"Putin remains powerful. He is seen by most Russians as the leader who overcame the humiliation and chaos of the 1990s, when the Russian state, economy, ideology and empire collapsed. Conceivably he has assigned himself a review role over the performance of his successor; it is possible that he is keeping open the option of running in a future presidential election.

Whatever the ultimate outcome, the last Russian election marks a transition from a phase of consolidation to a period of modernization. The ceding of power by a ruler at the height of his influence is unprecedented in Russian history. The growing complexity of the economy has generated the need for predictable legal procedures, as already foreshadowed by Medvedev. The government's operation -- at least initially -- with two centers of power may, in retrospect, appear to be the beginning of an evolution toward a form of checks and balances.

A Russian democracy is not foreordained, of course. But neither was the democratic evolution in the West.

What are the implications for American foreign policy? During the next several months, Russia will be working out the practical means of the distinction between design and implementation of national security policy. The Bush administration and the presidential candidates would be wise to give Moscow space to do so and restrain public comment."

Kissinger proceeds to outline the areas where American-Russian cooperation is important, especially on the Iranian nuclear issue and Russian nuclear stockpiles in general.  Unsurprisingly, Kissinger advocates a softer approach to Russia as opposed to a reflexive policy of condemnation.

While I still believe that we push for our interest on things like missile defense, I concur that constant hectoring of Russia's internal political dynamics doesn't gain us much.  While Russia will never do everything we want, we can assure ourselves of an even more belligerant relationship if we continue to lecture them.  Their history, as I have pointed out numerous times, is substantially different from our own.  We cannot expect the outcomes generated by living that history to approximate our own.