To that I say- so what?

It seems increasingly ludicrous to me that the President really believes that merely by climbing up to some supposed “moral highground” we will really give incentives to North Korea, Iran (or, for that matter Burma, if recent reports hold any truth).

I can support more work on securing unsecured nuclear material throught the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, but I maintain deep skepticism over the entire thrust of Obama’s arms control policy.

Stripping away the technical arguments, does anyone really believe we can achieve a fully non-nuclear world? If so, then supporting President Obama’s plans makes sense. If not, then how far down the road of arms control do you take things and still retain the correct amount of flexibility as it relates to not only our direct deterrent, but our extended deterrence on behalf of other nations and/or regions?

I think at the very least, SecDef Gates has stated an important point. Namely, if your going to reduce our stockpiles, then those remaining stockpiles must be made more effective in order to retain the level of deterrence we need across the board.

Losing a bit of the proverbial “moral highground” is an acceptable consequence if one is bound and determined to seek arsenal reductions."

I also commented over at the Atlantic Community.  There they are having a symposium on the "Global Zero" movement.

The group encourages comments and even indicates the best will be summarized, with credit, at the the Heinrich Boell Foundation's 10th Annual Foreign Policy Conference "A World Without Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Anarchy? The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime" in Berlin on September 10 and 11, 2009. In addition to its presentation at the Boell conference the policy memo will be handed out to high-ranking decision makers in both the German and European parliaments and to diplomats in Berlin and Brussels.

So even though I am not an academic, I could not resist outlining my opposition to the general trend of the articles in the symposium which unsurprisingly call for more arms control and reduction of nuclear arsenals.

I responded to this piece which argues that "Global Zero is not feasible unless the security concerns of all nations are addressed. A world free of nuclear weapons depends on conventional disarmament, deeper cuts in the US and Russian arsenals and a ban to further produce nuclear weapons."
 
I responded,

" I think it is evident that putting the genie of nuclear weapons back in the bottle is a quixotic campaign that will ultimately lead nowhere.

Obviously, "Global Zero" is an aspirational goal. That said, how do we verify? Perhaps, even more importantly, how do we seriously address the "security dilema?"

I would agree that if we were able to resolve the security issues of the nations' seeking to acquire nuclear weaponry, we might be able to dicentivize rampant proliferation. However, isn't that nearly as quixoctic an ideal as dealing with "Global Zero" itself? In other words, what came first, the chicken or the egg? Nuclear weapons were generated because there has always been "security dilemas."

Some dilemas are legitimate and can be addressed through meaningful diplomacy and multilateral institutions. However, even rational regimes may make irrational decisions based on irrational assumptions that take us into the realm of psychology. How can that be dealt with now any more fundamentally than in the age of Thucydides?

Additionally, even if the "security dilema" could be resolved and provide a disincentive to acquisition of nuclear weapons, what of the non-status quo power (state based or otherwise) that has unlimited ambitions? Would it not be rational to obtain such weapons as a method of blackmail (or worse) in a world where others are disarmed? Isn't maintaining the flexibility inherent in a deterrent force necessary to provide stability?

I maintain that even if we think we're providing the right disincentives for going nuclear by showing a glowing moral example, we still won't really be able to guarantee rogue elements won't pursue them anyway.

Finally, the irony in the "Global Zero" debate is that nuclear weapons have largely resolved the issue of great power conflict. Since World War II, no "great powers" have engaged in a war amongst themselves, at least not directly (though I am well aware of proxy conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, the Soviet-Afghan war in the 80s). Rather, conflict has been between regional powers or have been essentially civil wars (such as Iran-Iraq War, the multiple Congo conflicts, the various Yugoslav wars). I would argue the fear of raising tensions to the nuclear threshold created an admittedly imperfect stability. While that "stability" is not nearly as stable as many previous MAD advocates might argue, the fact that there was no "Dr. Strangelove" moment says something profound.

Is the highly touted greater relative peace of the moment a product of higher morality, or of a recognition of limited utility? Could we reopen the Pandora's Box of reinvigrating new great power conflict so long as the costs remained in the "conventional" rather than "nuclear" realm? At the very least, this must be a consideration when looking to go to "Zero."

So while we face a truly frightening prospect of proliferation to a multitude of actors beyond the proverbial "great powers", do we face the same quasi existential threat we faced during the heigth of the Cold War? I think not.

Consequently, while by definition nuclear weapons are dangerous and the shadow of catastrophe remains looming over the world, there is no way to go backwards in time. We can't "unsteal" the fire our modern day Prometheans have bestowed upon us. The best choice is to be wise in our application of this gravest of all weapons. The worst choice is to be lulled into a sense of false hope by the siren song of utopian visions not grounded in a realistic assessment of the human nature that drives all human actions in this world."
 
I also responded to this piece that argues, "A prerequisite for the abolition of nuclear weaponry is that international leaders must effectively and comprehensively address the evolving global nuclear dangers of the 21st century. Thus, they should launch a Nuclear Security Initiative, that would include a comprehensive suite of next-generation nuclear security policies and tools."

My thoughts,

"First, I must clarify that I am skeptic of arms control treaties, at least at this time.

I am highly skeptical of their real utility, especially if they begin incorporating missile defense into their web of obligations (like with the ABM Treaty). While I acknowledge that a deep reduction in the US and Russian arsenals may lead some nations that would consider acquiring nuclear weapons to stand down and appreciate the "moral high ground" of the major nuclear states, I do not envision this convincing nations like North Korea, Iran, or now even Burma.

It may seem a bit tongue in cheek, but Machiavelli made clear that it is best to be both loved and feared, but better to be feared than loved. In international relations, I firmly believe this maxim holds. Reducing arsenals, especially for the United States, does not guarantee global respect. It simply limits potential flexibility with the hope that respect will follow. History should not allow man to be so sanguine about such prospects.

So while I am deeply concerned about the need for a new START treaty and retain concerns regarding the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and a possible fissile material cutoff treaty, I would agree with Mr. Luongo that the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program should be strengthened.

While I believe reducing US arsenals is not necessarily wise, I think it is extremely prudent to limit access to nuclear material that is not currently adequately secured. The threat of non-state actors securing such material and fashioning even a rudimentary device is the greatest threat associated with nuclear weapons and/or material. Clearly, it is more likely that this is the nature of the threat to materialize than a state on state nuclear conflict.

In essence I believe abolition is an absolute fool's errand that substitutes high minded sounding platitudes for hard headed confrontation with reality. However, securing materials so that only state based actors can acquire them is a worthy and necessary goal."
 
So what do others think.  Am I out on a limb, or does it seem a bit ridiculous that arms control is coming back into vogue along with rise of Obama?