The Doomsday Clock and Deterrence
I had an interesting comment session with an author of a piece at the Atlantic Community regarding the recent decision to reset the Doomsday Clock by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. It initiated a good exchange regarding nuclear deterrence and the theory behind deterrence. The author of the article pointed me to a useful piece in the journal, the Non-Proliferation Review.
Our comment train below:
"Me: There is indeed uncertainty in the world. However, there is no uncertainty as it relates to the non-proliferation regime. Absent a radical, and very nearly instantaneous, alteration in human nature, that regime is dying if not dead.
Perhaps, it can be kept on life support for a few more years or even a decade or so, but I think an argument could be made that it is already terminated in the most meaningful sense. North Korea has crossed the threshold. Iran appears to be zeroing in on doing the same.
Once that happens, Pandora's Box will remain flung wide open with multiple demons flying out. Some will be less terrifying than others, but it will be unstable to say the least.
I often argue in my comments on these issues that it is time to conceive of new ways of employing deterrence, expanding it and making it more flexible and calibrated for conflicts far below the old, bipolar, Cold War era of Superpower quasi-annihilation.
I think this would be far more fruitful than utopianism. So, while the Doomsday Clock will eventually have to reckon with this dangerous environment, there is no time for policymakers to waste. The must begin seriously examing how to best live within this vastly different strategic context today.
Frank O'Donnell: I'm not fully convinced that an Iranian bomb in itself will be the death of the nonproliferation regime. I'm more worried about Iran as a 'precedent', in signalling to the world how a state can obtain a nuclear weapon while still a legitimate member of the NPT. To put it differently, I'm concerned more about a Saudi bomb, or a United Arab Emirates bomb. I think Iran is far more dangerous as a precedent than as a case in itself.
However, little is inevitable in politics, and its important to bear in mind that many states have considered a nuclear weapons programme or even obtained or developed nuclear weapons then given them up. South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Argentina and Belarus are some states that have either started a programme, obtained the bomb or developed it themselves, then gave them up. So there is still hope that Iran is a limited and isolated case - it is perhaps too deductive to infer that a logical chain of Middle East nuclear weapons programmes will follow from Iran.
If you are interested in deterrence, I recommend this article - http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153_wilson.pdf. It aims to revisit some of the core assumptions behind nuclear deterrence. I hope you find it of interest!
Thanks for commenting!
Me: Frank-
Clearly I believe the Iranian bomb will create the impetus for a cascading effect on proliferation. In this sense, it, more so than North Korea, is the tipping point that dooms the proliferation regime due to exactly what you referred to a the threat of a future "Saudi bomb." With instability already in Pakistan, having two major Middle East powers go nuclear (with the prospects that Egypt might follow) will represent the decomposition of the non-proliferation regime.
You raise a valid point with respect to nations with viable nuclear weapon programs that turned away, but the strategic contexts were vastly different than in the Middle East today.
With South Africa, there was really no existential external threat to the nation that would require the maintainance of such an expensive weapon.
With former Soviet republics, the end of the Cold War facilitated the relinquishing of weapons to a central location- Russia.
I am admittedly less familiar with the Argentina and Sweden examples, though, I would suspect that similar to South Africa, the strategic landscape was not perceived as threatening enough to warrant maintaining a nuclear weapon infrastructure.
In the Middle East, a Shiite, Persian bomb could well be considered a significant threat to Sunni, Arab interests. Beyond traditional geopolitical considerations such as oil (of which much of the Saudi supply lies with territory composed of many Shia despite their overall minority status within the nation), the religious differences are significant. The recent shift in the balance of power amongst the Shia vis a vis the Sunnis is a major historical development. Arguably one of the biggest shifts of the millenium. It seems highly unlikely that we can assume the Saudis and other Arab nations won't want an insurance policy to check the advance of Shiism.
Additionally, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the United States looks ready to initiate a substantial retrenchment in its foreign policy. While it is obviously still highly engaged in Iraq and, especially Afghanistan and Pakistan (with looming questions over Yemen), the intended trajectory of Obama's policy is to use diplomacy to keep America as an "indispensable facilitator" rather than an arbiter capable of deploying decisive force. Obviosuly, this isn't an instantaneous process, but the writing seems to be on the wall and the Arab nations understand that. They are hedging their bets that America may not be there to continue providing its own extended deterrent capability over the long haul, consequently, they must compensate.
If America is unwilling to change this perception, the cascade seems inevitable as a result of the complex interplay of these geopolitical and religous factors.
On a side note, I appreciated the link. The article was interesting and does raise very legitimate questions that begin to gnaw at the foundation of deterrence theory. As one might expect, I am not convinced that it effectively debunks the theory, but, it forces one to reconsider assumptions that are typically taken as a priori.
I partially agree that the previous campaigns Mr. Wilson refers to (even those of Genghis Khan and Julius Caesar) that destroyed villages, also did not necessarily end the respective wars. Consequently, this helps to undermine the notion that making existential threats really can achieve strategic ends, but may, in contrast reinforce the will to resist.
But I am also not sure that he considers just how revolutionary nuclear weapons really were and are from a psychological standpoint. It is true, as he correctly points out, that nuclear weaons did not actually kill more people than firebombing during World War II. However, the did make the threat of annihilation relatively easy from a technological perspective. A threat to destroy a village used to require a great deal of effort and logistics to make good, even with respect to the firebombings of Dresden or Tokyo. Therefore, even a threat of annihilation in previous eras was no guarantee of success, there was always the possibility it would fail if the village or city stood strong enough.
However, that is no longer the case. There can be no illusion as to the potential consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. You don't need to fly hundreds of sorties, you can literally press a button at a silo site in America or on a submarine or a single armed bomber plane. This does not require significant physical effort or large scale military logistics such as supply lines (though I recognize there must be a domestic infrastructure of large scale to maintain nuclear weapons).
The real challenge to using nucelar weapons is a question of will and ethics. Is a nation willing to destroy a city? Is the purpose behind such an act deemed necessary enough that it could be perceived in some way as ethical?
Of course, there are questions of retaliation, this especially so in the bipolar era of the Cold War. However, even this fits in as a function of "will." A policymaker considering the use of nuclear weapons would clearly have to consider the damage imposed by a retaliatory strike (or terrorist strike) and factor that in to the equation when determining whether to actually use them.
In a nutshell, though I know the phrase is now been corrupted for general use since the Iraq War, but nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons of "shock and awe." Their use has stunning psychological implications and that is what forms the real basis for their efficacy as a deterrent force. The threat of annihilation is no longer a question mark that leaves room for risk taking to achieve an advantage. The threat can be unambiguous and made catastrophically real under any conceivable scenario.
Perhaps, this line of questioning and reasoning could be further explored. As yet another brief side note, another factor to consider: if deterrence fails, the irony is that conventional war will probably reassert itself. But that is a seperate conversation."
Our comment train below:
"Me: There is indeed uncertainty in the world. However, there is no uncertainty as it relates to the non-proliferation regime. Absent a radical, and very nearly instantaneous, alteration in human nature, that regime is dying if not dead.
Perhaps, it can be kept on life support for a few more years or even a decade or so, but I think an argument could be made that it is already terminated in the most meaningful sense. North Korea has crossed the threshold. Iran appears to be zeroing in on doing the same.
Once that happens, Pandora's Box will remain flung wide open with multiple demons flying out. Some will be less terrifying than others, but it will be unstable to say the least.
I often argue in my comments on these issues that it is time to conceive of new ways of employing deterrence, expanding it and making it more flexible and calibrated for conflicts far below the old, bipolar, Cold War era of Superpower quasi-annihilation.
I think this would be far more fruitful than utopianism. So, while the Doomsday Clock will eventually have to reckon with this dangerous environment, there is no time for policymakers to waste. The must begin seriously examing how to best live within this vastly different strategic context today.
Frank O'Donnell: I'm not fully convinced that an Iranian bomb in itself will be the death of the nonproliferation regime. I'm more worried about Iran as a 'precedent', in signalling to the world how a state can obtain a nuclear weapon while still a legitimate member of the NPT. To put it differently, I'm concerned more about a Saudi bomb, or a United Arab Emirates bomb. I think Iran is far more dangerous as a precedent than as a case in itself.
However, little is inevitable in politics, and its important to bear in mind that many states have considered a nuclear weapons programme or even obtained or developed nuclear weapons then given them up. South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Argentina and Belarus are some states that have either started a programme, obtained the bomb or developed it themselves, then gave them up. So there is still hope that Iran is a limited and isolated case - it is perhaps too deductive to infer that a logical chain of Middle East nuclear weapons programmes will follow from Iran.
If you are interested in deterrence, I recommend this article - http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153_wilson.pdf. It aims to revisit some of the core assumptions behind nuclear deterrence. I hope you find it of interest!
Thanks for commenting!
Me: Frank-
Clearly I believe the Iranian bomb will create the impetus for a cascading effect on proliferation. In this sense, it, more so than North Korea, is the tipping point that dooms the proliferation regime due to exactly what you referred to a the threat of a future "Saudi bomb." With instability already in Pakistan, having two major Middle East powers go nuclear (with the prospects that Egypt might follow) will represent the decomposition of the non-proliferation regime.
You raise a valid point with respect to nations with viable nuclear weapon programs that turned away, but the strategic contexts were vastly different than in the Middle East today.
With South Africa, there was really no existential external threat to the nation that would require the maintainance of such an expensive weapon.
With former Soviet republics, the end of the Cold War facilitated the relinquishing of weapons to a central location- Russia.
I am admittedly less familiar with the Argentina and Sweden examples, though, I would suspect that similar to South Africa, the strategic landscape was not perceived as threatening enough to warrant maintaining a nuclear weapon infrastructure.
In the Middle East, a Shiite, Persian bomb could well be considered a significant threat to Sunni, Arab interests. Beyond traditional geopolitical considerations such as oil (of which much of the Saudi supply lies with territory composed of many Shia despite their overall minority status within the nation), the religious differences are significant. The recent shift in the balance of power amongst the Shia vis a vis the Sunnis is a major historical development. Arguably one of the biggest shifts of the millenium. It seems highly unlikely that we can assume the Saudis and other Arab nations won't want an insurance policy to check the advance of Shiism.
Additionally, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the United States looks ready to initiate a substantial retrenchment in its foreign policy. While it is obviously still highly engaged in Iraq and, especially Afghanistan and Pakistan (with looming questions over Yemen), the intended trajectory of Obama's policy is to use diplomacy to keep America as an "indispensable facilitator" rather than an arbiter capable of deploying decisive force. Obviosuly, this isn't an instantaneous process, but the writing seems to be on the wall and the Arab nations understand that. They are hedging their bets that America may not be there to continue providing its own extended deterrent capability over the long haul, consequently, they must compensate.
If America is unwilling to change this perception, the cascade seems inevitable as a result of the complex interplay of these geopolitical and religous factors.
On a side note, I appreciated the link. The article was interesting and does raise very legitimate questions that begin to gnaw at the foundation of deterrence theory. As one might expect, I am not convinced that it effectively debunks the theory, but, it forces one to reconsider assumptions that are typically taken as a priori.
I partially agree that the previous campaigns Mr. Wilson refers to (even those of Genghis Khan and Julius Caesar) that destroyed villages, also did not necessarily end the respective wars. Consequently, this helps to undermine the notion that making existential threats really can achieve strategic ends, but may, in contrast reinforce the will to resist.
But I am also not sure that he considers just how revolutionary nuclear weapons really were and are from a psychological standpoint. It is true, as he correctly points out, that nuclear weaons did not actually kill more people than firebombing during World War II. However, the did make the threat of annihilation relatively easy from a technological perspective. A threat to destroy a village used to require a great deal of effort and logistics to make good, even with respect to the firebombings of Dresden or Tokyo. Therefore, even a threat of annihilation in previous eras was no guarantee of success, there was always the possibility it would fail if the village or city stood strong enough.
However, that is no longer the case. There can be no illusion as to the potential consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. You don't need to fly hundreds of sorties, you can literally press a button at a silo site in America or on a submarine or a single armed bomber plane. This does not require significant physical effort or large scale military logistics such as supply lines (though I recognize there must be a domestic infrastructure of large scale to maintain nuclear weapons).
The real challenge to using nucelar weapons is a question of will and ethics. Is a nation willing to destroy a city? Is the purpose behind such an act deemed necessary enough that it could be perceived in some way as ethical?
Of course, there are questions of retaliation, this especially so in the bipolar era of the Cold War. However, even this fits in as a function of "will." A policymaker considering the use of nuclear weapons would clearly have to consider the damage imposed by a retaliatory strike (or terrorist strike) and factor that in to the equation when determining whether to actually use them.
In a nutshell, though I know the phrase is now been corrupted for general use since the Iraq War, but nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons of "shock and awe." Their use has stunning psychological implications and that is what forms the real basis for their efficacy as a deterrent force. The threat of annihilation is no longer a question mark that leaves room for risk taking to achieve an advantage. The threat can be unambiguous and made catastrophically real under any conceivable scenario.
Perhaps, this line of questioning and reasoning could be further explored. As yet another brief side note, another factor to consider: if deterrence fails, the irony is that conventional war will probably reassert itself. But that is a seperate conversation."
Posted by Greg R Lawson at 12/15/2011 4:48 PM 
Categories: Nuclear Deterrence
Tags: Nuclear Deterrence
Categories: Nuclear Deterrence
Tags: Nuclear Deterrence
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