through the complexities of our globalized world.

Technology and the Future of Jobs

Greg R Lawson — Thu, 05 Jan 2012 13:51:20 GMT

This is no time to call out a bunch of neo-Luddites, but this article from Technology review points to a potentially problematic trend- technology is displacing employment. Check out the following,

"Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, people have feared that new technologies would permanently erode employment. Over and over again, these dislocations of labor have been temporary: technologies that made some jobs obsolete eventually led to new kinds of work, raising productivity and prosperity with no overall negative effect on employment.

There's nothing to suggest that this dynamic no longer operates, but new research is showing that advances in workplace automation are being deployed at a faster pace than ever, making it more difficult for workers to adapt and wreaking havoc on the middle class: the clerks, accountants, and production-line workers whose tasks can increasingly be mastered by software and robots. "Do I think we will have permanently high unemployment as a consequence of technology? No," says Peter Diamond, the MIT economist who won a 2010 Nobel Prize for his work on market imperfections, including those that affect employment. "What's different now is that the nature of jobs going away has changed. Communication and computer abilities mean that the type of jobs affected have moved up the income distribution."

There is a real silver lining here. Eventually people will become trained in the new technologies and that will likely mean more fulfilling, probably better paying jobs for many people. This is very similar to how the Industrial Revolution displaces so many farmers, but yielded incredible enhancements in quality of life (after awhile at least).

The problem is, however, that in the interim period, long bouts of displacement breed resentment, sociological disturbances and (as we seem to see all the time), political volatility.

Consequently, the transition is going to be painful for the majority of people as they change their lifestyles and workplaces. Hopefully, the tumult of this will soon start to be offset by what should be the inevitable gains. But the timing is important. Long-term, perceived structural unemployment will create that unpleasant and tumultuous backlash.

If that gets out of hand, then all bets could be off.

Neo-Middle Ages, Here We (Hopefully Don't) Come

Greg R Lawson — Tue, 03 Jan 2012 22:17:42 GMT

In the past I have posted extensively on what I think will be the most likely outcome of a retrenchment by AMerica from global affairs. Here are several representative pieces:

Will Atlas Shrug

Welfare at Home, Weakness Abroad

Forget Utopia

Why do I mention these pieces. Because now Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the foreign policy establishment (and for those that believe in Black Helicopters, one of the founders of the dreaded Trilateral Commission), is writing about it in Foreign Policy magazine and is soon having a new book come out on the subject.

While he appears not to be alarmist, his warning should be sobering. Brzezinski, despite the opprobrium heaped upon him as President Carter's National Security Advisor and an early supporter of President Obama, is a man of intellect whose opinions are widely sought. Indeed, much like Henry Kissinger (whom he is often compared as the Democrat's version of), he as close to a "wise man" as the establishment has.

This may turn some off, even among the less conspiratorial he is controversial, for the more conspiratorial, just Google him and you'd think he was a real life "Dr. Evil" complete with the Blofeld cat.

Yet, those who dislike what he represents should still take seriously his fears that we may soon be descending back towards a Hobbesian world order rather than the Kantian cosmopolitanism one many internationalists perceive.

Note this,

"For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes...

...No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue."

Not a pretty picture is it? These are the stakes in politics and policy. Very serious. I hope those who select our leaders take note. This is more than a popularity contest. It can be about life and death and on a large scale.