There's nothing to suggest that this dynamic no longer operates, but new research is showing that advances in workplace automation are being deployed at a faster pace than ever, making it more difficult for workers to adapt and wreaking havoc on the middle class: the clerks, accountants, and production-line workers whose tasks can increasingly be mastered by software and robots. "Do I think we will have permanently high unemployment as a consequence of technology? No," says Peter Diamond, the MIT economist who won a 2010 Nobel Prize for his work on market imperfections, including those that affect employment. "What's different now is that the nature of jobs going away has changed. Communication and computer abilities mean that the type of jobs affected have moved up the income distribution."
There is a real silver lining here. Eventually people will become trained in the new technologies and that will likely mean more fulfilling, probably better paying jobs for many people. This is very similar to how the Industrial Revolution displaces so many farmers, but yielded incredible enhancements in quality of life (after awhile at least).
The problem is, however, that in the interim period, long bouts of displacement breed resentment, sociological disturbances and (as we seem to see all the time), political volatility.
Consequently, the transition is going to be painful for the majority of people as they change their lifestyles and workplaces. Hopefully, the tumult of this will soon start to be offset by what should be the inevitable gains. But the timing is important. Long-term, perceived structural unemployment will create that unpleasant and tumultuous backlash.
If that gets out of hand, then all bets could be off.
In the past I have posted extensively on what I think will be the most likely outcome of a retrenchment by AMerica from global affairs. Here are several representative pieces:
Welfare at Home, Weakness Abroad
Why do I mention these pieces. Because now Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the foreign policy establishment (and for those that believe in Black Helicopters, one of the founders of the dreaded Trilateral Commission), is writing about it in Foreign Policy magazine and is soon having a new book come out on the subject.
Note this,
"For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes...
...No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue."
Charles Krauthammer is probably my favorite columnist. I have long thought him to be the most cogent writer critiquing President Obama. He was scathing, but respectful which is something many who dislike the President seem to refuse to be.
However, his latest column is truly great because it makes a compelling case for why we must engage in politics. He does this in a round about way that touches on the search for sentient life beyond our own planet. This may seem a strange segue into a conversation about the need for politics, but it is, in fact one of the best.
Here are several relevant sections,
"...Modern satellite data, applied to the Drake Equation, suggest that the number should be very high. So why the silence? Carl Sagan (among others) thought that the answer is to be found, tragically, in the final variable: the high probability that advanced civilizations destroy themselves.
In other words, this silent universe is conveying not a flattering lesson about our uniqueness but a tragic story about our destiny. It is telling us that intelligence may be the most cursed faculty in the entire universe — an endowment not just ultimately fatal but, on the scale of cosmic time, nearly instantly so.
This is not mere theory. Look around. On the very day that astronomers rejoiced at the discovery of the two Earth-size planets, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity urged two leading scientific journals not to publish details of lab experiments that had created a lethal and highly transmittable form of bird flu virus, lest that fateful knowledge fall into the wrong hands.
Wrong hands, human hands. This is not just the age of holy terror but also the threshold of an age of hyper-proliferation. Nuclear weapons in the hands of half-mad tyrants (North Korea) and radical apocalypticists (Iran) are only the beginning. Lethal biologic agents may soon find their way into the hands of those for whom genocidal pandemics loosed upon infidels are the royal road to redemption."
He concludes by waxing lyrically on how politics, for all its grunginess and stupidity, at the core, is the necessary precondition for surviving and channeling our intelligence, if we can, in a way so as to avoid true catastrophe.
"We grow justly weary of our politics. But we must remember this: Politics — in all its grubby, grasping, corrupt, contemptible manifestations — is sovereign in human affairs. Everything ultimately rests upon it.
Fairly or not, politics is the driver of history. It will determine whether we will live long enough to be heard one day. Out there. By them, the few — the only — who got it right."
So haunting and so potentially prophetic. This is why anyone who engages with politics, and does so for the right reasons, is worthy of respect.
I once was engaged in an interesting e-mail exchange with someone whose opinion I valued a great deal. It went back and forth some as we discussed democracy and its future prospects here in the United States. We touched on the "Tytler Cycle" and many other items. I thought this discourse useful for those who want to consider our current state of affairs. By the way as a side note, apparently the Tytler Cycle is a bit of a misnomer as it appears to be an amalgamation of two different quotes not originally from the purported author. Nonetheless, the concept is what is more important than that technicality.
The exchange begins below:
I think the Tytler cycle is largely accurate and that it does reflect on the flawed nature of humans. The striking thing is that because democracy is a product of flawed humans, it contains within itself the seeds of its own demise, so that even though it may well be better than alternatives, its aspirations are ultimately somewhat utopian.
Unlike Marxism and those who like any form of millennial apocalypse, the utopians of democracy may be a bit more tempered in their enthusiasms. It seems they think it possible that while they have not necessarily "solved" the flaw of man, they have at least tamed it enough that it can be sublimated into other pursuits- like seeking wealth and recognition in the context of community. The Alexanders, Caesars and Napoleons of a democratic age are more likely to be a Bill Gates or, at worst, a Rockefeller than the military conquerors of old. That was, if I recollect, a significant element of Fukuyama's thesis about "recognition."
Yet, it seems that even the balances of power brought about through the separation of powers in the Montesquieu sense, though very wisely devised, still cannot overcome human nature's desire for power and/or ease. Those seem to me the Scylla and Charybdis through which a form of government that would be permanent would have to sail. The desire for power of those who feed off of it and the general sloth of the many in the so-called "masses." Those two very human traits unwittingly conspire together to overthrow the only form of government that can bring a modicum of meaningfully peaceful recognition to the human condition. But they always do conspire and set the Tytler cycle (or, depending on one's taste, the Toynbee or Spengler or even Gibbon cycle) in motion.
So I do think it is the human condition that is the fatal flaw, unfortunately, I think that flaw overwhelms even the best efforts to compensate for it. The best we can hope for is a constant shifting between various poles of the condition in order to walk the tightrope that gives us the best possible life. In that sense its a constant and noble pursuit.
Navigating a world filled with flawed humans requires a great deal of dexterity. Institutions, even the best, atrophy and require someone like a "statesman" to reinvigorate them. Each cycle of atrophy and resurrection plays out over a long period of time but those are the oscillations that comprise History. The Tytler Cycle is inescapable. We don't have any Pericles, Ciceros or Washingtons available to us. Democracy will fade, only to return. Its just I fear we are living in the waning time of one great period.
Again, though, we have no choice but to struggle mightily, even if we fail. I know Teddy Roosevelt would not be your favorite, but this seems very appropriate,
"The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat."
After I wrote the above, I began reading Kissinger's memoirs ( believe it or not I have never read them, but have most of his other works). I came across this and while not entirely surprised at its similarity to my own thoughts, it was interesting how much I seem to relate to his tragic sense of the human condition.
"History knows no resting places and no plateaus. All societies of which history informs us went through periods of decline; most of them eventually collapsed. Yet there is a margin between necessity and accident, in which the statesman by perseverance and intuition must choose and thereby shape the destiny of his people. To ignore objective conditions is perilous; to hide behind historical inevitability is tantamount to moral abdication; it is to neglect the elements of strength and hope and inspiration which through the centuries have sustained mankind. The statesman's responsibility is to struggle against transitoriness and not to insist that he be paid in the coin of eternity. He may know that history is the foe of permanence; but no leader is entitled to resignation. He owes it to his people to strive, to create, and to resist the decay that besets all human institutions."
I don't always like David Brooks, but his op-ed in today's New York Times hits on some very interesting themes regarding the unique challenges America and America's economy face today. He attempts, and I think he does so very well, to debunk the notion that was so popular at the beginning of the Obama Administration that we are in a new "Progressive Era."
He does this in ways that would both appeal and, quite possibly terrify conservatives. In my mind the most searing line in the piece is the following,
"One hundred years ago, we had libertarian economics but conservative values. Today we have oligarchic economics and libertarian moral values — a bad combination."
He goes on to say,
"In sum, in the progressive era, the country was young and vibrant. The job was to impose economic order. Today, the country is middle-aged but self-indulgent. Bad habits have accumulated. Interest groups have emerged to protect the status quo. The job is to restore old disciplines, strip away decaying structures and reform the welfare state. The country needs a productive midlife crisis."
Many, if not practically all, self described conservatives would declare the Progressive Era as a very bad thing, something almost like an "Original Sin." So to ever say anything positive about it at all would strike them as heretical. However, one thing to keep in mind is that when there is too much stratification in society, that society becomes unstable and prone to overact to both internal and external shocks.
We may be nearing a tipping point in America from which we cannot return. It is incumbent upon leaders to be far more aggressive than they have been and it will require major changes in our own personal self-indulgences too.
We should certainly should not hold the Progressive Era up as our be all and end all model, but neither should we entirely discount the inexact analogies it may offer for our own increasingly troubled times and much of it has to do with our values. No technical tweaks to our system can overcome a degenerated value system, because a value system unable to hold its own will succumb to every stray gust of wind that blows its way.

"There is a constant drumbeat on both sides of the Atlantic that we must enhance NATO and make sure its up to the multifarious challenges of a globalized world. This is a questionable assertion by its advocates. By contrast, it seems increasingly likely that the new global security infrastructure should be built on a foundation of regionalism.
As I have previously argued, the US, for as long as it remains the single most powerful nation in the world, should play a pivotal role in each of several key security institutions. Yet these institutions should remain regional, focusing on their own neighborhoods so that they can be more effective, rather than morphing into grandiose institutions with ambitions far exceeding their capabilities.
For the trans-Atlantic world, NATO is, unfortunately, becoming a prime example of an institution that is flailing about in the globalized post- Cold War world. Its most recent attempt to maintain relevance above and beyond what it should be is its relatively ill-fated Libya intervention.
This sideshow theater has done much to advertise both Europe’s incapacity and America’s unwillingness to do what is necessary to win in a small-scale conflict. Additionally, there are serious questions why this was ever done in the first place. If it was really engaged in due to the hazy concept of "Right to Protect", then it is really quite embarrassing to see what is happening simultaneously in Syria.
Indeed, one can make a cogent argument that the Assad regime crackdown in Syria is of far more strategic importance to the region than whatever Colonel Qadaffi has been doing. However, the point is, if one is to engage, they must engage fully. This, NATO has emphatically not done and it is visible to other nations and growing power centers in the world.
The take away from this sorry state of affairs is that NATO should remain focused on European stability, not out of theater operations. Efforts, like Libya, to use NATO outside of Europe leave much to be desired. Fundamentally, it is making the Atlantic Alliance look weaker not stronger.
Meanwhile, though it is true that threats in the new, globalized world are vastly different than those previously confronted in the pre and post World War II eras, their amorphous nature does not lend itself to having to create institutions that are all things to all people. It makes little sense why NATO should be involved in Asian security competition for the long run. By contrast, something akin to the old SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization), would make perfect sense in the region.
Yes, the old SEATO disbanded due to the fractiousness of its members. However, with the rise of China and threats like terrorism, piracy off the Somali coast, Indo-Pakistani tensions and a nuclearized North Korea, there could be renewed interest in a security system for the region. Overlapping membership with the ASEAN and APEC would be guaranteed.
It could also serve as a useful balancer to the Shaghai Cooperation Organization, but not necessarily make membership contingent upon the domestic political structure of various interested states. Though it would probably need to exclude China as a direct member, it should certainly look for something akin to the NATO-Russia council to assuage legitimate Chinese concerns.
Also, given the importance of East Asia to the future economic order of the world, a "Quadrilateral Commission" comprised of the U.S. China, India and, possibly Japan should also be sought out for both additional economic discussions and, peer-to-peer military exercises.
Meanwhile, the U.S. should pursue more robust engagement with Brazil in South America and seek a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization" that might deal not only with Marxist revisionists like Hugo Chavez, but also drug cartels.
Certainly, this is all very rough in conception, but the point is, there is an increasing need to become focused on regions. By making security architectures appropriately focused, they can avoid becoming empty hulks that do little more than offer superficial comfort."
"The key for the future of NATO is to once again establish a clear strategic rationale for its existence. This was a relatively easy task during the Cold War, when the threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was very real and perceived as existential. In the years since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, this is obviously no longer the case. NATO's actions since that time, in terms of its use of military force against Serbia during the Kosovo crisis in the 1990s and its extensive work in Afghanistan, illustrate how NATO can work and how it really cannot.
The key question is this: Should NATO in the twenty-first century be used primarily to defend Europe from external aggression while also facilitating intra-European stability, or is it to be a platform for external stabilizing missions in other geographic regions, such as the Middle East or East Asia?
The answer is that it should remain focused on what it can do and do well.
If NATO was largely created "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down," as stated memorably by the Alliance's first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, this should in large measure be maintained as a raison d'etre. The questions of Russia and Germany continue to be, as they always have been, of paramount importance to European stability. NATO can and should deal with this. The Alliance should remain a serious player in Europe, capable of defending against any potential external aggression, especially coming from Russia (even though this scenario seems highly unlikely any time in the foreseeable future). It should also retain the ability to maintain a sense of order in the continually tumultuous southern side of Europe, especially the Balkan tinderbox.
That being said, NATO must re-examine its capacity to engage in missions outside of Europe, and should probably scale back any extra-European ambitions. The fiscal and military resources are not available to engage in global operations, and the scarce resources that are available are better spent in the European neighborhood.
Referring again to the Kosovo air campaign, it appears that NATO can use force effectively when deployed against malefactors within the general European area. By contrast, although NATO has played a significant role in Afghanistan, the ambiguities of general policy towards that nation and the larger issues pertaining in particular to stability in Pakistan have made it a far less successful endeavor. Granted, much of this is due to internal policy divisions within the United States, which is quite evidently the largest player in the Afghan theatre. However, the projection capabilities of NATO are not all that impressive when looking outside of Europe. Attempting to bolster that in order to essentially become some kind of global constabulary force seems unwise.
At the end of the day, each region of the world will require its own multilateral (though not pan-global) institutions.
The US will, for as long as it remains the single most powerful nation in the world, play a key role in each of these regional institutions. Yet these institutions should remain regional, focusing on their own neighborhoods so that they can be more effective, rather than morphing into grandiose institutions with ambitions far exceeding capabilities. That is a sure-fire recipe for ineffective institutions that spend more time talking than acting on the imperatives of the moment."
"There is a great deal of fear emerging in both the United States and East Asian nations such as Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam over a recently assertive China. Barring a fundamental transformation in the way international relations has always worked, the anarchical "state of nature" described by Thomas Hobbes and the theory of Realism indicate that conflict with China is virtually inevitable.
There are also those that dismiss these fears. They indicate China is unlikely to ever engage in overly dangerous behavior and that any current bellicosity will moderate in time as China becomes further enmeshed in the global economic order. These dismissals, however, miss a key point. The point is not what China will do in the immediate future. The real point is what will China COULD do in the future.
Fear is not based upon a certainty of what will occur, but upon the uncertainty of what might occur and make no mistake; fear and interest are perpetual drivers of human activity. They are the stuff of which history is comprised.
The fundamental problem of international relations is its anarchical nature. Whether one is a "classical realist" in the Morgenthau mould or a "structural realist" in the Waltz mould, anarchy is the core problem that frames how all states interact with each other. At the end of the day, there is no transnational, "global cop" or global Leviathan that can enforce international law. Indeed, force is the ultimate arbiter of international relations. Always has been and always will be.
Law and the "institutionalization" of law by embedding states into a legal framework is effective only so long as more interests are served than harmed and a real balance of power is achieved. When the balance shifts, institutions atrophy and become largely irrelevant from a practical standpoint. While they may manage to retain some amount of symbolic value, their inability to act in a concrete fashion fundamentally inhibits their usefulness. This is because law is an agreed upon code of conduct. When agreement falters and compromise is no longer possible for one side or both sides, what is left to enforce a given claim? As Mao himself bluntly stated, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." This is truly a Hobbesian State of Nature.
As a given nation's economic clout grows, interests inevitably expand and run into those interests of others once they become large enough.
China’s interests are now quite large. While it appears that it seeks to negotiate outcomes within the current global trading order for the most part, China’s aforementioned actions in the South China Sea showcase a more "Westphalian" as opposed to "Kantian" notion of international relations.
These actions are most likely taken for the same reason analogous actions have always been taken. Namely, because at a certain point, a once advantageous law will become a straitjacket. At that point, law takes the back seat and interest is pursued by whatever is the most efficacious means.
This process ALWAYS happens. It happened to Athens. It happened to Rome. It has happened every time a European power sought hegemony in Europe. It happened as the U.S. expanded its continental territory long before engaging in World Wars. It happened to a certain degree already with various previous dynasties in China.
This brings us full circle, for this same process is now happening (again) with China. The fears mentioned at the outset are thus not overhyped. It doesn't matter what the present leadership of China wants, or even the next generation. China’s capabilities are what count. As various military capabilities are enhanced, subtle hedging becomes essential. Fear begins to begat further fear and the vicious cycle of the past reasserts its seemingly inexorable logic.
History teaches by inexact analogies, so the future could be different, perhaps, amazingly different from the past. Yet, a reasonable statesman must, by virtue of their position, assume that the vicissitudes of fortune will impact them in ways similar to their predecessors.
China’s rise is but merely the latest rise to instill fear due to the very nature of the world we live in."
With an officer whose background is in transportation and special operations chosen to head the entire Air Force, a cultural revolution is well under way. Fighter planes and their pilots will not loom as large in the future as they have in the recent past."
The drawings, discovered in 2006 on computers owned by Swiss businessmen, included essential details for building a compact nuclear device that could be fitted on a type of ballistic missile used by Iran and more than a dozen developing countries, the report states...
These advanced nuclear weapons designs may have long ago been sold off to some of the most treacherous regimes in the world," Albright wrote in a draft report about the blueprint's discovery...
The A.Q. Khan smuggling ring was previously known to have provided Libya with design information for a nuclear bomb. But the blueprints found in 2006 are far more troubling, Albright said in his report. While Libya was given plans for an older and relatively unsophisticated weapon that was bulky and difficult to deliver, the newly discovered blueprints offered instructions for building a compact device, the report said. The lethality of such a bomb would be little enhanced, but its smaller size might allow for delivery by ballistic missile."
Again, the problem is that it is not just state based actors we have to worry about, but greedy businessmen looking to make money.
So let's by all means end the hand-wringing and embrace the responsibility to protect, wherever necessary and feasible. Let's spare the thousands of innocents, punish the wicked, oppose tyrants, and support democrats – both in places where it is now fashionable to do so (Burma) and in places where it is not (Iraq). If that turns out to be Mr. Obama's foreign policy, it will be a worthy one. It does come oddly close to the Bush Doctrine."
How strange would that be if a President Obama embraced the most significant concept of the now oft maligned "Cowboy from Texas?"
At any rate, I have grown skeptical of our ability to do too much to change societies, at least within the a domestically politically palatable horizon. The consequence of Iraq will likely continue to loom large and it may well be poor people like those in Zimbabwe who pay the price for years to come as the struggle to unshackle themselves from their own Saddam Husseins persist as Americans merely observe the news and shake their heads in despair.
Gary Hart, former Democratic candidate for President in 1984, is actually a rather good writer and this article is a perspective that I think is gaining currency. I also think he may be right. We are now ready for a liberal revival unlike any since the rise of FDR.
As Hart asserts, 1932-1968 was the age of FDR and 1968-2008 is the Age of Reagan. Now he claims the next three to four decades may be the Age of Obama, if Obama develops a comprehensive plan of reform which is now needed to combat too much time in conservative consolidation (at least by Hart's definition).
I think America is close to attempting this and is well along the way choosing the wrong road, the Road to Serfdom as Hayek would maintain. If Obama wins, Hayek loses and America will become a soft-Socialist state like those of Europe. The Republican Party may have made many errors and may well deserve much of the recent public negativity, but it is still the bulwark against the real threats that are out there. I think, sadly, we have few leaders able to articulate why Republicans are more right than wrong. While McCain offers some needed corrections to the brand and may save the GOP from a complete apocalypse on Election Day, I believe the conservative movement is losing the war. I believe the road to socialism is being travelled extensively by many.
I also believe it will take something large and dangerous to wake us up to confront the new dangers of the world. The dangers of intense global economic competition, WMD attacks facilitated through international proliferation black markets, the rise of possible peer military competitors like China, domestic entitlements programs that are unsustainable, and global climate change. The new buzzwords are "engagement", "cooperation", and "reintroduction." Unfortunately, this papers over some serious divergence of interests between us and others. America is the only nation with the power to effectively compel certain states to remain "in line." This may sound arrogant, but I defy anyone to tell me who else is prepared and/or capable. If we do choose to become a self centered, government subsidized population that is deaf to the the truth of real danger, we will not be prepared to assume the leadership so many casually claim we must embrace.
The essence of conservatism is to be careful where we go, not to dive into the complete unknown with a willful blindness. Conservatism does not mean no progress, it just means that we weigh our choices and realize tradition often has great wisdom, often greater than mere progress for progress sake.
I fear the desire for equality of outcome and a superficial understanding of "peace" is the currency of the day and it if it wins, we will all eventually lose far more than we comprehend at this moment of transitory challenge.
Woe be unto us and to the world, for when the devils outside gnash their teeth, we may not be ready and will pay in copious amounts of blood for our naive embrace of empty "change." We do need change, but it must be appropriately calibrated. While I have used this quote before, it bears repeating. So again from Henry Kissinger's magisterial dissertation, "A World Restored":
"But the attainment of peace is not as easy as the desire for it. Not for nothing is history associated with the figure of Nemesis, which defeats man by fulfilling his wishes in a different form or by answering his prayers too completely. Those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search of peace. Those whose quest for it seems unending appear least able to achieve tranquillity. Whenever peace—conceived as the avoidance of war—has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. Whenever the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable."
I hope we are not embracing emptiness for change, for if that is the what the new historical cycle represents, it the cycle of our inexorable decline, not our rejuvenation.