In other words, if human nature were not fundamentally Hobbesian, why would states have the same types of fear that ultimately permeates and creates the anarchy of the international system as envisaged by neo-realists? 

The system’s structure is a reflection of the pieces of which it is comprised, just as the strucutre of a great cathedral or modern skyscraper is a reflection of the architects and designers that make it.  Granted, the international system is not “designed” by a single grandmaster, but it IS designed by a multitude of smaller, little “masters” such as national leaders, political opposition parties, non-state actors, etc that are in constant conflict either real, or just as importantly, perceived.

Ironically, even domestic politics is anarchic.  The difference is that there is a sovereign with the capacity to enforce discipline and/or enough commonality amongst the population that coercion is not an essential tool because it limits the scope of the anarchy to more predictable boundaries.  If the sovereign does not continue to retain its coercive  capacity and/or there is less commonality amongst the population, the the state itself essentially withers away and we are confronted with full blown anarchy akin to the state that exists between states (see Somalia as a contemporary example). 

Therefore, realism, in all its grim outlook, is fundamentally sound.  It cannot offer specific solutions to policy questions, but it most certainly can shape the prism through which policymakers view the facts they must interpret to reach policy decisions."

There have been inter-state conflicts such as the Korean War, Vietnam, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War since 1945 as well as many intra-state, civil war type situations.  Yet, despite the tragedy of these conflicts and the suffering they brought, none came close to the cataclysms of the first half of the Twentieth Century. Given the destructive capacity of contemporary weapons, what can we attribute to the fact that the mid-century level of carnage has not been surpassed.

Some may argue that the horror of those wars finally awakened mankind to its ethical responsibilities and that the supremacy of the rule of law and the enthroning of human rights throughout human institutions is the key to an end to these conflagrations.  Others may argue that the advent of the nuclear age frightened the major powers into a tenuous and always fearful, but ultimately fruitful balance of power.  Still more believe that interconnected economic development has finally made callous barbarism too expensive for major powers.  Perhaps then some combination of ethical evolution, economic interweaving and primal, existential fear are the conditions underwriting this relative, though far from absolute, stability.

Irrespective of which of these perspectives one may align, there should be a very serious examination of the one constant during this time period.  After all, if almost everything "changes" over time, but the underlining relative stability has remained, then it would stand to reason that whatever has been the constant over that time frame must bear at least partial responsibility for the stability.

American power is the one constant.  While US power has certainly waxed and waned over the past 65 years, few would argue with the assertion that the United States has been the single most powerful nation during this period.  Though it faced stiff competition from its partner in Cold War theatrics, no other nation comes close. 

However, we are entering an uncharted time where new powers are rising and America's star seems to be fading.  It is in this contextual milieu that the recent speech by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, at the United States Navy League's "Sea, Air and Space" Exposition, becomes deeply troubling. While he certainly does not indicate an abandonment of American naval supremacy, one of the keys, along with nuclear weapons, to America's post-World War II military dominance, it is evident that he is willing to allow a relative decline based on the assumption that Great Power conflict is a thing of the past.

This policy, combined with President Obama's almost pollyannaish vision of a nuclear-free world, is a toxic view to maintain at a time of great uncertainty.  It also takes for granted that the relatively peaceful conditions of the present day can be projected into the future. Sadly, this is misguided. A lack of knowledge about the future means one should hedge their bets.  Today's prognostications of what types of threats will emerge and where they will emerge from can look decidedly myopic within a matter of moments, much less years or decades. The U.S. cannot allow itself to become tired of its global responsibilities.

Credibility matters. If the US is perceived as  declining, we really cannot be sure what will happen if others test our resolve. This could pave the way for the destabilization of the regional balances of power.  It is through that door that renewed Great Power conflict could step and shock a world that has forgotten that relative peace is secured through strength.

Does the newly negotiated START Treaty between the United States and Russia compromise American security and/or the security of its allies?  The answer is not simple for either side in the debate.  It is this very ambiguity that will, and probably should, make ratification of the treaty by the US Senate anything but a foregone conclusion.

The new START Treaty signed by US President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev earlier this year is intended to take the place of the 1991 START Treaty that expired at the end of 2009.  It has been hailed as another pivotal point along the path to securing better relations between the former Cold War foes.  It is also being promoted by arms control advocate up to and including those that embrace the so-called "Global Zero" movement as a positive, though insufficient, step along the path to a non-nuclear world.  Practically the entire US military as well as a bipartisan collection of senior statesmen such as former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and many others have voiced their unequivocal support.

By contrast, its opponents raise numerous questions about the preamble of the treaty and whether it could ever be used as a way to limit further development of a US missile defense system.  They also state that the cuts hit the US more than Russia, that it uses gimmicky accounting rules for how many bombs could be loaded on aircraft, that it does not address the imbalance of deployed tactical nuclear weapons between Russia and the US, etc.

Other opponents also raise serious questions about the nature of the verification regime the new START Treaty will have vs. its predecessor. The admittedly conservative Heritage Foundation found a series of problems with the new verification mechanisms including the mothballing of exchange of telemetry data and a reduction in the number of inspections.

While it is true that in the absence of a new START Treaty, there would be no mechanism in place to exchange any information about what nuclear arms and delivery systems are deployed between Russia and the US; the troublesome lack of a fully effective verification regime, much more so than the hyperbolic fretting about missile defense, is a problem that should not be ignored just to get "something" in place.

There is good reason to believe that Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons will increase over time irrespective of this treaty.  As Russia's conventional military projection capabilities potentially decline, it will likely feel a need to compensate with what is still the ultimate equalizer.  Indeed, its need for nuclear weapons will probably have less to do with its fears of an encroaching "West" and more to do with an encroaching "East," as China continues to grow even during a time period where Russia's demography may not be as sustainable as in the past.

If this occurs, a lack of appropriate verification mechanisms could easily open the door to cheating.  In turn, this would obviate the intended goal of the treaty in the first place.

Additionally, it cannot be forgotten, that the ratification of the new START Treaty is taking place in a highly charged political atmosphere and is backed by a President whose own stated mission is the rather pollyannaish vision of a world without nuclear weapons (even if it "won't be in his lifetime").  It also is taking place in a time where the concept of deterrence is being downgraded by the present Administration.  Consequently, even beyond the issues of Russian compliance and the US ability to detect non-compliance, there are other reasons for legitimate concern.

It would seem that a better alternative would be to reauthorize the previous START Treaty with the nuclear limits associated with the SORT Treaty, as agreed to by former Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in 2002. Those limits were still dramatic, 1700-2200, for each side as opposed to the 1550 in the new START. Further, if tied to pre-existing verification mechanisms of START I, those limits would still embrace a willingness to de-emphasize a confrontational posture between the US and Russia, while not unduly limiting US flexibility in what could easily degrade into bad deal.

Under the fiscal circumstances, it seems highly likely the U.S. will retrench, probably substantially. I have long argued, however, it is largely the U.S. military that underwrites relative global security thus offering the stability so prized by corporations in order to reasonably conduct business.

A contraction from this will create something of a power vacuum with one of two outcomes:

1) someone else fills the void and may not be as relatively benign as the U.S. or
2) no one fills the void and we watch a slow motion return to a quasi-anarchical state of affairs with proliferating weapons of mass destruction thrown in the mix.

Liberal international expectations of continued "globalization" tying us all together in a big web of economic interdependence complete with benevolent laws and regulations is possible, but, if history's analogies have any resonance as to the likely future, this is not the probable end game.

Here is a piece on it.

We don't yet know if David Cameron and the newly resurgent Tories can win in Great Britain and bring the first conservative Prime Minister back to Downing Street since John Major.  However, Cameron is a person to watch closely.  He may be a harbinger of what conservatism may become in America within this generation. 

Essentially , he is not laisse faire as he recognizes that pure libertarianism has no moral content and no mechanism for assisting those born into subserviance to government to make their own decisions.  However, while there remains a key role for govenrment, it should be "smarter" and better and guide people towards decisions that make them freer rather than decreeing one is free without giving them a map of how to get to a hoped for destination.  A smaller government that moves people towards embracing the freedom they long ago gave up to enter into the statist social compact without simply cutting all strings immediately.  That sounds Burkean.

I need to read more of his campaign pledges and on his philosophy to render a meaningful opinion, but these snippets from the British press are certainly nothing if not intriguing:

"Cameronism is neither a politics of individualism, nor of state collectivism. Britain, goes the argument, is an unbalanced nation. We import too much. We save too little. We consume too much today and don't guard the environment for tomorrow. We rely too much on the financial services, the housing sector and state employment. But, more fundamentally, we are too ready to look to the state and to the market for solutions to our nation's problems and not to the diverse social architecture that lies between the individual and the state.Conservatives worry that a large state and an untrammeled free market both damage society. A heavy tax burden and unenlightened employers work together to force parents to work longer hours than they would wish. A hyper-mobile capitalism does not invest in community life. An arrogant, we-know-best state denies parents any choice in their child's schooling.

In the past the Conservatives wanted to cut the supply of government, and a secondary consideration was the hope that something better might spring up in its place – that something better emerging from a libertarian utopia. Cameron has repeatedly rejected laissez-faire. He believes in a smaller state but he wants to reduce the demand for government before tampering with the supply of critical welfare and other state services.

Only, he says, if Britain builds up the family, local schools and the not-for-profit charity sector can the deficit be reduced in a sustainable way. For him, a badly educated, welfare-dependent individual, who has never had the support of a strong family, is one of the most expensive sources of Britain's problems. Where a libertarian party would simply decree that it is for the individual to build a strong family, get their children into a good school and find work, Cameron's conservatism wants to actively help people secure those three fundamental building blocks of the good life."

The past week has been huge for followers of all things related to nuclear arms and terrorism.  Last week President Obama unveiled his new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), signed the START successor treaty with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and has hosted a Nuclear Summit attended by 47 world leaders to secure nuclear material and avoid terrorists acquiring it.

While I can unequivocally say I support secuing so called "loose nuke" material, much of the rest of the President's nuclear agenda seems deeply flawed. 

I have argued before that there is no need for a new START Treaty.  Other than the inspection regime brought into effect as a result of this (of which there is benefit), the treaty does not actually reduce all that many weapons and only gives the Russians the ability to say that they have "strategic parity" with the United States at a time when they do not have the capacity to maintain it absent such an agreement.  Further, despite the President's apparent belief in establishing an ethical framework from which to lobby potential new entrants to the nuclear club not to move forward with their ambitions, reducing old, superpower weapons manifestly does not deal with the myriad of issues that drive those new proliferators to seek such weapons.

As for the NPR, I had an op-ed published at the Atlantic Community on why I think this is misguided.  Below is the piece.

"Though heralded by many, the Obama’s new nuclear strategy is a misguided document that glosses over the relative stability nuclear weapons provide while reducing the credibility of deterrence when confronting nuclear proliferation.

I do not always agree with Tom Friedman.  Often he is way too glib and enamored of catchy phrases for my tastes.  But in this particular article, I think he strikes a reasonable chord.

We cannot continue piling domestic benefits onto our already rickety entitlement structure without sacrificing our ability to be the great stabilizer of the world.  For better and worse, that is a position we have been in since arguably the end of the Second World War and certainly since the end of the Cold War.  I have blogged on this many times.

However, the loyal opposition, the Republican Party, cannot simply be the party of “No” as he makes quite clear.  There are new challenges in the 21^st Century and an overreliance on nostalgia for President Reagan and the 80s is not going to cut it anymore. 

What will a new conservative position look like?  I have argued this previously as below:

“One key to statesmanship is to understand how to do what is necessary when necessary and face the consequences even when undesirable.  This means a resounding no to naive utopianism.  But another key is to recognize the need to prudently and cautiously move forward,  taking advantage of opportunities as they present themselves while looking to create new ones.  

In an age desperately needing renewal to set the stage for the future, the road forward is to have universal aspirations, while never losing sight of parochial necessities.  It is a balance of realism and idealism.  One cannot be all one or the other without coming to ruin.  Possibly we cannot be "American" citizens without being "World" citizens as well.  Should this be so, then the reverse must also be true.  One could be a citizen of any nation, but to be a citizen of the world, one must truly be "American."

If we decline or stumble, the world will suffer incalculably.  Best for us to do all we can to avoid this, but to avoid it with more than just a glint of hope and a reservoir of cynicism.  We must have a reservoir of hope, tempered by reality, but expectant of great things.

Vacuous promises of change and hope must be met with tangible promises of change and hope.  This is the message for Republicans.  Not "Change We Can Believe In", but "Hope We Can Believe In."

Republicans must be the party of:

• educational innovation;
• embracers of small business entrepreneurs;
• pro-immigration contingent upon assimilation;
• pro-tradition (including second amendment and pro-life);
• pro- strategic free trade combined with a renewal of industrial policy vis a vis potential strategic competitors;
• pro infrastructure development based on rational calculation and not raw and political pork barrel spending;
• pro-military and unwilling to make the false trade between “guns and butter;
• and pro-reform of entitlements so there is a safety net not a “safety couch.” 

Basically, the Republican Party must become the Party of effective government that does not stifle freedom, does not promote the irresolution born of wanton immorality, but can still look to the future and not be accused of expressing the decaying beliefs of trogdolytes. 

If America, or any nation, wants to be free, that freedom can only be based upon virtue.  The Republican Party should unashamedly promote this, but be prepared to deal with the reality that we may not be a virtuous society.  Consequently, we must adapt, be flexible and pour new wine into old vessels.

This idea is, I think, pretty influential among some of the people in the Obama administration.  It may even have a place in the President’s thinking.

It could not be more wrong.  The world is inexorably developing in directions that undermine the authority and efficacy of big international institutions, and American power (not, I think, doomed to decline) will increasingly have to operate outside of institutional frameworks, like it or not.

There are three big factors in world affairs that make the liberal internationalist path increasingly problematic going forward."

Reading the entire article is advisable, but it underscores the point I frequently make on my blog, which is that America, by default, is the great stabilizer of the world.  President Obama is misguided to think that he can "institutionalize" foreign policy and international relations in such a way as to give America the luxury (and it is a luxury at this point) to focus inward on great domestic social transformation to achieve the airy notion of "social justice." 

The tragedy of global politics will intrude on this and make it impossible. 

While the famous “unclenched” fist President Obama offered to Iran has yet to be reciprocated, seeking a geopolitical compromise with Iran is rapidly becoming a necessity. However, such a potential agreement must also encompass the wider Shia population within the Greater Middle East. The Shia, though overall a minority in the Middle East, make up majorities in Iran and Iraq. Even though they comprise less than twenty percent of the population in Saudi Arabia, they tend to reside in areas of high oil concentration. This enables them to exert influence disproportionate to their numbers.

This means that as the balance of power between Sunni and Shia shifts with the ousting of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the relative rise of Iran, the US should be willing to shift its focus on who plays the great stabilizer role for global oil prices. However, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the US has had a Sunni-centric approach to the region that has hobbled its diplomatic flexibility.

Any accommodation with Iran with respect to its nuclear program, though perceived by many as heretical, should be rigorously examined.

For this to happen, a change in focus must take place. Despite fears of Iran’s pending nuclearization killing the non-proliferation regime, the truth is that it is already dead. Attempting to block nations from developing nuclear capabilities on an ad hoc basis will squander scarce resources and not guarantee success, thus making such efforts of doubtful long-term utility.

As it pertains to Iran, it is important stop clinging to ineffectual policy options such as economic sanctions. Few expect these to be effective even if they could clear the myriad of hurdles that keep bottling them up at the United Nations.  Rather, the entire endeavor looks more like a subterfuge designed to give the appearance of meaningful action in the actual absence of such action.

It is also extremely unrealistic to assume that military force will permanently stop nuclear progress absent an actual invasion of the country and an intrusive inspection regime being imposed.  Given the limited flexibility of ground forces available to the US at the moment, not to mention possible domestic political backlash for unleashing a third regional war, the option of invasion seems off the table for the foreseeable future.  What is left as an option appears to be, as unsatisfying as it is for many, a re-embracing of deterrence.

Iran, contrary to many assertions, is likely to take a strong deterrent stance seriously, though it will need to be quite explicit and quite harsh to be effective. If a line is drawn on what is unacceptable, any crossing of that line must not yield “discussions”, “negotiations”, or “processes.” Such a crossing, for example an attack on Israel, must be made existentially catastrophic so that it won’t seriously be contemplated.

Naturally, the development of these “lines” is much easier said than done, however, it seems reasonable to assume several key lines would involve:

• No attacks on Israel either overtly or covertly through the use of proxies such as Hezbollah or Hamas
• No attacks of Arab neighbors either overtly or covertly through the use of proxies such as Hezbollah or Hamas
• No distribution of nuclear material to third parties whether state or non-state based.

Should an aggressive sense of deterrence be established psychologically where the concept actually resides, then a “deal” can be possible allowing Iran a certain degree of security within well defined limits. The regime can be assured that no external forces or externally supported internal forces will overthrow it. It may even be possible to envision allowing it to openly develop nuclear power (and even a limited weapon) capability.  Other economic incentives can also be included, especially the option of facilitating oil refining, a particular weakness in present day Iran.

Conceptually, this is no more shocking an idea than having the arch-anti-Communist Richard Nixon work with Mao in order to balance the Soviet Union. That Nixon-Kissinger policy of triangulation is generally considered to have paid handsome dividends. While this diplomatic gambit would be different in many ways, it would operate similarly by opening the door to flexible diplomacy in the region.

If the US and Iran can come to some terms, the ability to tilt between the Sunni Saudi regime and the Shia ascendancy in Iran and Iraq will be possible. Additionally, this flexibility will have to be taken into consideration by a resurgent Turkey which currently appears as though it is attempting to regain influence within the region.

Today the US is stuck trying to contain Iran without the military flexibility to be serious, thus looking a bit like a paper tiger. Tomorrow, it could seize the geopolitical initiative by being the decisive weight on the scale of Sunni-Shia relations. Both would be forced to cultivate relations with the US in order to maintain its support.

Obviously, for this to work the US must allay the most pressing fears of present allies in the region, notably Israel whose immediate security concerns regarding Iran are far more immediate and proximate than those of the US. The US’s stance on deterrence must be clear enough that Israel understands that any attack upon it by Iran would be answered with the most aggressive of responses.  To further compensate, missile defense cooperation with Israel will probably have to be quickened and made even more robust than it already is.  Additionally, the US should be careful in pushing an unrealistic settlement in the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process.  It is difficult to conceive of Israel willingly accepting a nuclear armed Iran while also accepting concessions that could put militants within even easier striking distance of major metropolitan areas than already exists.

Finally, current signs of enhanced missile defense and other technology trade with Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia and others should be made permanent and expedited.

In order to avoid losing ground in a geopolitically pivotal region of the world, the US must be bold. Today, Iran and the increasingly confident Shia of the Middle East are playing a central role in shaping what the region will look like a generation from now. The US must be able to adapt to the shifting sands and not cling rigidly to yesteryear’s policy prescriptions."

Of course, only those prone to hyperventilation would state that all of this is going to happen today or tomorrow.  It won't.  The problem is more subversive and long-term than the President's knee-jerk critics assert. 

In twenty years, with our current trajectory, the US will not be able to underwrite global stability if its domestic financial situation remains as skewed (or even more so) than it is today.  It is in this time period as America deals with the ramifications of its past profligacy where latent threats can materialize both within the globalized system as well as on the periphery. 

Given the democratization of technology to empower small groups to wreak the type of harm previously requiring either a state's backing or, at least large military campaigns, it is not an absurdity to be concerned about the severity of the threats churning in those areas not currently connected to the global system...

Obama wants to manage conflict through the institutionalization of cooperation while focusing on domestic concerns.  It's an intriguing wager: betting that others will take on responsibility and be willing to cooperate effectively enough that we can greatly reduce our international responsibilities while reforming our society. 

We should pause, reflect and consider the consequences if the wager is wrong. What if global order is about not only cooperation, but also the ability to project meaningful diplomatic and military force when needed?  We won't get another chance to make another bet."

As I write this piece, I am reminded of a post over at the Weekly Standard linking to various bloggers lists of the 10 books that most shaped their views.  Given the portents of decline that I think can rightly be assocated with the momentous decision to pass the  health care reform bill, let me give you five of my favorite books that should be mandatory reading for our political classt this very moment.  Though differing in their analyses of decline and geopolitics, they should be understood so that we can compare our present position to the position other great powers have held:

1) The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire by Edward Gibbon
2) The Decline of the West by Oswald Spengler
3) A Study of History by Arnold Toynbee
4) Politics Among Nations by Hans Morgenthau
5) A World Restored by Henry Kissinger.

If health care for all is the beginning of a great turn inward, then Americans should be very fearful what world they are leaving to their children and grandchildren.  It may not be a pretty place.  Kissinger's word from A World Restored should be examined closely and we should hope they are not too prophetic in anticipating our leaders' views of what will happen tomorrow:

""But the attainment of peace is not as easy as the desire for it. Not for nothing is history associated with the figure of Nemesis, which defeats man by fulfilling his wishes in a different form or by answering his prayers too completely. Those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search of peace. Those whose quest for it seems unending appear least able to achieve tranquillity...

For powers long accustomed to tranquillity and without experience with disaster, this is a hard lesson to come by. Lulled by a period of stability which had seemed permanent, they find it nearly impossible to take at face value the assertion of the revolutionary power that it means to smash the existing framework. The defenders of the status quo therefore tend to begin by treating the revolutionary power as if its protestations were merely tactical; as if it really accepted the existing legitimacy but overstated its case for bargaining purposes; as if it were motivated by specific grievances to be assuaged by limited concessions. Those who warn against the danger in time are considered alarmists; those who counsel adaptation to circumstance are considered balanced and sane, for they have all the good reasons on their side: the arguments accepted as valid in the existing framework. Appeasement, where it is not a device to gain time, is the result of an inability to come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives."

At the end of the day, "ObamaCare" requires a world of stability so that the resources necessary to its functioning can be devoted upon it.  If the world fails to offer this stability, great tradeoffs must be made, tradeoffs that the average American will probably not be too happy to have to make.  We will either have to pull back and watch the degeneration of global order, hoping our relative geographic isolation offers us respite, or we will have to take back much of what is now going be offered through "ObamaCare" like manna from heaven.  Neither choice is palatable.  Yet, netiher choice has to be made, if we were to avoid the calamity of going down the treacherous path the President wishes us to traverse in the first place.

Tragically, after tomorrow, we may no longer have the ability to avoid this choice in the future.

However, America must continue sharing missile defense technology so as to contain any potentially careless acts by the regime in Tehran. An explicit statement regarding American use of nuclear weapons in response to any nuclear provocation by Iran is probably also a necessary complement to this new era variation of “containment.”

Additionally, bolder, out of the box diplomacy might be necessary to shift the geopolitical currents within the region."

Nuke proliferation has remained far slower than the experts have predicted for more than half a century now. Ever since I am a kid I have been told we are just years from 20-30 powers, and yet Iran will make only ten. If Turkey and the Saudis followed suit, that would be 12. There is simply no prospect of even two dozen on the horizon.

Among the established nuke powers, there is no sign of irrationality overcoming precedent, so we are left, as always, with newcomers and nonstate actors. Does anybody posit massive nuclear exchanges on this basis? No. Do we wrap our entire grand strategy around the axle around the singular event? Some would have that.

I would not.

Iran and Israel exchange nukes and nothing much would change. Indeed, the rule set would likely be overwhelmingly strengthened.

We cannot stop every act of irrationality on the planet, nor should we fear it. We should simply take it in stride and stick with our own calculations of interest.

As for bringing up 1914, pre-nuclear examples of world war don't work in a post-nuclear world. You can't roll back the clock. You can't get rid of the crystal ball effect provided by nukes. You can't un-invent them.

And it's deeply misleading to cast colonial empires as the equivalent of today's globalization. Comparing the two casually is like comparing apples and handcuffs. The uncompetitive movement of resources from colonies to home countries does not compare to globally integrated production. Enslaved populations do not compare to a global middle class. Telegraphs controlled by governments don't compare to 3-billion and growing cellphones held by individuals.

Colonial empires were zero-sum developments, both in terms of the enslaved and in terms of competing with each other. No surprise the empires eventually turned on each other, and good riddance.

But what should I live in fear over that outcome in today's world?

We just lived through a financial crash very similar to the one that triggered the Great Depression. The difference in global outcomes was profound, was it not?

Me:

As my comment elicited Mr. Barnett's response referred to in this post, I would just state that while I believe he is laregly correct thus far in his assement of contemporary global events and interdependence; to assume this will remain inevitably so seems too optimistic.

Nuclear weapons have historically kept a lid on "Great Power" conflict since the end of World War II, at least in the sense of "Hot Wars." However, we have never had a world of numerous nuclear powers, much less a world of nuclear powers of various stability and security capabilities. As proliferation takes place, more rapidly now than over previous decades, we can not be sure what might happen afterwards.

Mr. Barnett states:

"Iran and Israel exchange nukes and nothing much would change. Indeed, the rule set would likely be overwhelmingly strengthened."

Why would the rules be strengthened rather than weakened as the long-standing taboo is broken? Because the world would get another demonstration of nuclear weapons terrible effects? Or will we see more people looking to amplify their ability to counter so they are not unwittingly on the end of an exchange?

We just can't tell how it would turn out. That is why we must prepare for the worst, even if it seems unlikely.

I sense an element of triumphalism in Mr. Barnett's comments- that all we have to worry about is small ball and integrating those currently not in the full blown "Core." He seems to think the belief in possible Great Power conflict is naively outmoded and that nuclear terrorism will not be all that big a deal as the world will pretty much go on as it always has the day after such an event.

I think hyperventilation over these potential threats is not necessary, nor strategic. However, I also think failing to consider their full implication could leave us ill prepared to handle the fall out should they actually transpire.

We don't live in 1914. That was never my point. My point was to simply illustrate that assumptions made one day can change dramatically and diametrically based upon a single discontinuity."

The below is a train of comments between myself and Thomas P.M. Barnett regarding the possibility of conflict with China.  Note, I do not believe this is in any way preordained.  I just believe it is possible while, despite his protestations, I do not think Mr. Barnett sees that as realistic.

 "Me: Though I know we disagree on the long-term potential for serious major power conflict (I see it as quite possible, though not inevitable and you seem to see it as close to impossible), I agree that the China as competing Superpower that will overtake America meme is overwrought. It is possible to envision a serious, long-term cooperative relationship.

 You rightly point out that China has many internal challenges and insecurities that most in the West do not pay much attention to along the path to their assumptions regarding inevitable conflict.

Of course, to be prepared for conflict even if unlikely remains a necessity and, in my estimation, should not be trivialized as reckless alarmism, but, rather, should be seen as prudential statesmanship.

 Mr. Barnett: Greg, I don't define anything as impossible. I simply don't see any sea change in the larger realities that have kept a firm moratorium on great power war since 1945. China rising doesn't change the nuclear warfare equations, and those still sit on top of any conflict scenario. So if those held during the Cold War, then I'm supposed to think everything's more iffy now that markets have spread and all our major competitors are getting richer? If nukes + a declining opponent with an anti-capitalism worldwide revolution dream + all manner of rivalry in third power situations doesn't get me a great-power war over 45 years, then somehow I should be more unsettled by nukes + marketization and rising incomes and a deep embrace of capitalism + no real rivalry in a military sense anywhere in third power situations?

 All you can say about me is that I find these assumptions and scenarios about inevitable great-power wars with China to all be rather underwhelming and unimaginative in their unwillingness to get beyond traditional pol-mil thinking and genuinely understand the larger economic and financial interdependency that ain't theory but actual, here-and-now fact.

 But what do businessmen know? They control so little of real-world events while governments run EVERYTHING!

 Me: Mr. Barnett:

 I understand your point. I also think you are mostly spot on in analyzing the current trends in global politics and economics.

 My concern is about the discontinuities. Surprising events that no one foresees that throw conventional wisdom out the window.

 I think the current conventional wisdom, at least among policy elites (though not necessarily military strategists), is that conflict with China is not inevitable and would be devasting as part of "Mutually Assured Economic Destruction." I think the policy elite envision a world where trade and economic competition not war will be the prime conflicts. Your views are particularly shrewd and helpful in conceptualizing this perspective and coming up with reasonable ways of managing international relations within this milieu.

 Indeed, I tend to agree with you that this is the most plausible situation and that China will continue a slow integration into global governance institutions which will slowly alter as it achieves and pushes for greater responsibility. Meanwhile, integrating "Gap" countries into the "Core" will be the main issue over the next several decades.

 However, "globalization's" earlier vintage before 1914 also brought similar perceptions among the business class.

 Though the underyling structure of global politics may have been more propitious for conflict then than now, a single spark ignited a conflagration that fundamentally reordered the world. This took place not because everyone acted rationally in their economic interest. That psychological component of human nature is still with us and drives behavior more than economists often think.

 Consequently, I think this is the lesson of history- one should never be surprised no matter how seemingly counterintuitive a given event may be.

 Nuclear proliferation may the wildcard that upsets the balance."

A provocative article about the future of NATO spawned a series of comments between myself and a member of the German military.  The question from my perspective is, should Europe and the U.S. clealry define different roles within NATO for those actions that are taken outside of Europe like Afghanistan today?

 I include only that train of comments below,

 "Olaf Theiler: With the statement that "Today, the questions are: defense against what threats and with which tools? Once these tough issues are solved, we then need to decide how to share and sustain the burdens" I think Dr. Jackson Janes made a more than valid point, but at the same time missed two quite important things here.
First, a sequential answer to these important questions will not be sufficient. The question of burden sharing refers to two very much related issues. In the first place there is the issue of the availability of resources and capabilities and as a follow up issue it refers also to the political will to invest or deploy them. Both issues are critical not only for the burden sharing debate but also for the initial question of what threats and with which tools do defense against. In theory, any kind of capability development would be a clear result of a threat and risk assessment. In the real world instead, this seems not to be that easy since most nations tend so realize threats also in terms of the availability of capabilities. To be more precise, if a nation does not have the capability to influence developments far from its borders, at least some of its politicians will automatically try to play it down or even to ignore it completely. Furthermore, the availability of capabilities is even more influential on any debate about the right tools to fix a problem. A heavily armed nation might be much tempted to address a perceived threat with the use of force while on the other hand an only lightly armed nation would probably prefer diplomatic or economic approaches. Therefore, it will be almost impossible to deal with these questions in sequence. Instead, NATO will have to find solutions here in a parallel approach. A new solution on current burden sharing difficulties will – at least potentially – allow more flexibility in providing consensual answers on which threats to address as an Alliance and vice versa.
This leads to my second point, the fact that NATO desperately needs a new approach on burden sharing. In the center of today’s debates on burden sharing there are only two issues: Troops and military capabilities on the ground (including the costs that come with their deployment and sustainment) on the one hand and the death toll of these troops on the other hand. Also the criticism on the current level of burden sharing is very much limited to these two criteria. At the same time, NATO is debating very different kinds of challenges and on how to tackle them, thereby causing a gap between the discussion of needed means and capabilities on the one hand and the existing criteria for judging the share of burdens on the other. In order to have a realistic and fair burden sharing discussion, NATO therefore needs to include new aspects into its catalogue of judgment. The Alliance has to find a new formula to include assets like civilian and humanitarian aid, development project funding and staffing, civil training and education capabilities, judicial and administrative advisory groups, police training and equipment donations, even efforts and investments in and through other institutions or mechanisms than NATO – in short: all kinds of contributions to a comprehensive approach.
To sum it up, the new strategic concept of NATO needs to be much more forward looking and much more innovative than this Alliance has ever been if it wants to provide sufficient answers to the new security environment and its growing complexity.

 Me: I have often argued here at the Atlantic Community that NATO is a solid security alliance for European issues, not so much as it relates to other regions in the world.

Is it possible as Mr. Theiler commented above that if NATO included

"assets like civilian and humanitarian aid, development project funding and staffing, civil training and education capabilities, judicial and administrative advisory groups, police training and equipment donations, even efforts and investments in and through other institutions or mechanisms than NATO – in short: all kinds of contributions to a comprehensive approach"

that it would be more useful? Perhaps, but that is a fundamental change in NATO's mission. It began as a military alliance to defend against potential Soviet expansionism. To morph into something that is all things for all people, it will inevitably be diluted from its initial purpose.

Perhaps, this diluted alliance would be better than none for issues external to Europe, but it will need to be examined through realistic lenses, not rose colored ones. If this is considered a plausible vision for NATO's future, then what of the military aspect? Does this not essentially mean that the US will remain the main utilizer of force in global affairs with NATO coming in later to "pick up the pieces?"

Again, this may be a reasonable and useful vision, but if it is to be so, both sides of the Atlantic need to begin drawing meaningful lines illustrating who has authority for the different types of actions that will need to be undertaken (ie, military altercations vs. policing vs. infrastructure development, vs. edcation, etc).

 Mr. Theiler: @ Greg Randolph Lawson

Dear Mr. Lawson, please don't quote me out of context. My argument was that NATO internal debates about fair and equal burden sharing needs to include all kinds of contributions by member states to a comprehensive approach exercised in one of its missions. This does not mean however, that NATO needs to develop capabilities on all these fields as part of its institutional structure.
In order to avoid any misunderstandings, here are some examples (not at all exhaustive) about the possible range of a more flexible approach to burden sharing:

1) If one NATO nation has a ship active in the EU counter-piracy operation Atalanta, this could be seen as much as a burden in this task as a ship provided to NATO's counter-piracy Operation Ocean Shield by some other NATO member.

2) If one NATO nations provides Police Trainers through the EU to Afghanistan, this could be seen as an additional part of its burdens to make the ISAF mission a success.

3) If one NATO nation spends money on bilateral programs on economic development in Afghanistan, this could also be accounted as contribution to the over burdens carried by NATO in Afghanistan.

So far, there is no clear formula to compare a fair and equal burden sharing in the Alliance existing. There is even a slight chance that a more flexible approach to burden-sharing accountability might encourage more contributions. My point was that in light of a comprehensive approach the burden sharing debate needs to be broadened, not the range of actual capabilities or responsibilities of NATO as an institution. The latter is a highly sensitive issue to be discussed and decided by the North Atlantic Council whenever they will decide to do so.

Nevertheless, you got a point here by arguing that "If this is considered a plausible vision for NATO's future, then what of the military aspect? Does this not essentially mean that the US will remain the main utilizer of force in global affairs with NATO coming in later to "pick up the pieces?"
A broadened debate about equal burden sharing should not become an excuse for European nations not to contribute on the military side or the hard part of the job. At the same time, the "boots on the ground -" and "body-bags counting" as the only source of comparisson for burdens to be shared in NATO seem to me as outdated due to the adoption of the highly praised comprehensive approach.

 Me: @ Olaf Theiler

Thank you for the clarification. I did not intend to quote of context. I am also glad to see your comment regarding Europe not using a broadened debate as an excuse to avoid military contributions.

I fear, however, such a debate may well result in just that. Yet even so, I am begininning to wonder if a broader conception of burden sharing may be what is needed to revitalize the NATO mission. By no means have I reached a firm conclusion in my own mind, but I would be interested in exploring how NATO members can contribute to out of Europe missions with something other than pure military force.

Dometically, it will be difficult for America to support this as the American public will have expectations regarding what they see as "fair" burden sharing and I am not sure the more comprehensive vision will be palatable to those outside of the intellectual and policy elite.

That said, I do think this may be a more realistic avenue to explore than perpetual exhortations for more troops from American leaders to their European counterparts.

Maybe the right division, roughly put, is to embrace Robert Kagan's thesis about Americans being from Mars and Europeans from Venus, but to do so without the negative connotations. In other words, Europeans should accept that the U.S. will be the leading edge of the proverbial spear, but Europe will be the diplomatic, soother and facilitator for reconstruction.

In a sense this seems the most logical division of labor. Rather than America trying to engage in activities it is unsuited for and vice versa. Additionally, it will allow both sides to more easily converge on issues of mutual interest while being able to walk away from those that do not rise to the level of perceived national interest.

 Mr. Theiler: @ Greg Randolph Lawson

To be blunt: No way. Not only because it will not happen, but rather because it should not happen.
Three short thoughts on that:

1. You rightfully highlight the problems this would cause for the American domestic support. In addition to this, it might also become problematic for the European public. Will we always agree on doing the dishes for the U.S.? The old and sad joke that the U.S. does the fighting, the UN the feeding and the EU the funding will not go well as an officially adopted policy, not even in Germany. In the end, the Americans might find themselves isolated and without international support even in cases where their efforts would be more than justified and welcome, simply because it is the U.S. that takes action.

2. Should Europe – and here I mean all the European nations in NATO as well as in the EU – really confine itself to something like a Switzerland on a global stage? I would argue against such an idea because to leave all the fighting – including the choice of place and time for that – to the U.S. would ultimately result in a world without any kind of European influence. We still live in a kind of Hobbesian world as Kagan argued. Disrespectable if we feel more like Kantians or not, most nations in this world tend to judge their neighbors, partners and competitors by the power they have. Power here means the chance to influence events on the ground whatever means are necessary. Military power will remain a very important currency in the global power games that nations tend to play. I thought that Europe had learned that lesson very painful in the Balkans, when we paid and mediated for a peace that never came since no one on the ground really cared until the U.S. (and NATO) came in with force. The whole idea of the ESDP was the acceptance of a need at least to be able to fight if you want others to stop doing that.

3. The final solution would not be a division of labor in the terms of Mars and Venus but a combination of tools and capabilities so that both sides can influence the decisions to be made, the strategies to be developed and implemented and the price to be paid on an equal manner. We don’t need to copy the US military strength and they don’t have to copy all that Europe can do, but both sides will need at least some parts of all the tools. First to be able to act alone if necessary, second to better understand each others concepts and mindsets (civ-mil cooperation is sometimes harder than a discussion between two groups with different religions) and cooperate effectively if we agree to do it together."

The Atlantic Community is beginning a series on the geopolitical implications of shrinking arctic ice.  THis is not about Global Warming per se, but about the potential struggles over natural resources that may happen due to facilitated access.

My comments to the first piece,

"Militarizing the Arctic might be regressive, but it also quite likely.

While there is no question that all five coastal states will seek peaceful ways of securing access to the new resources being made available by receding ice, each will have to look at "hard power" mechanisms as well. Pieces of paper are nice and can carry moral weight, but guns (and in this case ice breakers) carry strategic weight.

Already, other nations are making some rumbles about their desire for access to the area.

For example, China has already begun staking a claim rhetorically. The below is from the Diplomat blog (http://the-diplomat.com/2010/03/09/china%e2%80%99s-arctic-play/)

" ‘The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.’ So said Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, in comments relayed by the official China News Service on March 5 that essentially staked Beijing’s claim to the North Pole."

Each of the coastal states are going to have to be very careful in determining just what territory they are claiming. Indeed, they need to come to agreement amongst themselves and then work in a concerted effort to explain themselves to the world at large. Even so, there will be a lot of unhappiness in state capitals of nation's that aren't geographically proximate to the Arctic."

An article over at the Atlantic Community from the famous IR scholar Joseph Nye regarding "hard", "soft" and "smart" power with my commets below,

 "Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" and it has useful applications. Nothing he states in his article is untrue. I am glad he is modifying the concept some by referring to "smart power"

This is something of a recognition that the dictum of Machiavelli remains true:

"It is better to be feared than loved, if you cannot be both."

Nations should take care they do not prostrate themselves before the altar of fickle public opinion when vital or existential issues are at stake. After all, as Mr. Theiler artfully describes above "the results of years of investment, engagement and sacrifices by the International Community can be almost negated by a single but highly reported strike of terrorists. "

There is only so much a nation can do. Occassionally mistakes will be made. We can't entirely prevent this, nor should we wring our hands in agitation over every mistake, lest paralysis of decision making will snuff out initiative and yield to those that wish to manipulate a public that is often quite easy to manipulate.

It is all a very careful balancing act where decisions must be calibrated with a recognition that the unexpected can lay to waste the best intentioned plans."

Therefore, the United States must find a way to counterbalance Iran without an open-ended deployment in Iraq and without expecting the re-emergence of Iraqi power, because Iran is not going to allow the latter to happen. The nuclear issue is simply an element of this broader geopolitical problem, as it adds another element to the Iranian tool kit. It is not a stand-alone issue.

The United States has an interesting strategy in redefining problems that involves creating extraordinarily alliances with mortal ideological and geopolitical enemies to achieve strategic U.S. goals. First consider Franklin Roosevelt’s alliance with Stalinist Russia to block Nazi Germany. He pursued this alliance despite massive political outrage not only from isolationists but also from institutions like the Roman Catholic Church that regarded the Soviets as the epitome of evil.

Now consider Richard Nixon’s decision to align with China at a time when the Chinese were supplying weapons to North Vietnam that were killing American troops. Moreover, Mao — who had said he did not fear nuclear war as China could absorb a few hundred million deaths — was considered, with reason, quite mad. Nevertheless, Nixon, as anti-Communist and anti-Chinese a figure as existed in American politics, understood that an alliance (and despite the lack of a formal treaty, alliance it was) with China was essential to counterbalance the Soviet Union at a time when American power was still being sapped in Vietnam.

Roosevelt and Nixon both faced impossible strategic situations unless they were prepared to redefine the strategic equation dramatically and accept the need for alliance with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. American history is filled with opportunistic alliances designed to solve impossible strategic dilemmas. The Stalin and Mao cases represent stunning alliances with prior enemies designed to block a third power seen as more dangerous.

It is said that Ahmadinejad is crazy. It was also said that Mao and Stalin were crazy, in both cases with much justification. Ahmadinejad has said many strange things and issued numerous threats. But when Roosevelt ignored what Stalin said and Nixon ignored what Mao said, they each discovered that Stalin’s and Mao’s actions were far more rational and predictable than their rhetoric. Similarly, what the Iranians say and what they do are quite different...

Consider the American interest. First, it must maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States cannot tolerate interruptions, and that limits the risks it can take. Second, it must try to keep any one power from controlling all of the oil in the Persian Gulf, as that would give such a country too much long-term power within the global system. Third, while the United States is involved in a war with elements of the Sunni Muslim world, it must reduce the forces devoted to that war. Fourth, it must deal with the Iranian problem directly. Europe will go as far as sanctions but no further, while the Russians and Chinese won’t even go that far yet. Fifth, it must prevent an Israeli strike on Iran for the same reasons it must avoid a strike itself, as the day after any Israeli strike will be left to the United States to manage.

Now consider the Iranian interest. First, it must guarantee regime survival. It sees the United States as dangerous and unpredictable. In less than 10 years, it has found itself with American troops on both its eastern and western borders. Second, it must guarantee that Iraq will never again be a threat to Iran. Third, it must increase its authority within the Muslim world against Sunni Muslims, whom it regards as rivals and sometimes as threats.

Now consider the overlaps. The United States is in a war against some (not all) Sunnis. These are Iran’s enemies, too. Iran does not want U.S. troops along its eastern and western borders. In point of fact, the United States does not want this either. The United States does not want any interruption of oil flow through Hormuz. Iran much prefers profiting from those flows to interrupting them. Finally, the Iranians understand that it is the United States alone that is Iran’s existential threat. If Iran can solve the American problem its regime survival is assured. The United States understands, or should, that resurrecting the Iraqi counterweight to Iran is not an option: It is either U.S. forces in Iraq or accepting Iran’s unconstrained role...

The strategic problem is, of course, Iranian power in the Persian Gulf. The Chinese model is worth considering here. China issued bellicose rhetoric before and after Nixon’s and Kissinger’s visits. But whatever it did internally, it was not a major risk-taker in its foreign policy. China’s relationship with the United States was of critical importance to China. Beijing fully understood the value of this relationship, and while it might continue to rail about imperialism, it was exceedingly careful not to undermine this core interest.

The major risk of the third strategy is that Iran will overstep its bounds and seek to occupy the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Certainly, this would be tempting, but it would bring a rapid American intervention. The United States would not block indirect Iranian influence, however, from financial participation in regional projects to more significant roles for the Shia in Arabian states. Washington’s limits for Iranian power are readily defined and enforced when exceeded.

The great losers in the third strategy, of course, would be the Sunnis in the Arabian Peninsula. But Iraq aside, they are incapable of defending themselves, and the United States has no long-term interest in their economic and political relations. So long as the oil flows, and no single power directly controls the entire region, the United States does not have a stake in this issue."

While I believe the below quote from Kissinger's doctoral thesis encapsulates my overall vision of what a good statesman should be, I reserve the right to hope for something less ephemeral than what we have seen in previous eras dominated by these so-called balances of power.

Japan is not much better. It has a shrinking workforce and rapidly ageing population. These factors, combined with bureaucratic government, have conspired to ensure that Japan has yet to recover fully from the crash of 1991.

The position of China is more complex: it has no shortage of young and ambitious citizens at the moment, but the one-child policy imposed by the Communist Party has skewed the country’s demographic profile. In a generation or so, China may find itself short of young people. It is in a race to grow rich before it grows old.

The extra million Americans will not all spring from the wombs of American mothers. The US will have to attract the brightest and most entrepreneurial young people from around the world, as will other greying states, provoking ever sharper competition to suck in new blood.

“No western-derived country produces enough children of European descent to prevent them from becoming granny nation-states by 2050,” Mr Kotkin has written. “In the next decades the fate of western countries may well depend on their ability to make social and economic room for people whose origins lay outside Europe.”

Now, the major question associated with this is- what becomes of "American culture" as new immigrants enter America?  Many of my fellow conservatives would be deeply wary of the cultural impact.  Indeed, this is a major consideration.  However, as Teddy Roosevelt made clear a century ago, immigrants who pledge real loyalty to the US should be considered Americans.  Essentially, we must make assimilation the cost of offering better opportunity for well being to those born outside our geopgraphic borders.  If we retain the bizarre "multi-cultural" stew many elites promote, all we will do is create the conditions for a slow moving balkanization of the country. 

The irony is that immigration policy is a key to America's future, but not in the way many think.  It offers, perhaps, the only chance to deal with the  demographic strangulation of American primacy, but it also has the potential to blow apart the ties that bind if done recklessly.

10) There is no recovery at all in Europe. European growth ground to a halt during the fourth quarter and German busines confidence unexpectedly fell in February.

9) China won’t collapse, but government efforts to stop overheatingby raising reserve requirements make clear that the world’s second-largest economy can’t be the locomotive for world growth.

8. Greece and its prospective rescuers in the European Community are at loggerheads over conditions for EC help. “Greece faces several important challenges in the coming days, including an expected bond auction, a planned general strike on Wednesday, and a visit from European Union officials that began Monday, aimed at pushing the country to take tougher steps to rein in its budget deficit,” WSJ reported today.

7. State fiscal crises continue to worsen. “Doomsday is here for the state of Illinois,” California’s last set of cosmetic measures do little to address a $20 billion deficit, Baltimore has no idea how to close a $120 billion deficit. On top of this year’s $200 billion deficit, states face a trillion-dollar shortfall in pension funds.

6) Commercial real estate is nowhere near bottom, with some sectors (e.g. hotels) at delinquency rates of nearly 10%. Credit Suisse says that delinquencies could reach $60 billion.

5) Regional banks continue to drop like flies, with 702 banks holding assets of $403 billion on the danger list.

4) Bank credit continues to shrink. Total bank credit is still falling at a 5% annual rate, an unprecedented decline

3) What bank credit is available is funding the US Treasury deficit in the mother of all crowdings-out, replacing commercial loans on banks’ balance sheets

2) Industrial production has bounced of the bottom, but manufacturing is only 15% of US employment

1) Employment won’t come back. Today’s consumer confidence number is one more nail in the coffin of exaggerated hopes for a cyclical recovery"

Contemporary trends may favor your overall argument, but discontinuities throughout history have taken place, usually because something unanticipated happened.

Niall Ferguson has a fascinating new piece in the current Foreign Affairs (March/April 2010) about how stunningly quickly collapses in order (including imperial orders) can transpire. In a sense, this piece is the anti-Gibbon, Spengler and Toynbee. Rather than long-term trends of decline that become obvious in retrospect, he raises the prospect that relatively small disturbances within systems can destroy the balance of those system and yield chaos.

Obviously, redundancy in any system can ameliorate this, but how do we really know what the impact of a nuclear or biological attack on a major American city be? What will that do to international trade? What will it do to America's already ballooning deficits?

Will a future generation of Chinese leaders feeling more confident be less pragmatic and see "Western" weakness as an opportunity to be exploited as opposed to a challenge to be overcome?

I do not think it is histrionic to be concerned with these possibilities. No order in the history of the world has yet proven itself permanent. Why is the order of this era any different?

If Rome could collapse, the empire of Qin Shi Huangdi collapse and the Sun set on the British, how can we be so sure we have found the "solution?"

I ask this in all earnestness and not to be controversial. Given your reputation, I would be most interested in your response.

Barnett:  Greg,

Echoing David Stewart, the major difference--and it's gargantuan, is that ours is the first "empire" (if you must use that term) that's empowered and enriched masses of individuals instead of merely elites. As such, its spread is achieved as a demand function, not a supply function, so it expands, it needs us less and not more.

Are we yet used to this reality? No. But growing up is a constant process.

As for why ours is the oldest continuous constitutional democracy in the world?

Same reason."

Check out the full blog and other comments for a full airing on some of these issues.

Why has this happened? I can think of a few contributing factors.

First, the meritocracy is based on an overly narrow definition of talent. Our system rewards those who can amass technical knowledge. But this skill is only marginally related to the skill of being sensitive to context. It is not related at all to skills like empathy. Over the past years, we’ve seen very smart people make mistakes because they didn’t understand the context in which they were operating.

Second, this new system has created new social chasms. In the old days, there were obviously big differences between people whose lives were defined by “The Philadelphia Story” and those who were defined by “The Grapes of Wrath.” But if you ran the largest bank in Murfreesboro, Tenn., you probably lived in Murfreesboro. Now you live in Charlotte or New York City. You might have married a secretary. Now you marry another banker. You would have had similar lifestyle habits as other people in town. Now the lifestyle patterns of the college-educated are very different from the patterns in other classes. Social attitudes are very different, too.

It could be that Americans actually feel less connected to their leadership class now than they did then, with good reason.

Third, leadership-class solidarity is weaker. The Protestant Establishment was inbred. On the other hand, those social connections placed informal limits on strife. Personal scandals were hushed up. Now members of the leadership class are engaged in a perpetual state of war. Each side seeks daily advantage in ways that poison the long-term reputations of everybody involved.

Fourth, time horizons have shrunk. If you were an old blue blood, you traced your lineage back centuries, and there was a decent chance that you’d hand your company down to members of your clan. That subtly encouraged long-term thinking.

Now people respond to ever-faster performance criteria — daily stock prices or tracking polls. This perversely encourages reckless behavior. To leave a mark in a fast, competitive world, leaders seek to hit grandiose home runs. Clinton tried to transform health care. Bush tried to transform the Middle East. Obama has tried to transform health care, energy and much more.

There’s less emphasis on steady, gradual change and more emphasis on the big swing. This produces more spectacular failures and more uncertainty. Many Americans, not caught up on the romance of this sort of heroism, are terrified.

Fifth, society is too transparent. Since Watergate, we have tried to make government as open as possible. But as William Galston of the Brookings Institution jokes, government should sometimes be shrouded for the same reason that middle-aged people should be clothed. This isn’t Galston’s point, but I’d observe that the more government has become transparent, the less people are inclined to trust it."

In some ways I think Brooks is correct.  Long-term accomplishments, not momentary gains, are the historical criteria for success.  However, our age is an age that demands instantaneous responses, even if they are ill advised and poorly considered.  Additionally, I do think that while technical knowledge is important, it is also very narrow, just as Brooks outlines.  This leads to an inability to always see the connections between what may at first glance seem disparate events. 

Leadership must be executed within context and by one who can see both the past and a plausible vision of the future.  Today, implausible visions of the future seem to be the rage and historical knowledge appears to be seen as anachronistic as the past is not seen to necessarily be prologue to the future. 

As we now face such challenges as health care reform being rammed down the collective American throat, deficits as far as the eye can see, rising international powers, proliferating WMDs and general international anarchy, it would be nice to have leadership that really gets the connections between the past and the future, as opposed to idealistic mirages as so many in our leadership class have, if they have any vision whatsoever.

Problems that seemed postponable for a couple of decades have leapt into the present as a result of the Great Recession, and Greeks have the choice of becoming noticeably poorer, or catastrophically poorer while taking down a good part of the financial world with them. The old game is over, and the national tantrum might take Greece over the edge."

What sober observer of America would be unable to envision a similar situation at some point in our own future?  If you can't, you're not looking very hard and if you can, no one is probably listening.  So what is today a Greek tragedy could well be a portent of things to come including an American tragedy in the not so distant future...

Of course, as I always say, this is not preordained.  No true Sibyl  has yet spoken oracularly and seen the definitive future.  There is time for a different path to be taken.

One of the most important but least-noted items in Friday’s employment report was the loss of 41,000 state and local government jobs. Real estate and related tax revenues bulked up local government spending during the boom, and how they are unsupportable. This is old news, but the market is more in need of reminder than instruction. The reminders will come frequently enough."

Given the democratization of technology to empower small groups to wreak the type of harm previously requiring either a state's backing or, at least large military campaigns, it is not an absurdity to be concerned about the severity of the threats churning in those areas not currently connected to the global system...

 Obama wants to manage conflict through the institutionalization of cooperation while focusing on domestic concerns.  It's an intriguing wager: betting that others will take on responsibility and be willing to cooperate effectively enough that we can greatly reduce our international responsibilities while reforming our society. 

With American preponderance and relative security of its homeland, a pre-emptive war against the Soviet Union would have been a very credible option, in this author’s opinion. If the Soviet ideology was to be believed, a future war would have been unavoidable. Stalinist or Molotovian politics would have stirred up the system to promote the cause of communism. Without MAD, force would have been a viable means to end communism. There would have been no dilemma of conciliating the use of nuclear weapons with the irrationality of a suicidal war.[27] On the other side of this non-nuclear Cold War the USSR would not be pressured to seek coexistence, and could have benefited from the constant fear of invasion and crisis. For these reasons this author believes that nuclear weapons saved humanity from a darker Cold War that could have been more likely to have turned hot."

A very good article that does a good job of highlighting the superficiality of the notion of a non-nuclear world.  This one from the New York Times no less and shockingly enough.

Part of the article is below,


"Moreover, even when the fear of American power is a factor in a country’s quest for W.M.D., the fear of our nuclear weapons usually isn’t. Saddam Hussein wasn’t chasing fissile material because he thought the United States would drop an ICBM on Baghdad. For rogue states, the bomb is an obvious way to offset America’s enormous conventional military advantage — and this will hold true no matter how low our nuclear stockpiles go.

This doesn’t mean that America shouldn’t enter into reasonable arms control agreements. But linking the antiproliferation agenda to the dream of universal abolition makes an already difficult problem even harder to solve.

It’s precisely because the proliferation problem is so difficult, though, that the “Global Zero” movement can feel superficially appealing. The Munich nuclear-abolition panel took place just 24 hours before Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ordered his scientists to forge ahead with uranium enrichment. Faced with yet another round of Iranian brinkmanship, you can understand why Western leaders might prefer to talk about a world without nuclear weapons. By making the issue bigger, more long-term and more theoretical, they can almost make it seem to go away.

But when it comes to containing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, the existing American arsenal simply isn’t part of the problem. And if Iran does acquire the bomb, our nuclear deterrent will quickly become an important part of the solution."

The editors pick up another theme that is familiar to readers of this blog:

“In trying to avert dangerous climate change, governments are aiming for something extraordinary. They want to transform the global economy because of a hypothesis for which the evidence is mostly inaccessible to the layman.

It is the biggest pre-emption in history, and it relies on collective trust in science.”

For Mr. Obama and his successors, the effect of those projections is clear: Unless miraculous growth, or miraculous political compromises, creates some unforeseen change over the next decade, there is virtually no room for new domestic initiatives for Mr. Obama or his successors. Beyond that lies the possibility that the United States could begin to suffer the same disease that has afflicted Japan over the past decade. As debt grew more rapidly than income, that country’s influence around the world eroded.

Or, as Mr. Obama’s chief economic adviser, Lawrence H. Summers, used to ask before he entered government a year ago, “How long can the world’s biggest borrower remain the world’s biggest power?”

The Chinese leadership, which is lending much of the money to finance the American government’s spending, and which asked pointed questions about Mr. Obama’s budget when members visited Washington last summer, says it thinks the long-term answer to Mr. Summers’s question is self-evident. The Europeans will also tell you that this is a big worry about the next decade."

Read this and the below post on "Instrumentality vs. Institutionalization" and one can easily see the writing on the wall is petrifying.

One of my new favorite blogs is now, Scholar's Stage.  I actually found it through my interactions over at Sublime Oblivion and I think it is quite excellent as it attempts to go far beneath the superficiality of so much of what passes for commentary in AMerica today.

One of its more recent posts refers to a fascinating theory of instrumentality vs. institutionalization.  In essense, things that eventually become institutions from states to churches to bureaucracies begin as instruments to achieve specific purposes.  Over time, the instruments decline and one they become "institutions" they becom calcified and more interested in their own self-perpetuation than in accomplishing anything worthy outside of their own existance.

The author's comments on the institutionalization of America, is both depressing and illuminating.  It shines a light on the real darkness of the problems America faces and it goes much deeper than partisan sniping would have one believe.

One should read the entire post, but here are several illustrative examples, including this quote he pulls from another blog while making his argument,

" 'A state is an instrument but it is only an instrument. It can be discarded if it ceases to be useful and becomes an end only for itself. Poland the state died but Poland the nation lived on. In the course of events, Poland was able to reacquire a state of its own. A nation acquired a state as its instrument. Similar to Poland, while the United States as a state apparatus may disappear, America the nation will endure. Constitutions are parchment. Laws are words on a page. Speeches are wind. Politicians are dust. Bureaucracies are passing. The empires of the past built merely on state power passed away eventually. Political communities built on surer foundations endured. Language endures. Land endures. Religion endures. History endures. Peoples endure. The American nation is a rock and upon this rock the true instrument of state will be built. If it isn’t the United States, it will be something else better adapted to our situation. Is the United States an instrument or an institution? The times we are in will tell...'"

He then goes on to make these comments,

"In the summer of 2008, the Bradley Project released a report on America's national identity titled "E Pluribus Unum". The report opened with an alarming statement:

To inform its work, the Bradley Project asked HarrisInteractive to conduct a study on Americans’ views on national identity. While 84 percent of the respondents still believe in a unique American identity, 63 percent believe this identity is weakening. Almost a quarter—24 percent—believe we are already so divided that a common national identity is impossible. In their minds, it is already too late. And young people—on whom our continued national identity depends— are less likely than older Americans to be proud of their country or to believe that it has a unique national identity.If the American nation is a rock, it is a rock eroded by time and warped by unrelenting exposure to hostile elements. A "surer foundation" it is not, nor will be.

If the American nation is a rock, it is a rock eroded by time and warped by unrelenting exposure to hostile elements. A "surer foundation" it is not, nor will be.

That America's ruling class has not moved to protect the American nation is unsurprising. The upper classes' isolation from their fellow citizens and identification with other members of the transnational elite play a part in this, I am sure. Yet there is a more fundamental reason for the upper classes' disengagement: perpetuating the American nation is simply not in the elite's best interest."

If America fails to find once more a tie that binds, its eventual descent into a torpor of self indulgence that may even border on irrelevancy will continue.  It may take two or three more generations for a "Rome" like collapse, but the outline of a looming catastrophe cannot be in doubt.  The American people and our leaders are sleepwalking towards an end goal that will lead us to a very bad place.

Unlike many who assume that as America falls as the lone "Superpower" someone else like China or a consortium of sorts made up of the newly rising powers like the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India China) will fill the void, I believe this end of American preponderance will usher in a neo-Middle Ages of chaos.  While something catastrophic will not happen all the time, with the proliferation of dangerous technology, when something catatrophic does happen, it will be shocking and destructive on a large scale.

America, as much by default as by design (perhaps, even more so by default), is the relative guarantor of stability.  We must find the strength within ourselves to guarantee that we do not allow this scenario to play out.  There will be no globalized governance that will make the mass of humanity sing from the same hymn book, there will only be anarchy without a Leviathan.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, most of the former Soviet republics and satellites found themselves cast adrift, not part of the Russian orbit and not really part of any other grouping. Moscow still held links to all of them, but it exercised few of its levers of control over them during Russia’s internal meltdown during the 1990s. During that period, a number of these states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Czechoslovakia to be exact — managed to spin themselves out of the Russian orbit and attach themselves to the European Union and NATO. Others — Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine — attempted to follow the path Westward, but have not succeeded at this point. Of these six, Ukraine is by far the most critical. It is not simply the most populous of Russia’s former possessions or the birthplace of the Russian ethnicity, it is the most important province of the former Russian Empire and holds the key to the future of Eurasia.

First, the incidental reasons. Ukraine is the Russian Empire’s breadbasket. It is also the location of nearly all of Russia’s infrastructure links not only to Europe, but also to the Caucasus, making it critical for both trade and internal coherence; it is central to the existence of a state as multiethnic and chronically poor as Russia. The Ukrainian port of Sevastopol is home to Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and Ukrainian ports are the only well-developed warm-water ports Russia has ever had. Belarus’ only waterborne exports traverse the Dnieper River, which empties into the Black Sea via Ukraine. Therefore, as goes Ukraine, so goes Belarus. Not only is Ukraine home to some 15 million ethnic Russians — the largest concentration of Russians outside Russia proper — they reside in a zone geographically identical and contiguous to Russia itself. That zone is also the Ukrainian agricultural and industrial heartland, which again is integrated tightly into the Russian core.

These are all important factors for Moscow, but ultimately they pale before the only rationale that really matters: Ukraine is the only former Russian imperial territory that is both useful and has a natural barrier protecting it."

There are two major yet unrelated conflicts taking place in Yemen—the Sunni and Al Qaeda-linked separatist threat in the central south of the country (a major concern of the United States) and a Shia uprising in the north (alarming to the Yemenis and Saudis, possibly supported by Iran, but of little relevance to the rest of the world). And carefully distinguishing between the two is critical to keep the US out of a real quagmire."

A crucial question is whether a government could hide weapons-grade fissile material from any possible inspection verification. Considering that enough plutonium to make a bomb could be hidden in the freezing compartment of my refrigerator or to evade radiation detection could be hidden at the bottom of the water in a well, I think only the fear of a whistle-blower could possibly make success at all questionable. I believe that a “responsible” government would make sure that fissile material would be available in an international crisis or war itself. A responsible government must at least assume that other responsible governments will do so.

We are so used to thinking in terms of thousands, or at least hundreds, of nuclear warheads that a few dozen may offer a sense of relief. But if, at the outset of what appears to be a major war, or the imminent possibility of major war, every responsible government must consider that other responsible governments will mobilize their nuclear weapons base as soon as war erupts, or as soon as war appears likely, there will be at least covert frantic efforts, or perhaps purposely conspicuous efforts, to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible. And what then?
…
In summary, a “world without nuclear weapons” would be a world in which the United States, Russia, Israel, China, and half a dozen or a dozen other countries would have hair-trigger mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer delivery systems, and would have prepared targets to preempt other nations’ nuclear facilities, all in a high-alert status, with practice drills and secure emergency communications. Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world."

Getting rid of nuclear weapons is not only "difficult", it is, as I argue, impossible for anyone who intends to be prudent.

China has changed a great deal in the past century, but it has remained the same in one respect: It is still ruled by a religious concept of politics. Legitimacy is not based on the give and take, the necessary compromises, the wheeling and dealing that form the basis of an economic concept of politics such as that underpinning liberal democracy. Instead, the foundation of religious politics is a shared belief, imposed from above, in ideological orthodoxy."
 
I think this shows quite well that despite the convergence of so much in the economic realm, culture and history can still play a large role in maintaining widely divergent views on things as fundamental as how to organize the society in which one lives.

Ahmed Said: No, Obama is not too soft on anything, but he needs more time to sort our his agenda list to reach better decisions. 

Tobias P. Fella : I agree with Ahmed. Obama is no too soft on anything concerning the national security of the United States. He just made the statement, that the Bush-administration undermined US-ideals, when going to war against international extremism (rule of law, human rights, the adherence of the Geneva Conventions and so on). Obama wants to set a new cours to restablish the liberal hegemony of the United States. He wants Washington to act as benign hegemon again, because that was the strategy which made the US a strong and attractive global power. To achieve this Obama takes a step back to multilateralism, the usage of soft power and also to cooperation.

Despite of that Obama surely isn't selling out the security of the United States. My assumption is based on various arguments. I just want to name a few: First even for the new president there is a war on terror, which has to be fought with military power, and not by the police and domestic law. He wants the terrorists to be judged by military commissions, not by federal courts. Further, he continues with the practice of preventive detention. Of course he has forbidden torture and wants to close Guantanamo, but he proceeds with the so called "rendition", the transfer of accused to countries without high huming rights standards. And at last he instructed the army and intelligence to go on with targeted killing. So where is Mr Obama too soft when dealing with international terrorism?

Me: I agree that Obama has clearly used force in dealing with terrorism. Indeed, he has used more of it than many of his more liberal supporters probably expected or desired. My point is that by his placing "international law" on such a pedestal that it gives the impression of being sacrosanct despite it not being updated to address contemporary security challenges, indicates an embrace of abstract theorizing suitable for scholars, not suitable for policymakers. Obama "appears" weak. If that appearance persists long enough then it will become conventional wisdom. Once that happens, the validity of what legitimate actions he takes will matter little, the appearance will be all important. President Obama should make the American people feel he will stop at nothing to prevent terrorist acts on American soil. That is how President Bush got reelected in 2004 despite much antipathy towards him from a great number of Americans. Obama's cerebral take on his role as Commander in Chief appeals to intellectuals, it does not appeal to main street Americans. For better and for worse, the Ameeican character and psychological profile must be taken into account in order for an American leader to be a success. President Obama is treading dangerous ground here politically and, if his legal instincts win out over his leadership instincts, he may well discover belatedly the flaw of such "intellectualizing."

Samir Awwad: Dear Greg,

was it "intellectualizing" that defined the change as American voters appeared to be fed up with easy answers and traffic-light style security warnings, wasn`t it?

I don`t agree that the law for conducting battles is to be changed in any dimension. Al-Qaida choose a tactic of camouflaged attacks on primarily civilian targets. And as we know attacking civilians is a war-crime and not wearing a uniform but a weapon is valid for summary execution under international law.

The question of international law firstly appeared with the Iraq invasion and the matter of civil rights under the light of increased security measures at the home front.

Public opinion turned against Guantanamo when people asked if the inmates are really non-uniformed combatants or eventually innocent and who judges over this.

I think Obama is aware that those "terrorists" usually (under international convention) should be executed immediately after they are caught.

Or if we look at what happened in Guantanamo maybe should ask the cynic question if they not preferred to be shot at the end of the day.

In my opinion we should be happy with international law, as it allows us to treat Al-Qaida as combatants as long they are hosted by governments ( Afghanistan) or in the Yemeni outback (as foreign non-uniformed combatants). What if we had to treat them in accordance to the law of their countries origins?

Me: Samir-

I appreciate the comment. I completely concur that there are not easy answers to the issue of terrorism and even made it clear that it is not possible to prevent all possible terrorist acts.

That said, I am not certain that President Obama does believe, as you state, that "'terrorists' (under international convention) should be executed immediately after they are caught."

If that were the case, why have a civilian trial with KSM under U.S. criminal law?

Now I will return to the Stratfor argument I referred to in my inital comment, which I find persuasive (I apologize for the length, but I think all of these sections are highly relevant)

Here is the link to the Stratfor piece,


" International law is actually not particularly ambiguous about the status of the members of al Qaeda. The Geneva Conventions do not apply to them because they have not adhered to a fundamental requirement of the Geneva Conventions, namely, identifying themselves as soldiers of an army. Doing so does not mean they must wear a uniform. The postwar Geneva Conventions make room for partisans, something older versions of the conventions did not. A partisan is not a uniformed fighter, but he must wear some form of insignia identifying himself as a soldier to enjoy the conventions’ protections. As Article 4.1.6 puts it, prisoners of war include “Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.” The Geneva Conventions of 1949 does not mention, nor provide protection to, civilians attacking foreign countries without openly carrying arms.

The reasoning behind this is important. During the Franco-Prussian war, French franc-tireurs fired on Prussian soldiers. Ununiformed and without insignia, they melded into the crowd. It was impossible for the Prussians to distinguish between civilians and soldiers, so they fired on both, and civilian casualties resulted. The framers of the Geneva Conventions held the franc-tireurs, not the Prussian soldiers, responsible for the casualties. Their failure to be in uniform forced the Prussians to defend themselves at the cost of civilian lives. The franc-tireurs were seen as using civilians as camouflage. This was regarded as outside the rules of war, and those who carried out such acts were seen as not protected by the conventions. They were not soldiers, and were not to be treated as such.

Extending protections to partisans following World War II was seen as a major concession. It was done with concerns that it not be extended so far that combatants of irregular forces could legally operate using their ability to blend in with surrounding civilians, and hence a requirement of wearing armbands. The status of purely covert operatives remained unchanged: They were not protected under the Geneva Conventions. Their status remained ambiguous.

During World War II, it was U.S. Army practice to hold perfunctory trials followed by executions. During the Battle of the Bulge, German commandos captured wearing U.S. uniforms — in violation of the Geneva Conventions — were summarily tried in field courts-martial and executed. The idea that such individuals were to be handed over to civilian courts was never considered. The actions of al Qaeda simply were not anticipated in the Geneva Conventions. And to the extent they were expected, they violated the conventions.

Holder’s decision to transfer Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to federal court makes it clear that Mohammed was not a soldier acting in time of war, but a criminal. While during times of war spies are tried as criminals, their status is precarious, particularly if they are members of an enemy army. Enemy soldiers out of uniform carrying out reconnaissance or espionage are subject to military, not civilian, justice, and frequently are executed. A spy captured in the course of collecting information is a civilian, particularly in peacetime, and normally is tried as a criminal with rules of evidence.

Which was Mohammed? Under the Geneva Conventions, his actions in organizing the Sept. 11 attacks, which were carried out without uniforms or other badges of a combatant, denies him status and protection as a POW. Logically, he is therefore a criminal, but if he is, consider the consequences...

The fact is that international law has not evolved to deal with persons like Mohammed. Or more precisely, most legal discussion under international law is moving counter to the Geneva Conventions’ intent, which was to treat the franc-tireurs as unworthy of legal protection because they were not soldiers and were violating the rules of war. International law wants to push Mohammed into a category where he doesn’t fit, providing protections that are not apparent under the Geneva Conventions. The United States has shoved him into U.S. criminal law, where he doesn’t fit either, unless the United States is prepared to accept reciprocal liability for CIA personnel based in the United States planning and supporting operations in third countries. The United States has never claimed, for example, that the KGB planners who operated agents in the United States on behalf of the Soviet Union were themselves subject to criminal prosecution.

A new variety of warfare has emerged in which treatment as a traditional POW doesn’t apply and criminal law doesn’t work. Criminal law creates liabilities the United States doesn’t want to incur, and it is not geared to deal with a terrorist like Mohammed. U.S. criminal law assumes that capture is in the hands of law enforcement officials. Rights are prescribed and demanded, including having lawyers present and so forth. Such protections are practically and theoretically absurd in this case: Mohammed is not a soldier and he is not a suspected criminal presumed innocent until proven guilty. Law enforcement is not a practical counter to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A nation cannot move from the rules of counterterrorism to an American courtroom; they are incompatible modes of operation. Nor can a nation use the code of criminal procedures against a terrorist organization operating transnationally. Instead, they must be stopped before they commit their action, and issuing search warrants and allowing attorneys present at questioning is not an option...

The real problem here is international law, which does not address acts of war committed by non-state actors out of uniform. Or more precisely, it does, but leaves them deliberately in a state of legal limbo, with captors left free to deal with them as they wish. If the international legal community does not like the latter, it is time they did the hard work of defining precisely how a nation deals with an act of war carried out under these circumstances.

The international legal community has been quite vocal in condemning American treatment of POWs after 9/11, but it hasn’t evolved international law, even theoretically, to cope with this. Sept. 11 is not a crime in the proper sense of the term, and prosecuting the guilty is not the goal. Instead, it was an act of war carried out outside the confines of the Geneva Conventions."

It would seem that the response is to push for a more tailored international legal approach- namely that acts such as those by KSM or the "Christmas Bomber" should be explicitly considered acts of war by non-uniformed actors and not subject Geneva Covention protections at which point the target nation is given the explicit authority to deal with them according to whatever mechanism they choose.

Subsequently, Obama would be wise to not afford such actors the protections of the U.S. civilian court system, but exclusively utilize military tribunals.

Not pushing along both of these avenues will keep Obama mired in limbo and stuck with a label that he will never shed."

As I reflect further, I also believe it will continue to be important for the U.S. to refine our ability to "connect the dots" from discrete pieces of intelligence.  President Obama is claiming that he is moving in this direction.  Time will tell if this will turn out to be the case.  The bottom line is that President Obama is developing a credibility gap on this issue.  He does have the opportunity to rectify this.  The question is will he do so or will he think too much like a lawyer and not a commander in chief responsible for millions of lives?

I do think that for international law to really be taken seriously on this subject and be something more meaningful than a feel good pose for people to strike who have no responsibility, it will need to be modified along the lines I suggested in my last comment.  If not, then there will continue to be pious finger wagging by activists, but little more.  Indeed, Obama must come to grips with reality and substance vs. image and rhetoric.