The Passing of McNamara
With today's passing of Robert McNamara, a major figure in American foreign policy history exits the stage. My initial thoughts below in the form of a comment on Foreign Policy Watch blog.
"I agree that studying McNamara is also a fascinating study of American foreign policy.
He represents much that is common in the foreign policy elite of his day, and probably any day since the end of WWII.
I still struggle to understand the full implications of the man and his policies. However, I think his guilt overcame his judgement.
Many mistakes were made in Vietnam, but how many of those mistakes were made in the glare of a media using new technology to influence not only domestic public opinion, but the opinion of those we were fighting at the time? Were his miscalculations any greater than a Ulysses S. Grant, a Lincoln, a Washington, or a Winston Churchill?
It is easy to say of course they were because we all know how Vietnam ended and how futile it all seemed with the image of helicopters in Saigon and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. However, how many mistakes by those ennobled greats in the historical pantheon could just as easily have turned towards complete disaster if fate had played just one card differently?
His is not an unambiguous study of failed hubris as is so often trumpeted by those who question American power and its uses. I think, like Iraq today, it is a far more nuanced and complex study.
It deserves much study and much philosophizing in order to take the good, leave the bad, and synthesize lessons that may be useful for future practioners of statescraft."
Indeed, just because McNamara himself was stricken with guilt does not ipso facto delegitimize everything he did, nor does it delegitimize what he attempted to do even if his own attempt turned out to be an abysmal failure.
Its important to maintain that perspective when using history as a guide, even history that appears as settled as the Vietnam War and McNamara's role in it.
"I agree that studying McNamara is also a fascinating study of American foreign policy.
He represents much that is common in the foreign policy elite of his day, and probably any day since the end of WWII.
I still struggle to understand the full implications of the man and his policies. However, I think his guilt overcame his judgement.
Many mistakes were made in Vietnam, but how many of those mistakes were made in the glare of a media using new technology to influence not only domestic public opinion, but the opinion of those we were fighting at the time? Were his miscalculations any greater than a Ulysses S. Grant, a Lincoln, a Washington, or a Winston Churchill?
It is easy to say of course they were because we all know how Vietnam ended and how futile it all seemed with the image of helicopters in Saigon and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. However, how many mistakes by those ennobled greats in the historical pantheon could just as easily have turned towards complete disaster if fate had played just one card differently?
His is not an unambiguous study of failed hubris as is so often trumpeted by those who question American power and its uses. I think, like Iraq today, it is a far more nuanced and complex study.
It deserves much study and much philosophizing in order to take the good, leave the bad, and synthesize lessons that may be useful for future practioners of statescraft."
Indeed, just because McNamara himself was stricken with guilt does not ipso facto delegitimize everything he did, nor does it delegitimize what he attempted to do even if his own attempt turned out to be an abysmal failure.
Its important to maintain that perspective when using history as a guide, even history that appears as settled as the Vietnam War and McNamara's role in it.
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