I have yet to have written much on the topic of transhumanism, but this is an important topic we need to concern ourselves with as the capabilities of technology may be growing too fast for our ethics to keep up with. 

Essentially, tanshumanism is the notion that man can eclipse himself through any number of different ways whether through bioengineering or cyberengineering, etc.  It posits that humans can and will be surpassed in intelligence and other capabilities and, for the most part, this is a good thing.

However, this obviously raises potentially terrifying ethical conundrums.  Probably, one of the greatest is the question as to how humans should be treated if something as far advanced beyond us as we are to other animals should emerge.  How should such "Supermen" treat us mere mortals that are way down on the so-called evolutionary chain?

This piece is part of a good blog hosted by the technology journal, the New Atlantis (named after the famous book of the same name by Francis Bacon).  It is part of a longer chain of blogs that is describing a debate among "tranhumanist" thinkers as to what a future morality should look like.  I was struck by the conclusion of the blog,

"It is surely true that there is an irreducible element of Enlightenment thinking in transhumanism, but it has little to do with transhumanist politics and morality per se, and is to be found rather in the topic of another of Prof. Hughes’s posts: scientific and technical progressivism. For the most part, though, transhumanism seems to rely on thinkers who reacted against Enlightenment liberal universalism, as is the case of Mill, whose utilitarian libertarianism explicitly eschews any rights foundation. Indeed, the éminence grise behind transhumanism may well be that great anti-liberal and anti-Enlightenment thinker Nietzsche. Too few transhumanists, if any, have fully come to grips with the significance of a crucial point of agreement with Nietzsche: that mankind is nothing other than a rope over an abyss, a rope leading to the Superman."

This dovetails with a recurring themehere at my own blog.  I even left the below comment to make the point there.

"It should be noted that without some transcendant entity of some kind capable of standing outside of what is rationally observable and making judgements, there is no way to erect a moral framework that is not parochial and utilitarian.

Universalism is impossible without transcendentalism.

Nietzsche understood that and understood the moral quandaries posed by this. Indeed, many travel down the road he did, few can match his ability to look the consequences in the eye... or the abyss as the case may well be."

Essentially, without God there can be no meaningful morality, none that can ever really be judged by any standard that exceeds the extreme finitude of our ability to experience and reason from that experience.  Yes, we may be able to "construct" some ethical system without a transcendant God, but it would ultimately be absurd because it would have no ultimate purpose.  it would be a temporary construction waiting to be torn down so a new morality could take its place.

We might as well be Nietzschean.

        

Stratfor once again has a great piece on what a poossible deal between the US and Iran might look like.  It is provocative, but definitely not outside the bounds of reason.

Contrary to what some say, the US can deal with regimes it disapproves of.  This doesn't mean I subscribe to the turn the other cheek mentality that has thus far been the hallmarks of the Obama Administration, however, if, as Stratfor outlines, FDR could deal with Stalin to defeat Hitler and Nixon (of all people, one of the staunchest anti-communists) could deal with Mao, then it would seem a current American President might be able to deal with Khameini or his selected figurehead, whether Ahmadinejad or otherwise.

Food for thought below from the full piece.

"Iraq, not nuclear weapons, is the fundamental issue between Iran and the United States. Iran wants to see a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq so Iran can assume its place as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf. The United States wants to withdraw from Iraq because it faces challenges in Afghanistan — where it will also need Iranian cooperation — and elsewhere. Committing forces to Iraq for an extended period of time while fighting in Afghanistan leaves the United States exposed globally. Events involving China or Russia — such as the 2008 war in Georgia — would see the United States without a counter. The alternative would be a withdrawal from Afghanistan or a massive increase in U.S. armed forces. The former is not going to happen any time soon, and the latter is an economic impossibility.

Therefore, the United States must find a way to counterbalance Iran without an open-ended deployment in Iraq and without expecting the re-emergence of Iraqi power, because Iran is not going to allow the latter to happen. The nuclear issue is simply an element of this broader geopolitical problem, as it adds another element to the Iranian tool kit. It is not a stand-alone issue.

The United States has an interesting strategy in redefining problems that involves creating extraordinarily alliances with mortal ideological and geopolitical enemies to achieve strategic U.S. goals. First consider Franklin Roosevelt’s alliance with Stalinist Russia to block Nazi Germany. He pursued this alliance despite massive political outrage not only from isolationists but also from institutions like the Roman Catholic Church that regarded the Soviets as the epitome of evil.

Now consider Richard Nixon’s decision to align with China at a time when the Chinese were supplying weapons to North Vietnam that were killing American troops. Moreover, Mao — who had said he did not fear nuclear war as China could absorb a few hundred million deaths — was considered, with reason, quite mad. Nevertheless, Nixon, as anti-Communist and anti-Chinese a figure as existed in American politics, understood that an alliance (and despite the lack of a formal treaty, alliance it was) with China was essential to counterbalance the Soviet Union at a time when American power was still being sapped in Vietnam.

Roosevelt and Nixon both faced impossible strategic situations unless they were prepared to redefine the strategic equation dramatically and accept the need for alliance with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. American history is filled with opportunistic alliances designed to solve impossible strategic dilemmas. The Stalin and Mao cases represent stunning alliances with prior enemies designed to block a third power seen as more dangerous.

It is said that Ahmadinejad is crazy. It was also said that Mao and Stalin were crazy, in both cases with much justification. Ahmadinejad has said many strange things and issued numerous threats. But when Roosevelt ignored what Stalin said and Nixon ignored what Mao said, they each discovered that Stalin’s and Mao’s actions were far more rational and predictable than their rhetoric. Similarly, what the Iranians say and what they do are quite different...

Consider the American interest. First, it must maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States cannot tolerate interruptions, and that limits the risks it can take. Second, it must try to keep any one power from controlling all of the oil in the Persian Gulf, as that would give such a country too much long-term power within the global system. Third, while the United States is involved in a war with elements of the Sunni Muslim world, it must reduce the forces devoted to that war. Fourth, it must deal with the Iranian problem directly. Europe will go as far as sanctions but no further, while the Russians and Chinese won’t even go that far yet. Fifth, it must prevent an Israeli strike on Iran for the same reasons it must avoid a strike itself, as the day after any Israeli strike will be left to the United States to manage.

Now consider the Iranian interest. First, it must guarantee regime survival. It sees the United States as dangerous and unpredictable. In less than 10 years, it has found itself with American troops on both its eastern and western borders. Second, it must guarantee that Iraq will never again be a threat to Iran. Third, it must increase its authority within the Muslim world against Sunni Muslims, whom it regards as rivals and sometimes as threats.

Now consider the overlaps. The United States is in a war against some (not all) Sunnis. These are Iran’s enemies, too. Iran does not want U.S. troops along its eastern and western borders. In point of fact, the United States does not want this either. The United States does not want any interruption of oil flow through Hormuz. Iran much prefers profiting from those flows to interrupting them. Finally, the Iranians understand that it is the United States alone that is Iran’s existential threat. If Iran can solve the American problem its regime survival is assured. The United States understands, or should, that resurrecting the Iraqi counterweight to Iran is not an option: It is either U.S. forces in Iraq or accepting Iran’s unconstrained role...

The strategic problem is, of course, Iranian power in the Persian Gulf. The Chinese model is worth considering here. China issued bellicose rhetoric before and after Nixon’s and Kissinger’s visits. But whatever it did internally, it was not a major risk-taker in its foreign policy. China’s relationship with the United States was of critical importance to China. Beijing fully understood the value of this relationship, and while it might continue to rail about imperialism, it was exceedingly careful not to undermine this core interest.

The major risk of the third strategy is that Iran will overstep its bounds and seek to occupy the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Certainly, this would be tempting, but it would bring a rapid American intervention. The United States would not block indirect Iranian influence, however, from financial participation in regional projects to more significant roles for the Shia in Arabian states. Washington’s limits for Iranian power are readily defined and enforced when exceeded.

The great losers in the third strategy, of course, would be the Sunnis in the Arabian Peninsula. But Iraq aside, they are incapable of defending themselves, and the United States has no long-term interest in their economic and political relations. So long as the oil flows, and no single power directly controls the entire region, the United States does not have a stake in this issue."

        

The recent news that the Dutch government fell due to its desire to maintain a contingent of troops in Afghanistan under the NATO banner should be quite concerning for advocates that NATO will be able to act as security alliance outside the confines of Europe itself.  Even Lord George Robertson, a former NATO Secretary General expressed serious concerns in  this piece.

This Atlantic Community piece prompted my below comments which I think dovetail quite a bit with what Lord Robertson states.

"It will be interesting if some other NATO member steps up to the plate and offers additional forces to make up for the pending loss of the Dutch. I suspect someone will, but it will be very limited in size and probably limited in terms of what their rules of engagement might be.

Overall, this is not that significant an event on its face, however, it may be a portent of things to come. To me, this is just a single example of why I am skeptical of the utility of transnational institutions on many issues. Absent an "existential" issue that unifies many different (and often competing nations), it is difficult to maintain a stable front when confronting challenges that require long-term committments, but are also subterranean or diffuse.

While I question whether Afghanistan can be put together in the way many in the West seem to want, and have argued this in article I previously wrote for the Atlantic Community, the Dutch case is indicative of a large problem for NATO that it may not be able to fundamentally resolve. Without the Soviet empire looming to the east, NATO has simply been unable to find and embrace a broad based, yet coherent strategic concept that gives it the impetus to continue being the "greatest alliance" in world history. By contrast, it seems more of a regional security mechanism that is trying to show itself capable of more than its infrastructure can actually bear.

NATO will always have a usefulness for intra-European issues like the Kosovo situation in the late 90s, but it will not be able to punch at its expected weight in external situations unless it has to to confront a threat of large proportion.

This isn't meant to denigrate NATO or suggest it be ignored. It is merely a call that policymakers begin adapting their plans to reflect an underlying reality as opposed to continuing to foist unrealistic objectives upon it.

Dealing with Afghanistan will require working with regional partners who have more at stake than the Europeans."

        

The Liberty Pen blog was kind enough to do a follow up debate with me.  Here is the link to its views on foreign policy and interventionism and mine.  I fully anticipate future debates on a variety of topics. 

Below are my comments on my general foreign policy vision, however, I encourage all to read the Liberty Pen's response as well as I think it is extremely well thought through and eloquent.

"I consider myself largely a "realist." I find myself drawn to the timeless insights of Thucydides as well as modern scholars of international relations such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger.
 However, while I would say I definitely lean in that direction, I find it difficult to completely accept the framework of balance of power that is implicit within classical and even neo-realism. While this concept is considered nearly sacrosanct for many, I think it is depressing. To believe that man must always live under the shadow cast by transitory alignments of power does not seem to me to be all that enobling, and I believe that nobility is something that all true statesman should aspire to.

While I believe the below quote from Kissinger's doctoral thesis encapsulates my overall vision of what a good statesman should be, I reserve the right to hope for something less ephemeral than what we have seen in previous eras dominated by these so-called balances of power.

"But the claims of the prophet are sometimes as dissolving as those of the conqueror. For the claims of the prophet are a counsel of perfection, and perfection implies uniformity. Utopias are not achieved except by a process of leveling and dislocation which must erode all patterns of obligation. These are the two great symbols of the attacks on the legitimate order: the Conqueror and the Prophet, the quest for universality and for eternity, for the peace of impotence and the peace of bliss.

But the statesman must remain forever suspicious of these efforts, not because he enjoys the pettiness of manipulation, but because he must be prepared for the worst contingency."

As for being isolationist, I am not. I believe that a desire to return to some idyllic image of the past borders on being a type of utopianism. The world has grown too interconnected with both opportunities, and more importantly, threats. When one lives in a world where a handful of men with access to the right technology can kill the number of people that used to take a full-scale army, we cannot be sanguine and wait to react after the fact. To this extent, I am not an opponent of the concept of preemption. While I believe one must be prudent in the deploying of force, as frivolous uses of military power undeniably degrade its potential, neither do I think we can afford to always wait until definitive proof is available.

As for the neoconservatives, I feel they largely attempted a noble project in Iraq, but they failed due to an inability to recognize the limitations of attemtpting to impose radical changes within a cultural milieu that they largely did not understand. To that end, they, not entirely unlike Marxists, became enraptured by utopianism. If a neoconservative was, as Irving Kristol famously asserted, a "liberal mugged by reality", I would have to say that I am something of a neoconservative mugged by reality as it relates to international relations. I do not hold onto their illusions and realize the eternal validity of much of what classical realism offers. However, I have to aspire and hope for others to aspire as well, to something higher than sacrificing upon the altar of power which seems so much of what realism passes for."

        

While it often may seem I am pessimistic about the future, I found a great article that highlights one way in which America might be able to continue living up to its global responsibilities.  It is essentially a review of an interesting book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050.  It contains the kernal of a controversial idea to be sure, but I think it has much validity- we need more immigration, not less.

This may seem counterintuitive to many, but if one looks at the demography of the US as well as other major (or currently major) powers, one will see that population declines and aging are deeply problematic for Europe, Japan, maybe Russia and maybe China.  The U.S. more than any other one of those powers (though we should probably consider India and Brazil as well), has the potential to maintain a reasonable demographic profile that could allow for economic growth vs. sclerotic  social spending on older generations.  In other words, as the need to spend more on retirees increases, the U.S.  is better positoned than many other contemporary industrial (or newly post-industrial) powerhouses to afford it by being welcoming to new immigrants.

Here are a few key quotes below ,

"Predictions are rarely correct, but Mr Kotkin’s focus on demography provides a useful gauge of the vitality of nations. The Russians, the rump of the former superpower, are in intensive care. Every year Russia has some 800,000 fewer schoolchildren. In 1997 there were 26 million children and teenagers at school. When the new school year begins next September, there will be only 15 million, a barely believable fall of 43 per cent. Its vibrancy as a society is under threat due to lack of young people.

Japan is not much better. It has a shrinking workforce and rapidly ageing population. These factors, combined with bureaucratic government, have conspired to ensure that Japan has yet to recover fully from the crash of 1991.

The position of China is more complex: it has no shortage of young and ambitious citizens at the moment, but the one-child policy imposed by the Communist Party has skewed the country’s demographic profile. In a generation or so, China may find itself short of young people. It is in a race to grow rich before it grows old.

The extra million Americans will not all spring from the wombs of American mothers. The US will have to attract the brightest and most entrepreneurial young people from around the world, as will other greying states, provoking ever sharper competition to suck in new blood.

“No western-derived country produces enough children of European descent to prevent them from becoming granny nation-states by 2050,” Mr Kotkin has written. “In the next decades the fate of western countries may well depend on their ability to make social and economic room for people whose origins lay outside Europe.”

Now, the major question associated with this is- what becomes of "American culture" as new immigrants enter America?  Many of my fellow conservatives would be deeply wary of the cultural impact.  Indeed, this is a major consideration.  However, as Teddy Roosevelt made clear a century ago, immigrants who pledge real loyalty to the US should be considered Americans.  Essentially, we must make assimilation the cost of offering better opportunity for well being to those born outside our geopgraphic borders.  If we retain the bizarre "multi-cultural" stew many elites promote, all we will do is create the conditions for a slow moving balkanization of the country. 

The irony is that immigration policy is a key to America's future, but not in the way many think.  It offers, perhaps, the only chance to deal with the  demographic strangulation of American primacy, but it also has the potential to blow apart the ties that bind if done recklessly.

        

I do not think the economy is going to get better anytime soon.  I do not think that President Obama will do anything that is really helpful.

I think he will make things much worse, though to be fair, not all of America's economic woes can be placed on his doorstep.  The strucutral flaws in our economy have been a longtime coming and finally broke out into the open.

We need to change our taxation structure from penalizing savings (and investment, the cornerstone of business growth), export more, and change much of our social habits to reembrace having families as opposed to living solely for creature comforts and mere individual gains.
 
For America to be great again rather than live on the fumes of past accomplishment, we have to collectively change much of our outlook and definitely change the outlook of Washington D.C.

As always, Spengler from First Things shows us a myriad of reasons why the next decade may well be, and as things stand today will be, a long hard slog absent dramatic shifts in attitudes and policy.

"And my Top 10 Reasons to fade the recovery appeared yesterday on my “Inner Workings” blog at Asia Times:

10) There is no recovery at all in Europe. European growth ground to a halt during the fourth quarter and German busines confidence unexpectedly fell in February.

9) China won’t collapse, but government efforts to stop overheatingby raising reserve requirements make clear that the world’s second-largest economy can’t be the locomotive for world growth.

8. Greece and its prospective rescuers in the European Community are at loggerheads over conditions for EC help. “Greece faces several important challenges in the coming days, including an expected bond auction, a planned general strike on Wednesday, and a visit from European Union officials that began Monday, aimed at pushing the country to take tougher steps to rein in its budget deficit,” WSJ reported today.

7. State fiscal crises continue to worsen. “Doomsday is here for the state of Illinois,” California’s last set of cosmetic measures do little to address a $20 billion deficit, Baltimore has no idea how to close a $120 billion deficit. On top of this year’s $200 billion deficit, states face a trillion-dollar shortfall in pension funds.

6) Commercial real estate is nowhere near bottom, with some sectors (e.g. hotels) at delinquency rates of nearly 10%. Credit Suisse says that delinquencies could reach $60 billion.

5) Regional banks continue to drop like flies, with 702 banks holding assets of $403 billion on the danger list.

4) Bank credit continues to shrink. Total bank credit is still falling at a 5% annual rate, an unprecedented decline

3) What bank credit is available is funding the US Treasury deficit in the mother of all crowdings-out, replacing commercial loans on banks’ balance sheets

2) Industrial production has bounced of the bottom, but manufacturing is only 15% of US employment

1) Employment won’t come back. Today’s consumer confidence number is one more nail in the coffin of exaggerated hopes for a cyclical recovery"

        

I find Thomas P.M. Barnett an interesting writer full of many good insights.  He is also a true cheerleader of globalization.  I think that he he is more nuanced than Thomas Friedman and acknowledges challenges.  However, I also think he is too positive about the future.  He is very dismissive that anything can radically alter the direction of globalization which he defines as integrating "non-functioning" states and regions that form a "gap" into the functioning "Core" of states like the U.S., Europe and now places like China and India.

He seems unwilling to acknowledge the possibility that all of our recent advances could well be temporary.

After one of his latest blogs on America's place in the world, I responded with comments and he obliged me with a response back to me.

"Me: I think that your overall thesis as advanced in your works such as the Pentagon's New Map is both sophisticated and very useful in terms of gameplanning US geostrategy. However, though I may be somewhat of a contrarian, how can you be so sure these rule sets will become permanently ensconced in international relations?

Contemporary trends may favor your overall argument, but discontinuities throughout history have taken place, usually because something unanticipated happened.

Niall Ferguson has a fascinating new piece in the current Foreign Affairs (March/April 2010) about how stunningly quickly collapses in order (including imperial orders) can transpire. In a sense, this piece is the anti-Gibbon, Spengler and Toynbee. Rather than long-term trends of decline that become obvious in retrospect, he raises the prospect that relatively small disturbances within systems can destroy the balance of those system and yield chaos.

Obviously, redundancy in any system can ameliorate this, but how do we really know what the impact of a nuclear or biological attack on a major American city be? What will that do to international trade? What will it do to America's already ballooning deficits?

Will a future generation of Chinese leaders feeling more confident be less pragmatic and see "Western" weakness as an opportunity to be exploited as opposed to a challenge to be overcome?

I do not think it is histrionic to be concerned with these possibilities. No order in the history of the world has yet proven itself permanent. Why is the order of this era any different?

If Rome could collapse, the empire of Qin Shi Huangdi collapse and the Sun set on the British, how can we be so sure we have found the "solution?"

I ask this in all earnestness and not to be controversial. Given your reputation, I would be most interested in your response.

Barnett:  Greg,

Echoing David Stewart, the major difference--and it's gargantuan, is that ours is the first "empire" (if you must use that term) that's empowered and enriched masses of individuals instead of merely elites. As such, its spread is achieved as a demand function, not a supply function, so it expands, it needs us less and not more.

Are we yet used to this reality? No. But growing up is a constant process.

As for why ours is the oldest continuous constitutional democracy in the world?

Same reason."

Check out the full blog and other comments for a full airing on some of these issues.

        

David Brooks, one of the few quasi-conservative columnists at the New York Ties has written a thoughtful and counter-intuitive op-ed that raises what must be considered uncomfortable questions about America's current governing classes.

Brooks asks a simple question- is our contemporary and relatively meritocratic way of selecting leaders today in both business and government better than the past era of WASP ascendancy?

On the surface, the answer would appear to be yes.  That is certainly the politically correct notion.  Brooks seems, on the other hand, to be inclined to disagree.  By contrast he seems to think some of these changes hhave led to a certain degree of dysfunction in or current government and other institutions.

Here are some interesting sections,

"The promise of the meritocracy has not been fulfilled. The talent level is higher, but the reputation is lower.

Why has this happened? I can think of a few contributing factors.

First, the meritocracy is based on an overly narrow definition of talent. Our system rewards those who can amass technical knowledge. But this skill is only marginally related to the skill of being sensitive to context. It is not related at all to skills like empathy. Over the past years, we’ve seen very smart people make mistakes because they didn’t understand the context in which they were operating.

Second, this new system has created new social chasms. In the old days, there were obviously big differences between people whose lives were defined by “The Philadelphia Story” and those who were defined by “The Grapes of Wrath.” But if you ran the largest bank in Murfreesboro, Tenn., you probably lived in Murfreesboro. Now you live in Charlotte or New York City. You might have married a secretary. Now you marry another banker. You would have had similar lifestyle habits as other people in town. Now the lifestyle patterns of the college-educated are very different from the patterns in other classes. Social attitudes are very different, too.

It could be that Americans actually feel less connected to their leadership class now than they did then, with good reason.

Third, leadership-class solidarity is weaker. The Protestant Establishment was inbred. On the other hand, those social connections placed informal limits on strife. Personal scandals were hushed up. Now members of the leadership class are engaged in a perpetual state of war. Each side seeks daily advantage in ways that poison the long-term reputations of everybody involved.

Fourth, time horizons have shrunk. If you were an old blue blood, you traced your lineage back centuries, and there was a decent chance that you’d hand your company down to members of your clan. That subtly encouraged long-term thinking.

Now people respond to ever-faster performance criteria — daily stock prices or tracking polls. This perversely encourages reckless behavior. To leave a mark in a fast, competitive world, leaders seek to hit grandiose home runs. Clinton tried to transform health care. Bush tried to transform the Middle East. Obama has tried to transform health care, energy and much more.

There’s less emphasis on steady, gradual change and more emphasis on the big swing. This produces more spectacular failures and more uncertainty. Many Americans, not caught up on the romance of this sort of heroism, are terrified.

Fifth, society is too transparent. Since Watergate, we have tried to make government as open as possible. But as William Galston of the Brookings Institution jokes, government should sometimes be shrouded for the same reason that middle-aged people should be clothed. This isn’t Galston’s point, but I’d observe that the more government has become transparent, the less people are inclined to trust it."

In some ways I think Brooks is correct.  Long-term accomplishments, not momentary gains, are the historical criteria for success.  However, our age is an age that demands instantaneous responses, even if they are ill advised and poorly considered.  Additionally, I do think that while technical knowledge is important, it is also very narrow, just as Brooks outlines.  This leads to an inability to always see the connections between what may at first glance seem disparate events. 

Leadership must be executed within context and by one who can see both the past and a plausible vision of the future.  Today, implausible visions of the future seem to be the rage and historical knowledge appears to be seen as anachronistic as the past is not seen to necessarily be prologue to the future. 

As we now face such challenges as health care reform being rammed down the collective American throat, deficits as far as the eye can see, rising international powers, proliferating WMDs and general international anarchy, it would be nice to have leadership that really gets the connections between the past and the future, as opposed to idealistic mirages as so many in our leadership class have, if they have any vision whatsoever.

        

An interesting article from the Atlantic Community on how the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) represents a move towards shifting international security burdens to allies.  My initial thoughts below,

"Prudential statesmanship means being able to look to the future and correct course without throwing away lessons of the past.

Clearly, the United States cannot act alone when confronting the myriad of complex problems it faces in the security arena. Building up domestic capacity in other states is prudent. To this extent the QDR represents real sobriety.

However, there must be some concern as to whether or not, given the U.S.' precarious domestic spending and deficit problem, this strategy could be perceived as indicative of a slow mechanism for retrenchment while attempting to bolster paper (as opposed to meaningful) cooperation.

While dealing with counterinsurgencies and terrorists requires a globally interdependent mindset of cooperation on intelligence and training, the specter of Great Power conflict has not altogether been eliminated. Though it may seem more unlikely than at any other point in history, to be unprepared for such a contingency is folly. In order to balance this, the U.S. will still require much of its current infrastructure in R&D, production and, perhaps, even further expansions of military personnel. This goes far beyond our current engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So the real battle should not be "new" vs. "old" paradigms for dealing with security, but an embrace of both "new" and "old" in order to adequately deal with the vagaries of history and the twists of fortune.

Of course, this is a difficult position to hold when much of the current security literature seems obsessively focused on counterinsurgency, terrorism and cyberwarfare. Again, all of these are clearly very relevant and should be dealt with, but we should not be sanguine about the prospects of more traditional types of conflict.

We should take care not to divorce ourselves from the reality that the U.S. cannot outsource security policy to those unable or unwilling to help and still be prepared for the unanticipated. Of course, allies are absolutely pivotal. However, alliances should be thought of less as institutionalized instrumentalities that can address a wide range of responsibilities, but as mutually beneficial instruments that can be deployed on a case by case basis when interests converge sufficiently to warrant or necessitate meaningful cooperation.

The overall point here is that the world is more complex than any single analyst or policymaker can appreciate. We must deal with new challenges brought about by technology every day and allies will play a role in dealing with this. But fears of the past should not be dismissed as purely anachronistic and thus relegated to irrelevance in favor of what may turn out to be momentary exigencies."

        

I just got the word that former White House Chief of Staff (under Nixon and Ford), NATO Supreme Commander, and Secretary of State (under Reagan), Alexander Haig has passed away.

It certainly seems we are now losing some of the titans of America's foreign policy tradition.  Last year, we lost McNamara and now Haig.  It is always a bit sad as these losses put a definitive end to an era.  Of course, we still have Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger, but the titans are falling.

The Washington Post has a good retrospective of Haig's career.

        

Spengler with yet another insightful blog about the looming economic catastrophe in Greece.  It is very interesting as well as ironic that Greece, the cradle of Western civilization, is about to showcase exactly what America has to look forward to absent some amazing staetsmanship and a willingness for the public to take responsibility.

"Greece, sadly, suffers from an extreme case of Euro-sclerosis. Its fertility is in the 1.3 to 1.4 range, which means that its elderly dependency ratio will rise from 27% at present to 64% in 2050. Unlike most of its EC partners, Greece has no industry of importance. Due to declining family size and emigration, the average Greek family has acquired several properties by inheritance, and the country rode a real estate boom in vacation properties. Taxi drivers took three-month seaside vacations.

Problems that seemed postponable for a couple of decades have leapt into the present as a result of the Great Recession, and Greeks have the choice of becoming noticeably poorer, or catastrophically poorer while taking down a good part of the financial world with them. The old game is over, and the national tantrum might take Greece over the edge."

What sober observer of America would be unable to envision a similar situation at some point in our own future?  If you can't, you're not looking very hard and if you can, no one is probably listening.  So what is today a Greek tragedy could well be a portent of things to come including an American tragedy in the not so distant future...

Of course, as I always say, this is not preordained.  No true Sibyl  has yet spoken oracularly and seen the definitive future.  There is time for a different path to be taken.

        

Below is my response to this essay at the Atlantic Community concerning possible cooperation between Russia and the EU going forward.

"While cooperation between Europe and Russia is no doubt something to be desired, there are no simple solutions for establishing a relationship that is anything but laregly cold and punctuated by occassion outbursts of diplomatic indignation.

The interests of Europe and Russia only somewhat converge and on perceived "existential
issues, they actually diverge rather dramatically. Russia needs to make money off of its natural resources. This will always mean energy competition as Europe seeks diversification of supplies and move away from over reliance on Russia. While, at the same time, Russia does need more foreign investment, much of which could come from Europe, it will never allow that to become a paramount concern.

Russia wants strategic depth. It always has since the Mongol invasions before there was a unified Russian state. Given its experiences at the hands of Napoleon and Hitler, it also still wants a western buffer zone that includes places like Ukraine and Georgia. Afterall, it continues to have a not altogether illegitimate fear of westward expansion, not only physically, but philosophically.

That fear of "westernization" is an existential fear that is deep and informs part of the Russian worldview. Yes, there are modernizers and those in Russia that want to embrace much of what Europe has to offer, however, cultural divides matter and cannot be easily papered over.

As for the Medvedev proposal for a "new European security architecture", what sober analysts think it is anything other than a shrewd gambit to split Europe and the US?

One can't blame Russia for their perspective. Their history is filled with so much tragedy, it would be hard not to be empathetic. However, retaining a realistic assesment of intentions still is needed.

While Europe (and America) need not be wantonly provocative towards Russia, they also should not become overly accomodative in the pursuit of illusory partnerships."

        

David P. Goldman (aka Spengler) has a neat piece at his financial blog, Inner Workings.  He points out that many state governments are about to face huge deficits (like California's gargantuan $21 billion hole) and will run into political disaaster galore as Republicans seek cuts and Democrats (backed by public sector unions) push to retain spending.  Can President Obama and the federal government ride into the rescue?  That will be a major question moving forward and will largely determine whether America at large can begin to live within its means.

Here is a sample of the posting,

"Far more worrying for the US economy, I said on the Feb. 5 Kudlow broadcast, is the $200 billion deficit of state governments. There will be a dozen California-style crises this year, exacerbated by public-sector employees’ unions who form the core of the Democratic party constituency. Obama will try to bail them out; the Republicans will resist; the unions will take states to the brink of bankruptcy and over it; and markets will repeat the mini-panic of the past few days.

One of the most important but least-noted items in Friday’s employment report was the loss of 41,000 state and local government jobs. Real estate and related tax revenues bulked up local government spending during the boom, and how they are unsupportable. This is old news, but the market is more in need of reminder than instruction. The reminders will come frequently enough."

        

I have long argued that President Obama wants to disarm America.  To defenders of the President this seems an insane assertion indicative of someone who must be a rabid, frothing at the mouth right-winger.  However, I have never said he wants to do it overnight or even within his Administration's lifetime (even a two term lifetime).

Instead, it is a slow process that will take several decades to fully happen and will dovetail with a rapid and unprecedented expansion of the welfare state.  I wrote an op-ed at the Atlantic Community on this very subject.  Several of my key points are summarized below.  Before reading them, however, take a look at this piece from Thomas Donnelly at the Weekly Standard where he reviews Obama's first Quadrennial Defense Review.  I think you'll see that I am far from the only one to observe just how slow, yet intentionally inexorable this plan is.

My goal is not to hyperventilate and say the sky is crashing tonight.  It is to point out that long-term trends, if not addressed will lead to outcomes that are manifestly not in the American (or the world's) interest.

"In twenty years, with our current trajectory, the US will not be able to underwrite global stability if its domestic financial situation remains as skewed (or even more so) than it is today.  It is in this time period as America deals with the ramifications of its past profligacy where latent threats can materialize both within the globalized system as well as on the periphery. 

Given the democratization of technology to empower small groups to wreak the type of harm previously requiring either a state's backing or, at least large military campaigns, it is not an absurdity to be concerned about the severity of the threats churning in those areas not currently connected to the global system...

 Obama wants to manage conflict through the institutionalization of cooperation while focusing on domestic concerns.  It's an intriguing wager: betting that others will take on responsibility and be willing to cooperate effectively enough that we can greatly reduce our international responsibilities while reforming our society. 

We should pause, reflect and consider the consequences if the wager is wrong. What if global order is about not only cooperation, but also the ability to project meaningful diplomatic and military force when needed?  We won't get another chance to make another bet."

        

Yet more great articles that point out what should be obvious to any rational person, a world free of nuclear weapons cannot, should not and will not happen, period.  Time to end the delusion and move on with dealing with the truth.

I think this is very important.  With President Obama at least superficially buying into and advancing the notion of "Global Zero", it must be debunked as the idealistic nonsense it really is.  The irony of this is that it would actaully make me feel better if I knew Obama was lying and never had any intention of abolishing nuclear weapons.  However his preoccupation with this issue seems to show he is being rather true to long held views.


This is a good piece discussing the recent Munich Security Conference and published in the World Affairs journal.

Note this,

"The responsibility for throwing cold water on all this silliness was left to Josef Joffe, the redoubtable editor of Die Ziet and one of Germany's most perceptive political analysts, who compared his position as a Global Zero skeptic to that of an agnostic at a Baptist convention. He pointed out that "history simply does not support" the notion that great power disarmament encourages non-proliferation, noting that, since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have dramatically reduced stockpiles all the while other nations have built up theirs. Joffe rolled a proverbial stink-bomb down the church aisle by challenging the supposition that nuclear weapons are strategically archaic, noting that Israel helps ensure its security with its nuclear status. And he added that North Korea, a "third-world country, [is] treated as a first-world power" because of its status as a nuclear state. Further, he challenged the fundamental logic underlying any plan to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, because, as stockpiles are cut, each weapon becomes more valuable due to the basic principle of scarcity.

How to explain why such distinguished and knowledgeable figures would support something so utterly fanciful? There's a common trait in elder statesmen that compels them to find benign, fuzzy ideas around which they can all cohere. In this sense, Global Zero is just another aspect of building one's legacy. Or perhaps Global Zero is just a noble lie; an idea that sounds pleasant to third-world ears, but in which everyone tacitly understands to be non-operative."
 
Also, I stumbled onto this reconceptualization of the Cold War at www.e-ir.info.  It looks at whether a third world war could have been avoided in the abscence of nuclear weapons which kept the U.S.-Soviet compeition truly "Cold" for the most part.  It is a piece that we can never verify, but it is a useful mental exercise that further raises questions about the wisdom of the very idea of nuclear disarmament.

Below is what for some might seem counterintuitive, but after reading the entire piece makes much greater sense.

"Conclusion

With American preponderance and relative security of its homeland, a pre-emptive war against the Soviet Union would have been a very credible option, in this author’s opinion. If the Soviet ideology was to be believed, a future war would have been unavoidable. Stalinist or Molotovian politics would have stirred up the system to promote the cause of communism. Without MAD, force would have been a viable means to end communism. There would have been no dilemma of conciliating the use of nuclear weapons with the irrationality of a suicidal war.[27] On the other side of this non-nuclear Cold War the USSR would not be pressured to seek coexistence, and could have benefited from the constant fear of invasion and crisis. For these reasons this author believes that nuclear weapons saved humanity from a darker Cold War that could have been more likely to have turned hot."

        

A very good article that does a good job of highlighting the superficiality of the notion of a non-nuclear world.  This one from the New York Times no less and shockingly enough.

Part of the article is below,


"Moreover, even when the fear of American power is a factor in a country’s quest for W.M.D., the fear of our nuclear weapons usually isn’t. Saddam Hussein wasn’t chasing fissile material because he thought the United States would drop an ICBM on Baghdad. For rogue states, the bomb is an obvious way to offset America’s enormous conventional military advantage — and this will hold true no matter how low our nuclear stockpiles go.

This doesn’t mean that America shouldn’t enter into reasonable arms control agreements. But linking the antiproliferation agenda to the dream of universal abolition makes an already difficult problem even harder to solve.

It’s precisely because the proliferation problem is so difficult, though, that the “Global Zero” movement can feel superficially appealing. The Munich nuclear-abolition panel took place just 24 hours before Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ordered his scientists to forge ahead with uranium enrichment. Faced with yet another round of Iranian brinkmanship, you can understand why Western leaders might prefer to talk about a world without nuclear weapons. By making the issue bigger, more long-term and more theoretical, they can almost make it seem to go away.

But when it comes to containing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, the existing American arsenal simply isn’t part of the problem. And if Iran does acquire the bomb, our nuclear deterrent will quickly become an important part of the solution."

        

This is a great piece from a sober writer at the American Interest.  Walter Russell Mead does an excellent job outlining a raft of reports from British press that contine to find serious mistakes or hyperbolized information regarding Global Warming.  He notes how very little of this is breaking into the mainstream U.S. press.

Hopefully, this will change without becoming "exposed" only on conservative blogs where it would be tempting for the media elite to be dismissive. 

By the way, I should make it clear that while I think there is nothing wrong with attempting to prudently deal with concerns over Global Warming, the radicalism of the "Save the Earth Now" crowd is shocking.  There seems to be no thought given to what happens to the world economy if draconian steps are simply mandated through diktats from unnaccountable bureaucrats.  Indeed, as the below quote makes clear, public confidence would be enhanced more by frank acknowledgments of scientific limitation more than by the lies that seem to keep being exposed.

Check out these sections,

"In my February 1 post on The Death of Global Warming, I said that the movement had been killed by two things: bad science and bad politics.  The Guardian hopes that the parrot isn’t dead yet, but it seems to agree with my basic diagnosis: “It is bad science and bad politics to counter scepticism with righteous indignation. In the long run, public confidence will be inspired more by frankness about what science cannot explain,” write the editors.

The editors pick up another theme that is familiar to readers of this blog:

“In trying to avert dangerous climate change, governments are aiming for something extraordinary. They want to transform the global economy because of a hypothesis for which the evidence is mostly inaccessible to the layman.

It is the biggest pre-emption in history, and it relies on collective trust in science.”

        

Given all my posts about the potential decline of American power, I thought I'd pass along a bit on one of the consequences- the greater likelihood of nuclear terrorism. 

Below is a video from a new project headed by Sam Nunn (along with one of my favorites, Henry Kissinger, as well as George Schultz, and William Perry).  You can get a free DVD to explain the issue to friends and family.  Obviously I ordered one, I just hope it does not go all the way down the utopian "Global Zero" road.

But a good trailer.

        

I have written extensively in the past on just how dangerous the deficits the U.S. currently faces are for our long-term ability to project power and avoid a generalized breakdown in the purveying of global public goods that are laregly backed by our military.

In the wake of President Obama's budget blueprint, the mainstream media pulled its collective head out of the sand long enough to do some reasonable reporting and raising of fundamental issues.  Even the New York Times.  Below are several sections from this piece.

"But the second number, buried deeper in the budget’s projections, is the one that really commands attention: By President Obama’s own optimistic projections, American deficits will not return to what are widely considered sustainable levels over the next 10 years. In fact, in 2019 and 2020 — years after Mr. Obama has left the political scene, even if he serves two terms — they start rising again sharply, to more than 5 percent of gross domestic product. His budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water.

For Mr. Obama and his successors, the effect of those projections is clear: Unless miraculous growth, or miraculous political compromises, creates some unforeseen change over the next decade, there is virtually no room for new domestic initiatives for Mr. Obama or his successors. Beyond that lies the possibility that the United States could begin to suffer the same disease that has afflicted Japan over the past decade. As debt grew more rapidly than income, that country’s influence around the world eroded.

Or, as Mr. Obama’s chief economic adviser, Lawrence H. Summers, used to ask before he entered government a year ago, “How long can the world’s biggest borrower remain the world’s biggest power?”

The Chinese leadership, which is lending much of the money to finance the American government’s spending, and which asked pointed questions about Mr. Obama’s budget when members visited Washington last summer, says it thinks the long-term answer to Mr. Summers’s question is self-evident. The Europeans will also tell you that this is a big worry about the next decade."

Read this and the below post on "Instrumentality vs. Institutionalization" and one can easily see the writing on the wall is petrifying.

        

One of my new favorite blogs is now, Scholar's Stage.  I actually found it through my interactions over at Sublime Oblivion and I think it is quite excellent as it attempts to go far beneath the superficiality of so much of what passes for commentary in AMerica today.

One of its more recent posts refers to a fascinating theory of instrumentality vs. institutionalization.  In essense, things that eventually become institutions from states to churches to bureaucracies begin as instruments to achieve specific purposes.  Over time, the instruments decline and one they become "institutions" they becom calcified and more interested in their own self-perpetuation than in accomplishing anything worthy outside of their own existance.

The author's comments on the institutionalization of America, is both depressing and illuminating.  It shines a light on the real darkness of the problems America faces and it goes much deeper than partisan sniping would have one believe.

One should read the entire post, but here are several illustrative examples, including this quote he pulls from another blog while making his argument,

" 'A state is an instrument but it is only an instrument. It can be discarded if it ceases to be useful and becomes an end only for itself. Poland the state died but Poland the nation lived on. In the course of events, Poland was able to reacquire a state of its own. A nation acquired a state as its instrument. Similar to Poland, while the United States as a state apparatus may disappear, America the nation will endure. Constitutions are parchment. Laws are words on a page. Speeches are wind. Politicians are dust. Bureaucracies are passing. The empires of the past built merely on state power passed away eventually. Political communities built on surer foundations endured. Language endures. Land endures. Religion endures. History endures. Peoples endure. The American nation is a rock and upon this rock the true instrument of state will be built. If it isn’t the United States, it will be something else better adapted to our situation. Is the United States an instrument or an institution? The times we are in will tell...'"

He then goes on to make these comments,

"In the summer of 2008, the Bradley Project released a report on America's national identity titled "E Pluribus Unum". The report opened with an alarming statement:

To inform its work, the Bradley Project asked HarrisInteractive to conduct a study on Americans’ views on national identity. While 84 percent of the respondents still believe in a unique American identity, 63 percent believe this identity is weakening. Almost a quarter—24 percent—believe we are already so divided that a common national identity is impossible. In their minds, it is already too late. And young people—on whom our continued national identity depends— are less likely than older Americans to be proud of their country or to believe that it has a unique national identity.If the American nation is a rock, it is a rock eroded by time and warped by unrelenting exposure to hostile elements. A "surer foundation" it is not, nor will be.

If the American nation is a rock, it is a rock eroded by time and warped by unrelenting exposure to hostile elements. A "surer foundation" it is not, nor will be.

That America's ruling class has not moved to protect the American nation is unsurprising. The upper classes' isolation from their fellow citizens and identification with other members of the transnational elite play a part in this, I am sure. Yet there is a more fundamental reason for the upper classes' disengagement: perpetuating the American nation is simply not in the elite's best interest."

If America fails to find once more a tie that binds, its eventual descent into a torpor of self indulgence that may even border on irrelevancy will continue.  It may take two or three more generations for a "Rome" like collapse, but the outline of a looming catastrophe cannot be in doubt.  The American people and our leaders are sleepwalking towards an end goal that will lead us to a very bad place.

Unlike many who assume that as America falls as the lone "Superpower" someone else like China or a consortium of sorts made up of the newly rising powers like the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India China) will fill the void, I believe this end of American preponderance will usher in a neo-Middle Ages of chaos.  While something catastrophic will not happen all the time, with the proliferation of dangerous technology, when something catatrophic does happen, it will be shocking and destructive on a large scale.

America, as much by default as by design (perhaps, even more so by default), is the relative guarantor of stability.  We must find the strength within ourselves to guarantee that we do not allow this scenario to play out.  There will be no globalized governance that will make the mass of humanity sing from the same hymn book, there will only be anarchy without a Leviathan.

        

Given that this past week allowed us the opportunity to witness President Obama's first State of the Union address, I wanted to reflect upon it.  What did it mean, what did he say, and how will Obama govern after the Massachussetts Special Election that saw a Republican take over Senator Ted Kennedy's seat?

Needless to say, commentary after the speech ran the full gamut from lauding it as an excellent speech filled with glowing signs of leadership to practical dismissal as anything other than a partisan pep speech with a few bones thrown in to give the patina of bipartisanship.

I think, however, all of this misses the point.  Does Obama understand what the problems facing America are?  I think the answer is no.  That said, I am not too sure many Republicans know either, which leaves the entire country treading along a precarious and dangerous path. 

David P. Goldman, also known as "Spengler" had a great post at First Things which outlined much of what was wrong with Obama's speech, namely that he is not addressing the fundamental need to transform America's economy.  Priming the pump through either spending (as Democrats typically and blindly assert) will only create new bubbles and ephemeral wealth.  Tax cuts (as Republicans typically and monotonously assert) will largely do the same thing.  Americans, both the government and the people, need to spend less while saving and exporting more.  Note these sections,

"Clinton slyly positioned himself to claim credit for the Great Expansion launched in 1983 by the Reagan tax reforms. Employment roared after 1995—the economy added five million jobs in the next two years. Clinton’s theft of welfare reform from the Republicans was like picking up lost money off the sidewalk. It was easy to push people off welfare into a booming labor market. Cutting the capital gains tax in 1997 helped the tech boom at the decade’s end.

In his attempt to emulate Clinton’s success, President Obama resembles nothing so much a the New Guinea aboriginals who built model airfields complete with straw control towers and airplanes after the Second World War and the departure of the American army. The Americans had summoned cargo from the sky through such magical devices, so thought the aboriginals, and by building what looked like airfields, so might they. But Obama can no more conjure up an economic recovery by doing things that look like what Clinton did, than the natives of New Guinea could draw cargo from the sky with straw totems. Marx’s crack about history repeating itself—the first time as tragedy and the second as farce—comes to mind...

Obama really seems to believe that there is enough economic recovery to take credit for, and that what remains is spin. He really does not seem to grasp the severity of his situation. His “spending freeze” on a tiny fraction of the budget, he said, will take effect “next year, when the economy is better.”

The Japan of the 1990s during its so-called lost decade offers a closer parallel to the American economic predicament of 2010. The United States has lost seven million jobs since the recession began, five million of them on Obama’s watch, and the most recent data point to worse to come. Including so-called “discouraged workers” whom the government does not include in the labor force, the unemployment rate is a wrenching 17 percent, and if “long-term” discouraged workers are counted, the rate rises to 22 percent. To put this in perspective, the unemployment rate stood at 15.9 percent in 1931, 23.6 percent in 1932, 24.9 percent in 1933, and 21.7 percent in 1934, at the trough of the Great Depression. The social safety net, the prevalence of two-earner households, and greater household wealth protect the unemployment against indigence, to be sure. Nonetheless the numbers are daunting, and still deteriorating.

Why hasn’t employment recovered, and why is not likely to? America is a creative-destruction economy. Old jobs lost in recessions for the most part are lost forever; new jobs replace them. Small business startups accounted for two-thirds of all net new job creation during the past thirty-five years. During the 1990s it was new industries (cell phones, cable, overnight delivery, as well as retail, financial and clerical). During the 2000s the housing boom dominated job creation, directly or indirectly. Small business remains prostrated—half of all small business owners report cash flow problems—and there are few opportunities to expand...

It certainly is true, as conservative commentators insist, that Obama steered too hard and too fast to the left for the majority of American voters. But underlying all the discontent is the simple and obvious fact that a very large number of Americans are watching their lives go to ruin. They are losing their homes, their savings, their jobs, and their prospects for dignified retirement. The trouble is not the short-term pain, but an adverse and irreparable change in the lives tens of millions.

What will Obama do when it dawns on him that the economy will not be better next year—perhaps a couple percentage points larger in terms of GDP, but worse in terms of employment and household balance sheets? The economy requires major surgery. As Brenner and I argued in the cited article, Americans can increase savings while maintaining full employment only by exporting and investing, and that requires a fundamental shift in the tax burden away from investment income to consumption—a tax reform more sweeping than Reagan’s."

On the foreign policy front, Obama was extraordinarily thin, especially so given the tipping point we seem ready to face with the Iranian nuclear question looming over the non-proliferation regime like the sword of damolces.

Over at the Atlantic Community I offered a variety of thoughts on the failure of Obama to be nearly as bold as so many of his defenders say he is, indeed, I find him to be little more than a particularly gifted politician, but not a true "statesman."

"Obama seems to see the future of economic growth is in Asia. This should not be a surprise, most analysts are saying the same thing and have been for awhile even before the current extreme hype of China's growth.

Obviously, this will probably mean a decline of importance in trans-Atlantic relations in a relative sense. Nothing is going to transform overnight and it is certainly true that American values more closely (though by no means exactly) correspond with Europe than China. This will always assure a grounded relationship. However, with population growth and market explosions in east Asia, its hard to see how Europe, once the primary focus of America, can retain primacy.

As for his diplomatic agenda, he said nothing of note. Its the same thing we have heard and not all that consequential. He barely touched on probably the greatest single security issue- Iran and its program and what he did say seemed cut out and pasted from any number of other speeched.

His focus on climate change was interesting, though unsurprising as it is a key plank for his domestic political constituency. Additionally, while he did throw out some surprising initiatives on nuclear power and the possibility of some off shore drilling, he still seems not to realize that anything that costs as much as the House passed Cap and Trade bill is political suicide in an economically stagnant America.

He could have been far bolder and more focused on unleashing the entrpreneurial spirit for new green technology by holding out more carrots instead of referring to what can only really be considered an implicit stick for most industry in America. Yes, I know he made some gestures that direction, but it is clear the focus is on punishing industry not incentivizing entrepreneurs to develop truly marketable alternatives. Had he done that, his clarion call for America (and perhaps Europe as well) to lead in green technology would have seemed more inspiring and certainly more bipartisan in domestic US politics.

His call for bringing about the end of nuclear weapons was another flight of pie in the sky rhetoric that sounds sweet but is not based in reality. Though I think the desire to implement a way to secure "loose" nuclear materials is wise (but what President doesn't urge for that?).

The thing that struck me the most about the speech was his sly way of constantly demeaning his predecessor and essentially attempting to lay all blame on his problems on the doorstep of Bush. While I have commented before on Bush's flaws, I find it distasteful that he continues to require Bush as a foil in order to justify his own lack of accomplishment.

The problems America faces across the entire board run much deeper than the 8 years of George W. Bush. They go even further than Clinton. They are severe and systemic. The real boldness of "Hope and Change" that Obama so readily embraced and embodied in the 08 Campaign was that he can change things by fundamentally changing politics and by doing what is right in the largest sense. The truth is, Obama has allowed much of his agenda to be drafted by Democrats in Congress who had waited years to push their specific agenda items.

Obama has not transcended politics. He has embraced predominately standard order politics (in his case of the more left wing vintage) with a shiny veneer bolstered by gifted rhetorical capabilities.

He will not change the world. He is not the leader people have been waiting for. He is merely a particulary gifted politician who combines intelligence with stature.

He may accomplish a few things of note here and there, but he is not transformational. He is actually quite ordinary underneath the star power. "

What does the audience think of these reflections?

        

I had an interesting comment session with an author of a piece at the Atlantic Community regarding the recent decision to reset the Doomsday Clock by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.  It initiated a good exchange regarding nuclear deterrence and the theory behind deterrence.  The author of the article pointed me to a useful piece in the journal, the Non-Proliferation Review.

Our comment train below:

"Me:  There is indeed uncertainty in the world. However, there is no uncertainty as it relates to the non-proliferation regime. Absent a radical, and very nearly instantaneous, alteration in human nature, that regime is dying if not dead.

Perhaps, it can be kept on life support for a few more years or even a decade or so, but I think an argument could be made that it is already terminated in the most meaningful sense. North Korea has crossed the threshold. Iran appears to be zeroing in on doing the same.

Once that happens, Pandora's Box will remain flung wide open with multiple demons flying out. Some will be less terrifying than others, but it will be unstable to say the least.

I often argue in my comments on these issues that it is time to conceive of new ways of employing deterrence, expanding it and making it more flexible and calibrated for conflicts far below the old, bipolar, Cold War era of Superpower quasi-annihilation.

I think this would be far more fruitful than utopianism. So, while the Doomsday Clock will eventually have to reckon with this dangerous environment, there is no time for policymakers to waste. The must begin seriously examing how to best live within this vastly different strategic context today.

Frank O'Donnell: I'm not fully convinced that an Iranian bomb in itself will be the death of the nonproliferation regime. I'm more worried about Iran as a 'precedent', in signalling to the world how a state can obtain a nuclear weapon while still a legitimate member of the NPT. To put it differently, I'm concerned more about a Saudi bomb, or a United Arab Emirates bomb. I think Iran is far more dangerous as a precedent than as a case in itself.

However, little is inevitable in politics, and its important to bear in mind that many states have considered a nuclear weapons programme or even obtained or developed nuclear weapons then given them up. South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Argentina and Belarus are some states that have either started a programme, obtained the bomb or developed it themselves, then gave them up. So there is still hope that Iran is a limited and isolated case - it is perhaps too deductive to infer that a logical chain of Middle East nuclear weapons programmes will follow from Iran.

If you are interested in deterrence, I recommend this article - http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153_wilson.pdf. It aims to revisit some of the core assumptions behind nuclear deterrence. I hope you find it of interest!

Thanks for commenting!

Me: Frank-

Clearly I believe the Iranian bomb will create the impetus for a cascading effect on proliferation. In this sense, it, more so than North Korea, is the tipping point that dooms the proliferation regime due to exactly what you referred to a the threat of a future "Saudi bomb." With instability already in Pakistan, having two major Middle East powers go nuclear (with the prospects that Egypt might follow) will represent the decomposition of the non-proliferation regime.

You raise a valid point with respect to nations with viable nuclear weapon programs that turned away, but the strategic contexts were vastly different than in the Middle East today.

With South Africa, there was really no existential external threat to the nation that would require the maintainance of such an expensive weapon.

With former Soviet republics, the end of the Cold War facilitated the relinquishing of weapons to a central location- Russia.

I am admittedly less familiar with the Argentina and Sweden examples, though, I would suspect that similar to South Africa, the strategic landscape was not perceived as threatening enough to warrant maintaining a nuclear weapon infrastructure.

In the Middle East, a Shiite, Persian bomb could well be considered a significant threat to Sunni, Arab interests. Beyond traditional geopolitical considerations such as oil (of which much of the Saudi supply lies with territory composed of many Shia despite their overall minority status within the nation), the religious differences are significant. The recent shift in the balance of power amongst the Shia vis a vis the Sunnis is a major historical development. Arguably one of the biggest shifts of the millenium. It seems highly unlikely that we can assume the Saudis and other Arab nations won't want an insurance policy to check the advance of Shiism.

Additionally, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the United States looks ready to initiate a substantial retrenchment in its foreign policy. While it is obviously still highly engaged in Iraq and, especially Afghanistan and Pakistan (with looming questions over Yemen), the intended trajectory of Obama's policy is to use diplomacy to keep America as an "indispensable facilitator" rather than an arbiter capable of deploying decisive force. Obviosuly, this isn't an instantaneous process, but the writing seems to be on the wall and the Arab nations understand that. They are hedging their bets that America may not be there to continue providing its own extended deterrent capability over the long haul, consequently, they must compensate.

If America is unwilling to change this perception, the cascade seems inevitable as a result of the complex interplay of these geopolitical and religous factors.

On a side note, I appreciated the link. The article was interesting and does raise very legitimate questions that begin to gnaw at the foundation of deterrence theory. As one might expect, I am not convinced that it effectively debunks the theory, but, it forces one to reconsider assumptions that are typically taken as a priori.

I partially agree that the previous campaigns Mr. Wilson refers to (even those of Genghis Khan and Julius Caesar) that destroyed villages, also did not necessarily end the respective wars. Consequently, this helps to undermine the notion that making existential threats really can achieve strategic ends, but may, in contrast reinforce the will to resist.

But I am also not sure that he considers just how revolutionary nuclear weapons really were and are from a psychological standpoint. It is true, as he correctly points out, that nuclear weaons did not actually kill more people than firebombing during World War II. However, the did make the threat of annihilation relatively easy from a technological perspective. A threat to destroy a village used to require a great deal of effort and logistics to make good, even with respect to the firebombings of Dresden or Tokyo. Therefore, even a threat of annihilation in previous eras was no guarantee of success, there was always the possibility it would fail if the village or city stood strong enough.

However, that is no longer the case. There can be no illusion as to the potential consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. You don't need to fly hundreds of sorties, you can literally press a button at a silo site in America or on a submarine or a single armed bomber plane. This does not require significant physical effort or large scale military logistics such as supply lines (though I recognize there must be a domestic infrastructure of large scale to maintain nuclear weapons).

The real challenge to using nucelar weapons is a question of will and ethics. Is a nation willing to destroy a city? Is the purpose behind such an act deemed necessary enough that it could be perceived in some way as ethical?

Of course, there are questions of retaliation, this especially so in the bipolar era of the Cold War. However, even this fits in as a function of "will." A policymaker considering the use of nuclear weapons would clearly have to consider the damage imposed by a retaliatory strike (or terrorist strike) and factor that in to the equation when determining whether to actually use them.

In a nutshell, though I know the phrase is now been corrupted for general use since the Iraq War, but nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons of "shock and awe." Their use has stunning psychological implications and that is what forms the real basis for their efficacy as a deterrent force. The threat of annihilation is no longer a question mark that leaves room for risk taking to achieve an advantage. The threat can be unambiguous and made catastrophically real under any conceivable scenario.

Perhaps, this line of questioning and reasoning could be further explored. As yet another brief side note, another factor to consider: if deterrence fails, the irony is that conventional war will probably reassert itself. But that is a seperate conversation."

        

Given the vast, and largely correct, coverage of the eathquake tragedy in Haitim the recent election in Ukraine has received  little coverage in the U.S. media.  As people will recall, it was the "Orange Revolution" a few years back that was one of the key events that seemed to show how former Soviet states would continue to slide from Russia's geopolitical orbit towards the West.  That recent event appear to have reversed that trend is geopolitically significant and offers evidence that Russia is consolidating its position in its near abroad rather well during these times of American distraction with economic headaches, health care debates, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, etc, etc.

From the estimable Stratfor is an analysis.  Here are key sections,

"Ukrainians go to the polls Feb. 7 to choose their next president. The last time they did this, in November 2004, the result was the prolonged international incident that became known as the Orange Revolution. That event saw Ukraine cleaved off from the Russian sphere of influence, triggering a chain of events that rekindled the Russian-Western Cold War. Next week’s runoff election seals the Orange Revolution’s reversal. Russia owns the first candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, outright and has a workable agreement with the other, Yulia Timoshenko. The next few months will therefore see the de facto folding of Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence; discussion in Ukraine now consists of debate over the speed and depth of that reintegration...

Russia has been working to arrest its slide for several years. Next week’s election in Ukraine marks not so much the end of the post-Cold War period of Russian retreat as the beginning of a new era of Russian aggressiveness. To understand why, one must first absorb the Russian view of Ukraine.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, most of the former Soviet republics and satellites found themselves cast adrift, not part of the Russian orbit and not really part of any other grouping. Moscow still held links to all of them, but it exercised few of its levers of control over them during Russia’s internal meltdown during the 1990s. During that period, a number of these states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Czechoslovakia to be exact — managed to spin themselves out of the Russian orbit and attach themselves to the European Union and NATO. Others — Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine — attempted to follow the path Westward, but have not succeeded at this point. Of these six, Ukraine is by far the most critical. It is not simply the most populous of Russia’s former possessions or the birthplace of the Russian ethnicity, it is the most important province of the former Russian Empire and holds the key to the future of Eurasia.

First, the incidental reasons. Ukraine is the Russian Empire’s breadbasket. It is also the location of nearly all of Russia’s infrastructure links not only to Europe, but also to the Caucasus, making it critical for both trade and internal coherence; it is central to the existence of a state as multiethnic and chronically poor as Russia. The Ukrainian port of Sevastopol is home to Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and Ukrainian ports are the only well-developed warm-water ports Russia has ever had. Belarus’ only waterborne exports traverse the Dnieper River, which empties into the Black Sea via Ukraine. Therefore, as goes Ukraine, so goes Belarus. Not only is Ukraine home to some 15 million ethnic Russians — the largest concentration of Russians outside Russia proper — they reside in a zone geographically identical and contiguous to Russia itself. That zone is also the Ukrainian agricultural and industrial heartland, which again is integrated tightly into the Russian core.

These are all important factors for Moscow, but ultimately they pale before the only rationale that really matters: Ukraine is the only former Russian imperial territory that is both useful and has a natural barrier protecting it."

        

This primer on Yemen over at the Coming Anarchy blog is very solid.  As with so much of what haooens in the world, a sophisticated understanding of local complexities (and history) is essential as policymakers decide on amongst varying courses of action.

Yemen has surged to the forefront of counterterror policy since the Detroit "Underwear Bomber" incident indicated the Nigerian attacker received training, etc. from al-Qaeda affiliates within that nation.  Yemen has also become a focal point of a supposed proxy war between the Sunni Saudis and Shia Iranians.

What shoud America's involvement be?  This is a legitimate and complicated question.  One interested should read the entire piece, but here is an interesting sampling,

"Yemen is probably the most misunderstood international story in the Western mass media since… well, Uganda in September 2009. As was the case during the Uganda uprising, I believe the problem originates in the ignorance of regionalism in Yemen, or as Professor Harm J. De Blij has written time and time again: geography matters.

There are two major yet unrelated conflicts taking place in Yemen—the Sunni and Al Qaeda-linked separatist threat in the central south of the country (a major concern of the United States) and a Shia uprising in the north (alarming to the Yemenis and Saudis, possibly supported by Iran, but of little relevance to the rest of the world). And carefully distinguishing between the two is critical to keep the US out of a real quagmire."

        

After reading this piece at the Atlantic Community, I simply had to respond.  My comment below,

"Nixon was a complex figure. He had what could certainly be considered personality flaws. However, I question if what Nixon ever did was all that much worse than the questionable tactics of his immediate predecessors, LBJ and JFK. It is well known that LBJ was not above wiretapping including his 1964 Republican opponent's plane. Additionally, JFK's AG, and brother, RFK was not above blackmailing private enterprises.

This is not to absolve Nixon of responsibility, however, Nixon is rarely put into an appropriate context. He is perpetually perceived as the dark, brooding, master manipulater who finally got his just desserts. If this is true of him, it is not too far from being true of the much more beloved JFK and certainly of LBJ, who while criticized for Vietnam, never has had the same opprobrium leveled at him. Additionally, in an era where documents like the "Pentagon Papers" were being leaked to the press and the "intellectual elite", enamored of their own moral certitude, was busy tearing down American policy , it is not difficult to imagine why a President desiring to maintain American credibility would have felt under constant assault.

I think a full understanding of this context makes it much more difficult to cavalierly dismiss Nixon and apply simplistic moral criteria to him. He was a skillful strategist and along with Kissinger, perhaps, the most creative American diplomatist of the the last half of the 20th Century. After such creative giants as Kennan, possibly Marshall, and to a lesser extent, Nitze and Acheson, I do not think any others come close to Nixon and Kissinger in talent. They changed the international dynamic in such a way as to give America a flexibility it had lost and, due to domestic political myopia, appeared dedicated to throwing away.

As for George W. Bush, he was not in Nixon's league. His own moral certitude made him inflexible and unable to alter policy trajectories when it became evident that they were going to be unfruitful. However, Bush was not the abject failure so many assume him to be.

The "conventional wisdon" that Bush destroyed our international relations is not well founded. His demeanor left much to be desired, but, thus far, for all of the tonal changes and rhetorical flourishes, President Obama is not translating his obvious popularity into much more than what Bush was left with in his second term."

Further, an examination of his policy shows it is not nearly so "black and white" as this conventional wisdom asserts.

His policy towards India seems solid and, I might add, he is popular in that nation which is is simultaneously the world's second most populous nation and the planet's largest democracy. Additionally, most have argued that his east Asian policy was adroit in managing China and relations with Japan. Given Asia's rising importance and probable long-term centrality to US foreign policy, this is not an inconsequential achievement. As for North Korea, obviously criticism can be leveled, but has the vaunted Obama done any better (yet) at this? Additionally, he is popular in Africa. While the continent is still rarely looked at as anything more than a tragedy, Bush spent more money to confront AIDS than any previous President.

An infinitely long debate could be had on Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, the PATRIOT Act, WMDs , Iraq, inattention to Global Warming, etc. Indeed, the "morally superior" use any of these words to point their disdainful fingers at Bush and highlight their own piety to the altar of abstract "Humanity." I would agree, we can find serious flaws with much of what Bush did, but the criticism exceeds sober reflection, just as it did with Nixon.

Foreign policy and defense policy is not about "Good vs. Evil" choices. In conceiving it as such, Bush did err. His detractors err, however, in the same way. The tragedy of international relations is that the real decisions are most often between "Bad and Worse." Within that framework, and that framework alone, can any real context be given to evaluate a President.

Nixon and Bush were far from perfect. However, their being turned into straw men useful for burnishing one's own moral credentials does no service to those tasked with grasping the complexities with which all Presidents, indeed all policymakers, must contend.

        

Another provocative posting at Darwinian Conservatism.  The posting is a review of a philosophical work that attempts to ground the natural human desire to believe in God within what Larry Arnhart, the blog's author, maintains is a Darwinian perspective.

This is the thesis,

"In Darwinian Natural Right and Darwinian Conservatism, I identify the desire for religious understanding as one of the twenty natural desires rooted in our evolved human nature. Human beings generally desire to understand the world as governed by gods or God, because this satisfies their natural longing to make sense of things that would otherwise be incomprehensible.

I must admit, however, that I have offered very little support--arguments or evidence--for this assertion. But I do believe that the recent research on the evolutionary and cognitive causes of religious belief goes a long way to substantiate my position. The general reasoning for how religious belief evolved as an innate disposition of human nature is laid out by David Hume and Charles Darwin. This new research provides elaborate theoretical and empirical grounds for their naturalisitic account of religion.

One of the best surveys of this research is Justin Barrett's Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004). Barrett is a Christian evolutionist. And although he never mentions Hume, his work largely confirms what Hume says in his Natural History of Religion (Clarendon Press, 2007)."

It would be wise to read the entire post, but my comments are below:

"An excellent post. This does raise an interesting question as to "why" it is natural to believe in God. Even if such belief can be explained solely through the argument of Darwinian evolution, the implication that something is "natural" raises the further question why this should be so.

In other words what is the purpose? If there is no purpose, then all "meaning" is an illusion and all that has actually happened is nothing more than just random quirks and occurrences, at least at the most fundamental level.

Perhaps, this is so, but if so, then we remain trapped in a void, perhaps, even a Nietzschean abyss.

Ultimately, we will never really "know" unless transendentalism is confirmed "on the other side." In the interim, all we can do is hypothosize, with some hypotheses better than others, but all ultimately futile as it pertains to complete knowledge.

Perhaps, that is why we should all "escape" as Hume suggests in your quote,

'But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy' "

        

I have written frequently on why I think it is ridiculous to push the concept of "Global Zero" with respect to nuclear weapons.  I came across this blog which excerpts nicely an article I read at the end of the year from Thomas C. Schelling a prominent Cold War theoretician who was well known for using Game Theory to outline Cold War deterrence policies.

As I am reading his book Arms and Influence, I thought this was a useful read to see how someone with a lot of experience views this idea.  Several pearls of wisdom emerge as quoted below ,

"If a “world without nuclear weapons” means no mobilization bases, there can be no such world. Even starting in 1940 the mobilization base was built. And would minimizing mobilization potential serve the purpose ? To answer this requires working through various scenarios involving the expectation of war, the outbreak of war, and the conduct of war. That is the kind of analysis I haven’t seen.

 

A crucial question is whether a government could hide weapons-grade fissile material from any possible inspection verification. Considering that enough plutonium to make a bomb could be hidden in the freezing compartment of my refrigerator or to evade radiation detection could be hidden at the bottom of the water in a well, I think only the fear of a whistle-blower could possibly make success at all questionable. I believe that a “responsible” government would make sure that fissile material would be available in an international crisis or war itself. A responsible government must at least assume that other responsible governments will do so.

We are so used to thinking in terms of thousands, or at least hundreds, of nuclear warheads that a few dozen may offer a sense of relief. But if, at the outset of what appears to be a major war, or the imminent possibility of major war, every responsible government must consider that other responsible governments will mobilize their nuclear weapons base as soon as war erupts, or as soon as war appears likely, there will be at least covert frantic efforts, or perhaps purposely conspicuous efforts, to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible. And what then?
…
In summary, a “world without nuclear weapons” would be a world in which the United States, Russia, Israel, China, and half a dozen or a dozen other countries would have hair-trigger mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer delivery systems, and would have prepared targets to preempt other nations’ nuclear facilities, all in a high-alert status, with practice drills and secure emergency communications. Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world."

Getting rid of nuclear weapons is not only "difficult", it is, as I argue, impossible for anyone who intends to be prudent.

        

So despite the negotiations for a successor to START, the Russians are expanding their concept of deterrence.  Ironic, isn't it, if we really ever expect to live in a world of so-called "Global Zero."

This, to me reinforces the point that the U.S. will need to expand our concept of deterrence.  As this post at the Nuke Strategy Wonk asserts, the new Obama Nuclear Posture Review may do the same for the U.S.  Very interesting.  I would agree with this, though I still doubt the meaningfulness of a renewed START Treaty other than to reconfirm previosuly made, as opposed to new, reduction commitments.

Check this out, to see what the Russians are thinking,

"…The number of military threats listed in the document has also been enlarged, according to the 17-page draft document. Those will include other nation’s ignoring of Russia’s strategic security interests, attempts to tip the balance of power in the neighborhood of Russia and her allies, and moves to change the balance in “nuclear and missile sphere”, like deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system.

Also on the threats list is interference with Russia’s internal policies, territorial disputes, arms race and undermining of international measures on arms limitation and reduction, possible deployment of weapons in space, and military conflicts near Russian borders…"

Not that I question the reason behind Russia's decision (in point of fact I really don't), but how exactly, would the U.S. ever assuage all of the Russian concerns that appear to be implicitly behind their decision to expand their conception of deterrence?

I don't think we can.  This is the paradox and the tragedy of the nuclear era.  Our capability drives fear in others that forces them to create and deploy capabilities that reinforce our own fear thus perpetuating the ultimate vicious cycle.  However, short  of someone unilaterally disarming, how can you ever convince someone that you really never would use your own capabilities?

Of course, then we return to the fear that even if one did unilaterally disarm, they could then be easier prey to blackmail by someone unwilling to play in good faith. 

Fundamentally, its all an impossible to escape from prison for policymakers.  The only way to break through appears not to be disarmament, but to gain a monopoly on the only power that can successfully neuter the capacity of others to inflict damage (missile defenses, deployed space weapons, etc) and then for the one with the monopoly to act in a relatively benign way.  Of course, this is no real assurance either as someone will always seek to counter each newly deployed capability.  Thus, even this- the ultimate hawkish concept, is in its its own way, almost as utopian as "Global Zero." 

Thus the vicious cycle by necesssity continues.

        

A good piece at the Atlantic Community that seeks to divine the future of geopolitics in the East.  Naturally, as many analysts believe power is inexrably shifting from West to East, this will be worth monitoring at great length.

I offer a few comments,

"I think the final sentence in this piece points to a description of exactly how the geopolitics of Asia is shaping up, at least with consideration of the desires the leading powers of influence in the region:

"But there can be no denying that these three leading Asian powers and the US have different playbooks: America wants a uni-polar world but a multi-polar Asia; China seeks a multi-polar world but a uni-polar Asia; and Japan and India desire a multi-polar Asia and a multi-polar world."

So many differing percpetions raises the question as to how relations will be managed long-term. I would envision the following as a very plausible scenario:

* Japan to decline due to demographic declines, but at the same time expand military power (possibly nuclear) as America retrenches

* China to remain growing, but at slower rates thus creating more internal instability than many might consider

* India to grow in influence as it is forced to play a role in stabilizing Afghanistan and keeping Pakistan from becoming a vortex of Islamist hatreds that spill over

* The U.S. attempting to hedge its bets on China and its role as a "responsible stakeholder" while trying to keep Japan from "going its own way" and quietly encouraging the greater influence of India.

It will be a balancing act. There will be room for miscalculation. Though unlikely to explode like Europe circa 1914, Asia does contain seeds of potential explosive power."

        

A good article that summarizes the reasons why China remains so harsh in its treatment of those expressing views challenging to the established orthodoxy and authority of the ruling Party.

Here is a quote,

"Without legitimacy, no government can rule with any sense of confidence. There are many ways to legitimize political arrangements. Liberal democracy is only a recent invention. Hereditary monarchy, often backed by divine authority, has worked in the past. And some modern autocrats, such as Robert Mugabe, have been bolstered by their credentials as national freedom fighters.

China has changed a great deal in the past century, but it has remained the same in one respect: It is still ruled by a religious concept of politics. Legitimacy is not based on the give and take, the necessary compromises, the wheeling and dealing that form the basis of an economic concept of politics such as that underpinning liberal democracy. Instead, the foundation of religious politics is a shared belief, imposed from above, in ideological orthodoxy."
 
I think this shows quite well that despite the convergence of so much in the economic realm, culture and history can still play a large role in maintaining widely divergent views on things as fundamental as how to organize the society in which one lives.

        

This article refers to yet another "respectable" commission and the results of a report it is putting out on how to acieve the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. 

Simply put I disagree vehemently with this entire notion.  I have written about what I term the "Golden Age of Proliferation" extensively on this blog.  I am actually in the process of writing an article I plan to submit to Foreign Affairs on expansive deterrence and dealing with proliferation as well as part of my contribution to combat what I think is well intentioned, but ultimately futile ideas of getting rid of nuclear weapons.

I feel like this is a retread in many ways of the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928 which attempted to outlaw war to no obvious avail.  While some argue that it helped to set "precedents", and despite the fact that it technically is still reflected in U.S. federal law, this treaty did not stop Italy invading Abyssinia, Japan invading China, Germany invading anywhere, North Korea invading South Korea and on and on.

Contrary to those that indicate treaties are worthless scraps of paper, they can yield true benefits, but the correlation of forces and/or power must back up the text, otherwise their utility really is quite limited and they serve more as documentation of aspiration, not documents of actualization.

I do not think we should tread further down this already well travelled path as it relates to nuclear weapons.  Deterrence is a necessity and to achieve ultimate flexibility, it will be necessary to not arbitrarily remove options from the table through stubborn adherence to impossible goals.

        

I engaged in a little debate over at the Atlantic Community over the last couple of days regarding the subject of whether President Obama is "soft" on terror.  Obviosuly this has become quite the subject for discourse since the Christmas bomber in Detroit.

Though there were more comments you can read at the full article linked above, the below are the ones I directly engaged with:

"Me: To be fair to President Obama, there is no 100% fool-proof way to avoid all possible terrorist attacks. The best that can realistically be hoped for is to raise the difficulty for conducting such strikes to such a level that they ocurr extraordinarily infrequently.

That said, President Obama seems not to understand the psychological need the American people have for needing to believe their leaders will do whatever it takes to prevent such acts.

In his effort to undo the "sins" of the Bush era, Obama has made it appear that the United States is more interested in reading Miranda rights to terrorists than stopping and/or killing them. This is somewhat ironic, given his actual policy of continuing a Predator drone war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but, it is a very real perception that he risks allowing to become conventional wisdom.

While the "Obama is weak" narrative is no doubt promoted by conservatives for political points, this line of argument is not some entirely illegitimate or scurrilous attack as it is often portrayed. The decision to try the "Christmas bomber" in civillian court and, certainly, to do the same with self-confessed 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) are very suspect.

As the estimable American journal Stratfor argued in a piece about the upcoming KSM trial,

"International law has clung to a model of law governing a very different type of warfare despite new realities. International law must therefore either reaffirm the doctrine that combatants who do not distinguish themselves from noncombatants are not due the protections of international law, or it must clearly define what those protections are. Otherwise, international law discredits itself."

This has not been done by the international community, thus all international law on this subject seems built upon shaky foundations that require updating. The fact that Obama apparently takes international law seriously on this point, while not being inclined to examine the implications of modifying it to reflect reality as opposed to abstractions relevant in a different epoch, is not to his credit given the gaping hole inherent within the system.

This inevitably will lead to further disillusionment with his policies as terrorist acts are attempted and, especially, should some be successful on U.S. soil.

In a nutshell, Obama is too soft on terrorism. While a more comprehensive view of the underlying factors motivating such acts is wise, a view that fails to meet the needs of the people to feel "safe" is unsustainable politically and, in its own way, just as misguided as the much maligned "militaristic" approach of his predecessor.

Ahmed Said: No, Obama is not too soft on anything, but he needs more time to sort our his agenda list to reach better decisions. 

Tobias P. Fella : I agree with Ahmed. Obama is no too soft on anything concerning the national security of the United States. He just made the statement, that the Bush-administration undermined US-ideals, when going to war against international extremism (rule of law, human rights, the adherence of the Geneva Conventions and so on). Obama wants to set a new cours to restablish the liberal hegemony of the United States. He wants Washington to act as benign hegemon again, because that was the strategy which made the US a strong and attractive global power. To achieve this Obama takes a step back to multilateralism, the usage of soft power and also to cooperation.

Despite of that Obama surely isn't selling out the security of the United States. My assumption is based on various arguments. I just want to name a few: First even for the new president there is a war on terror, which has to be fought with military power, and not by the police and domestic law. He wants the terrorists to be judged by military commissions, not by federal courts. Further, he continues with the practice of preventive detention. Of course he has forbidden torture and wants to close Guantanamo, but he proceeds with the so called "rendition", the transfer of accused to countries without high huming rights standards. And at last he instructed the army and intelligence to go on with targeted killing. So where is Mr Obama too soft when dealing with international terrorism?

Me: I agree that Obama has clearly used force in dealing with terrorism. Indeed, he has used more of it than many of his more liberal supporters probably expected or desired. My point is that by his placing "international law" on such a pedestal that it gives the impression of being sacrosanct despite it not being updated to address contemporary security challenges, indicates an embrace of abstract theorizing suitable for scholars, not suitable for policymakers. Obama "appears" weak. If that appearance persists long enough then it will become conventional wisdom. Once that happens, the validity of what legitimate actions he takes will matter little, the appearance will be all important. President Obama should make the American people feel he will stop at nothing to prevent terrorist acts on American soil. That is how President Bush got reelected in 2004 despite much antipathy towards him from a great number of Americans. Obama's cerebral take on his role as Commander in Chief appeals to intellectuals, it does not appeal to main street Americans. For better and for worse, the Ameeican character and psychological profile must be taken into account in order for an American leader to be a success. President Obama is treading dangerous ground here politically and, if his legal instincts win out over his leadership instincts, he may well discover belatedly the flaw of such "intellectualizing."

Samir Awwad: Dear Greg,

was it "intellectualizing" that defined the change as American voters appeared to be fed up with easy answers and traffic-light style security warnings, wasn`t it?

I don`t agree that the law for conducting battles is to be changed in any dimension. Al-Qaida choose a tactic of camouflaged attacks on primarily civilian targets. And as we know attacking civilians is a war-crime and not wearing a uniform but a weapon is valid for summary execution under international law.

The question of international law firstly appeared with the Iraq invasion and the matter of civil rights under the light of increased security measures at the home front.

Public opinion turned against Guantanamo when people asked if the inmates are really non-uniformed combatants or eventually innocent and who judges over this.

I think Obama is aware that those "terrorists" usually (under international convention) should be executed immediately after they are caught.

Or if we look at what happened in Guantanamo maybe should ask the cynic question if they not preferred to be shot at the end of the day.

In my opinion we should be happy with international law, as it allows us to treat Al-Qaida as combatants as long they are hosted by governments ( Afghanistan) or in the Yemeni outback (as foreign non-uniformed combatants). What if we had to treat them in accordance to the law of their countries origins?

Me: Samir-

I appreciate the comment. I completely concur that there are not easy answers to the issue of terrorism and even made it clear that it is not possible to prevent all possible terrorist acts.

That said, I am not certain that President Obama does believe, as you state, that "'terrorists' (under international convention) should be executed immediately after they are caught."

If that were the case, why have a civilian trial with KSM under U.S. criminal law?

Now I will return to the Stratfor argument I referred to in my inital comment, which I find persuasive (I apologize for the length, but I think all of these sections are highly relevant)

Here is the link to the Stratfor piece,


" International law is actually not particularly ambiguous about the status of the members of al Qaeda. The Geneva Conventions do not apply to them because they have not adhered to a fundamental requirement of the Geneva Conventions, namely, identifying themselves as soldiers of an army. Doing so does not mean they must wear a uniform. The postwar Geneva Conventions make room for partisans, something older versions of the conventions did not. A partisan is not a uniformed fighter, but he must wear some form of insignia identifying himself as a soldier to enjoy the conventions’ protections. As Article 4.1.6 puts it, prisoners of war include “Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.” The Geneva Conventions of 1949 does not mention, nor provide protection to, civilians attacking foreign countries without openly carrying arms.

The reasoning behind this is important. During the Franco-Prussian war, French franc-tireurs fired on Prussian soldiers. Ununiformed and without insignia, they melded into the crowd. It was impossible for the Prussians to distinguish between civilians and soldiers, so they fired on both, and civilian casualties resulted. The framers of the Geneva Conventions held the franc-tireurs, not the Prussian soldiers, responsible for the casualties. Their failure to be in uniform forced the Prussians to defend themselves at the cost of civilian lives. The franc-tireurs were seen as using civilians as camouflage. This was regarded as outside the rules of war, and those who carried out such acts were seen as not protected by the conventions. They were not soldiers, and were not to be treated as such.

Extending protections to partisans following World War II was seen as a major concession. It was done with concerns that it not be extended so far that combatants of irregular forces could legally operate using their ability to blend in with surrounding civilians, and hence a requirement of wearing armbands. The status of purely covert operatives remained unchanged: They were not protected under the Geneva Conventions. Their status remained ambiguous.

During World War II, it was U.S. Army practice to hold perfunctory trials followed by executions. During the Battle of the Bulge, German commandos captured wearing U.S. uniforms — in violation of the Geneva Conventions — were summarily tried in field courts-martial and executed. The idea that such individuals were to be handed over to civilian courts was never considered. The actions of al Qaeda simply were not anticipated in the Geneva Conventions. And to the extent they were expected, they violated the conventions.

Holder’s decision to transfer Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to federal court makes it clear that Mohammed was not a soldier acting in time of war, but a criminal. While during times of war spies are tried as criminals, their status is precarious, particularly if they are members of an enemy army. Enemy soldiers out of uniform carrying out reconnaissance or espionage are subject to military, not civilian, justice, and frequently are executed. A spy captured in the course of collecting information is a civilian, particularly in peacetime, and normally is tried as a criminal with rules of evidence.

Which was Mohammed? Under the Geneva Conventions, his actions in organizing the Sept. 11 attacks, which were carried out without uniforms or other badges of a combatant, denies him status and protection as a POW. Logically, he is therefore a criminal, but if he is, consider the consequences...

The fact is that international law has not evolved to deal with persons like Mohammed. Or more precisely, most legal discussion under international law is moving counter to the Geneva Conventions’ intent, which was to treat the franc-tireurs as unworthy of legal protection because they were not soldiers and were violating the rules of war. International law wants to push Mohammed into a category where he doesn’t fit, providing protections that are not apparent under the Geneva Conventions. The United States has shoved him into U.S. criminal law, where he doesn’t fit either, unless the United States is prepared to accept reciprocal liability for CIA personnel based in the United States planning and supporting operations in third countries. The United States has never claimed, for example, that the KGB planners who operated agents in the United States on behalf of the Soviet Union were themselves subject to criminal prosecution.

A new variety of warfare has emerged in which treatment as a traditional POW doesn’t apply and criminal law doesn’t work. Criminal law creates liabilities the United States doesn’t want to incur, and it is not geared to deal with a terrorist like Mohammed. U.S. criminal law assumes that capture is in the hands of law enforcement officials. Rights are prescribed and demanded, including having lawyers present and so forth. Such protections are practically and theoretically absurd in this case: Mohammed is not a soldier and he is not a suspected criminal presumed innocent until proven guilty. Law enforcement is not a practical counter to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A nation cannot move from the rules of counterterrorism to an American courtroom; they are incompatible modes of operation. Nor can a nation use the code of criminal procedures against a terrorist organization operating transnationally. Instead, they must be stopped before they commit their action, and issuing search warrants and allowing attorneys present at questioning is not an option...

The real problem here is international law, which does not address acts of war committed by non-state actors out of uniform. Or more precisely, it does, but leaves them deliberately in a state of legal limbo, with captors left free to deal with them as they wish. If the international legal community does not like the latter, it is time they did the hard work of defining precisely how a nation deals with an act of war carried out under these circumstances.

The international legal community has been quite vocal in condemning American treatment of POWs after 9/11, but it hasn’t evolved international law, even theoretically, to cope with this. Sept. 11 is not a crime in the proper sense of the term, and prosecuting the guilty is not the goal. Instead, it was an act of war carried out outside the confines of the Geneva Conventions."

It would seem that the response is to push for a more tailored international legal approach- namely that acts such as those by KSM or the "Christmas Bomber" should be explicitly considered acts of war by non-uniformed actors and not subject Geneva Covention protections at which point the target nation is given the explicit authority to deal with them according to whatever mechanism they choose.

Subsequently, Obama would be wise to not afford such actors the protections of the U.S. civilian court system, but exclusively utilize military tribunals.

Not pushing along both of these avenues will keep Obama mired in limbo and stuck with a label that he will never shed."

As I reflect further, I also believe it will continue to be important for the U.S. to refine our ability to "connect the dots" from discrete pieces of intelligence.  President Obama is claiming that he is moving in this direction.  Time will tell if this will turn out to be the case.  The bottom line is that President Obama is developing a credibility gap on this issue.  He does have the opportunity to rectify this.  The question is will he do so or will he think too much like a lawyer and not a commander in chief responsible for millions of lives?

I do think that for international law to really be taken seriously on this subject and be something more meaningful than a feel good pose for people to strike who have no responsibility, it will need to be modified along the lines I suggested in my last comment.  If not, then there will continue to be pious finger wagging by activists, but little more.  Indeed, Obama must come to grips with reality and substance vs. image and rhetoric. 

        

As always, the Darwinian Conservative has thought provoking material.  This is a fascinating read concerning the affinity between German philosophers and the Nzi regime.  However, the piece exapands to make arguments regarding philosophy and political in general as this section makes clear,

"The mistake of the Nazi philosophers was Plato's mistake--the mistake of thinking that political order can be grounded in an eternal metaphysical order as discovered by philosophers who then exercise spiritual leadership in politics.

To avoid this mistake, philosophers need to see that philosophy is primarily an exercise in questioning the order of nature and human existence with no hope of finding any absolute metaphysical answers, and therefore the moral and political order of human life must be grounded in ordinary human experience--human desires and needs--rather than any eternal cosmic order. The Socratic life itself--the life of continual questioning--suggests that Socrates was a philosophic skeptic rather than a Platonic idealist."

Essentially, the blog's author, Larry Arnhart, makes the case that because philosophy is by nature intended to be Socratic and never yielding final answers, it should not seek to establish political order in anything transcendent.

I disagree as the following comment thread shows,

"Me:  This is a fascinating read. I think you raise a great point about philosophers seeking metapyhsical certainty and the problems inherent in that as it relates to the embrace and perpetuation of political power based upon such certainties.

However, if the philosophical quest is essentially the Socratic quest for "Truth" through ceaseless examination, it raises a question as to philosophy's ability to facilitate a practicable political order. After all, order cannot be constantly questioned and remain "orderly." To some extent one could argue this was the reason Socrates was forced to drink the hemlock, though I am aware there were also concerns over the authoritarian efforts of some of his students such as Alcibiades.

At the end of the day, political order must have a foundation and man's longing for transcendence offers a foundation that gives man the "meaning" to endure what could seem to be the capriciousness of "nature" cut loose from purpose.

This is a form of idealism, perhaps, even Germanic romanticism, yet it does seem to be an antidote to the trivialization of existence by post-modern relativism.

The tension between the quest for "Truth", philosophically speaking, and the need for a grounded order is real, dangerous, yet ultimately essential. 

Paul: Being an American and having read Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy, as well as a good portion of the Federalist Papers, I've never really understood Nietzsche's fear of liberal democracy, especially given his high praise for Machiavelli in BGE. However, democracies whose laws don't take their inspiration from Machiavelli might be dangerous enough to Socratic Philosophy to warrant an attempt at Platonic Political Metaphysics to correct them. But obviously Heidigger didn't see it that way.

Also, as for Mr. Lawson's assertion that "order cannot be constantly questioned and remain 'orderly,'" I think that the history of both the Roman and American Republics proves that within a proper institutional framework, order can be constantly questioned without jeopordizing a practicable political order. 

Me: In response to Paul,

I agree republics can survive within a "proper institutional framework." The problem is, stresses on the system can often undermine the best institutions and lead to the rise of things like Caesaresque "Dictators for Life."

Obviously, the American Republic has not come to that point, though there may well be questions as to whether or not Lincoln did not act in a quasi-Caesar like fashion in order to maintain the Republic.

Additionally, while I agree Machiavelli was a supporter of republics, he did understand that the need to establish such orders may require more "Princely" actions.

I would argue, that all human institutions are inherently frail. That frailty may not be immediately exposed, indeed it may be well hidden for generations as certain stresses remain subacute. However, the tensions within man lead to explosions that can overturn the best laid "rational" plans. "

Thus I do believe a metaphysical and transcendent foundation for order is necessary, lest all illusions of order prove ephemeral.

        

I stumbled across this piece from the Economist through another of my favorite blog, Coming Anarchy.  It is a long read, but very interesting as it highlights the career of the most famous philosopher in the Western tradition, Socrates.

The article recounts his history from his ironic questioning (and demolishing) of opinions to the youth he attracted,to his seeming arrogance; all leading to what is considered a major sin by democratic Athens: his conviction for corrupting the youth and subsequent self administered execution by drinking hemlock.

I find Socrates a fascinating figure, so much so that I actually have the below picture, "The Death of Socrates" over my fireplace at home.  To me it represents the potential for even a form of government as highly considered as democracy to commit a dangerous act against "Truth."  It also raises the question as to whether Socrates and his ceaseless quest for "Truth" was destabilizing to the foundations of a reasonable political order.  In this sense, I, too find Socrates an ironic figure whose legacy is ambiguous and full of paradox.  He is the poster child for the nobility of questing after ultimate knowledge, but also the very real danger of such a pursuit to the establishment of the order necessary for man to function. 

As for the article in the Economist, it makes a less philosophical claim, but a more practical critique of modern American political discourse and its fundamental flaw- that it does not seek truth, but is really the stage for nothing more than gifted rhetoriticians practicing sophistry.

Of course, this raises a further question, or perhaps, a restatement of the major issue- is sophistry necessary with something akin to the Platonic "Noble Lie" as the prerequisite for order? 

Oh the complexities here of the human predicament.  What side should one come down on or should one ever come down on any side, but remain in perpetual tension?  Maybe Socrates' mistake was in deciding to be too unambiguous not only for his own safety, but for the safety of man in general.  Maybe it is this tension that should be his real lesson?

This, in my estimation, is the question man must answer to gain a complete understanding of himself as man.  It is in the realm that faith, knowledge and the eternal just might meet.

        

A great article at the new policy journal, National Affairs.  I quote extensively below because I think those sections articulate clearly the core issue Americ has to confront to maintain economic growth and social stability. 

It is quite the Gordian Knot.  The political leader who, like Alexander the Great, cuts this knot will be considered one of the greats of recent history.

I believe we need to re-examine our culture and look to tradition to guide us towards a more sustainable path.  No doubt, this is controversial in an era that believes that we must move ever further beyond the past in order to have a future worth embracing.  At any rate below is the challenge:  

"Our strategic situation is shaped by three inescapable realities. First is the inherent conflict between the creative destruction involved in free-market capitalism and the innate human propensity to avoid risk and change. Second is ever-increasing international competition. And third is the growing disparity in behavioral norms and social conditions between the upper and lower income strata of American society.

These realities combine to form a daunting problem. And the task of resolving it turns out not, by and large, to be a matter of foreign ­policy. Rather, it compels us to consider how we balance economic dynamism and growth against the unity and stability of our society. After all, we must have continuous, rapid technological and business-model innovation to grow our economy fast enough to avoid losing power to those who do not share America's values — and this innovation requires increasingly deregulated markets and fewer restrictions on behavior. But such deregulation would cause significant displacement and disruption that could seriously undermine America's social cohesion — which is not only essential to a decent and just society, but also to producing the kind of skilled and responsible citizens that free markets ultimately require. Moreover, preserving the integrity of our social fabric by minimizing the divisions that can rend society often requires ­government policies — to reduce inequality or ensure access to jobs, education, ­housing, or health care — that can in turn undercut growth and prosperity. Neither innovation nor cohesion can do without the other, but neither, it seems, can avoid undermining the other.

Reconciling these competing forces is America's great challenge in the decades ahead, but will be made far more difficult by the growing bifurcation of American society. Of course, this is not a new dilemma: It has actually undergirded most of the key political-economy debates of the past 30 years. But a dysfunctional political dynamic has prevented the nation from addressing it well, and has instead given us the worst of both worlds: a ballooning welfare state that threatens future growth, along with growing socioeconomic disparities.

Both major political parties have internal factions that sit on each side of the divide between innovation and cohesion. But broadly ­speaking, Republicans since Ronald Reagan have been the party of innovation, and Democrats have been the party of cohesion.

Conservatives have correctly viewed the policy agenda of the left as an attempt to undo the economic reforms of the 1980s. They have ­therefore, as a rhetorical and political strategy, downplayed the problems of cohesion — problems like inequality, wage stagnation, worker displacement, and disparities in educational performance — to emphasize the importance of innovation and growth. Liberals, meanwhile, have correctly identified the problem of cohesion, but have generally proposed antediluvian solutions and downplayed the necessity of innovation in a competitive world. They have noted that America's economy in the immediate wake of World War II was in many ways simultaneously more regulated, more successful, and more equitable than today's economy, but mistakenly assume that by restoring greater regulation we could re-create both the equity and prosperity of that era.

The conservative view fails to acknowledge the social costs of unrestrained economic innovation — costs that have made themselves ­powerfully apparent in American politics throughout our history. The liberal view, meanwhile, betrays a misunderstanding of the global economic environment.

To grasp the difficulty of this moment for America, we must see more clearly the pain involved in economic innovation, the price we would pay for stifling innovation, and the daunting social obstacles that stand in the way of balancing the two."

        

Given all the hubub over the Copenhagen conference, I am linking to two pieces from the Atlantic Community and my comments.

First story, HOT ISSUE: Losing HOPEnhagen?.  My comments below:

"The much ballyhoed Copenhagen conference on global warming ended up with an agreement that includes both more and less than meets the eye and all depending on perspective.

It is obviously less than meets the eye in the sense that there are no mandatory (or enforceable it might be added) emission cuts. All is voluntary. However, it does establish a legitimate frame with reference to the limits of hoped for temperature increases.

In that sense, the document might well provide enough political clout to force more aggressive repsonses from national governments than many of those disappointed in the conference may think.

However, like much with the entire global warming debate, the elephant constantly present in the room but never seriously acknowledged is why the international community does not embrace something akin to a global Manhattan project to look for technology that can be commercially viable that will reduce carbon emissions.

China, particularly wise in this area, is moving with many nuclear power plants to avoid increasing devotion to carbon based energy (and I am sure they are pleased it reduces their exposure to political volatility in many of the producing nations). The major expansion of nuclear energy would be a positive development, though there are admittedly many thorny security questions associated with this.

Innovation has led to practically all the changes in human history that have enabled man to constantly improve his material (if not spiritual) lot in life. Mandatory cuts in emissions may spur innovation, but it seems much more beneficial for an international pool of capital to be placed at the disposal of our great minds in order to not just develop the possible, but to develop the practical. That is the carrot approach.

It seems ironic that for so many adverse to using sticks in the security arena want to embrace sticks in this arena where, arguably, those sticks will have even less potential to create the desired outcomes than they do with respect to security."

The second piece, Polluting the Climate Change Debate, my comments below:

"The constant mantra is that the debate over Global Warming is settled. This is not necessarily so. While most scientists do adhere to the notion that global warming exists and is related to man's own activities, our historical perception is limited. It is ambiguous enough that while action should be taken, that action should be very pragmatic.

To take decisions that will have a draconian impact on the global economy is not wise. America, Europe, and the "wealthy" won't even be the ones most harmed by cap and trade and other prospective emission control regimes. It will be the world's poorest and hungriest. They will suffer and they will die as the economy slows down (further than it already has in the wake of the financial crisis) and as food production and distribution also slow down.

I do not believe doing nothing is an option. Further investment in technologies that can wean the industrialized (and industrializing) world from fossil fuels and carbon emission is correct. In fact, the investments should probably be far larger than they are. A "Manhattan Project" that could be global, with a certain percentage of GDP placed into an internationally administered pool of money where the best ideas would recieve something akin to venture capital seems a good place to start.

While there would be obvious issues that would have to be resolved regarding how funding is distributed and corrpution avoided, the concept of providing seed money seems wise and plausible. A command and control imposed solution only increases the likelihood of corruption on a high scale, probably even worse than any prospective corruption involved in administering the "venture capital" (can you imaging the market bubbles emerging from cap and trade emission credits?). Also, the global nuclear energy boon should be pushed far more aggressively by the United States (though security must remain a consideration).

By all means, let's deal with global warming. But let's do it by freeing the minds of todays Einsteins and Oppenheimers and giving them real opportunities to find, develop, and market new solutions."

        

With the Holidays proving a distraction for many Americans, several major news events have been taking place.  Of course, there was the most recent terrorist plot to blow up a plane landing in Detroit. (here's a background for context from teh Council on Foreign Relations)  However, as disturbing as that is, the event with the potential for long-term impact is in Iran as a new round of protests following the death of anti-regime cleric have led to security forces firing on crowds and apparently killing several. 

There are now many comments on the Internet comparing the Supreme Leader, Ali Khameini, to the Shah as if this is rapidly becoming an Islamic Revolution in reverse.

Should that be the case, it would be momentous.  The 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution was a watershed that changed relations in the entire region for three decades.  A reversal of some kind would be dramatic, but I suspect, the outcome will be less than imagined.

Even should Khameini and even the President, America's favorite boogeyman Mahmoud Ahmadinejad get overthrown (still a long way off), the prospects of Iran flowering into a Western style, liberal democracy is extremely unlikely.  The probable beneficiary would be Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former Iranian President and while considered "moderate" by the standard of Ahmadinejad, is no western democrat.  He is still an Islamist, at least officially, and actually represents a more subversive challenge to policy in the region as he is likely to pursue similar ends as Khameini and Ahmadinejad, but in far less overt ways.

We are witnessing the potential for major change, but our enthusiasm should be appropriately tempered.  Here is some background from Stratfor on key figures and cleavages within the Iranian ruling elite to help make sense of this facts moving situation.

        

The Economist is simply the best weekly newsmagazine in existance.  This story on the idea of progress (and its discontents) is great stuff.  I quote several fascinating section but encourage all to read it., despite its length.

Progress, from a purely material standpoint, is not the sine qua non of human existance, much less happiness.

Sections from the piece:

"The idea of progress has a long history, but it started to flower in the 17th century. Enlightenment thinkers believed that man emancipated by reason would rise to ever greater heights of achievement. The many manifestations of his humanity would be the engines of progress: language, community, science, commerce, moral sensibility and government. Unfortunately, many of those engines have failed...

The 20th century was seduced by the idea that humans will advance as part of a collective and that the enlightened few have the right—the duty even—to impose progress on the benighted masses whether they choose it or not. The blood of millions and the fall of the Berlin Wall, 20 years ago this year, showed how much the people beg to differ. Coercion will always have its attractions for those able to do the coercing, but, as a source of enlightened progress, the subjugation of the individual in the interests of the community has lost much of its appeal.

Instead the modern age has belonged to material progress and its predominant source has been science. Yet nestling amid the quarks and transistors and the nucleic acids and nanotubes, there is a question. Science confers huge power to change the world. Can people be trusted to harness it for good?

The ancients thought not. Warnings that curiosity can be destructive stretch back to the very beginning of civilisation. As Adam and Eve ate from the Tree of Knowledge, so inquisitive Pandora, the first woman in Greek mythology, peered into the jar and released all the world’s evils.

Modern science is full of examples of technologies that can be used for ill as well as good. Think of nuclear power—and of nuclear weapons; of biotechnology—and of biological contamination. Or think, less apocalyptically, of information technology and of electronic surveillance. History is full of useful technologies that have done harm, intentionally or not. Electricity is a modern wonder, but power stations have burnt too much CO2-producing coal. The internet has spread knowledge and understanding, but it has also spread crime and pornography. German chemistry produced aspirin and fertiliser, but it also filled Nazi gas chambers with Cyclon B.

The point is not that science is harmful, but that progress in science does not map tidily onto progress for humanity...

...Nor does economic progress broadly defined correspond to human progress any more precisely than does scientific progress. GDP does not measure welfare; and wealth does not equal happiness. Rich countries are, by and large, happier than poor ones; but among developed-world countries, there is only a weak correlation between happiness and GDP. And, although wealth has been soaring over the past half a century, happiness, measured by national surveys, has hardly budged.

That is probably largely because of status-consciousness. It is good to go up in the world, but much less so if everyone around you is going up in it too. Once they have filled their bellies and put a roof over their heads, people want more of what Fred Hirsch, an economist who worked on this newspaper in the 1950s and 1960s, called “positional goods”. Only one person can be the richest tycoon. Not everyone can own a Matisse or a flat in Mayfair. As wealth grows, the competition for such status symbols only becomes more intense.

And it is not just that material progress does not seem to be delivering the emotional goods. People also fear that mankind is failing to manage it properly—with the result that, in important ways, their children may not be better off than they are. The forests are disappearing; the ice is melting; social bonds are crumbling; privacy is eroding; life is becoming a dismal slog in an ugly world.

All this scepticism, and more, is on display in “Nineteen Eighty-Four” and “Brave New World”, the two great British dystopian novels of the 20th century...

...At the end of Madach’s poem, Adam is about to throw himself off a cliff in despair, when he glimpses redemption. First Eve draws near to tell him that she is to have a child. Then God comes and gently tells Adam that he is wrong to try to reckon his accomplishments on a cosmic scale. “For if you saw your transient, earthly life set in dimensions of eternity, there wouldn’t be any virtue in endurance. Or if you saw your spirit drench the dust, where could you find incentive for your efforts?” All God asks of man is to strive for progress, nothing more. “It is human virtues I want,” He says, “human greatness.”

Ms Neiman asks people to reject the false choice between Utopia and degeneracy. Moral progress, she writes, is neither guaranteed nor is it hopeless. Instead, it is up to us. "

        

The former Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakumar with a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of new geopolitical trends in Central Asia.  The major thrust of this is that China has spent years establishing diplomatic and business relations with key natural gas providers like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and that Russia is largely supportive of this as it will enhance their ability to control supplies to Europe.

Very intricate, but worthwhile to read as it shows the very significant challenges the US faces in the region.  It also offers further evidence of just how adroit and patient China is as they move to secure their energy requirements.

        

This post at Darwinian Conservatism sparked me to write several comments as part of a pback and forth between myself, Larry Arnhart of Darwinian Conservatism and another reader.  Additional comments might be forthming, but already I see a fruitful discourse.

"Me:  Another great post.

I have serious questions about the full utility of reason. As I have written on my blog:

"Reason is indeed quite necessary to function in the natural world around us, however, it offers no glimpse into the transendent. That is its perennial limit and an important one to keep in mind when phrases like 'let reason decide' get thrown around in debate.

'The existential-ethical questions as to who I am and what I am to do are inseparable at once from the political question who we are and from the theoretical or 'ontological' question of the way things are.'

None of those questions are answered by 'reason.'"

Reason can only function within predetermined parameters. It is indispensable, but much more limited than many, especially in our secular age acknowledge.

So what predetermines those parameters? Again we come to what seems to me the existential question. Faith and faith alone can answer the existential and ontological questions. THis is irrespective of whether that faith is in an atheistic conception of the universe or a universe of intelligent design.

So do we now arrive at the Kierkegaardian "Leap?"

Again, it is man's need for transcendence and cosmic purpose that makes this such a needful discussion. 

Arnhart:  You say that only transcendent faith allows us to answer questions about "what I should do."

Does it give us specific answers? Could you provide some examples?

For instance, Robert George claims that "pure reason" alone tells us that heterosexual married couples who engage in any sexual act other than vaginal intercourse are committing sodomy, and this is self-evidently bad.

Would transcendent faith confirm this? 

Me: I certainly take your point and would agree that pure reason does not necessarily confirm your example.

However, if you believe in the Bible as the unadulterated word of the Judeo-Christian God, then I do think it illustrates many things one should do as well as not do. The Old Testament "Law" is actually rather specific, perhaps, in Leviticus, so specific as to prove itself practically impossible. Consequently, though we should not be under the illusion we can adhere to everything in an entirely legalistic sense, we can acknowledge that it is a guide that points us in a direction.

I certainly recognize that transcendent faith cannot specifically spell out what one must do under every conceivable scenario. I also recognize transcendence, certainly that which is present outside of the Judeo-Christian framework, does point in vastly different directions on innumerable specific issues.

However, in a general sense, transcendent faith points in a direction that tends towards order and authority. This is the indisputable necessity of functional society.

There will always be differences of opinion as to what is the "Truth" with a capital "T." However, if there is not "Truth" with a capital "T" then, as Dostoevsky illuminates, anything is possible. That cannot be an acceptable situation for us to confront in anything outside academia or conferences on philosophy.

I am not certain if I am responding adequately to your inquiry, I trust you will advise me if I am not. 

Paul: Mr. Lawson has written:

'Reason is indeed quite necessary to function in the natural world around us, however, it offers no glimpse into the transendent. That is its perennial limit and an important one to keep in mind when phrases like 'let reason decide' get thrown around in debate.

'The existential-ethical questions as to who I am and what I am to do are inseparable at once from the political question who we are and from the theoretical or 'ontological' question of the way things are.'

However, I thought that reason could tell us the way that things are, and that it is for precisely that reason why medieval theologians such as Aquinas turned to Aristotle as an authority, because they thought that reason itself confirmed the existence of God, but what was more, reason could illuminate the ontological status of God in a way that the Bible could not. Not that the Bible was inferior to reason, but rather the truth that the Bible conveyed was about God's role in human history and in human life, and didn't specify really too much about God's nature, except that he was Jesus. 

Me: Paul,

Thanks for raising this issue.

I confess, my view on transcendence is much more existentialist. I think that while reason proves itself a useful tool that can explain much, it cannot explain all. I am not certain that Aristotle could ever really reason through what God is, at best I think he could only reason about how God might choose to manifest himself in ways that we can observe.

How is God the "Alpha and the Omega?" How did he always exist outside of time and space? If, theoretically, God can act arbitrarily and against nature at any time (since God is the creator of nature in the first place), how can we ever use reason to really understand an entity that protean? How do we reason through to an answer for any of these questions?

If we ever do manage this task, then I would be forced to reevaluate reason itself.

We know God as a personal and historical entity through the Bible. We understand how God chooses to become manifest in nature through reason. But even that manifestation must still be God's choice. Consequently, our reason bumps up against the limit of what God allows us to comprehend in our finitude. "

I hope more will be forthcoming.

        

Charles Krauthammer offered a good retrospective last week on the occassion of his 25th anniversary of becoming an editorialist.  This career, his second after psychology, has earned him the Pulitzer Prize and, recently, a legion of devoted followers who see him as a clarion response to the current Presidential Administration.  The below section is the crux of the piece.  I agree wholeheartedly with Krauthammer that then opportunity for strong and meaningful; intellectual combat due to the rise of Obama is good.  It gives us purpose and direction, something man needs to retain his respectability.

"Looking back on the quarter-century, the most remarkable period, strangely enough, was the '90s. They began on Dec. 26, 1991 (just as the '60s, as many have observed, ended with Nixon's resignation on Aug. 9, 1974) with a deliverance of biblical proportions -- the disappearance of the Soviet Union. It marked the end of 60 years of existential conflict, the collapse of a deeply evil empire, and the death of one of the most perverse political ideas in history. This miracle, in major part wrought by Ronald Reagan, bequeathed the ultimate peace dividend: a golden age of the most profound peace and prosperity.

"I recently told an assembly at my son's high school," I wrote in 1997, "that they were living through a time so blessed they would tell their grandchildren about it. They looked at me uncomprehendingly ... because it is hard for anyone to apprehend the sheer felicity of one's own time until it is gone."

I concluded with "golden ages never last." Throughout the decade, and most especially as it began to wane, I returned to this theme of the wondrous oddity, the sheer impossibility of an age of such post-historical tranquility.

And inevitable ennui. So profound was that tranquility, so trivial the history of that time, that George Will and I would muse that if this kept up -- an era whose dominant issue was a president's zipper problem -- he might as well go back to the academy and I to psychiatry.

Of course, it didn't keep up. It never does. History is tragic, not redemptive. Our holiday from history ended in fire, giving birth to a post-9/11 decade of turbulence and disorientation as we were faced with the unexpected resurgence of radical eschatological evil.

Which brings us to the age of Obama, perhaps -- mirabile dictu -- the most exhilarating time of all. There is nothing as bracing for democracy as the alternation of power, particularly when it yields as serious, determined and challenging an ideological agenda as Barack Obama's. This third wave of transformative liberalism -- FDR, then LBJ, now Obama -- is no time for triangulation. This is not incrementalism. We're not debating school uniforms. When Obama once declared Ronald Reagan historically consequential and Bill Clinton not, he meant it. Obama intends to be the Reagan of the new liberalism.

It's no secret that I oppose nearly everything Obama has proposed. But after the enervating '90s and the tragic 2000s, the prospect of combative and clarifying 2010s, of sharply defined and radically opposed visions, is both politically and intellectually invigorating."

        

In news that many Americans may be unaware of, last week Iran siezed an oil well in what is considered by the international community to be Iraq.  This move, especially as it comes during a time of heightened tension over Iran's nuclear program, could have been extremely provicative. 

Stratfor, as always offers a great analysis of the reasoning for this move and its implications in the stand off.

Here is a relevant section,

"The Iranians signaled last week that they might not choose to be passive if effective sanctions were put in place. Sanctions on gasoline would in fact cripple Iran, so like Japan prior to Pearl Harbor, the option of capitulating to sanctions might be viewed as more risky than a pre-emptive strike. And if sanctions didn’t work, the Iranians would have to assume a military attack is coming next. Since the Iranians wouldn’t know when it would happen, and their retaliatory options might disappear in the first phase of the military operation, they would need to act before such an attack.

The problem is that the Iranians won’t know precisely when that attack will take place. The United States and Israel have long discussed a redline in Iranian nuclear development, which if approached would force an attack on Iran to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Logically, Iran would seem to have a redline as well, equally poorly designed. At the point when it becomes clear that sanctions are threatening regime survival or that military action is inevitable, Iran must act first, using its military assets before it loses them.

Iran cannot live with either effective sanctions or the type of campaign that the United States would have to launch to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities. The United States can’t live with the consequences of Iranian counteractions to an attack. Even if sanctions were possible, they would leave Iran with the option to do precisely those things Washington cannot tolerate. Therefore, whether the diplomatic or military route is followed, each side has two options. First, the Americans can accept Iran as a nuclear power, or Iran can accept that it must give up its nuclear ambitions. Second, assuming that neither side accepts the first option, each side must take military action before the other side does. The Americans must neutralize counters before the Iranians deploy them. The Iranians must deploy their counters before they are destroyed.

The United States and Iran are both playing for time. Neither side wants to change its position on the nuclear question, although each hopes the other will give in. Moreover, neither side is really confident in its military options. The Americans are not certain that they can both destroy the nuclear facilities and Iranian counters — and if the counters are effective, their consequences could be devastating. The Iranians are not certain that their counters will work effectively, and once failure is established, the Iranians will be wide open for devastating attack. Each side assumes the other understands the risks and will accept the other’s terms for a settlement.

And so each waits, hoping the other side will back down. The events of the past week were designed to show the Americans that Iran is not prepared to back down. More important, they were designed to show that the Iranians also have a redline, that it is as fuzzy as the American redline and that the Americans should be very careful in how far they press, as they might suddenly wake up one morning with their hands full.

The Iranian move is deliberately designed to rattle U.S. President Barack Obama. He has shown a decision-making style that assumes that he is not under time pressure to make decisions. It is not clear to anyone what his decision-making style in a crisis will look like. Though not a prime consideration from the Iranian point of view, putting Obama in a position where he is psychologically unprepared for decisions in the timeframe they need to be made in is certainly an added benefit. Iran, of course, doesn’t know how effectively he might respond, but his approach to Afghanistan gives them another incentive to act sooner than later.

There are some parallels here to the nuclear warfare theory, in which each side faces mutual assured destruction. The problem here is that each side does not face destruction, but pain. And here, pre-emptive strikes are not guaranteed to produce anything. It is the vast unknowns that make this affair so dangerous, and at any moment, one side or the other might decide they can wait no longer."

Meanwhile, in other fascinating news, the death of an outspoken cleric and opponent of the Tehran regime sparks further questions about regime stability.  As always, how these factors interact will determine much about the potential for armed conflict.

        

An excellent piece over at the Wall Street Journal that makes quite clear that it will likely be the world's poor (irrespective of the Copenhagen agreement for wealthy nations to supply funding to new carbon emitters from the lower income nations) who will suffer the most from grandiose schemes to combat global warming.  Sensibly, it is suggested enhanced funding for R&D for legitimate and marketable alternative energy resources (not just pie in the sky stuff like fields of windmills).

Below are two meaningful snippets,

"In the run-up to this month's global climate summit in Copenhagen, the Copenhagen Consensus Center dispatched researchers to the world's most likely global-warming hot spots. Their assignment: to ask locals to tell us their views about the problems they face. Over the past seven weeks, I recounted in these pages what they told us concerned them the most. In nearly every case, it wasn't global warming.

Everywhere we went we found people who spoke powerfully of the need to focus more attention on more immediate problems. In the Bauleni slum compound in Lusaka, Zambia, 27-year-old Samson Banda asked, "If I die from malaria tomorrow, why should I care about global warming?" In a camp for stateless Biharis in Bangladesh, 45-year-old Momota Begum said, "When my kids haven't got enough to eat, I don't think global warming will be an issue I will be thinking about." On the southeast slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro in Tanzania, 45-year-old widow and HIV/AIDS sufferer Mary Thomas said she had noticed changes in the mountain's glaciers, but declared: "There is no need for ice on the mountain if there is no people around because of HIV/AIDS...

Instead of making far-fetched promises about greenhouse gases, how about a concrete commitment to green energy research and development? Specifically, we should radically increase spending on R&D for green energy—to 0.2% of global GDP, or $100 billion. That's 50 times more than the world spends now—but still twice as cheap as Kyoto. Not only would this be both affordable and politically achievable, but it would also have a real chance of working."

Again, this is a simple, clarion call for action to confront global warming, but is also a call for prudence, not utopianism.  When will global leaders understand how to not ignore problems and also how to not react rashly, harmfully, and precipitously?

It seems we are destined to always have leadership that oscillates between these poles, each representing opposite, but equally damaging extremes.  Its amazing to consider that that being pragmatic has now become radical, while the truly radical is so commonplace, its almost worth nothing with anything more than a passive shrug.

 

        

It took  a long time but I finally finished reading Paul Johnson's Modern Times.  It was an excellent read and elegantly makes a point that all intellectuals (real and pseudo) should ponder.  Namely, that freedom, not coercion leads to optimal outcomes.

While this may be a bit facile, the evidence amassed in this nearly 800 page behemoth regarding the history of the 20th century in all its boldness and bloodiness does justice to the idea.  The last paragraph encapsulates the book's idea perfectly and so I quote it,

"Certainly, by the last decade of the century, some lessons had plainly been learned.  But it was not yet clear whether the underlying evils which had made possible its catastrophic failures and tragedies- the rise of moral relativism, the decline of personal responsibility, the repudiation of Judeo-Christian values, not least the arrogant belief that men and women could solve all the mysteries of the universe by theirn own unaided intellects- were in the process of being eradicated.  On that would depend the chances of the twenty-first century becoming, by contrast, an age of hope for mankind."

If the 1980s brought the end of the Cold War and freedom from the Iron Curtain by 1989 and the 90s seemed a time of joy in the West, what does the future portend? 

The lessons Johnson seems to believe were learned may not have been learned so well.  Much of the ideological underpinnings, at least amongst the intelligentsia, that led to the misery of the 20th century is still present.  It seemed discredited and permanently laid upon the "ash heap of history" once the Berlin Wall fell.


Yet the financial crisis, fears of global warming, racial and identity politics and growing statism within the heart of the West raises the prospect that a new cycle of history is upon us with the same, old lessons needing to be relearned.

Are we up to the task?

        

Below is an exchange I had with Professor Larry Arnhart regarding his latest post at his blog Darwinian Conservative.

Check out the article here.  Below are the comments:

"Me:  I find this one of the most thought provoking blogs out there because it cuts to the core of so many philosophical issues.

Whether there is a fundamental teleology of man, or teleology of history as reflected in man, is the question upon which all significant existential questions rest. Does man have a transcendent purpose, or, as you clearly articulate an immanent teleology?

At the end of the day, I tend to agree with Nietzsche that without a cosmic order, morality is essentially meaningless. Even if you are correct regarding the Humean aspects of Darwin's thought and how man may "paint our world with the colors of our moral emotions," this raises the question of why?

Man wants to know why. Evolution gives no ultimate answers, offering only a multitide of "small answers" that respond to what can only be seen as trivial in relation to the grand scope of the universe at large.

Unlike many who believe is cosmic teleology, I agree that Darwinian insights abound when attempting to understand the variation and adaptability of different animals and even of man as he has confronted different climates, geographical barriers, etc.

However, ultimate meaning cannot be found in the immanent. If that is all there is, then the existentialists who expound upon the meaningless and even the absurdity of existence are actually correct and over time, that view will seep in to destroy our foundations of order. In many ways it already has.

You are to be commended for your efforts at grounding ethics and morality in a secular fashion, however, I do not think that man, overall, will accept this as the sine qua non of his existence.

Arnhart:  Mr. Lawson,

Thanks for this thoughtful statement.

Including "religious understanding" on the list of twenty natural desires is my attempt to recognize the naturalness of human transcendent longings.

I realize, however, that folks like Holloway would say this doesn't go far enough in acknoledging the need for transcendent principles."

        

David P. Goldman, otherwise known as Spengler and one of my favorite bloggers, sums up in an effficient way one of the most distressing things about the current state of the economy, namely that the jobs being lost by big companies not only are unlikely to return, but that the typical engine for new jobs, small businesses, are being so squeezed that they may not (and most likely will not) be able to absorb those newly unemplolyed.  In a nutshell, the economy is in terrible shape no matter how much stimulus the Obama team tries to inject and how much badgering of banks to loan more that they engage in.

Here is the relevant sections from his more economic focused blog at Asia Times, Inner Workings:

"Structurally, a very large percentage of job losses during recessions reflect creative destruction: big companies who lay off workers in recessions downsize permanently. The jobs are not replaced at the same companies; the old jobs go away forever, and new jobs are created at the grass roots of the economy.

That’s why we have to look to small business for continued job growth, and why the prospects are grimmer than the market seems to believe.

Visually, the relationship between changes in payrolls and changes in inventories appears quite strong:

Quarter-on-Quarter Change in Inventories (GDP Basis) Vs. Payrolls (Establishment Survey)

 

But closer examination shows that the relationship is quite one-sided: the correlation is very high in recessions, but practically nil in recoveries.

Correlation (over 12 quarters) Between Inventory and Payroll Change vs. Payroll Change

The one-sidedness of the correlation is consistent with the fact that the vast majority of new jobs during recoveries are created by new, small businesses. The inventory cycle is largely a function of big firms. They shrink in recessions and their job losses often are permanent. The old jobs are replaced by new entrepreneurs.

Given the miserable situation of entrepreneurs, there is little reason to expect that future job growth wil be correlated with any recovery of inventories."

        

A great piece from the City Journal that outlines the Obama Administration's rather nefarious plan to blackmail businesses into supporting Congressional passage of cap and trade legislation.

Several relevant sections are below.

"Up to this point, Congress has seemed unwilling to pass global warming legislation, largely because of the perceived economic damage that would ensue. A 2007 MIT study suggested that cap-and-trade would cost the average American family $3,900 each year in economic losses and taxes. A more recent Heritage Foundation study reached a similar conclusion. Even candidate Obama said, “Under my plan of a cap-and-trade system, electricity rates would necessarily skyrocket.” What Obama is saying to Congress today is: If you don’t pass cap-and-trade, which I have already acknowledged is costly, I’ve got something coming down the pike that will be even costlier. It’s a very cynical—and very risky—strategy.

United Nations climate chief Yvo de Boer explained the strategy to reporters in Copenhagen: “If I were a businessman, I would say, ‘Please, please, please do a deal in Copenhagen, and please, please, please make it market-based.’ Because if we fail to get a market-based deal here, and if the U.S. Senate fails to pass cap-and-trade legislation, then the EPA will be obliged to regulate. And every businessman knows that taxes and regulations tend to be a lot more expensive and lot less efficient than market-based approaches.”

An unnamed White House official was more explicit, telling Fox News, “If you don’t pass this legislation, then . . . the EPA is going to have to regulate in this area. And it is not going to be able to regulate on a market-based way, so it’s going to have to regulate in a command-and-control way, which will probably generate even more uncertainty.”

Interetingly, this dovetails nicely with a quick exchange I had with Thomas P.M. Barnett at his blog.  Here is the exchange:

"Barnett:  ...Climate-gate only proves that world-class scientists are big-ego, high-maintenance types that, left to their own devices, are about as petty as a bunch of junior high school girls.

Big surprise to some, less so to others, but "proves" nothing...

Me:  "Climategate" certainly does not refute the theory of manmade global warming. It does, however, raise questions about the severity of the crisis and the time frame we are dealing with.

Barnett: Agree completely.

The key is to not ignore the potential for global warming as many skeptics want, but to not go insane and throw our economy into the toilet.  One good way to begin to be serious about this is to embrace nuclear power.  There are serious waste and security issues associated with this, but it is certainly clean from an emissions standpoint.

        

A new study from an think tank run by defense contracting giant Northrup Gruman speculates that the U.S. may need to shift to a "nuclear dyad" as opposed to the contemproary "triad" arrangement. 

This is troubling as the report itself indicates that the triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear capable long-range bombers is appropriate for a robust deterrence stance.  However, as the report indicates, "The triad, the most attractive strategically, is also the most costly in both operating and investment costs..."

Consequently, the report attempted to look at what would be the most economical as opposed to strategically valuable mix of capabilities to assure deterrence.

In an era of proliferating nuclear technology, should we be reducing our deterrent capabilities?  I have been an opponent of the soon, though not yet completely negotiated, successor to START that the Obama team is attempting to negotiate with the Russians for this very reason.

Flexibility is key.  While threats should not be thrown about cavalierly, no option can be arbitrarily removed from the table.  Reducing one piece of a robust mechanism of deterrence, even if it is, relatively speaking, the least necessary, speaks of a willingness to embrace decline. 

As I have written before, this is where the Obama Administration is taking us.  An era where we will be hamstrung by overwhelming demand for domestic spending that forces strategically painful cuts to our military posture.  This is where the potential for chaos or entropy begins.  Others see the potential as well...

        

A good piece at the Atlantic Community on Europe's "tough" neighborhood and my comments below:

"Interesting article that frankly acknowledges the seemingly intractable nature of security competition and conflict. These things will not go away, they will always be with us, for, by in large, human nature and geography doesn't fundamentally change.

Tribalism can be ameliorated under the sway of relative prosperity, but it still lurks beneath the surface and waits for its opportunity to be unleashed, irrespective of what elite opinion considers rational and enlightened.

The irony is, that even if less and less people are willing to be "intractable" as globalization sweeps the world and attempts to rationalize and pacify the world through the purveying of prosperity, technology will facilitate the ability of even that truncated number to wreak amazing damage. That , in turn, could well be the spark that causes a "regression" in broad historical terms. That is what will allow "tribalism" to re-emerge in more overt form than it currently appears to the casual observer.

That is why there is no utopia at the end of the rainbow. History will continue to march as there will be no "end" just transformations and transmogrifications."

        

Below is my response on Dan Drezner's blog to a question e has on his IR student;s finals.  He promises some comments soon, I am curious what he'll say.

Below is the question and my response.  Note that I did use bits and pieces of an op-ed I had already written, but I thought it appropriate.  Most of the other responses dive into economic theory.  Should mine?  I'll let the readers judge.

"When China becomes the world's largest economy, the current era of globalization will come to an end.  The simple fact is that while Great Britain and the United States had open liberal polities, China does not.  This will foster mutual suspicion between China and the west, as well as discourage China from fully opening up its domestic market.  That, plus the geopolitical tensions that come from a hegemonic power transition, means we can expect a new era of mercantilism."

Do you agree or disagree with the above statement?  Why or why not?
 
Response: 

Only a mere century ago man thought the world would never devolve into catastrophic warfare because economic interdependence would make it too costly. Famous books were written to bring home that point. Books like Norman Angell’s “Great Illusion” clearly made the elite opinion of the day swoon by arguing that it was folly to believe a great war would ocurr. Indeed, the belief in a large conflagration was the supposed "Great Illusion" that should be dispensed with due its very irrationality and economic incomprehensibleness.

A single day in June 1914 put an end to the mockery of that “Great Illusion.”

Similarly, the belief in the infinite potential of contemporary globalization is likely to be just as unfounded as that of the pre World War I era. However, globalization's actual end will only in a limited way be due to the rise of China's economy, its political system, east-west conflicts, or any neo-mercantilist policy it might engage in.

Globalization will end when the traditional concerns of populations and their leaders emerge once more and create incentives for policies that are not economically sensible.

Pride, envy, fear. These very human emotions drive much of human history, in many ways, they drive it more than rationalized economic theory would seem to dictate and most economists predict.

Many countries, not only China, will succumb to these traditional concerns. The potential sparks for a massive retrenchment into efforts at achieving autarky are legion. It could be a massive WMD based terror attack. It could be a pandemic that is far more problematic than H1N1. It could be destabilizing arms races that emerge in strategically important areas. It could be domestic backlash in America. It could be domestic backlash in the EU. It could be a domestic backlash in China.

Indeed, it could be any number of things or an impossible to decipher combination of factors. However, to distill globalization's end due to the rise of a single nation, irrespective of the rapidity of the rise and the awe it inspires, is too simplistic.

Globalization will end because human nature is what it has always been. Of course, the Alexandrine desire for universality will likely emerge after such a period of retrenchment once more as well. Thus, does Sisyphus make another attempt to push the boulder over the top of the mountain."

        

A thought provoking post over at the Coming Anarchy blog regarding the potential biological foundations for religion.  This actually correlates to a number of posts over at Darwinian Conservatism.  I raise a question in the first comment to the Coming Anarhy piece and then the debate takes off.  If you have time, it is worth persuing the entire thing, but my core issue is summed up in my comment which I reproduce below.

"By destroying faith, we run the risk of leaving man unmoored from responsibility. You refer to this in this post yourself in the below quote. Isn't this a problem for those who are dedicated to trying to "rationalize" everything?

'And religion also boosts reproduction of their members, the evidence of which we can see today looking looking at the low replacement rates of the rich and casually religious societies of Western Europe (Spain: 1.3, Czech Republic: 1.23) and East Asia (Macau: 0.9, South Korea: 1.2, Japan: 1.22) compared to the high fertility of many devoutly religious Islamic societies that are otherwise chaotic (Afghanistan: 7.07, Somalia: 6.04, Nigeria: 5.2)."'"

I do not believe that biologic explanations for faith explain away or resolve Nietzsche's challenge.

From the Darwinian Conservatism post on this issue:

"'As the will to truth thus gains self-consciousness--there can be no doubt of that--morality will gradually perish now: this is the great spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe--the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all spectacles."'Thus declares Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals (third essay, sec. 27).

Nietzsche's prediction of the gradual disappearance of morality over the 20th and 21st centuries was based on his claim that this would follow from the decline in the belief that morality was founded in some eternal, divine order of the universe. Traditional morality could not survive once human beings saw the truth that all morality was only a human invention with no support in divine will or natural order."

The Darwinists seem to think that morality can be advanced by "cooperation through reciprocity."  However, it does breakdown as it attempts to become universalized as this quote from the same Darwinian Conservatism post indicates:

"Rather, morality arises from the emergent evolution of human nature. If Darwin is right about the evolution of human morality as a process of evolutionary group selection, then human morality is not absolutely disinterested or universalizable, because it is biased in favor of insiders and against outsiders.

Consequently, in a "big picture" manner, any morality not grounded in the transcendent can at best only be parochial and essentially "tribal."  This means, to me, that Nietzsche was right, "morality will gradually perish now: this is the great spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe"

I do not think this is a hopeful spectacle as Nietzsche might hope.  Man is incapable of making it such.  The current quest for secularized human rights will fail as resources become depleted and societies worldwide become increasingly atomized.  "Tribal" relations, the love of "one's own" will guarantee persistent conflict absent the transcendent.

        

An interesting article over at the Atlantic Community about the challenges that the EU has, especially after their recent election of two virtual non-entities as EU President and High Commissioner for Foreign Policy.  The article seems to posit a unique and positive outcome for Europe, my comments below:

"I like the terminology employed in this article. The EU is a very complex, "Frankenstein's Monster" sort of entity. I suspect, at the end of the day, the EU will remain what amounts to a glorified free trade zone. That is what it is now and what it will probably always predominatey be.

I understand why no medium sized power (like a Germany or France) would want the EU organs to become too powerful and possibly conduct policy inimical to their interests. However, by not attempting to give more influece to two supposedly key roles within its bureaucracy, the EU contines to look unable to punch at the political weight one would expect from its relative economic base.

Meanwhile, it remains the EU's individual constituent nation-states that hold the real diplomatic power. With that in mind, I do not think the "EU Monster" will have the "last laugh." Indeed, I think it illustrates a truth that runs beneath much discourse regarding the entire EU project and the notion of any trans-national structure patterned upon it.

There is altogether too much faith that "transnational entities", of which the EU is the ultimate example, are the definitive wave of the future. Certainly, there will be a role for economic cooperation and interdependence on some policy issues (certain health issues, global warming, international terrorism, some financial regulation). However, when existential questions are raised, nations as well as subnational rather than transnational actors hold sway. This is because most people are loyal to what they know and see around them.

Loyalty to abstactions is difficult. Even the Westphalian "nation" occassionally has problems maintaining loyalty. To think that real loyalty can emerge to a quasi-federation of supposedly sovereign, yet not entirely indpendent nation-states, can be achieved seems a bit overindulgent .

I would even submit that it borders on the height of rationalistic hubris to think that larger conglomerations will be able to hold onto the imagination of the masses, as opposed to the intellectual elites.

Ultimately, that is why we will all have to continue living in a complex world of ever shifting state based alliances concerned with permanent interests dictated by historical context, culture, and geography."

        

Received the "On Principles" newsletter from the Askbrook Center today. In it, Director Peter Schramm wrote an excellent essay on discovering the American mind.

The below section, where he quotes Lincoln is quite poetic and encapsulates exactly what a truly worthy education should consist of.

"Literacy not only frees the mind, it teaches the mind to know that it is free.  If you can read and write, Lincoln says, you can 'converse with the dead, and the unborn, at all distances of time and space.'  Eventually you can have conversations with Aristotle and Locke, Homer and Shakespeare, Jefferson and Lincoln.  You can meet these great thinkers directly, rising to their level as you come to understand them and pursue the questions that engaged them.

Notice that Lincoln says rise to equality.  Equality is not a lowering.  Once the habit of freedom of thought is established, the mass of men can rise.  This is their opportunity,  Any they must re-learn this - and establish and maintain the habits necessary - in each generation.  This, the heart of a liberal arts education, undergirds that last best hope of the world called America.  When a student really begins to see this - the conditions of freedom - he knows he has risen to the level of the American mind.

What Mr. Schramm said is exactly what should be said to each and every child in America.  Its greatness is its ability to allow all to rise to greatness, not be levelled down into mediocrity.  This is the real hope of America lyrically expressed.  I hope it is still heard by enough. 

        

I have been reading the magisterial Modern Times by Paul Johnson.  It is striking to me how much death and destruction Stalin wreaked upon his own nation as well as most of Eastern Europe.  Manmade famines, purges, show trials, the pact with Hitler that greenlighted the invasion of Poland, etc. 

While death tolls are not necessarily the only way to measure evil, Hitler and Stalin's count are roughly equal with it quite possible that Stalin's exceeded Hitler's.  Here is a breakdown of the morbid numbers culled from numerous sources.

This raises to me an important question.  When one thinks today of "evil", the human embodiement is very rarely if ever thought of as Stalin.  Rather it is almost always Hitler.  

Stalin's crimes are comparable and yet he is rarely discussed in the same breath with Hitler outside of conversations between historians.  I suspect that if you put a picture of Stalin before present day high schoolers, less than 50% would know Stalin, while over 95% would recognize Hitler.  I wonder why? 

Certainly, the Holocaust plays a key role in this impression.  Hitler's crimes are correctly seen as industrialized mass murder on an unimaginable scale. Hitler almost single handedly provided us with the notion we now have of what a genocide is.  Yet, how can one ignore the Gulag Archipelego?

It seems to me that some of this has to do with the fact that Hitler's most egregious (though by no means only) crimes were fundamentally race based, while Stalin's were ostensibly class based, though often it seems they were the acts of a paranoiac.  Is the answer this simple or there something mroe sinister at work here?

Stalin was a communist.  His end goal was supposed to be a utopia, a utopia that very much appealed to intellectuals disdainful of free markets and classical liberalism.  Certainly, while no one of serious repute attempts to exhonerate Stalin, he is also not thrown into the bottom of a Dantesque inferno with near the frequency of his German counterpart.  Its almost as if he is given somehat of a pass and not bestowed with the appropriate amount of ignominy his historical record seems to cry out for.  Is it because Hitler was too "parochial," a defender of only one group while Stalin at least had pretensions of eventual universality?

In a way, I think that is part of the reason.  His barbarism was, in the eyes of many who shape public opinion, more tolerable due to its professed intent.  In the end, I supose the answer is not all that important, after all, most people would at least say Stalin is a bad guy.  But I think it cuts to the core of a very real problem.  For all of our political correctness these days and outrage over the seemingly trivial, have we forgotten how to be outraged by the truly demonic and evil in all its multifarious forms, or only certain types?

Let me be clear, none of this is meant to paint Hitler in anything but the darkest light possible, it is merely meant to raise a question whose answer can tell us a lot about the state of our present sense of our morality.

        

No matter what one's partisan persuasion, today is a day to be thankful for the greatness of America and, just as importantly, the sacrifices made to accomplish this.  It is also a time to reflect on God and our belief in that which makes us, still despite our challenges, very much the envy of the preponderance of the world's population.

Enjoy your time with your family and friends.

        

It appears President Obama is about to unveil his long awaitied re-calibration of Afghan policy.  Leslie Gelb, a former President of the Couincil on Foreign Relations, is giving a sneak peak in this article.  It appears his policy will be multi-faceted and, at first glance, rather reasonable.  However, I still think it may be too much of a committment given our other strategic needs as I detailed in another op-ed of mine.

Of course, only time will tell.

        

A tremendous, if long, post over at the Sublime Oblivion blog that details the history of Russia from it's pre Ivan IV (the Terrible) phase through the rise of Putin in the post- Communist era.  The author contends that Russia is constantly going through its own "Sisyphean Loop", "which all its attempts to Westernize – for a panoply of economic, cultural, and political reasons – merely end returning it to its imperial Eurasian past-and-future."

A great piece.  I do not know if I would agree on every point, but I think this has a great deal of accuracy from an overarching perspective.

        

An interesting article that seems to validate my view that we need a dramatic new Middle East policy.  From the Christian Scienc monitor, a piece arguing Middle East power is shifting to Turkey and Iran.  This would seems to at least make consideration of my thoughts posted below worthwhile.

        

The below are my comments to a provicative piece at the Atlantic Community regarding EU-Turkishn relations and whether the West has lost sight of itself even as it quiety snubs Turkey from being able to join the EU.

"The article raises an intriguing question: "Could it be the case that the West has lost its own Western identity, but the pundits have yet to realize it?"

The question of what is the "West" is deeply philosophical. Is the "West" Christian, secular, modern, post-modern, etc? The answer appears to be all of the above and this is fundamentally what will keep Turkey and the EU from ever formally being able to be joined despite a strong contemporary strategic rationale.

The dominant philosophical trend of secular humanism espoused so strongly throughout Europe appears to actually be the vestiges of Christianity. As paradoxical as that might seem at first glance, Christianity's morality and ethics still dominate European thinking. Certainly, post-Enlightenment rationality attempts to entomb the faith of the transcendent that defines Christianity. Yet even as it does so, there is a residue of compassion, respect, and love of neighbors that seems to still be grounded in faith even if it is now promoted by vacuous legalisms.

Rationality does not beget morality. Rationality is a morally neutral device that can help illuminate some answers, but cannot answer those that are the most fundamental of questions especially why do we exist. Consequently, the "West", still retains elements of itself and has not completely succumbed to airy cosmopolitanism. Though even as it attempts this, it is still living out an effort at universality that is reflective of its Christian origins in the wake of the collapse of the western Roman Empire.

To step back from going too far down the road of abstraction, the question about Turkish-EU relations boils down to this: can an Islamist nation (as Turkey is slowly turning into under the AKP, though let's leave the debate over "extreme" and "moderate" for another time) join a faithfully Christian or secularized Christian grouping without sacrificing something of intense importance to its own long-term identity?

I suspect the long-term answer is no (as in several generations). Neither side is able to swallow this at the most subterranean of levels.

That said, for contemporary strategic reasons, it would be advantageous to paper over this reality for the moment. Good policy often has to glide over uncomfortable truths in order to function. It is in Europe's interest to be more embracing of Turkey so as to deal with the very immediate challenge of energy security. The larger philosophical questions can be answered later and, perhaps, in ways difficult for anyone living now to conceive."

        

Below are several comments I left at multiple websites including the Atlantic Council and Atlantic Community. They are the beginnings of what I think a new American posture in the Middle East may need to look like.  Indeed, with the coming likelihood of an Iranian nuclear capacity along with the rise of the Shia and the resurgence of interest in the Middle East by Turkey, it seems all the old policies for the region are due for a new look.

While I am still considering the full implications of the suggestions below, I think that the one thing we know for sure is that its time to be creative.  President Obama is not being creative.  He is embodying leftist, liberal guilt and seems too willing to embrace their naive and utopian concepts, even as he tries to say he doesn't.  Meanwhile, the conventional right has no answers either and are content to merely throw stones at Obama.  While this is becoming an increasingly easy task, it is by no means useful in terms of determining what we can and must do to husband American power under very difficult and complex circumstances.

Nothing is easy.  Surprising policy twists may be needed to reset the board and allow the U.S to regain our strategic flexibility.  At the moment, we seem to be going in the opposite direction: ossification and ideological blindness of both liberal and conservative varieties.

1) Regarding Turkey's eastward shift:

http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/Turkey%3A_Still_a_Bridge_Between_West_and_East%3F_

"Turkey's future is open. It has the opportunity to verify its's post-Ottoman, Kemalist trajectory should Europe be pushed into grudingly opening their eyes to a strategic necessity or it can choose to become a new pole of Islamism competing with Wahhabism of the Saudi strain or Shiism of Iranian flavor.

 

For the U.S. and for Europe, it is obvious that a Turkey within the "West" is better than watching it compete for status in the Middle East. Turkey can be a linchpin in a more multifaceted energy policy for Europe and can represent a bridge to the Middle East for the "West" provided it does not slide into a hard Islamist phase.

All that said, it is probably time for the U.S. to begin contingency planning for an eastward shifting Turkey. While pushing Europe to be willing to integrate Turkey is appropriate, it has to be assumed that this may fail due to recalcitrance on either or both of the European and Turkish sides.

The balance of power between Sunni and Shia has shifted since the 2003 Iraq War. With Turkey, perhaps, returning with focus to the region, the U.S. may need to recalibrate its relations across the board. Consequently, the U.S. must shore up its relations with current and potential allies in the Middle East. Notable among these is Israel, but, probably a serious examination of our long-term arrangements with Shiite Iraq and Iran needs to be considered and considered in tandem as opposed to seperately as seems often to be the case.

A bold, "Nixon goes to China" moment with Iran could reset the geopolitics of the Middle East and create new realities that shake up conventional thinking. This might even reorient Turkish calculations and make it more amenable to Western interests even absent a full throated endorsement by the Europeans."

 

2) Regarding a new way of looking at Iran:

http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/iran-problems-go-beyond-nukes

"It is time for a "Nixon Goes to China" moment. While no doubt, President Obama envisions this as a hoped for eventual possibility, it is unlikely he will take the adequate steps to make such a seeming fantasy reality.

 

While Bush would not talk to the Iranians (at least not publicly until late in his Administration), President Obama has bordered on being obsequious. Both were wrong because they are trying to bottle up a problem that can't be bottled up.

Nuclear proliferation is already a reality and will only increase. It is time to forget the overburdened and impossible to adequately implement non-proliferation regime. Attempting to block nations on an ad hoc basis will only squander scarce resources. Better to face up to the scary reality of numerous nations seeking and acquiring nuclear weapons.

Once this is realized and leaders stop clinging to fantasies of stopping proliferation and embracing pie in the sky notions of "Global Zero," the sooner they can reembrace deterrence.

Iran, contrary to assertions by many, is likely to be deterrable. However, deterrence will need to be quite explicit and quite harsh to be effective. If a line is drawn on what is unacceptable, any crossing of that line must not yield "discussions", "negotiations", or "processes." Such a crossing must be made unbearable so that it won't seriously be contemplated.

If aggressive deterrence can be established psychologically (the domain where deterrence actually resides), then a "deal" can be made that will allow Iran a certain degree of security within well defined limits. The regime can be assured that no external forces or externally supported internal forces (as opposed to solely internal forces) will overthrow it. It may even be possible to envision allowing it to develop nuclear power (and even a limited weapon) capability to save face.

Naturally, all of the concerns over terrorism and expanding Iranian influece throughout the Middle East seem to mitigate against this notion. Indeed, it is counterintuitive for many to consider. However, the hinge once more pivots upon the quality of deterrence and the legitimacy (and perceived seriousness) of the threats backing up that deterrence.

Iran will go nuclear. The U.S. can either find a creative way of dealing with this undesired but unstoppable predicament, or it can continue levelling empty threats of military action and scrambling about for meaningful (rather than superficial) sanctions.

As for Israel, which clearly feels the Iranian development of a nuclear weapon as an existential threat, robust defense cooperation must continue. It must also be made quite clear that the U.S. understands its fears and would not allow an attack upon it to be answered with anything except the most aggressive of responses. Without these assurances, it would be close to impossible for Israel not to respond unilaterally."

        

I read this blog at the academic site, Immanent Frame and it inspired to comment as below:

"If modernity is about “human liberation” the question must inevitably be asked, is man better off as “liberated?” While a lack of freedom can clearly result in despotisms ranging from merely semi-authoritarian to totalitarian, is “complete freedom” or “mastery” bringing about happiness in the human condition?

This seems to be the crux upon which the debate over modernity rests. Certainly, modernity has yielded amazing material gains. However, even as it satisfies physical needs (and even physical desires far exceeding needs) does it satisfy the non-material yearnings that man has? If not, then can modernity be considered a teleologically “good” thing?"

What say the readers?

        

This ran in the Asia Times for awhile, I am republishing it here as it reinforces multiple themes I frequently comment on.

Beyond the Great Illusion

by Greg R. Lawson
 

Is the world careening to a new world disorder?  There are numerous analysts who think that this view is anachronistic and merely doom and gloom pessimism that recalls Spenglerian decline while ignoring the rise of new centers of power amidst the overall positive benefits of a globalized economy.  To some, once the economic and credit crisis ends and a new global financial architecture is erected, we will be able to move forward into a world of grand, "social justice."  Some even dream of a world of "Global Zero" and no nuclear weapons.

 

Yes, they say, America may decline, but new and vigorous nations will rise to compensate and provide order in its place.  Indeed, many even argue America will benefit from this as its long time role as Atlas holding the world on its shoulder can end with a shrug as opposed to a debacle.  Of course, this is only if America acts gracefully and loses its haughty arrogance.

 

Perhaps, this is true.  Perhaps, civilized man has reached a point where we can be sanguine about the future.  Yet, we’ve been here before.  Only a mere century ago man thought the world would never devolve into catastrophic warfare because economic interdependence would make it too costly.  Famous books were written to bring home that point.  Books like Norman Angell’s “Great Illusion” clearly made the elite opinion of the day swoon, just as today we have “The World is Flat.” 

 

A single day in June 1914 put an end to that “Great Illusion.” 

 

Today, we face a world on the precipice of entering a “Golden Age of Proliferation.”  The unfolding challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the current guise of Iran and North Korea , along with initial steps towards possible nuclearization in many other nations such as Burma and Venezuela , offer us a glimpse into the future.

 

Certainly, not all of these nations will develop weapons technology.  But some might and probably will.  The need for nuclear power for domestic energy consumption is imminently reasonable, yet it can be a subterfuge within which to hide a military purpose.  Even this, is not necessarily unreasonable.  Indeed, depending on what neighborhood one is in, it might seem a no brainer to develop nuclear weapons as leverage or defense.  After all, they are the great equalizers, the weapon that while expensive, is far less expensive than maintaining a conventional force capable of opposing the U.S. or even regional powers like China , Russia , Pakistan , or soon North Korea and Iran .

 

This is ultimately unstoppable.  There will be a world with many nuclear power states in varying stages of potential weaponization.  This will be a highly unstable situation as even Great Powers will now have greater difficulties than ever before in providing some semblance of stability in their regions.  The relatively weak, will have greater power than ever.  This will ultimately not be the power to make the world better, but the power to unleash the kind of damage it used to take huge armies and/or industrialized nations to wreak and this doesn't even include non-state actors such as terrorists.

 

Obviously, the feverish diplomatic efforts to stop North Korea and Iran persist. Efforts to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime are also afoot.  However, every new “deal” appears to buy time for those on the outside of the international system to continue their drive to obtain the technology necessary to intimidate neighbors and extort further concessions from the world at large.  And each occasion when that time is bought only shreds the non-proliferation regime even more.

 

Beyond this world of proliferation, we also see the rise of sleeping dragons and the resurgence of what was thought merely a decade ago to be sleeping bears.  New powers and old powers all jostling again for position in the international system. 

 

While our sanguine analysts predict that these nations can be made into responsible “stakeholders”, this is an open question.  Certainly, it is a possibility, but can good policy and strategy count on this?   Or must it be prepared to deal with the unexpected?

 

These realities must be confronted.  They will only metastasize should America retrench to focus on domestic reforms. For who is ready to step in to fill the void that would be left by the United States?  Indeed, the world might get a heavy dose of “non-polarity” as opposed to “multi-polarity.” 

 

It is time to move beyond rhetoric and realize that we are always teetering on an abyss.  Statesmanship and wisdom are the necessary means to avoid tipping over.  However, before addressing this, Americans need to understand the full context of the world we live in and understand the threats we face without hyperbole, but also without naivety.

 

Every generation thinks itself the one to "end war" for all time and create a "just" world order.  Each generation is disabused of these notions as reality stares them in the face. 

 

The current American generation needs to become disabused sooner than previous ones for the storms brewing beneath the surface of our false tranquility (even after the economic crisis) are real and will not be tamed by rhetoric, resolutions, and vague concepts of hopeful cooperation.  They will be tamed by eternal vigilance and recognition that even as the world undergoes profound transformations, fundamentally, man is still man. The old emotions, so well described by Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, of envy, fear, and greed are just as present now as love, respect, and humility. 

 

While more of the latter is to be hoped for, more of the former should be prepared for.  We must move beyond our own “great illusion” and defend order rather than expecting it to spontaneously emerge through economics and international treaties that are unable to be backed up.

 

        

A nice op-ed from the Washington Post that details what I think will be the looming problem in a real "post-American" era: no one will take charge and anarchy will ensue.

Note these sections:

1) Regarding President Obama's meetings with Chinese leaders:

"Translation: China will not cooperate in placing sanctions on Iran; China will not hinder North Korea's nuclear missile program; and China will not help solve the problems of Afghanistan, the Middle East or anywhere else. China has decided that, in short, it will not become America's full partner in foreign policy. "

2) Regarding Europe's ridiculous (though politcally expedient for Germany and France) decision to name two unknown actors to become the President and Foreign Policy officials for the EU:

"Translation: Europe might have a new phone number, but when Obama calls, the person on the other end of the line will still be unable to act. "Europe" will not be a unified entity capable of coordinating a unified policy in Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, the Middle East or anywhere else anytime soon. Europe cannot, in short, become America's full partner in foreign policy."

Here is the money section:

"And thus we are left with a curious situation: America no longer wants to be the sole superpower. The American president no longer wants to be the leader of a sole superpower. Nobody else wants America to be the sole superpower and in fact America cannot even afford to be the sole superpower. Yet America has no obvious partner with which to share its superpowerdom, and if America were to cease being a superpower, nothing and no one would take its place...

Halfway through his presidency, George W. Bush found he had to drop unilateralism in favor of diplomacy. Now one wonders: At some point in his presidency, will Obama find he has to drop diplomacy in favor of unilateralism, too? "

That would truly be the irony to end all ironies.

        

A great piece at Stratfor outlines the flaws in contemporary international law as it relates to dealing with terrorism.  Its obviously a timely piece given the controversy surrounding Attorney General Eric Holder's decision to try the self proclaimed mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM), in civilian court in New York.

This is a very poor decision.  As Stratfor outlines, international law is essesntially silent on dealing with "non-uniformed" combatants and leaves their prosecution (or other treatment) to the individual states.  Holder's decision may well either compromise intelligence assets or will be so weak that it could well lend itself to an acquittal.  Its a no win proposition politically.  If Mohammed is convicted, those on the radical left will criticize much of what was done to him while in Guantanamo.  If he is, shocking though it may seem, acquitted, how do you deal with that?  You can't simply let him go and if you don't let him go, you will have destroyed any tint of legality  by not freeing an "acquitted" man.  The military tribunal option, imperfect as it may have been to legal purists, was the best alternative.

However, an even larger question than KSM himself is what does all this mean for the amorphous concept many like to think of as "international law?"  On this, Stratfor's point at the end of the article sums up my view entirely:

"International law has clung to a model of law governing a very different type of warfare despite new realities. International law must therefore either reaffirm the doctrine that combatants who do not distinguish themselves from noncombatants are not due the protections of international law, or it must clearly define what those protections are. Otherwise, international law discredits itself."

At the moment, it is largely discredited.  Can it do better?  Yes, but it will take will power and foresight.  Who is ready for that?

        

I got another op-ed published at the Atlantic Community.  This one is on what I perceive as the need for strategic flexiibility in our Afghanistan-Pakistan policy, especially considering President Obama's reexamination of the policy he decided on soon after entering the White House.

The text of the op-ed follows:

"In a tumultuous world, America needs to retain maximum strategic flexibility.  The  request by General Stanley McChrystal to expand US ground forces in Afghanistan, while perhaps necessary to secure medium term stability there, may tie up more forces than the US interest can afford.  An appropriate regional strategy must focus on preventing the reemergence of easy training grounds for terrorists while bringing in other players to prevent a collapse of regional stability.  

Pakistan is the key nation where US interests are most challenged.  While true that the former Taliban government in Afghanistan gave succor to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the Taliban itself largely originated from Pakistan as part of complex local and geopolitical issues including its conflict with India.  

Fundamentally, America's interest in Afghanistan, while significant, must be looked at within a global framework.  Simply put, US resources must be built back up so that it can take on these kinds of projects.  In the interim, they must be judiciously deployed while retaining the ability to confront other simultaneous challenges.  Though a reconstituted al-Qaeda within Afghanistan must be dealt with immediately, this does not necessarily require Afghanistan to become a democracy in the traditional, western sense.  

Both President Bush and President Obama seem allured by the notion that the only way to keep al-Qaeda off balance is to force Afghanistan to become something it has never been in its history- a unified state with a reasonably strong central government. However, even a federated government may not do justice to the various tribal loyalties in the nation.  This raises serious questions about any long-term success for creating a stable state, even if Gen. McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy works as intended.   

With all choices in the region deeply problematic, it seems the least bad one is to focus on preventing Afghanistan from being an easy base of operations for terrorists while shifting to regional diplomacy to dry up the wellspring from which al-Qaeda grows. This could be done by taking several steps:  

1. slowly disengage most current ground forces in Afghanistan without telegraphing specific time lines;
2. retain an intelligence presence complete with financial incentives to maintain relations with various tribes;
3. retain a rapid strike capability with naval and air assets that can act upon any intelligence;
4. work to develop public/private partnerships with NGOs to continue an influx of capital into Afghanistan to construct schools and basic infrastructure
   

Though a far cry from "doubling down" in Afghanistan, this would also not be a  repeat of the mistake made after the US left Afghanistan to its inner turmoil in the early 90s.  

Meanwhile, the US must continue to push Pakistan to keep neo-Taliban elements contained within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and away from the most significant population centers. This must be done with or without the current rather weak civilian government.  

The US also needs to reengage India more than it has since Obama took office. As India is a rising power in the region, it must be considered the key ingredient in keeping the pot from boiling over.  It would clearly not be in India's best interest if Afghanistan devolves back into a jihadist playground.  Given this, it may even be possible to entice India to play a limited role on the ground in Afghanistan as the US reduces its own footprint. 

Obviously, there would need to be guarantees to Pakistan that this is not part of a conspiracy to surround it.  However, this may add another incentive for Pakistan to fight more aggressively against those destabilizing Afghanistan to avoid a major expansion of Indian influence.  

The US can not abandon Afghanistan to the vicissitudes of fortune.  Al-Qaeda cannot be allowed to again find sanctuary there.  Yet, with other problems looming, including the possibility of a military altercation with Iran or the need to recalibrate forces in Central/Eastern Europe due to revanchism in Russia, the US cannot allow its flexibility to be permanently constrained while fighting to establish something unlikely to be successful in the long-term.  US interests are  too broad for it to become strategically myopic."

        

Below are my comments to Atlantic Community's question regarding the usefulness of the rhetoric emanating from European and world leaders at the 20th anniversary commemoration of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

"The best part of the speeches were the remeberances of what transpired 20 years ago. While there will continue to be ongoing debate as to the exact influce of Reagan, Thatcher, Pope John Paul II, Lech Walsea, Vaclav Havel, and Gorbachev, at the end of the day, a confluence of events and unique personalities led to a surprising outcome- a largely peaceful transition from authoritarianism to relative freedom.

We should all take pride from across the Atlantic as to this achievement and rememeber it as an example that hope can, even if it does not always, make positive changes.

As to the promises and comments aimed towards the future- everything said is completely conventional wisdom. The enitre notion of bringing down metaphorical walls is so common place as to be practically irrelevant.

Indeed, the paens to future cooperation are nothing more than rhetorical flourishes. Necessary though they are, they really don't mean much other than confirm that political leaders will always find the most optimistic things to say, no matter how conventional and, perhaps, vapid.

That said, it is to be expected but we should be less than sanguine about calls for future action. They should be seen for what they are, rhetorical devices that obfuscate the fundamental trends and interests of individual nations.

All in all, the rememberance was full of meaning; the promises, not empty but far from full."

        

One of the main reasons a nation can become a "superpower", "hyperpower", "global hegemon", or whatever term you want to call a singularly important nation that is more powerful than others by several orders of magnitude, is that it offers strategic reassurance to other nations.

The history of international relations is a history of balances of power and ever shifting alliances that recalibrate those forces.  A superpower is capable of attaining and retaining such status by being less scary to other nations than potential competitors are.  This allows that nation to to always be closer to both friend and foe than they are with each other.  This is Bismarckian (and Kissingerian) thinking.  Even when it fails for a time, it is returned to in order to once more find an equilibrium (as after the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars or after the cataclysms of World Wars I and II).

This was a key ingredient to the U.S. long term strategy of containment that dominated much of the Cold War era.

This article by Frederick Kagan and Dan Blumenthal illustrates exceptionally well (and efficiently) how President Obama is squandering this.  This should be read along with the Krauthammer pieces I have posted before to show just how problematic Obama's approach really is for world affairs.

The irony of Obama is that rather than being a "great change" or someone who bucks conventional wisdom, he is actually the embodiement of western, enlightened, quasi post-modern thought as exemplified in much of Europe.  Obama is "conventional" and the conventions of the present era are conventions of naivity and fear.  Naivity due to believing man can be fundamentally changed, fear that the blood stains of past conflicts can only be absolved by avoiding their prospects in the future.

Unortunately, this conventional wisdom will only hold until the system breaks down.  Though that may not happen, to be unprepared for such a truly radical contingency is a mark of a lack of creativity. 

We need to keep "reassuring" and maintain our relative power, not attempt to dissolve into an amorphous mass of humanity, because that will not work over the long term.

        

Given the pronouncements of an end to capitalism since the great economic catastrophe of the past few years, I found this poem I wrote years ago rather fitting.  Though at the time I wrote it, it was meant as being a meditation on my own existential angst, I think it could apply to so many who seek out the benefits of raw materialism and fail to see anything beyond of a transcendent nature.  Where does one end in a life defined by the ceaseless quest for meaning as reflected in objects?

Empty Hearts and Empty Thrones

Years have gone by and here I sit upon my once cherished throne
In my youth I would salivate at the opportunity to be so revered
How grand my portrait does loom upon the wall, larger than life
Like divine law, my word seems to scatter the ocean of men beneath
All the trappings of wealth and power at my fingertips
A spent life in the pursuit of the gold than now adorns my furrowed brow
Happy should I seem for whose dreams bear this forbidden fruit?
Yet restless have I become for this is not enough, never enough
Once when I was just another face, I was fuller than I am today
Once when I had nothing to my name but a few ideals, I was satisfied
How long ago it does seem when my hair was dark, my body strong
Then, though, did I look to the horizon for a day yet to come
Then, though, I had my love, my soul always seemed to wander
But today this throne might well be empty, for I fail to fill it
I fail to fill anything anymore, worthless are these idle extravagances
A tear trickles down my cheek from my eye as I look back
Like so many before, I sit with an empty heart upon an empty throne

        

I was looking back through some old poetry I had written a little over a decade ago and found several gems.

This one is particularly appropriate given the 20th anniversary of the Berlin Wall fall as I wrote this while taking a course on Czech literature and film.  It was striking in that class just how rigorous the Communist efforts at controlling history, or at least the perceptions of history,were.  They literally would airbrush people out of pictures and eliminate the appearance of them ever having existed.  That was truly shocking, just how existentially destructive this totalitarianism really could be.

Here is the poem (a referenc eto the ill fated 1968 Prague Spring):

Organized Forgetting

A leader in a picture airbrushed away
Never one street name may stay
Yesterday's sins disappear unmentioned
Utpoian society so well intentioned
Lost letters, lost memories, lost hope
With fresh wounds one must cope
A dead husband rots in silence
A tearful wife standing in lone defiance
Tanks roll in, blood flowing in the street
Bold images made so discreet
Next day, business commences
Nothing said, unpunished offenses
From above collective thought controlled
The land's memory is on hold

        

An insightful piece from Stratfor on the geopolitics of Russia.  Essentially, Russia is too large, too sparsely populated, and the victim of poor access to oceanic trading routes and without major navigable rivers.  This makes Russis inherently unstable despite periods when it comes under authoritarian leadership that typically controls it's security services.  Putin, contrary to ebing an anomaly, is simply the most recent incarnation of this natural (and potentially inescapable) predisposition.

Its a bit sad to think of Russia this way as it seems to doom it to perpetual struggle.  However, thus far, its history appears to bear this out.

        

I reread a piece over at the Sublime Oblivion blog that spoke to me in a way.  Though I do not necesssarily subscribe to all of this, the last paragraph of this post, aptly titled "Armageddon" says something interesting and, I think potentially profound:

"At the end of history, there will be a clash of civilizations; each of whose essence will be defined by the noosphere’s collective unconscious, for by then the fusion of technology and postmodernism will have enabled all to create their own reality. The megalothymiacs will rise out of their millennial slumber and sow chaos across the world; men will once again know what is good and what is evil. The unwitting slaves of Belief and the nihilist masters of Chaos will wage one final apocalyptic War of the Spirit, Armageddon, which is a synthesis of struggle and suicide, and one of the forms of Sublime Oblivion."

I think postmodernism and the disease of relativism it has brought into the world will eventually be extirpated as a major philosophy of the world.  This will happen when man finally confronts the nihilism of Nietzsche's abyss and chooses: faith or Ubermensch. 

One way or the other, the abyss will be conquered. 

        

I plan to take a brief break from regular blogging as I work on several larger pieces I want to write.

While I will occasionally link to comments at other sites and blogs, my main focus for the next couple of months is to work on three major writings.

1) A piece focusing on Kissinger and his "romantic" view of statesmanship as an almost aesthetic "creation" where great historical actors are able to manipulate the systemic forces of history to achieve some type of balance.

2) A piece focusing on the paradox of the quest for absolute security and how the very desire for impregnability leads to instability.  While this is not a novel conception, I intend to show that simply because "absolute" security has never (and almost by definition cannot be) achieved, it is not prudent for statemen to avoid seeking the closest thing to absolute security as possible.  In this sense, I intend to buck the contemporary wisdom that the very paradox of absolute security should preclude it being sought after.

3) A piece on "Existential Conservatism."  While I think the general idea has been referred to elsewhere, it is striking to me how Kieerkegaard's Fear and Trembling may represent the only method through which faith in the transcendent can be achieved.  Given the importance I place on this faith, I want to delve deeper into how we to "believe" based upon our experiences, even the paradoxical experiences that eliminate the ability to enthrone reason as the sine qua non of knowledge.  This, in turn, can be turned into a more intellectually astute defense of tradition than being merely reactionary.

        

I just hasd an opinion piece I submitted to Asia Times promoted by their editors to front page of the pay website.

Here is the direct link, however, you have to pay to register at Asia Times.net (as opposed to their .com site).

I will publish the full piece in the coming days.

        

I was simply too young to have an appreciation for just how momentous the events of November 1989 were.  I knew something big was going on, but I was only 11 years old at the time.  Now, having examined the history of the Cold War, it continues to amaze me just how amazing the events were.  It is almost beyond belief that one of the largest and most powerful imperial strucutres in humanity's history crumbled in a largely, if not entirely, peaceful way.  Just amazing given the threats of "Mutually Assured Destruction" that had hung over the world for over forty years.

I have compiled the reflections of many key players through the foillowing links including two national security advisors who were present throughout the Cold War, one future national security advisor who was present on the National Security Council staff when the events transpired, and the British Prime Minister at the time.  I hope they cast a light on these events that shines quite brightly for those who want to see how hope and change can really look.

Of course, some of the optimism of that heady time has dimmed over recent years, but as a guiding light, November 1989 can still illuminate a path towards the "better angels of our nature."

Brent Scowcroft's reflections.

Zbigniew Brzezinski's reflections

Condoleeza Rice's relfections

Margaret Thatcher's reflections

        

Over at the Atlantic Council, a brief report card for President Obama on foreign policy where he got a B-.  I gave him C, mostly because its too early to tell how disasterous his policies will be or whether he will make course corrections. 

I believe a preliminary note is in order before I offer my comments. 

I believe that criticizing Obama is legitimate, I just hope it is done in a way that avoids stigmatizing his opponents as being unreasonable and cretinous. I strive to avoid that mistake because it only plays into the hands of Obama's handlers when they are able to make the issue be about his opposition rather than the nature of his ideas and the flawed nature of his policies. 

With that caveat, my comments below,

"I would give Obama a C. While I think we can all agree on the need for him to reset the rhetorical tone of U.S. foreign policy, he has bordered on being obsequious. His handling of Honduras was distasteful given the Zelaya regime's unconstitutional efforts at remaining in power.

        

This is a great post over at the Postmodern Conservative regarding the future of secularism.  It created a good train of comments, of which below are two of mine and the responses to my commentary.  However, one should read the entire piece to obtain proper context for the debate and subsequent commentary.

In essence, I doubt that any order for society can be based on anything other than faith in the transcendent.  While there will be debate on what exactly is the transcendent, it is fundamentally a religious longing (even if not ensconsed within institutions).  I believe secularism, in its logical extension, undermines the very foundation of order.  In the abscence of transcendence, I think the Nietzschean critique of modernity holds immense sway, but that is quite a dangerous path.

It is interesting to review the thoughs of other commentators.  Questions of the "Good" and the prospects of philosophy are raised.  I am still, in many ways, considering these thoughtful reflections.

My initial comment:

"The fundamental question is, can man as a whole (not just isolated examples here and there) live in a world without the ethics supplied by faith in the transcendent, or religious faith?

        

Last week one of my favorite journals, Stratfor had a constest for a free membership to the intelligence service.  The contest considted of answering a the question of what would U.S. foreign policy look like in the abscence of 9/11.

I submitted a response, and though I did not win, I publish it here to obtain any commentary.

"U.S. Foreign Policy Absent 9/11:  a Look at Key Relationships and Regions

 

While a few regions would have seen dramatically different U.S. foreign policy approaches towards them (mostly Mexico/South America and, of course, the Middle East/Afghanistan/Pakistan), much policy would not have changed as much as some would think had 9/11 not taken place.

 

The clear trajectory of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy prior to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 was to focus on “great power” conflict and management while transforming the military to act as an offshore balancer while promoting free trade.  This was evident by the piece drafted by soon to be National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 2000 and there is no reason to envision that it would have changed dramatically absent that catalytic event. 

 

Rice’s piece, entitled “Promoting the National Interest” was a clear rebuke to what then Presidential candidate George W. Bush saw as the failures of the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy.  Rice summed up Bush’s anticipated approach extraordinarily succinctly with this passage:

 

The Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) or “Moscow Treaty” would have happened anyway.  Bush clearly wanted to ditch the Antiballistic Missile Treaty so as to move forward with the politically popular, at least for conservatives, missile defense program.  Overall, relations with Russia , despite the “I was able to get a sense of his soul” comment by Bush with respect to Russian President Putin, would have remained roughly on the same trajectory they went through after 9/11.  However, it probably would have gotten frostier much more rapidly had there not been the warmth generated by Russia ’s initial support of American placement within Central Asia to deal with Afghanistan after 9/11. 

 

Europe

 

Europe disliked the “Toxic Texan” long before 9/11.  While absent 9/11 the Iraq War would not have happened, Europe still would have disagreed with Bush policies on Global Warming, disapproved of his perceived disdain of the United Nations, and worked hard to create a new pole of competition for the U.S. In response, the U.S. would have probably reached out to create new, positive relations with the central and eastern European nations such as Poland and the Czech Republic in order to counterbalance its difficulties with the Franco-German European Union axis.

 

East Asia and India

 

Given that even after 9/11 one of Bush’s more positive legacies revolved around relatively good relations with Japan and East Asia , it seems that this would have persisted.  Though U.S.-Chinese relations would not have been as harsh as might have been expected, the U.S. would clearly have worked to keep the Japan alliance front and center while reaching out more to India in order to begin a soft containment strategy to hedge against a rising China . 

 

As for North Korea , Bush’s trajectory would probably have remained the same.  He came into office ridiculing the Clinton era “Agreed Framework” and made clear his distaste for negotiating with the regime.  Consequently, while North Korea would not have been upgraded to a member of the “Axis of Evil”, efforts at international sanctions and imposition of isolation would have persisted.  It is also quite likely that in a possible second Bush term, he would have veered, as he eventually did, towards a more diplomatic solution once he realized military action was impractical and meaningful sanctions a mirage given China’s unwillingness to risk destabilization on its border.

 

The U.S. also would have persisted in pushing trade in the region.  In other words, the same general policy direction would have been pursued with respect to most of East Asia and India .

 

Africa

 

It is slightly less likely that Bush would have achieved such positive outcomes in Africa absent 9/11.  Given the Administration’s aversion to Clintonian nation building, getting mired down too much in conflicts in Somalia , Sudan , etc would not have appealed to Bush.  It is also unclear if the U.S. would have made the same commitment to AIDS reduction efforts absent what would become a perceived strategic interest in the region after it was feared Africa could host al-Qaeda training camps.  Overall, Africa policy would have likely been permanently adrift.

 

Now we get to the two regions where policy would have seen the most dramatic changes absent 9/11.

 

Mexico and South America

 

Given President Bush’s expected close ties to then Mexican President Vicente Fox, it is highly likely that comprehensive immigration reform would have happened absent 9/11.  Without the rampant security fears generated after the event, Bush and his pro-business allies would have found a way to move this policy to the front of the agenda.  While unclear what the final policy would have looked like, it is almost certain that something dramatic would have happened which may have even helped to stem some of the drug violence now plaguing Mexico .

 

Additionally, while South America was virtually ignored after 9/11, it is highly likely President Bush would have pushed for more cooperation with the rising power on the continent, Brazil .  Bush also would likely have taken an even more aggressive stand against Venezuela ’s Hugo Chavez since while he was only an irritant, the irritation would have been far more noticeable absent the focus on the Middle East .  Additionally, free trade within the region, to prevent South America “going its own way” would have been near the top of the U.S. regional agenda and pushed far more aggressively by top officials with the cache to get results.

 

Middle East & Afghanistan/Pakistan

 

No where would the absence of 9/11 have been felt stronger than the Middle East .  While President Bush likely would have remained a staunch supporter of Israel given his personal and religious beliefs, the militarization of policy in the region would not have happened. 

 

Saddam Hussein would still be in power.  Despite an apparent pre-existing desire to remove Hussein, it is unlikely in the extreme that without a major catalytic event that spawned serious fears of rogue states and WMD usage, the domestic support for anything beyond a Clinton like air assault could be obtained.

 

The U.S. would have essentially been left pursuing a dual containment strategy focusing on both Iran and Iraq similar to that being conducted by the Clinton team. 

 

By not unleashing the many different forces that were in fact unleashed by the toppling of Hussein and the new rise of a Shiite dominated Iraq , Iran would be in a far less powerful position.  While concerns over both nations’ WMD programs would have persisted, the U.S. would have attempted to subtly play each off the other, probably while trying to support moderates within Iran .

 

The Israel-Palestine issue would be nearly as convoluted as it actually became after 9/11.  However, absent the zeal for democratization in the region that became the linchpin of Bush’s policy after 9/11, it is not highly likely that Hamas would have gained the amount of influence it has, nor would Hezbollah in Lebanon . 

 

Therefore, the U.S. policy in the region would have been merely to keep the oil flowing and client regimes stable so as to not threaten that flow.

 

Additionally, it is obvious that the U.S. never would have intervened in Afghanistan nor put as much pressure on Pakistan to deal with the Taliban.  It is even possible to envision absent 9/11 that the U.S. may have even attempted to work with the Taliban and offered them a certain amount of economic benefits from possible hydrocarbon pipelines in the region.  Had this happened, it is possible the Taliban might have even been co-opted and turned against Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda while the U.S. gained leverage against Russia as part of an effort to circumvent Russian control of Europe ’s access to energy.

 

In summation, in several areas, notably with respect to “Great Powers” like Russia and China as well European relations and those with India , U.S. policy would not have differed much absent 9/11.

 

However, its relations in its own hemisphere and in the Middle East would have looked radically different as the U.S. worried less about abstract morality and terrorism, and more on traditional, state based competitions and threats.  It is quite unlikely that policy in the Middle East would have become militarized any more than it had been throughout the entire Clinton era.  Ironically, policy in central and South America may actually have become more militarized as part of an effort to counteract leftist revolutionaries and the drug trade had the focus not shifted to the Middle East ."