A provocative article about the future of NATO spawned a series of comments between myself and a member of the German military.  The question from my perspective is, should Europe and the U.S. clealry define different roles within NATO for those actions that are taken outside of Europe like Afghanistan today?

 I include only that train of comments below,

 "Olaf Theiler: With the statement that "Today, the questions are: defense against what threats and with which tools? Once these tough issues are solved, we then need to decide how to share and sustain the burdens" I think Dr. Jackson Janes made a more than valid point, but at the same time missed two quite important things here.
First, a sequential answer to these important questions will not be sufficient. The question of burden sharing refers to two very much related issues. In the first place there is the issue of the availability of resources and capabilities and as a follow up issue it refers also to the political will to invest or deploy them. Both issues are critical not only for the burden sharing debate but also for the initial question of what threats and with which tools do defense against. In theory, any kind of capability development would be a clear result of a threat and risk assessment. In the real world instead, this seems not to be that easy since most nations tend so realize threats also in terms of the availability of capabilities. To be more precise, if a nation does not have the capability to influence developments far from its borders, at least some of its politicians will automatically try to play it down or even to ignore it completely. Furthermore, the availability of capabilities is even more influential on any debate about the right tools to fix a problem. A heavily armed nation might be much tempted to address a perceived threat with the use of force while on the other hand an only lightly armed nation would probably prefer diplomatic or economic approaches. Therefore, it will be almost impossible to deal with these questions in sequence. Instead, NATO will have to find solutions here in a parallel approach. A new solution on current burden sharing difficulties will – at least potentially – allow more flexibility in providing consensual answers on which threats to address as an Alliance and vice versa.
This leads to my second point, the fact that NATO desperately needs a new approach on burden sharing. In the center of today’s debates on burden sharing there are only two issues: Troops and military capabilities on the ground (including the costs that come with their deployment and sustainment) on the one hand and the death toll of these troops on the other hand. Also the criticism on the current level of burden sharing is very much limited to these two criteria. At the same time, NATO is debating very different kinds of challenges and on how to tackle them, thereby causing a gap between the discussion of needed means and capabilities on the one hand and the existing criteria for judging the share of burdens on the other. In order to have a realistic and fair burden sharing discussion, NATO therefore needs to include new aspects into its catalogue of judgment. The Alliance has to find a new formula to include assets like civilian and humanitarian aid, development project funding and staffing, civil training and education capabilities, judicial and administrative advisory groups, police training and equipment donations, even efforts and investments in and through other institutions or mechanisms than NATO – in short: all kinds of contributions to a comprehensive approach.
To sum it up, the new strategic concept of NATO needs to be much more forward looking and much more innovative than this Alliance has ever been if it wants to provide sufficient answers to the new security environment and its growing complexity.

 Me: I have often argued here at the Atlantic Community that NATO is a solid security alliance for European issues, not so much as it relates to other regions in the world.

Is it possible as Mr. Theiler commented above that if NATO included

"assets like civilian and humanitarian aid, development project funding and staffing, civil training and education capabilities, judicial and administrative advisory groups, police training and equipment donations, even efforts and investments in and through other institutions or mechanisms than NATO – in short: all kinds of contributions to a comprehensive approach"

that it would be more useful? Perhaps, but that is a fundamental change in NATO's mission. It began as a military alliance to defend against potential Soviet expansionism. To morph into something that is all things for all people, it will inevitably be diluted from its initial purpose.

Perhaps, this diluted alliance would be better than none for issues external to Europe, but it will need to be examined through realistic lenses, not rose colored ones. If this is considered a plausible vision for NATO's future, then what of the military aspect? Does this not essentially mean that the US will remain the main utilizer of force in global affairs with NATO coming in later to "pick up the pieces?"

Again, this may be a reasonable and useful vision, but if it is to be so, both sides of the Atlantic need to begin drawing meaningful lines illustrating who has authority for the different types of actions that will need to be undertaken (ie, military altercations vs. policing vs. infrastructure development, vs. edcation, etc).

 Mr. Theiler: @ Greg Randolph Lawson

Dear Mr. Lawson, please don't quote me out of context. My argument was that NATO internal debates about fair and equal burden sharing needs to include all kinds of contributions by member states to a comprehensive approach exercised in one of its missions. This does not mean however, that NATO needs to develop capabilities on all these fields as part of its institutional structure.
In order to avoid any misunderstandings, here are some examples (not at all exhaustive) about the possible range of a more flexible approach to burden sharing:

1) If one NATO nation has a ship active in the EU counter-piracy operation Atalanta, this could be seen as much as a burden in this task as a ship provided to NATO's counter-piracy Operation Ocean Shield by some other NATO member.

2) If one NATO nations provides Police Trainers through the EU to Afghanistan, this could be seen as an additional part of its burdens to make the ISAF mission a success.

3) If one NATO nation spends money on bilateral programs on economic development in Afghanistan, this could also be accounted as contribution to the over burdens carried by NATO in Afghanistan.

So far, there is no clear formula to compare a fair and equal burden sharing in the Alliance existing. There is even a slight chance that a more flexible approach to burden-sharing accountability might encourage more contributions. My point was that in light of a comprehensive approach the burden sharing debate needs to be broadened, not the range of actual capabilities or responsibilities of NATO as an institution. The latter is a highly sensitive issue to be discussed and decided by the North Atlantic Council whenever they will decide to do so.

Nevertheless, you got a point here by arguing that "If this is considered a plausible vision for NATO's future, then what of the military aspect? Does this not essentially mean that the US will remain the main utilizer of force in global affairs with NATO coming in later to "pick up the pieces?"
A broadened debate about equal burden sharing should not become an excuse for European nations not to contribute on the military side or the hard part of the job. At the same time, the "boots on the ground -" and "body-bags counting" as the only source of comparisson for burdens to be shared in NATO seem to me as outdated due to the adoption of the highly praised comprehensive approach.

 Me: @ Olaf Theiler

Thank you for the clarification. I did not intend to quote of context. I am also glad to see your comment regarding Europe not using a broadened debate as an excuse to avoid military contributions.

I fear, however, such a debate may well result in just that. Yet even so, I am begininning to wonder if a broader conception of burden sharing may be what is needed to revitalize the NATO mission. By no means have I reached a firm conclusion in my own mind, but I would be interested in exploring how NATO members can contribute to out of Europe missions with something other than pure military force.

Dometically, it will be difficult for America to support this as the American public will have expectations regarding what they see as "fair" burden sharing and I am not sure the more comprehensive vision will be palatable to those outside of the intellectual and policy elite.

That said, I do think this may be a more realistic avenue to explore than perpetual exhortations for more troops from American leaders to their European counterparts.

Maybe the right division, roughly put, is to embrace Robert Kagan's thesis about Americans being from Mars and Europeans from Venus, but to do so without the negative connotations. In other words, Europeans should accept that the U.S. will be the leading edge of the proverbial spear, but Europe will be the diplomatic, soother and facilitator for reconstruction.

In a sense this seems the most logical division of labor. Rather than America trying to engage in activities it is unsuited for and vice versa. Additionally, it will allow both sides to more easily converge on issues of mutual interest while being able to walk away from those that do not rise to the level of perceived national interest.

 Mr. Theiler: @ Greg Randolph Lawson

To be blunt: No way. Not only because it will not happen, but rather because it should not happen.
Three short thoughts on that:

1. You rightfully highlight the problems this would cause for the American domestic support. In addition to this, it might also become problematic for the European public. Will we always agree on doing the dishes for the U.S.? The old and sad joke that the U.S. does the fighting, the UN the feeding and the EU the funding will not go well as an officially adopted policy, not even in Germany. In the end, the Americans might find themselves isolated and without international support even in cases where their efforts would be more than justified and welcome, simply because it is the U.S. that takes action.

2. Should Europe – and here I mean all the European nations in NATO as well as in the EU – really confine itself to something like a Switzerland on a global stage? I would argue against such an idea because to leave all the fighting – including the choice of place and time for that – to the U.S. would ultimately result in a world without any kind of European influence. We still live in a kind of Hobbesian world as Kagan argued. Disrespectable if we feel more like Kantians or not, most nations in this world tend to judge their neighbors, partners and competitors by the power they have. Power here means the chance to influence events on the ground whatever means are necessary. Military power will remain a very important currency in the global power games that nations tend to play. I thought that Europe had learned that lesson very painful in the Balkans, when we paid and mediated for a peace that never came since no one on the ground really cared until the U.S. (and NATO) came in with force. The whole idea of the ESDP was the acceptance of a need at least to be able to fight if you want others to stop doing that.

3. The final solution would not be a division of labor in the terms of Mars and Venus but a combination of tools and capabilities so that both sides can influence the decisions to be made, the strategies to be developed and implemented and the price to be paid on an equal manner. We don’t need to copy the US military strength and they don’t have to copy all that Europe can do, but both sides will need at least some parts of all the tools. First to be able to act alone if necessary, second to better understand each others concepts and mindsets (civ-mil cooperation is sometimes harder than a discussion between two groups with different religions) and cooperate effectively if we agree to do it together."