This interview with James Poulos, whi is a doctoral candidate in political theory at Georgetown University and founding editor of obne of my new favorite blogs,  Postmodern Conservative, is the kind of reading all thoughtful conservatives should do.  It confronts a very serious dilema that we face- how do we live as individuals in the current modern and "Liberal" with a big "L" (as opposed to a classical liberal of the Burke or even Adam Smith variety).

Several interesting quotes

"The big challenge today, I think, is convincing people—especially younger people—that a life in which political liberty has been readily surrendered in exchange for great cultural or “personal” freedom is not a good life, either individually or socially. The willingness to be carried along to that destination, particularly under the impression that it’s basically inevitable, ought to be something that everyone with anything at all nice to say about NR’s (National Review) editors should unite against...

Conservatives are at great pains to convince themselves and one another that their vision of the good or virtuous life is not a mere lifestyle choice. Conservatives don’t just want to experience happiness or individuality—they want assurances, reliable enough that their souls may rest in them, that their progeny will be able to live, indefinitely, more or less as they do. If there’s no reason to live that way outside idiosyncratic personal choice, they’ll fail to inculcate their way of life, and lifestyle-choosing liberals will turn their children and grandchildren into individuals who could be just anyone."

This piece got me thinking about many different things, not only those specific issues raised by the interview itself.

So what do we "conserve" as "conservatives?"  There is much more to this than just being a "fiscal conservative."  After all a "fiscal conservative" can be an amazingly selfish and greedy person who does not care about anything outside of their own self-fulfillment.

If being fiscally conservative, however, is married, so to speak, with an overall cultural renewal, then, that fiscal conservatism is no longer a means only to one's self satisfaction, but is a morally responsible position that can allow us to give more to our family, our friends, and our community.

So, we conserve money for a greater good than oneself.  But what else?  Isn't conservation about saving things that are vitally important to us, possibly even necessary for life itself?  Isn't that what the "conservation" movement is all about when it comes to "saving the planet?"

So isn't being "conservative" about saving  something that will sustain us, not only materially, but spiritually?  Isn't it about maintaining a connection to our roots, our family, and our cultural heritage that has historically shaped, though not determined, what and who we are?

So conservatives must "conserve" more than their individuality, they must conserve those instituions that transcend, otherwise, do we not lose touch with any sense of eternity?

In this respect, I think the "virtuous life" is much more than a mere "lifestyle choice."  It is a life that attempts to raise our horizons to something much higher than ourselves, and even higher than mere man.  For youth that seek the stimulation of "personal" freedom, conservatives must offer a more comprehensive vision, a vision of greatness, transcendance, and the eternal.  These are that which should be "conserved" because they are what give us true inspiration and bring us closer (if not into the direct presence of) Truth.

Faith, family, and community are where these senses of the transcendant reside and those, even more than the fiscal arena, is what we must conserve.

How we do this is another question.

 

        

As I read today's Commentary blog, I found this posting offered an excellent way to frame our views of President Obama.

Our "Sophist" in Chief. A good moniker for Preisdent Obama.   Indeed, despite his prentensions, I think he is no philosopher, much less a Platonic Philsospher-King. As this blog makes clear, Obama has outsourced his biggest policy initiatives to old-school liberals in Congress.  Whether this is intentional or not, what has happened is that old-school policies are moving forward with the patina of "newness" since he bestows his blessing upon them.

Consequently, he comes off far more like an extremely gifted politician, than any sort of grand statesman or philosopher of the future.

I still believe President Obama is formidable, but perhaps not as formidable as I had feared.

        

The title of this post might be a bit over the top, but I couldn't resist.  It was a big day for fans of the Atlantic Monthly columnist, world traveller extraordinaire , and now member of the prestigious Pentagon think tank, the Defense Policy Board, Robert D. Kaplan.

I recall having asked him a question recently through the Foreign Affairs website that focused on his coverstory a couple of months back.  It was an excellent experience and his response was thoughtful.

Kaplan is always a provocative writer who has travelled many of the globe's hot spots from the Balkans and Central Asia to the Middle East. 

His recent post in the Atlantic on the recent end to the Sri Lankan insurgency by the Tamil Tigers, is a fascinating read.  He clearly outlines how to win a counterinsurgency campaign, though not without extreme bloodshed. 

However, what really caught my eye was his interview over at the Michael Totten blog (a fellow world traveller and reporter).

This interview is a virtual tour du force of geopolitics.  It zeroes in on the Sri Lanka campaign, but also takes in Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, of course China.

It are the comments on China that are most interesting.  He articulates just how cold-blooded the Chinese version of "realism" really is, especially how they gave arms to Sri Lanka as well as diplomatic cover at the United Nations while the government of that country crushed the Tamil Tiger insurgency irrespective of civilian casualties and the brutal shut down of journalistic dissent.  In return for all this, China gets a deep water port in a strategically vital area where they can house some of their expanding blue water navy.

While I do not necessarily agree with everything Kaplan writes, these conversations are important.  They force American policymakers and strategists to examine what the world will look like after our focus on Iraq and Afghanistan shifts to what is becoming the most critical area on the planet, East Asia.  



 

        

This Spengler piece that argues that President Obama's desire to retrench American power in the wake of the "misdeeds" of the Bush Administration will cause a vacuum to materialize and numerous new dangers.

In large measure, I think this is true on a wide variety of fronts.  America IS the grand stabilizer.  Even its misdeeds are relatively benign in comparison to most outcomes.   Obviously in this context, "relative" can become a loaded term as outcomes are often not "good" in the sense we might prefer and often are in an absolute sense "bad."

All that said, to look at America as the fountainhead of evil imperialism is an extremely misguided view.  As Spengler asserts,

"Obama's continuing obsession with America's supposed misdeeds - deplorable but necessary actions in time of war - is consistent with his determination to erode America's influence in the most troubled parts of the world. By removing America as a referee, he will provoke more violence than the United States ever did. We are entering a very, very dangerous period as a result."

President Obama wants to remake America to be more fair and more just, yet by piling on the debt, creating larger government bureaucracy that will only lead to sclerosis and a required retrenching from global affairs, he will create a world far more unjust.  This won't be a world of enlightened cooperation, it will be a world  where Hobbesian rules gain influence and fill the global power vacuum left by the self imposed limitation of a self interested, self absorbed, and deeply confused former superpower.

I'm all for "realism", but realism is intended to preserve one's capital for later expenditure.  Does President Obama see where things must move rather than where he thinks they should move to be "just?" 

Renewal at home, strength abroad.  That is the burden history places on America today.  President Bush did not live up to that burden in the final analysis.  I do not think President Obama will either.  So prepare yourself for the sucking sound of global power disappearing into a neo-Middle Ages of instability, chaos, and violence.

As with any moment in time, the future is not yet written, we have choices to make.  Will we as Americans make the right ones?

        

Despite America's recent distraction with death of Michael Jackson, important events continue in the Middle East.  America is looking to draw troops down from major Iraqi cities and, of course, the aftermath of the fraudulent Iranian election continues to play out.  Unfortunately for the Iranian people, the color of the revolution is no longer gree, but red, blood red.

However, as I have said before, and as this Stratfor piece also continues to assert, the reality behind the images is that an internal power struggle was the key issue in Iran.  The imagery of protests and even the violence, while heart rending, are in many ways a sideshow in relation to the core issues being settled in this spasm of power grabbing.  Below is a key excerpt.

"The key to understanding the situation in Iran is realizing that the past weeks have seen not an uprising against the regime, but a struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution. The post-election unrest in Iran therefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as in Prague in 1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are each committed to the regime, but opposed to each other.

The demonstrators certainly included Western-style liberalizing elements, but they also included adherents of senior clerics who wanted to block Ahmadinejad’s re-election. And while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly committed electoral fraud to bulk up his numbers, his ability to commit unlimited fraud was blocked, because very powerful people looking for a chance to bring him down were arrayed against him.

The situation is even more complex because it is not simply a fight between Ahmadinejad and the clerics, but also a fight among the clerical elite regarding perks and privileges — and Ahmadinejad is himself being used within this infighting. The Iranian president’s populism suits the interests of clerics who oppose Rafsanjani; Ahmadinejad is their battering ram. But as Ahmadinejad increases his power, he could turn on his patrons very quickly. In short, the political situation in Iran is extremely volatile, just not for the reason that the media portrayed."

What this means for the region as a whole is raised in this quote:

"The question for the rest of the world is simple: Does it matter who wins this fight? We would argue that the policy differences between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani are minimal and probably would not affect Iran’s foreign relations. This fight simply isn’t about foreign policy.

Rafsanjani has frequently been held up in the West as a pragmatist who opposes Ahmadinejad’s radicalism. Rafsanjani certainly opposes Ahmadinejad and is happy to portray the Iranian president as harmful to Iran, but it is hard to imagine significant shifts in foreign policy if Rafsanjani’s faction came out on top. Khamenei has approved Iran’s foreign policy under Ahmadinejad, and Khamenei works to maintain broad consensus on policies. Ahmadinejad’s policies were vetted by Khamenei and the system that Rafsanjani is part of. It is possible that Rafsanjani secretly harbors different views, but if he does, anyone predicting what these might be is guessing."

So now, how do we negotiate?

        

A rather amusing piece from Foreign Policy on the 10 reasons why its apparent now that President Obama's Honeymoon with America is over and he is sliding into a much more typical place for a politician to reside in the national consciousness.

I think overall this is a pretty good assessment of where Obama stands, but I also do not underestimate the power of the media to want to continue "guaranteeing" his success.  However, recent poll numbers undeniably are showing that the halo effect is beginning to wear off and people are looking less at the celebrity and allure of Obama the myth and are looking at how his policies will directly impact their lives.  The jury is out, and he may well win many more battles, but he can no longer be sanguine either.  The hard part of governing is now beginning for him.

        

Another strong meditation at First Thing's Postmodern Conservative regarding reason.  I commented before that "reason" is a means as opposed to an end and, in a nutshell, I believe that continues to be true.  Reason is indeed quite necessary to function in the natural world around us, however, it offers no glimpse into the transendant.  That is its perennial limit and an important one to keep in mind when phrases like "let reason decide" get thrown around in debate.

"The existential-ethical questions as to who I am and what I am to do are inseparable at once from the political question who we are and from the theoretical or “ontological” question of the way things are."

None of those questions are answered by "reason."

        

From the Postmodern Conservative blog at First Things:

"Cicero’s implicit warning was to watch what could become of the Republic. In thinking through Cicero as an inspiration for conservatism, what it means for an orator to serve ethically begins with the setting of an example. Cato’s prosecution was something like a “systematic philosophy” and a rigid, purified ethic to the demands of “reason.” By contrast, Cicero retorts that the Roman people inhabit a different, more comfortable ethical world where duties are understood in relation to a realistic assessment of occasions and situations. Such is a political ethic conveyed through tradition and connected to a living culture. Thus traditions are living and a means for change is a means for conservation. The means for change, however, are “Ciceronian” in the resistance of turning idealism to formula and ideology and in the long-lived embodiment of sentiment. Causes of public decay were directly related to a decline of moral virtue. Cicero was not principally concerned in his rhetorical writings with the ethical formation of the private individual. He was concerned with a civic ideal whose dynamic was reflective of the republican constitution."

Cicero is arguably the most famous orator in all of western civilization's history.  This particular blog outlines an interesting case that Cicero's "conservatism" in the wake of the calamities befalling the Roman Republic in his lifetime could prove an inexact, yet useful example of what we could aspire to now in our own trying times. 

Cicero trumpted the Roman Republic and tactfully criticized both radicalism and rigidity.  In the case cited here, Cicero actually is on the opposite side of Cato.  Indeed, Cicero was not for rigidity as exemplified by the aristocratic and anti-democratic Cato, but he was equally disillusioned by the rabble rousing demagoguery of Julius Caesar and Mark Anthony (who was a contestent along with Octavian to be the political heir of Caesar).  As we all well know, his criticisms of Anthony led to his untimely demise.  

Ulitimately, Cicero was a supporter of flexibility within the context of traditional bonds.  Not content to sit still and remain tethered to outmoded ways of living, he also was wary of radical breaks with tradition that could cause permanent rupture within a society. 

I am not so sure Cicero was quite as Burkean as this blog almost alludes to implicitly.  However, if so, he, like Burke can be a model for responsible conservatism in an age that needs tradition once more to avoid cultural decay. 

Make no mistake if moral virtue declines, public decay is inevitable and so is Caesarism.  Cicero's fight to preserve the Roman Republic was ultimately a failure.  Julius Caesar ended the Republic due to its inability to withstand internal political cleavages and respond realistically to the challenges it faced.  Caesar's adopted son (and biological nephew) Octavian would cement that end by becoming Augustus and heralding the Roman Empire.  The Empire was built on the foundations of a republic that lost its way, lost its voice, and lost its freedom not due so much to the machinations of political opportunists, but because it became a culture incapable of self government due to a loss of virtue.  Julius Caesar and Augustus merely completed what was already a fait accompli.   

Cicero's failure was Rome's failure.  At that point it had nowhere to go but into the hands of skillful leaders that understood the imperatives of power and were unwilling to watch Rome completely dissolve.

That final dissolution would have to wait nearly half a millenia, but the seeds were sown long before.

I am not suggesting that our time is an exact analogy to this ancient history, too many have made that facile case.  However, it does serve as both an inspiration and a warning on what fates can befall a decayed culture.

        

I'd like to stay away from discussing the farce now known as South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford, however I can't.  The bizarre revelations of his mysterious excursion to Argentina to meet his "lady friend" is not only a tragedy for him and his family, but it really gums up the ability of the Republican party to get back on track.  This is especially so after the revelation just about a week ago regarding Nevada's Senator John Ensign, another Republican who couldn't remain faithful.

The Republican party is finally finding some traction on the deficit issue and even the health care debate.  However, the GOP can't seem to stop having leading figures shoot themselves in the foot.  this means that while the party wants to focus on issues, the media is able to shift the focus onto the foibles of foolish politicos.  This is especially a problem for the party of "family values." 

It is pretty hard to run on those values when leading lights disregard them in such a flagrant manner. 

Hopefully, the Party can move forward and embrace a new agenda, much liek the agenda I referred to in a previous post.

        

This blog posting from Keith Hennessey is excellent in pointing out the long-term demographic challenges the United States faces with Social Security and Medicare.  It cogently asserts that part of the growth in health and social spending is due to pure demographics.

"The rapid growth of per capita health spending in the U.S. is a critical policy problem that needs to be addressed.  It is not, however, the primary driver of our federal budget problems over the next 30-40 years.  The aging of the population is.  Policy changes need to address both pressures to prevent an eventual fiscal meltdown.  We must not ignore demographics."

Of course, the answer to this apparent policy conundrum is rather simple from a pure policy perspective: raise retirement and modify current benefits.  Of course some would add tax increases into the policy option mix, but given the deleterious effects that would have on the economy I don't think the time is right to discuss that. 

The sad fact is, this policy really is simple, it does not require a rocket scientist to recognize the fiscal oblivion waiting to hit us.  However, no politician (or aspiring politician) could ever run on that platform, the politics is too complex and bad.  The legitimate policy options to resolve this are automatically removed from serious consideration because no one really wants to face this issue square on. 

This won't change in the near term, but somewhere, sometime something is going to have to give.

        

From the blog Foreign Policy Watch, this blog outlines the history of inter-war foreign policy and counters claims made by Matthew Yglesias that it was only the Great Depression that led to the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe.

Clearly, the Great Depression played a role in the rise of Hitler.  However, the author at Foreign Policy Watch argues persuasively that the status quo that was being defended during the years between 1918 and 1939 were inherently destabilizing and did not reflect the distribution of power in the international system.  That Hitler and Imperial Japan wanted to overthrow the status quo could be expected and would at some point in time have likely ocurred in some form even without the Depression greasing the skids for radicalism.

I think simple answers are hard to come by when examining this period of history.  There are a myriad of factors that influenced events and only in retrospect do they seem obvious.  I think pure luck played a role as well.  Hitler was a unique individual who was probably more successful (even if in a demonic way) than any other leader at that time would have been irrespective of the Depression and an unsustainable international status quo.

At any rate, it is always a useful excersize to look back and consider what happened from several vantage points.  We'll never stand at an archimedean point where we can be completely objective, so multiple vantage points offers us the next best (if flawed) option.

        

An extremely thought-provoking piece from one of the blogs at First Things. 

The ruminations in the piece ask a very pertinent question for today, namely  "what is reason's responsibility?"

Given that a vastly secularized world has enthroned "reason" as the ultimate arbiter of competing claims to justice (or less charitably as a "moderator of prejudice"), how is "reason" to act in this capacity?

If reason is a tool, then what is the end it is employed to bring about?  The below section, I believe, shines a spotlight on this most uncomfortable of questions for those who believe that reason alone can be moral.

"What Leo Strauss had already understood in 1941, having worked through his own “German nihilist” (that is fascist or proto-fascist) temptation, is that if reason is to survive as a moderator of prejudices, it must befriend the honorable prejudices or approximate truths of non-intellectuals who are ready to stand for something. And (as too many Straussians fail to see), to accomplish this political function the philosopher must respect the provenance of goods essential to the order of his own soul that “simple reason” cannot create ex nihilo."

Reason cannot create except within a framework that has already been, at some level, predetermined by something external to the process of "reason" itself.  This is its inherent limitation.

        

With all of the news continuing to pour out of Iran, it is a futile task to try to stay on top of the "latest news."  It also seems futile to attempt to place the last week of protests within any historical context given that the outcome is murky as are the motivations of so many key players in the drama.

Of course, the video of the young woman, "Neda" has amped the emotion of the moment as has domestic politics in the United States where President Obama has come under increasing pressure to respond forcefully in favor of the protestors.

With the nuclear issue and proliferation more generally very much hanging in the balance on the Iran question, the nature of the regime that emerges from this turmoil will be key.

That said, several good articles have outlined the situation well.  First, Fareed Zakaria essentially says the revolutionary regime in Tehran is now completely delegitimized.  Even if it maintains power (as he sees as likely), the rickety edifice of the regime's theocracy will not continue to function under the illusion that it speaks with the wisdom of the Imam.  It will now be a regime of brute force.

Meanwhile, Stratfor downplays that this is really a revolution and casts the events as a struggle amongst the Iranian elite.  The clerics backed Mousavi because he would make it harder to isolate the regime and would protect their perrogatives, while others supported Ahmadinejad because of his criticisms of the cleric's excesses and "betrayal of the revolution."

Whether Mousavi or Ahmadinejad won mattered more to the internal elites of Iran than to the West because there was no substantive difference between them on policies of interest to the West and particularly the United States. 

As for the protestors, Stratfor questions whether they really represent all that much of the population and notes their apparent "western" appearance vs. the more traditional population which still is a majority.

Personally, I think Iran is unstable now less because of any desire to "westernize" and more because of internal power games.  The visually stunning images and video of protests is reminiscient of protests during our own Vietnam era (as I have alluded to before).  It represents a minority, even if it is a vocal and technologically skilled minority. 

Iran may change some, but not in any way that are beneficial for the United States.  I simply do not think this is a revolution and the "legitimacy" Zakaria asserts has been blown by Supreme Leader Khameini may be highly overrated.  Brute force works when employed against a group that is isolated. 

        

When I found this article the other day, I almost couldn't believe it.  An international relations scholar actually using concepts from the discipline to outline how to deal with children.  Given my pending fatherhood, I thought that I couldn't find a better guide!

        

As always, I find Spengler's coloumn at First Things thought provoking.  Below is a comment I left to this article.
 
" 'I think it is the sense of our own miserable tininess next to the Transcendent that terrifies us, and the recognition of mortality that horrifies us.'

I believe that is absolutely true. All desire to transcend “this” life stems from a fundamental fear of both the transitory and mortal. Doesn’t even an existentialist feel this too?

All humans want immortality. The question is what path do we each choose. Do we choose to become our own Gods or do we choose to offer thanks to our creator? That is the line that seperates atheists (and probably agnostics) from those of faith.

Meaning can only be found in the Transcendent, and the quest of humanity is to discover (or listen to) the Transcendent."

I honestly can't think of anything more terrifying nor anything more awe inspiring than the infinite and transcendent creator.  Anything else must, by definition, be small.

        

A "non-declinist realist" speaks. This piece dovetails with a book I just read by Stratfor's George Friedman.

The bottom line from these geopolitical analysts is that America will remain the sole superpower even if not quite as powerful as in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. I believe the geopolitical terrain is rough and tricky, but that this is essentially correct- if culture stays strong. But its a big "if."  We are fully capable of throwing away our advantages if we don't watch ourselves, especially in the next several years.

        

        

I hate to be depressing, but this article by David P. Goldman is eye-opening (and depressing).

Here is the money quote:

"High savings rates are deflationary. Savings postpones consumption. Savers forego consumption of present goods for future goods by purchasing securities rather than current production. That drives down the price of current goods and increase the price of future goods (bonds)."
 
If Americans start saving more (as I think is necessary for an overall recalibration of our economy), who is going to pick up on the demand side?  There is no way this can be quick, its a structural issue we are working through, not merely a cyclical one.

        

The big international news of the week has obviously been the Iranian elections and what, from the western point of view appears as a rigged victory for President Ahmadinejad.

Of course, all the videos and Twitter "tweets" seem to verify the brutality of the Iranian regimes crackdown on those yearning for change from the pariah role Ahmadinejad seems content allowing Iran to play indefinitely.

This may well be absolutely the core of what is happening.  It is possible we are seeing a revolution in the making, but I doubt it.

Not only was Ahmadinejad's opponent not all that substantively different on the policy areas of most concern the United States, there is some reason to question whether the voting fraud that has been alledged is as rampant as advertised.

Again, it could be.  Given the closed nature of the system, the reality is that America has no good way to know for sure.

However, I was struck by the following analysis by Stratfor and wondered if the desire for revolution in Iran is more a projection of our hopes for Iran rather than their hope for themselves.  Sure, there may be thousands upon thousands of those disaffected by the outcome, but is there a "silent majority" that is not? 

In the 1960s you would have thought America was nothing but left-wing antiwar protestors as did many on the outisde at the time looking in.   Yet Richard Nixon engineered victories by piecing together those that did not agree with the radicalism of the protest movement.

Is this what Ahmadinejad has done in Iran?

From Stratfor:

"Ahmadinejad’s Popularity

It also misses a crucial point: Ahmadinejad enjoys widespread popularity. He doesn’t speak to the issues that matter to the urban professionals, namely, the economy and liberalization. But Ahmadinejad speaks to three fundamental issues that accord with the rest of the country.

First, Ahmadinejad speaks of piety. Among vast swathes of Iranian society, the willingness to speak unaffectedly about religion is crucial. Though it may be difficult for Americans and Europeans to believe, there are people in the world to whom economic progress is not of the essence; people who want to maintain their communities as they are and live the way their grandparents lived. These are people who see modernization — whether from the shah or Mousavi — as unattractive. They forgive Ahmadinejad his economic failures.

Second, Ahmadinejad speaks of corruption. There is a sense in the countryside that the ayatollahs — who enjoy enormous wealth and power, and often have lifestyles that reflect this — have corrupted the Islamic Revolution. Ahmadinejad is disliked by many of the religious elite precisely because he has systematically raised the corruption issue, which resonates in the countryside.

Third, Ahmadinejad is a spokesman for Iranian national security, a tremendously popular stance. It must always be remembered that Iran fought a war with Iraq in the 1980s that lasted eight years, cost untold lives and suffering, and effectively ended in its defeat. Iranians, particularly the poor, experienced this war on an intimate level. They fought in the war, and lost husbands and sons in it. As in other countries, memories of a lost war don’t necessarily delegitimize the regime. Rather, they can generate hopes for a resurgent Iran, thus validating the sacrifices made in that war — something Ahmadinejad taps into. By arguing that Iran should not back down but become a major power, he speaks to the veterans and their families, who want something positive to emerge from all their sacrifices in the war.

Perhaps the greatest factor in Ahmadinejad’s favor is that Mousavi spoke for the better districts of Tehran — something akin to running a U.S. presidential election as a spokesman for Georgetown and the Upper East Side. Such a base will get you hammered, and Mousavi got hammered. Fraud or not, Ahmadinejad won and he won significantly. That he won is not the mystery; the mystery is why others thought he wouldn’t win.

For a time on Friday, it seemed that Mousavi might be able to call for an uprising in Tehran. But the moment passed when Ahmadinejad’s security forces on motorcycles intervened. And that leaves the West with its worst-case scenario: a democratically elected anti-liberal.

Western democracies assume that publics will elect liberals who will protect their rights. In reality, it’s a more complicated world. Hitler is the classic example of someone who came to power constitutionally, and then proceeded to gut the constitution. Similarly, Ahmadinejad’s victory is a triumph of both democracy and repression."
 
Let's see what happens if there are recounts and where the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini eventually (and finally) comes down.  Perhaps, the west is correct in its views, but the troubling question not yet fully answered is- what if we were wrong?

        

I typically shy away from discussing state politics.  However, this article  from the Dayton Daily News really got to me.

The lead sums it all up:

"As Ohio’s budget swells with red ink, state Treasurer Kevin Boyce spent $32,469 in taxpayer money on promotional items such as water bottles, grocery bags and pencils and plans to buy another $47,457 in swag plastered with his name."

While the Ohio General Assembly is currently struggling to find a way to deal with a looming $3 billion chasm in its upcoming operating budget, a statewide officeholder is busy promoting himself with taxpayer money.  If Boyce were a Republican, there would be mobs demanding retribution.

Fortunately, the Ohio GOP is putting up a true shining light of the party to run against Boyce, State Representative Josh Mandel.

I've known Mandel for a number of years, before he served in the legislature and  before he served two tours in Iraq as a Marine.  He's smart, fiscally conservative, and quite frankly, a tireless worker.  In many ways, he is the prototype of the kind of Republican I often write about on my blog.  He is unashamedly conservative, but he is able to speak about conservatism in a way that does not turn people off, but brings them in.  This is exemplified by his past victories in a district that is not particularly favorable for Republicans.

I can already state that I hope he wins this race.  He'd be great in the job and, I think, he can represent the beginning of the kind of renewal so desperately needed.

        

This is an astute piece from the Claremont Institute on the future of conservatism. 

It is only natural to conclude that the left would be giddy at the prospect that conservatism may have "slipped back into the chaos and impotence that prevailed" before the rise of the modern right with William F. Buckley and the National Review as John Judis of the New Republic asserts.  The question is, however, do they have a real basis for getting that "warm and tingly" feeling that vanquishing conquerors must have gotten as they stood over the prone bodies of their opposition?

This article is ambiguous as to whether or not conservatism is destined to wander about in the political wilderness for decades as the newly empowered radical left merrily pushes its agenda to its only logical destination- the collapse of America under the weight of utopian, consequences be damned individualism.

"In the American context, our experiment in self-government is the precarious undertaking conservatives defend. Most experiments fail. America's astounding triumphs in the past do not guarantee perpetual success going forward. Whatever their differences about conservatism's foundations, conservatives agree that defending the American experiment more often requires opposing than accommodating liberalism.

The danger liberalism poses to the American experiment comes from its disposition to deplete rather than replenish the capital required for self-government."

This quote is completely in line with arguments I have made previously regarding the necessity for cultural renewal in order to remain vibrant enough to withstand the challenges confronting us as a nation.  Contemporary liberalism deplinishes the reservoir of will that makes it possible to stand up and deal with the dangers and complexities of modernity.

The debate within conservatism between "traditionalists" and "reformers" and any other sub groups must be robust, but also must be quick.  We do not have time to attend a multitude of seminars on how to rediscover what we are for.  We must begin articulating that very soon or risk being washed away by the remorseless tide of history.

Conservatism, as I have said before, is about pragmatism in the face of radicalism and about respect for the past vs. its casual dismissal as being irrelevant to the ever change course of the future.  Indeed, conservatism can be progressive, but progressive within the bounds of what human nature tolerates.  The sin of modern liberalism is that it thinks it knows no boundaries even when those boundaries starkly stare it in the face.

Its our job to highlight this and usher in real hope, not delusions and pious morality hollowed by a lack of connection to any sense of Truth.

        

It is almost beyond belief how far the mainstream media has pushed their obsequiesness to President Obama.  This Drudge Report headline is truly cringe inducing.  The White House is excluding the opposition and welcoming ABC news to its own "green room" in oprder to produce what will likely be nothing more than a slightly ennobled infomercial.

Its not shocking that Obama would attempt this, but it is shocking that ABC is going along and doing this.  Where is the objectivity?  I can only imagine the apoplexy of the left if a major television station had done this for President Bush.

Of course, life isn't fair, but this move quite clearly proves that neither is the mainstream media.

        

In my post below I heap praise on former U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich who I think gave the best GOP speech since Obama's election.  I want to focus now on an issue he raised but I  think failed to pursue as far as necessary in order to capture the high ground on the issue.

Gingrich was correct to point out that America was, can, and should be again a true melting pot.  Immigration is NOT bad.  However, immigration with no expectations of those who are seeking to come here is bad and destructive culturally in a deep way.  Therefore, let them come, but let them be Americans, not hyphenations.  Let english be the language of government affairs so that assimilation becomes a must.  That's not immoral or prejudiced, its the only way to avoid placing new immigrants in untenable situations where they lack the skills to communicate outside of their own communities thus limiting prospects for the very prosperity they came to find.

I think Gingrich's only misstep was his categorical statement that he is "not a citizen of the world", but an American citizen.

It could have been so much more powerful if he  said "As an American citizen, I am citizen of the world and I do not need to denigrate America to prove this point, because we are all Americans."  A potentially classic variation on the Kennedy "Eich bin ein Berliner" speech.

That may sound a bit radical, especially to come from a conservative, yet consider, that America is based on the idea of universal values.  As longtime readers of my blog know, I have grown skeptical of our crusading zeal in the wake of Iraq and have advocated for a neo-Kissingerian foreign policy.

I still think that is correct.  However, if, by the power of our ideas we can begin to transform minds, then a little less Kissingerianism, or Machiavellianism, might be necessary.  We don't need to impose democracy at the point of a gun, but we can become a magnet for the rest of the world to come here.

Foreign policy is about calculation and that cannot change.  However, our domestic relations can change.  We have been the greatest synthesizer of culture since Rome.  Yet, we have lost this through a blindness to the consequences of "multiculturalism" and have placed our future upon the altar of "diversity" at all costs.  We have lost an understanding of the cleavages this creates and the animosities it foments.

Unity and cultural renewal are keys to America's willingness to face down all its future challenges from terrorism to proliferation of WMDs and from renewed great power conflict to unprecedented economic competition.  American culture is the glue that binds us together to face these challenges. 

Imagine if, we could be "American" and "World" citizens.  Why do we have to make  a choice?  Shouldn't we open the door to all?  Isn't that how we were a beacon of light, a shining city on a hill?  Is there, in today's age even a choice?  Or do we face an inexorable requirement?

One key to statesmanship is to understand how to do what is necessary when necessary and face the consequences even when undesirable.  This means a resounding no to naive utopianism.  But another key is to recognize the need to prudently and cautiously move forward  taking advantage of opportunities as they present themselves while looking to create new ones.  

In an age desperately needing renewal to set the stage for the future, the road forward is to have universal aspirations, while never losing sight of parochial necessities.  It is a balance of realism and idealism.  One cannot be all one or the other without coming to ruin.  Possibly we cannot be "American" citizens without being "World" citizens as well.  Should this be so, then the reverse must also be true.  One could be a citizen of any nation, but to be a citizen of the world, one must truly be "American."

If we decline or stumble, the world will suffer incalculably.  Best for us to do all we can to avoid this, but to avoid it with more than just a glint of hope and a reservoir of cynicism.  We must have a reservoir of hope, tempered by reality, but expectant of great things.

Vacuous promises of change and hope must be met with tangible promises of change and hope.  This is the message for Republicans.  Not "Change We Can Believe In", but "Hope We Can Believe In."

        

I am heartened that Republicans are beginning, ever so gradually and yet discernibly, to find a voice while in opposition.  I am actually rather impresses by Newt Gingrich's recent speech before party activists at a major fundraiser. 

While the former Speaker of the House obviously has a large amount of baggage he carries with him, he gave a very good speech.

It did not have the rhetorical flair of the President and was not as warm and soothing as the President Regan, but it was a clarion call to conservatives in a new century and facing new challenges.  The best speech given by a Republican since Obama's election (even including Cheney's cogent defense of Bush Administration national security policy).

He was steadfastly opposed to the spending binge embraked upon by President Obama (and don;t ever let anyone say its all Bush's fault, the spending of this President is unprecedented in American history and is not all "fix it up", its new programming too).  Gingrich was also steadfast in his appeal to national security conservatives.  However, the part that really resonated for me was when he referred to education as the civil rights issue of this century.

How refreshing it is to not constantly be engaging in stale debates over Affirmative Action and gay rights.  He hits the nail on the head by recognizing that the great competition coming this nation's way from Asia will challenge the next generation in ways that they have never been challenged before.  There will be no opportunity to coast on the fumes of yesteryear's accomplishments, there will only be opportunity to win or lose and the key to that is to equip young minds with knowledge. 

This was great stuff.  I am going to post another message on the "melting pot" portion of Gingrich's speech as I think he started on the right trail, but did not go as far as possible and lost an opportunity to make the grandest gesture, something that could really set Republicans apart.

        

The deepest interpretation of Obama's Cairo speech comes from David P.  Goldman, or Spengler.  The full piece is a bit of a retread of many articles he has written about cultural decline, the Muslim world, and President Obama's own unique (if not peculiar) past.

However, this one article synthesizes it all using the context of the famous speech the President made last week in Cairo as a backdrop.

The thesis is this:

Obama is a sympathizer with the plight of the Third World, so much so that he uses his immense political talents in such a way as to pull America back from the global stage in order to essentially rescue the Third World from its inability to grapple with the modernity carried forth by America, ie. its "cultural imperialism."  In order to do this, Obama is willing to inadvertently, but without much care, throw Israel under the bus by forcing such severe compromises as to render the state indefensible, if not today then in the forseeable future.

My paraphrasing does not do justice to the nuance or detail Goldman includes, making reading the full piece a true necessity.

I am not completely convinced Obama is the kind of near mastermind that Goldman asserts.  Obama may be nothing more than a particularly gifted liberal politician who came to power largely due to a confluence of events: the mistakes made by the previous Administration and a long-term cultural shift  towards post-modern secularism.
 
That said, Goldman's fears of where Obama may take us are frightening, especially if one believes, as I certainly do, that America is the necessary global power and, by default, the grand stabilizer needed to avoid a general chaos in international affairs.

I was very critical of Obama during the campaign.  I shifted my criticisms and even articulated some begrudging admiration of his newly installed Cabinet early on after his innauguration. 

I now believe my initial fears were correct.  It is not that he is a "socialist" or a "statist" that is most troubling.  It is that he actually buys into the left-wing academic view of America as the ultimate purveyor of evil in the world.  While he could never explicitly state this outside of the ivory towers of academia, by being President, he has the ability to counteract this perceived "great wrong.  He can do this by making  America fit the preconceived notions of elite opinion that believes relativism, ironically enough, is the only fundamental truth.

Obama is the opposite of what the world needs.  We do not need an American President that wants to hobble our power so that we can be humble and "deserving" of respect.  We need a President that can marry hard nosed diplomacy with force and has a conception of how global order is really maintained as opposed to legal theories that evaporate upon contact with the brutality of the real world.

A man of theory can be a good thing, provided the theory is either correct or, at least more correct than the competing alternatives.  I disagree that Obama's theories are correct.  I believe they are misguided and ill informed by true history.  I believe Obama is sincere, but sincerely wrong.

        

I commented on this Washington Post op-ed on Facebook, but it really got me thinking.  Below were my initial thoughts.

"Having historically been an advocate for globaliztion and free trade, I wonder if this article doesn't illustrate an interesting prospect. Could America, by becoming a saving nation again rather than consumer driven, retain its strength while others nations dependent on export driven growth decline more rapidly than we do?

This might mean an absolute decline in living standards, but not in relative terms where national power would still be largely determined. So while there is still free trade, its slow down (though not its complete retrenchment in a spat of neo-isolationism) could be beneficial. Again, this would be relative and would have lasting domestic implications, but perhaps this is also the key to cultural renewal.

I'm not saying this is correct, just curious. Can we ever renew our culture while awash in a sea of mass consumerism? Maybe there is a small silver lining, provided government does not step in as a permanent replacement for the family unit."

I believe the answer to my question is no.

        

Kissinger speaks to the dangers of allowing North Korea to go nuclear.  He outlines a compelling case that diplomacy is becoming increasingluy nothing more than a tactic that is being manipulated by North Korea as it continues its march towards becoming a full blown nuclear power.

Kissinger also, I think rather eloquently, describes the consequences of what this means with respect to the Iranian nuclear question and the larger implications of nuclear proliferation.   In fact, he lays down what I perceive as a precursor to what will soon be an essential need to establish a new strategy of deterrence for a world of multiple nuclear power states and the associated problem of non-state terrorist organizations. 

I have written before about the need for what I would consider "extended deterrence" in the face of a proliferation regime that is so tattered as to be impotent in practice and nearly impotent in rhetoric.  The debate over the shape of this deterrence should begin now rather than weak attempts at breathing life into a moribund treaty that exists in paper and not in spirit.

In the shadows of the North Korean nuclear program is the newly emerging stage on which a new and dangerous game must be played.  The "Golden Age of Proliferation" will tax security experts and political leaders for years to come. 

        

The following are two more entries in the declinist school, this time not from the traditional leftist perspective, but from the more distinctively "right" perspective.

The first is from David P. Goldman, also known as Spengler.  I quote a large section from this entry he does over at Asia Times, Inner Workings, which is devoted more to banking and economis issues.  The piece argues that with the new and seemingly endless government intrusions into the market, the ability of the US economy to be as productive as we have been accustomed to will evaporate.  Incentive, or that lovely capitalist phrase "animal spirits" , won't be animated by statism, taxation, and government fiat.

While we won't crash spectacularly, absent  radical changes, America will become a stiffled, petty, navel gazing, former Superpower that watches power ebb to the hungry, vibrant, and dedicated Eastern Asian powers.

"What worries me more than anything else is that America’s young people, who offered such overwhelming support for Obama, may continue to huddle underneath the federal umbrella as times get tough. A self-feeding problem may ensue as Asia decouples from the American economy and opportunities for wealth creation in the United States shrink. Americans are facing a degree of competition from Asian university graduates on a scale they never before encountered, and cannot possibly imagine. One example: China has 40 million primary and secondary school students studying classical piano, a hallmark of the hot-housed, tutored, overachieving character of Chinese youth. America has just 30 million primary and secondary school students.

During the next generation, talented young Asians won’t start their businesses in the United States. They still will learn computer science at Stanford and international law at Yale, but unlike the 1980s and 1990s, they will not leave their families behind to put roots down in the US. Asian capital markets are sufficiently developed to provide them an adequate platform at home. Young Americans, who used to think that a business or law degree was a ticket to prosperity, will find the pickings all the slimmer in the new global competitive environment. They may look to the federal government for protection, much like their European counterparts.

America’s economic decline relative to Asia is not baked in the cake — yet — but the cake batter is in the pan, and the pan is en route to the oven. And the administration is more concerned about consolidating its own power than promoting economic efficiency. In third world countries, economic weakness increases the power of the comprador elite, because it leaves economic factors all the more dependent on the combination of government and oligopoly. It is possible to foresee a long and self-inflicted American economic decline."

The second piece is from Mark Steyn in the Washington Times.  With a morose title like "Hollow Superpower" there can't be any question as to the thesis being espoused by Steyn.  However, while Steyn himself may be a somewhat controversial figure due to his tendency to gravitate towards the polemical, he quotes someone manifestly non-polemical in summarizing his op-ed.  He quotes Leslie Gelb, the former President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The country's economy, infrastructure, public schools, and political system have been allowed to deteriorate. The result has been diminished economic strength, a less vital democracy, and a mediocrity of spirit."

Steyn concludes by referring to the "mediocity of spirit."  I have spent a lot of time discussing my fears as to this very subject and what its longterm consequences will be.  I am saddened that what was at one time, even recently, only a latent fear, is becoming vocally expressed by many, including those that are judicious and not extreme.  This means that there is likely some fire below the darkening clouds. 

Decline is in the air and while it can be reversed, it won't happen with a culture that no longer believes in anything sacred.

        

Seriously, the PR is great, but who really, when you strip away idealistic blinders, believes that reducing our nuclear stockpiles (or for that matter the Russians') will really make the world safer?  Yet that is the goal of negotiating a successor to the expiring START treaty.

After talking with a Heritage Foundation scholar the other night at Ohio State, James Carafano, a striking thing was brought up.  Namely, that as you reduce your nuclear stockpiles, other nations will actually have less distance to travel to get on par with the US since they obviously would need to produce less to have an equivalent number of weapons.

Clearly, it will still take time for new nuclear powers to reach even the high hundreds of operational nuclear warheads, but the bottom line is that this will still be destabilizing as it might actually encourage not discourage the growth of weapon arsenals. 

Essentially this confirmed what I always believed, namely, that the genie is out of the bottle and we can't put it back in, no matter how hard we try. When the "moral highground" competes with national interest, guess what loses.

Lowering our stockpile is not going to address the geopolitical needs (or perceptions) of other nations that feel they do need these weapons as equalizers or bestowers of status.

Arms negotiation is not necessarily bad in terms of limiting the growth of new weapons, but it I think it is unambiguously bad if intended to lower existing weapons.

        

The best articulation of why "empathy" should not be the gold standard by which to judge a judge:

"Injustice is bad primarily because it hurts; to ignore or distrust the cries of the hurting is to be cruel, and cruelty is the worst thing we do.

Why, after all, would somebody cry out if they were not in pain? This is the logic of what we mean by empathy."

What if their pain is legitimate?  Does empathy mean we should empathize even if their they are wrong?  Does that not raise some interesting questions?

        

This piece from the Harvard Crimson magazine was drafted by Harvey Mansfield, a conservative (gasp) professor there.  The article is a response to the excoriation the Crimson gave to many of President Bush's policies and interpretations of legality, in particular, the oft maligned "Unitary Executive Theory."

Here is the core argument:

"Yet the rule of law also has defects less obvious to us. Suppose the law is bad, then the rule of law is the rule of bad law. Think of the law requiring Rosa Parks to sit in the back of the bus. And a good law, meaning good in normal circumstances, may not be good in an emergency, when the country is at war or under attack. It may not even be good in a special case in ordinary times; this defect requires what used to be called equity and is now called “empathy.”  Moreover, when executing the law it is not enough to say “pretty please”—violence is sometimes necessary. Necessary: the executive deals especially with necessity as distinct from desirability."

I believe Mansfield is correct in his view on executive power. Executive power can and should be vigorous. This view is considered by many as dangerous, but it has always been such. Even the Roman Republic (which was a republic far longer than the US has been a nation) allowed power to go to one man in emergencies. Is this flawed? Perhaps, but no system can deal with all potentialities. Nor can the abstration of law.  Indeed the law is always going to be "behind the times" as the unexpected emerges.  To tie one's hands through an inflexible adherence to something that may well be outdated could well be suicidal.

Obviously, there must be limits to such power as this could easily become a subterfuge within which to hatch plots leading to despotism.  However, a balance must be struck so that we do not arbitrarily limit ourselves when all options, even unsavory ones, must be thoroughly vetted and not merely dismissed because it offends too many sesnsibilities.

As Mansfield asserts, "The Constitution intends that this debate never end, and it is naïve to think that one side should always win."


 

        

A very provocative piece that intimates an undercurrent of Nietzschean philosophy in the pre-Buckley "Old RIght" days.

The case is laid out with reference to famed journalist H.L. Mencken and his criticisms of FDR and the New Deal.  However, the author of this piece makes clear that Mencken was not driven to opposition due to a populist revolt against the elites, but that he was angered by FDR's enshrinement of the wrong elites in power:

"But in poking fun at old money and new, Mencken’s objective was hardly egalitarian: the decadent WASPs must be cleared away and room made for a new elite, who, as Mencken probably imagined it, would march into power with copies of Zarathustra and The Anti-Christ under each arm. The problem with America was not that its ruling class was too powerful, but that it didn’t have the right kind of ruling class.

What makes Mencken’s “libertarianism,” if we’re to call it that, so startling and intriguing is that it is not primarily based on the polarities we’ve become used to in the postwar libertarian and conservative movements: for instance Liberty and Tyranny, the Individual and the State, Collectivism and Freedom. Instead, Mencken concerns himself with the interaction between physiological types—the, in Mencken’s mind, inevitable conflict between the superior man and the resenter, between those capable of advancement and creating abundance and those who simply want to get their fingers in the eyes of their betters, between the strong and the weak."
 
I have not read Mencken, but I have read Nietzsche.  It is often assumed that Nietzsche is the ultimate emblem of all that is wrong with modernity, or more accurately, post-modernity, since it is largely through him that relativism found its first and probably best proponent.  In some ways, this is true, though I do not believe that was Nietzsche's goal and is actually represntative of a bastardization of a far more complex project he attempted.

Nietzsche wanted man to love life here and now and not wait for an ethereal future that he thought did not exist.  Consequently he attacked those things that denigrated what he perceived as natural, healthy impulses.  His attacks were aggressive and when read in today's politically correct universe are shocking.  He disdained religion because he thought it destroyed the qualities that made man strong and attempted to replace them with weaknesses enthroned as the highest virtues.

Clearly, this is a very dangerous line of thought.  That said, I believe he is a great prognosticator of the very things that have made the modern world actually rather dehumanizing.

Nietzsche was a full throated humanist.   Today's secular humanists by contrast are those who actually plagiarize Christian faith while simultaneously jettisoning the very foundation of what allows their morality to exist.

Niezsche was in this sense far more honest than many of those who deny faith but ape its goals.

Nietzsche (and ultimately Mencken if one ascribes to him quasi-Nietzschean views) is not a good model for modern conservatism, but he may be the best critic modern conservatives will ever have of the perils associated with humanism devoid of Christian faith.

How can you aspire to Christian goals in the finitude of time on earth while denying the infinitude of immortality?

I do not believe you can, at least not honestly.  To be honest, would mean embracing the Will to Power and all the things that make Nietzsche so frightening, because he sees what humanity devoid of God would really be.

        

Though I have written on Obama's upcoming speech to the "Muslim World" from Cairo later this week, I could not resist linking to Spengler's take on this:

"By addressing the "Islamic world" from Cairo, Obama lends credibility to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and other advocates of political Islam who demand that Muslims be addressed globally and on religious terms - in contradistinction to nationalists such as Mubarak. Rather than buttress a loyal ally, Obama's speech undermines him on his home ground. That is a lose-lose proposition...
 
For his trouble, Obama will get more bloodshed in Pakistan, more megalomania from Iran, more triumphalism from the Palestinians, and less control over Iraq and Afghanistan. Of all the available bad choices, Obama has taken the worst. It is hard to imagine any consequence except a steep diminution of American influence."

Instead of working within the defined "state" system, Obama is making a speech that offers succor to those that want to see a pan-Islamic world take shape.  That is unlikely his intent, but, if Spengler is on to something here, that may be the inadvertent, and deeply counterproductive outcome.

        

After reading this piece in the Financial Times I finally realized that it is time to stop making such a distinction between so-called "hard" power and "soft" power.  This distinction has been all the rage since President Obama's diplomatic flair is supposed to be an exemplar of "soft" power and its seductive qualities while President Bush was the exemplar of "hard" power's coercive nature.

Obviously, it is unsurprising that many scholars and diplomats favor the "soft" approach.  However as Gideon Rachman makes clear, there are some issues confronting America today that cannot be finessed away with soft spoken words and empathy.

Readers of my blog know that I have been outspoken on this issue, but its nice to see further confirmation from a well respected journalist at a premier newspaper.

The distinctions are arbitrary, its about "power" in general and how all manifestations of it can be brought to bear on recalcitrant opposition.

Machiavelli said it is better to be feared than loved, if you can't be both. Obviously, even he recognized its advantageous to be both.

Meanwhile, a solid primer from the Heritage Foundation on why a strong national defense continues to be important.

Diplomacy divorced from the legitimate threat of force is nothing but rhetoric.

        

I always admire the writings of Victor Davis Hanson.  As a classical military historian and a farmer, he has a unique perspective on America.  He has seen and lived a traditionalist lifestyle, written about the common western heritage, and dealt with the world of self flagellation in academia.

With the recent nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, it is evident that, the desire for "empathy" has clearly trumped the need to interpret law as it is constructed.  Others have written on this issue extensively, so I won't go into this in much detail.  However, th below section from this work of Hanson's raises in my mind one of the core challenges America faces.  Namely, the desire of the political, elite left to raise the race issue ad nauseum.  This is not really multiculturalism, it the beginning of factionalism which, as Hanson explicitly states devolves into tribalism.  That is the opposite of the universal aspirations of America.

For America to retain its strength, it must become color blind and race blind.  Anything else enshrines parochial loyalties rather than broad, national loyalties.  This is no way for the world's strongest nation to remain strong.  It is a path leading to navel gazing and disunity.  

Hanson sums up well,

"In a weird way, I don’t think we’ve seen officials of a government as racially conscious since the days of the 1930s.  Surely in the last three decades one’s race has never been so emphasized as it is now-and large numbers of all races will begin to resent that once again we are not talking about the content of our characters, but our racial pedigrees and the degree to which we can all showcase the modern populist version of being born in a log cabin. There is a feeling I think that every Obama appointment for some reason either will fit some desirable race/class/gender rubric, or, if not, will soon have to  be “offset” one-for-one, by another PC selection to come: sort of Obama’s racial version of Al Gore’s carbon offsets. This is very disturbing, and one is surprised that sensible people seem to be happy with seeing people in terms of racial profiles rather than simple human beings with a common humanity...

one should remember the story of the last 3,000 years is the escalation of such tribalism into mayhem, as those of different races and religions went at it ad mortem. Why emulate the former Yugoslavia, or Kurd/Shiite/Sunni, or Rwanda, when the US alone had created the basis for a multiracial culture under the aegis of a shared Western paradigm?"

        

I happened to stumble upon the American Chesterton Society the other day.  While I assume this to be a somewhat obscure organization, I found it to be a grandly educational experience.  It gave me an excuse to learn about who G.K Chesterton was.  My previoulsy knowledge being limited to recognizing the name when finding the occassional quote.

The Society's webpage included numerous shorter pieces of writing Chesterton produced (he was a bit of a polymath as he was a journalist, philosopher, fiction writer, and even a bit of a theologian).  I found two to be particularly insightful relating to why having a conscious philosophy of life is a good thing and why Christianity makes more sense than agnosticism and certainly more than atheism.  Here is his reasoning for having a

"The best reason for a revival of philosophy is that unless a man has a philosophy certain horrible things will happen to him. He will be practical; he will be progressive; he will cultivate efficiency; he will trust in evolution; he will do the work that lies nearest; he will devote himself to deeds, not words. Thus struck down by blow after blow of blind stupidity and random fate, he will stagger on to a miserable death with no comfort but a series of catchwords; such as those which I have catalogued above. Those things are simply substitutes for thoughts. In some cases they are the tags and tail-ends of somebody else's thinking. That means that a man who refuses to have his own philosophy will not even have the advantages of a brute beast, and be left to his own instincts. He will only have the used-up scraps of somebody else's philosophy; which the beasts do not have to inherit; hence their happiness. Men have always one of two things: either a complete and conscious philosophy or the unconscious acceptance of the broken bits of some incomplete and shattered and often discredited philosophy."

I think this is largely true.  We must have some understanding (even if not necessarily correct and true with a capital "T") of what life is.  Not to have that is to wander about aimlessly as stormy waters throw one back and forth.

As it relates to Christianity, I am not sure I have ever seen as strong a summation of its need than this,

"Now when Christianity came, the ancient world had just reached this dilemma. It heard the Voice of Nature-Worship crying, "All natural things are good. War is as healthy as he flowers. Lust is as clean as the stars." And it heard also the cry of the hopeless Stoics

and Idealists: "The flowers are at war: the stars are unclean: nothing but man's conscience is right and that is utterly defeated."

Both views were consistent, philosophical and exalted: their only disadvantage was that the first leads logically to murder and the second to suicide. After an agony of thought the world saw the sane path between the two. It was the Christian God. He made Nature but He was Man.

Lastly, there is a word to be said about the Fall. It can only be a word, and it is this. Without the doctrine of the Fall all idea of progress is unmeaning."

So is that the truth?  Only faith knows.  That said, I do believe Mr. Chesterton to have been a prodigious intellect who offers golden nuggets of thought that can help man make some sense of that which often seems senseless. 

I am glad to have found this little corner of the web, it certainly makes me think.

        

The debate over whether America has reached its zenith and is about to inexorably travel the well trod path of decline and fall continues to rage.  This article summarizes the arguments outlined in a new issue of the Washington Quarterly.

Its useful to read as most of the articles outlined appear to be in the "declinist" vein.  Of course, this is not surprising given all of the challenges we face today from the economic crisis to our ongoing military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the continuing fraying of the non-proliferation regime (with North Korea and Iran continuing their marches), to the resurgence of Russia and the rise of a potential peer competitor in China.

But we do need to consider that despite all of this, history has a way of showing conventional wisdom to be wrong.  5 years ago America was the behemoth bestriding the globe exercising its power wih virtually no constraint.  Now we are ordained to either fall or become one pole in a multipolar world.  This conventional wisdom drastically changed in what amounts to overnight.  What will another 5 years bring?

I am sensitive to the concerns of those who believe in the inevitability of decline.  I think we are on the road down that path.  However, I also believe that internal, cultural issues can be overcome should we apply the right lessons of history (not fadish postmodern academic diatribes) and exhibit the will to succeed that America has shown in its past.

America is blessed with probably the best geography of any nation in history, complete with many natural resources and two oceans separating us from powerful potential adversaries while also giving us the ability to project naval power simultaneously in the Atlantic and the Pacific.  No one else has this.  Europe is only an Atlantic power, and is not as unified politically as it aspires to be, China is mostly landlocked with limited (even if growing) Pacific naval capacity as well as possible internal contradictions, and Japan is only a Pacific power (even when not under its current constitutional restraints) with practically no natural resources.  India has limited access to the ocean and is in a tough neighborhood with China and Pakistan on its borders.  Russia is landlocked with a rapidly declining population, and the Middle East, while endowed with petroleum, is not endowed with much else, especially political unity.  There are too many states in Africa and too much turmoil for any of them to rise even with their natural resources.  Australia is simply not large enough with its population.

In a nutshell, America has inherent advantages that no other nation has.  Our problems stem from our own internal decay. 

Declinism is in vogue and may be the ultimate harbinger of the future, but, again, it is not preordained.  We still have the ability to forestall this seeming "inevitability" should we choose to do so.  We will not be able to, though, if we refuse to address our internal problems.

        

Yet another thougtful read from Spengler, or David P. Goldman.  In this blog entry, he throws a devastating roundhouse to the notion that "mediocrity" can lead to greatness.  That concept is pedalled far more frequently than one might imagine.  He highlights recent op-eds by David Brooks in the New York Times that seems a paean to the wonders not of genius, but to the mediocre.

Spengler states that such mediocrity leads to corruption as those that are not likely to be successful based on their merits seek alternative methods for obtaining what they want.

The entire thesis is provocative and I believe does have a kernal of truth in it.  However, we must also be careful.  Elitism is not attractive.  On the contrary, it breeds resentment and defiance, regardless of whether there is any legitimacy to the opposition or not.

Also, we should remember, genius is like fire.  It may bring warmth and provide illumination, but it can also burn.  Sometimes, the average and the safe are all that is really needed and should not be viewed with scornful derision.  Sometimes the average is what saves humanity from its excesses and provides the stability necessary to ever achieve a posterity.  Raw genius can burn itself out and consume everything in an amazing, but apocalyptic conflagration.

Balance and stability are not sexy, but they are necessary.  We should just take care not to enshrine them as the summum bonum of existance.

        

Another tremendous read.  This is the transcript of the 2009 Jefferson lecture.  I posted the 2007 one yesterday from Harvey Mansfield.  This one is from President Bush's former head of a bioethics commission., Leon Kass.

It is truly fascinating to watch a man offer his intellectual biography to his audience like an open book.

Much like with Mansfield, this lecturebears many "Straussian" undertones, particularly the fondness for the classics, especially the admiration of Aristotle.  Yet I find this a very useful corrective to what I think is a false cocnceit of many modern intellectuals, namely that progress inherently means more happiness.

Perhaps, the great minds of the past are wiser than we are today because they had a larger perspective than our current, academically narrow and specialized  intelligentsia.

Lectures like this give me hope that not all in the culture wars is lost and that clear, brave, and, most significantly, articulate voices can still be heard above the cacophany of what passes for common wisdom of the ever transient moment.

Here is the clarion call:

"The search for our humanity, always necessary yet never more urgent, is best illuminated by the treasured works of the humanities, read in the company of open minds and youthful hearts, together seeking wisdom about how to live a worthy human life. To keep this lantern lit, to keep alive this quest: Is there a more important calling for those of us who would practice the humanities, with or without a license?"

        

While my post below deals with the long term issues concerning proliferation, I found several intriguing reads regarding North Korea and its geopolitical impact on the east Asian region.  First, here is Charles Krauthammer speculating that now would be a good time for Japan to acquire their own nuclear weapons as part of a deterrent. 

Here is one of two analyses produced by one of my perennial favorites, Stratfor.  The last line is particularly telling and dovetails with Krauthammer's comments, though Stratfor does not appear to be thinking Japan will go "nuclear" anytime too soon.

"Perhaps the more significant change in the regional security environment, then, will not be the incremental improvements in North Korea’s nuclear technology, but the more substantial and accelerated adjustments to Japan’s defense doctrines and capabilities."

Here is a deeper analysis of the situation eith North Korea, also from Stratfor.

Here are two of the most interesting snippets placing the North Korean advent to the nuclear club in historical perspective.  Note that the perspective is far from histrionic and is rather placid, though not cavalier.

"Enduring Geopolitical Stability

Wars of immense risk are born of desperation. In World War II, both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan took immense geostrategic gambles — and lost — but knowingly took the risk because of untenable geopolitical circumstances. By comparison, the postwar United States and Soviet Union were geopolitically secure. Washington had come into its own as a global power secured by the buffer of two oceans, while Moscow enjoyed the greatest strategic depth it had ever known.

The U.S.-Soviet competition was, of course, intense, from the nuclear arms race to the space race to countless proxy wars. Yet underlying it was a fear that the other side would engage in a war that was on its face irrational. Western Europe promised the Soviet Union immense material wealth but would likely have been impossible to subdue. (Why should a Soviet leader expect to succeed where Napoleon and Hitler had failed?) Even without nuclear weapons in the calculus, the cost to the Soviets was too great, and fears of the Soviet invasion of Europe along the North European Plain were overblown. The desperation that caused Germany to seek control over Europe twice in the first half of the 20th century simply did not characterize either the Soviet or U.S. geopolitical position even without nuclear weapons in play. It was within this context that the concept of mutually assured destruction emerged — the idea that each side would possess sufficient retaliatory capability to inflict a devastating “second strike” in the event of even a surprise nuclear attack.

Through it all, the metrics of nuclear warfare became more intricate. Throw weights and penetration rates were calculated and recalculated. Targets were assigned and reassigned. A single city would begin to have multiple target points, each with multiple strategic warheads allocated to its destruction. Theorists and strategists would talk of successful scenarios for first strikes. But only in the Cuban Missile Crisis did the two sides really threaten one another’s fundamental national interests. There were certainly other moments when the world inched toward the nuclear brink. But each time, the global system found its balance, and there was little cause or incentive for political leaders on either side of the Iron Curtain to so fundamentally alter the status quo as to risk direct military confrontation — much less nuclear war.

So through it all, the world carried on, its fundamental dynamics unchanged by the ever-present threat of nuclear war. Indeed, history has shown that once a country has acquired nuclear weapons, the weapons fail to have any real impact on the country’s regional standing or pursuit of power in the international system.

Thus, not only were nuclear weapons never used in even desperate combat situations, their acquisition failed to entail any meaningful shift in geopolitical position. Even as the United Kingdom acquired nuclear weapons in the 1950s, its colonial empire crumbled. The Soviet Union was behaving aggressively all along its periphery before it acquired nuclear weapons. And the Soviet Union had the largest nuclear arsenal in the world when it collapsed — not only despite its arsenal, but in part because the economic burden of creating and maintaining it was unsustainable. Today, nuclear-armed France and non-nuclear armed Germany vie for dominance on the Continent with no regard for France’s small nuclear arsenal.

The Intersection of Weapons, Strategy and Politics

This August will mark 64 years since any nation used a nuclear weapon in combat. What was supposed to be the ultimate weapon has proved too risky and too inappropriate as a weapon ever to see the light of day again. Though nuclear weapons certainly played a role in the strategic calculus of the Cold War, they had no relation to a military strategy that anyone could seriously contemplate. Militaries, of course, had war plans and scenarios and target sets. But outside this world of role-play Armageddon, neither side was about to precipitate a global nuclear war.

Clausewitz long ago detailed the inescapable connection between national political objectives and military force and strategy. Under this thinking, if nuclear weapons had no relation to practical military strategy, then they were necessarily disconnected (at least in the Clausewitzian sense) from — and could not be integrated with — national and political objectives in a coherent fashion. True to the theory, despite ebbs and flows in the nuclear arms race, for 64 years, no one has found a good reason to detonate a nuclear bomb."

I would like to touch upon the following snippet in a bit more detail,

"New additions to the nuclear club are always cause for concern. But though North Korea’s nuclear program continues apace, it hardly threatens to shift underlying geopolitical realities. It may encourage the United States to retain a slightly larger arsenal to reassure Japan and South Korea about the credibility of its nuclear umbrella. It also could encourage Tokyo and Seoul to pursue their own weapons. But none of these shifts, though significant, is likely to alter the defining military, economic and political dynamics of the region fundamentally.

Nuclear arms are better understood as an insurance policy, one that no potential aggressor has any intention of steering afoul of. Without practical military or political use, they remain held in reserve — where in all likelihood they will remain for the foreseeable future."

Essentially, this argues that nuclear weapons will always remain in reserve and that the potential for their actual use is virtually inconceivable.  I am less sanguine. 

As I constantly refer to the "Golden Age of Proliferation" my concern is not so much that a stable nation would ever use (or even sell) nuclear weapons.  Yet, instability could well raise the specter of use or, more likely, them being sold or stolen.

Obviously, we are not talking about ballistic missiles as those would be next to impossible for any terrorist group to utilize, however, serious dangers from less full blown devices still can level major portions of a modern, iindustrial city.  Therein lies the challenge and the fear.  North Korea is far from stable as no one knows what the status of Kim jong-Il is or how any subsequent transfer of power will take place.

We assume the North Korean military is rational.  This is probably correct.  But internal power struggles and ambiguity make everyone on edge.

        

Anyone paying attention to the news over the last several days could not miss that North Korea not only conducted another nuclear test (though admittedly small), but that it also fired multiple short range missiles while saying it will no longer abide by the 1953 armistice that put a lid on the Korean War.

Obviously, this is huge news, though it also is not overly surprising.  With all the controversy and uncertainty surrounding the health of leader Kim jong-Il and any efforts underway to begin a possible transfer of power in the not so distant future, this “showmanship” could be expected.  Kim has proven himself quite adept at knowing when to apply pressure to the global community in his efforts to extort concessions.

No one thinks North Korea will be launching a missile attack any time soon on South Korea , Japan , or, especially the US .  However, as with the ongoing issue with Iran ’s nuclear program, this illustrates the immense, if not impossible, challenge of keeping the nuclear genie bottled up.  How long before North Korea may sell technology to a terrorist group?  It already appears they were helping Syria In that nation’s effort to acquire weapons.

I know, experts are convinces that no sovereign nation (at least none that are not suicidal) would run the risks associated with pawning their WMD ware to terrorist groups they could not be sure of controlling.  However, experts are often wrong and contingencies must be planned for, especially when the stakes are high.

As we continue marching in the new Age of Proliferation, we need to examine our old notions of deterrence and update them for a more unstable time.  It is never too early to start.

        

A lot of anticipation is palpable relative to the upcoming Cairo speech that President Obama intends to deliver to the Muslim world from Cairo, Egypt. 

A very thoughtful analysis is provided here by the blog Diplomat of the Future.  I find this to always be a solid read even with its somewhat inaccessible to the layman academic tenor.

In this piece, the absurdity of Obama's likely speech and the similar view shared by the current British Foreign Secretary is highlighted ruthlessly.  In essence, "understanding", "compromise", and other euphemisms for greater cultural sensitivity border on the ridiculous.  As it states,

"Let us be clear: diplomacy and statecraft is at times a messy or indeed a nasty business. As the late great Max Weber pointed out above, if one is interested in savings souls, one should probably not enter politics. The ultimate, 'art of the possible', as the even more great Otto von Bismarck-Schonhausen once put it. The real issue as it relates to the Muslim world, indeed the troubled, ugly and not very appealing world outside of the USA, Canada, Japan (other parts of East Asia) and Europe, is how does one hold hands or co-operate with rulers who while not in the least democratic or tolerant, are: a)legitimate; b) not aggressive outside of their own borders...

The reality of the situation, is that due to a variety of differing and not very intelligent or cogent reasons, Western views and policies as they relate to the Muslim world are at best quixotic and at worst idiotic & simply mindless."

There really are major differences between cultures in the world that are not capable of being papered over despite the brilliance of those making the attempt.  America has a hard time accepting this.  Both Bush's "democracy" agenda and Obama's "respect" agenda are flawed because they assume a universal commonality between cultures that is not there. 

All humans want respect and to this extent there is at least some universal commonality.  The problem is, what illustrates this respect to one may be quite the opposite of what represents it to another.  At the end of the day I do not think President Obama will be all that much more effective at bridging these divides between the West and the Muslim world than President Bush.  

We should hope to simply manage these challenges and limit their potential for exploding in such a way as to permanently damage our interests.  Doing otherwise may  superficially make one "feel better" but it won't matter substantively. 

On the other hand, what political alternative does President Obama have?

        

This 2007 lecture from Harvey Mansfield, a Harvard professor, is amazingly insightful as it relates to understanding what politics is really about.  Mansfield delves into what politics is, not the mere tactics that are so often dissected in today's blogosphere, but the deep philosophical meaning of politics and identity.

Mansfield is often considered a "Straussian" and became famous for his detailed interpretations of Machiavelli and Tocqueville.

In this lecture he refers to "Thumos" or thymos.  I have spoken of this before and it is a classical concept that describes "spiritedness."  It is the seemingly inscrutable element of man's soul that drives him toward accomplishment.  In one way it is "ambition," yet I think it goes far beyond that notion.

It is about recognition and seeking "greatness" as abstract as that idea is.

Mansfield clearly laments "political science" as it abstracts and homogeneizes knowledge rather than allowing for grand interplays of ideas.  However, this lecture surely must make people think about their humanity in a more profound way.  This in turn allows us to consider politics in a deeper, more profound way than just the perception of ceaseless talking heads screeching at each other on the nightly cable broadcasts.

Politics should be about "greatness" not mere bureaucracy and technical manipulation.  This lecture is a reminder of why this should be so.

        

Great piece in the Politico on Charles Krauthammer and his astute criticism of Obama. I concur that Krauthammer may, as of this moment, be the best voice the conservatives have had in laying out why Obama is wrong on many issues.

I have always liked Krauthammer and hope Republicans begin making critques on Obama like he does as opposed to how Rush Limbaugh does. He understands coherence and how key that is to being effective when levelling criticism.

As I articulated in a previous post about reviving intellectual conservatism, we need voices that can battle at a high level and not be summarily dismissed by the intelligentsia and mainstream media as "extremist."

Few are as insightful as Krauthammer on many fronts.  As long time readers of my blog know, I found his approach to "Democratic Realism" a cogent foreign policy that embraces our values, but not at the expense of becoming quixotic.  I think he is directing a strong light towards the type of attacks that will eventually work to defeat or moderate President Obama's excesses.

It may take some time, but these are the kind of voices we should be listening to.

        

A truly interesting debate over at Foreign Policy.com on the future of Republican foreign policy. I still believe a neo-Kissingerian realpolitik is a necessary antitode to overly optimistic and naive assumptions about international relations.

I know that pure realpolitik with absolutely no regard for the nature of the regimes being negotiated with and the treatment they give to their populations is a nonstarter politically.  However, we need to ask whether we can afford to be so focused on the "values" questions overseas as we are domestically.

The funny thing is that ideological coherence rarely is able to produce optimum policy outcomes.  International relations is often infected with domestic politics, but systemically, the two are vastly different and should be substantively dealt with accordingly.

        

Below is a poem I wrote over a decade ago.  I began thinking about it as I explored the history of civilizations by reading Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History, and reflected on the numerous postings of the pseudonymous Spengler, or David P. Goldman ,at the Asia Times and now, First Things.  The rise and fall of civilizations seems sometimes so comparable to the birth, maturation, decline, and death of man.

It made me again wonder about the meaning of life and the fact that understanding that mystery is an impossibility.  There is no way to penetrate that which is impenetrable.  Finite minds can only understand so much of infinity and only an infinite perspective could ever allow us to fully "understand" history and its chronicle of life.

I admit this poem has limitations as it reflects a late teen's perspective on the unanswerable.  For all I know now that I did not know then, I still have to grapple with the exact same questions and am unable to come any closer to the truth with a capital "T" without a faithful abandonment of the hope of rationally "knowing."  Perhaps, that is the key difference of what I believe I know now, faith.

This Conundrum (Life)
When one gazes into the placid reflection of smooth mirror glass, what do they see?
Is any man or woman ever able to actually see the truth staring back at them?
Questions seem to abound and fly from all walks of known existence, demanding explanation
What delicate creature is this and what provides it's sustenance for today, tomorrow, and the next day?
Out of the mother's bossom all light seems to blind and obfuscate perceptions of reality
Mystical dreams seem to make confusing sense as the struggle for identity ravenously consumes
Searching for themselves with the ignorance of a disconnected element of nature
A preacher espouses his holiest of messages and seeks to offer spiritual salvation
Eyes peer behind a magician's curtain, feverishly hoping to spy a trick unable to grasped
Yet their disconnectedness from themselves and each other closes their eyes prematurely
The delicate creatures writhe spasmodically in their own quagmire of self induced delusion
A scientist with infinitely small amount of wisdom preaches secular religion for enlightened times
Eyes again peer, this time into secret notebooks with the desire to steal their own respect
As life moves forward, the less pieces of the puzzle seem to fit where small minds expect them to reside
Again, one gazes at the mirror in the twilight of their time on this hurtling sphere
No religion, no science, no philosophy illuminates the ultimate question of questions
Of all conundrums known by mankind, only one remains hidden from the soul's guiding light: life itself

        

        

An intriguing article by Robert D. Kaplan on the importance of geography on determining likely conflict.

In essence, Kaplan is updating the old concepts of "geopolitics" as innaugarated by thinkers like Mayer, Mackinder, and Spykman.  Unsurprisingly, Kaplan's prime focus is on the Middle East and Central Asia and areas he terms "shatter zones" where ethnic conflict could alter the local balances of power.

I do not think geography is the prime determinant in international relations, though it is hugely influential.  That said, nothing Kaplan says is shocking, it really just ree

        

I have frequently posted stories on my blog linking to the pseudonymous “Spengler” at Asia Times.   The real identity of this erudite, yet controversial writer was for years something of an Internet parlor game.  I suppose choosing to write under the name of an author whose pessimistic and deterministic view of human history was encapsulated in the well known title, the Decline of the West, raises questions of identity and intended purposes.

This article finally tears away the veil of mystery surrounding Spengler as he sketches his own intellectual odyssey and the reason he chose to write under that name.

Also, in this article, Spengler, or David P. Goldman, examines the competitive nature of many Chinese and contrasts that with what he clearly believes to be a slothfully indulgent West. 

I do not subscribe to all of Spengler’s ideas, but his general thesis that civilizations die by no longer valuing their future posterity, while new, hungry civilizations rise, is a sobering thought experiment for those convinced of the possibility of manmade utopias at the end of the rainbow.

Civilizations, in fact most civilizations, die.  Only those that are still relatively young seem to still be alive and even as they live, they struggle.  Competition is ceaseless and once the will for competition ceases to exert its gravitational pull, lethargy is spawned. 

To be a conservative is to recognize the limitations of man and be willing to even take pride in some of the very things that make him parochial.  This doesn’t mean we should remain standing in one place forever with feet of clay, but it should sober us to the prospects of what is the best that can happen in this world. 

Progress appears; often only in retrospect, to be linear, but really occurs in fits and starts.  Two steps forward and one back.  There are no “final solutions” that will ever be final.  That is the central tenet of conservatism.

Civilizations die when their youthful vigor peters out.  This happens because man becomes so convinced of his “solutions” to the exigencies of the moment that he fails to remain connected even to shards of tradition and memories that stir deeply in the unconscious.  In a sense, the desire to seek unbounded “progress” destroys the foundations necessary for society to exist in a healthily functional way.  A void emerges like a Black Hole that eventually will suck all goodness and hope into its infinite vortex. 

 Perhaps, then, civilizations are the most ironic of human constructs- both the highest culture and the beginning of the end of that culture.

Globalization is not universalism, “westernization”, or “Americanization.”  It is merely a tool that can be used by any number of cultures.  Some will reap its fruits more than others.

Fundamentally, the question is- will globalization bring man together or will it find new ways to tear him apart?  An unyielding adherent to progress will believe it to bring man together, a conservative anticipates the absurdity of this “final solution” to history’s grand problems and recognize the transience of the moment.  A conservative will also smell decay long before the rot has decimated the structures underpinning their civilization, because it as an odor only tradition and history rightfully appreciates.

A conservative must defend what has been great, because to defend what “may be great” is a leap of faith more difficult than believing in God and far more likely to sow seeds of bitterness when the inevitable disappointment saps that once youthful vigor.  At that point, a rootless, existential ambiguity consumes those once well meaning hopes.

Tradition is posterity and the cumulative total of history’s lessons.  Losing tradition will kill civilization.

        

I wrote the below blog in response to a thoughtful piece by Roger Ebert (yes, the movie critic) on his blog regarding how he conceives of God.  The comments ijn response to his blog were, for the most part, quite thoughtful and intriguing.  I found it stimulating, though I was troubled by the atheistic bent of many comments.  That said, the below encapsulated my own, often conflicting and complex feelings about God and Christianity and the necessity of faith.


God, the universe, knowledge, truth, these are all very difficult things to wrap oneself around. I believe there is a "Truth" with the capital "T", yet the more one reads philosophy and engages with the great minds of the past and present, the more one realizes they simply cannot know what that "Truth" is through intellectual understanding. The "Truth" is simply too large and man's mind too finite to be able to stand at a point far enough above and beyond to have the necessary total vision that would allow one to say they see the completeness of "Truth."

Socrates was wise in a most fundamental way because he acknowledged that he did not really know. His skill was in forcing others to realize that they too, irrespective of their seeming assurances to the contrary, do not really know.

Does God exist? I am a firm believer in an uncaused cause. I suppose this is Aristotelian and in Catholic terms, the view of Aquinas. Our linearly inclined minds simply are unable to conceive of something that exists outside that which has a beginning and an end, an Alpha and an Omega.

Whether that God is the God of monotheism and the Judeo-Christian tradition is a question I do not feel answerable via the intellect. As other posters have made clear here, there must be an "experience" that draws one to these conclusions.

That said, I do believe atheism is every bit as arrogant and unyielding in its own way as the narrowest religion has ever been. To be an atheist is to be certain of an absence of God. That may be a label, but if it fits, it is folly to pretend it to be something other than what it is.

I also believe secular humanism is a disease that will not save mankind. I do not believe it will lead to a utopia at the end of the rainbow where man will feel infinite love for his neighbors not just next door but in the continent over the ocean. Secular humanism does not have an external reference point for morality. At best, ethics under purely secularized humanism is little more than utilitarianism when all the pious pontifications are stripped away.

God is necessary, because only God gives such a reference point. It allows a true morality that is not a cover for that which has been (and remains) animalistic about man.

Whether "God" actually exists in the realm of "Truth" with a capital "T" then becomes of secondary if not tertiary importance. Man needs God to survive here and now in a world and universe that is only barely grasped in multifaceted manifestations.

Faith is like stepping off a cliff and is truly a Kierkeggardian Leap. Yet that leap is all that will ultimately allow man to find salvation here now; just as much as salvation in the netherworld of unfathomed infinity.

There may be a whiff of utilitarianism in this line of argument, but man is a utilitarian entity and must seek out that which is most beneficial. Where does one go if not to that which is beneficial?

Man, contrary to Nietzsche and his desire for the transvaluation of values, is not really able to create a morality out of whole cloth. Thus utility becomes necessity. The “Ubermensch” finds that the will to power leads back to a possibly even more primordial need than that for power- the desire for eternity.

Nothing gives eternity but faith, faith in history, faith in memory, faith in that that bestows life itself.

        

The last twelve months have been great for the though-provoking action film genre.  Two instant classics have been released, the Dark Knight and now Watchmen.

Both are based on comic book characters and/or stories.  Yet both delve into both deep psychological and philosophical terrain.

The Dark Knight asks serious questions of how far does society go to protect itself from the ravages of those who seek chaos.  How can you, as Nietzsche warns, take care that when fighting monsters, one does not become a monster oneself?  How do you avoid the abyss’ gaze as it stares into you own soul?

I have written on that film in previous blogs.  Now, Watchmen has been released. 

While I did not enjoy that film nearly as much, despite the appearance of Henry Kissinger advising President Nixon in an alternate reality 1985, it definitely treads along some of the same lines as the Dark Knight.  In this case it does so on an even grander scale.   It takes the battle for the soul of a city and amplifies it into a global battle for the survival of mankind.

I am not an aficionado of the critically acclaimed comic book series that spawned the movie, so I offer no illusions that I have ruminated on the meaning of Watchmen for years.  A lot of questions are raised in the dense film including the nature of damaged psyches, how does a God actually feel towards creatures as seemingly inconsequential to it as ants to man, and what is justice in a world laden with corruption.  However, I was most interested in the largest question that is resolved at the end.

With no spoilers involved, I was impressed with the final minutes of the film.  It raises an imminently human question on the broadest of scales: what might it take to create a world in which the differences between peoples and nations are set aside in order to avoid unleashing apocalypse on our own heads.

If, as Thomas Hobbes would say of life in the state of nature, life is nasty, brutish, and short, how do we forestall that when we now have near god-like power over the atom?

Obviously, to reflect on these questions is not unique, but it does seem many people avert their eyes from confronting these questions.  Fortunately, through the entertainment media, there are new pathways for people to wrestle with these concepts.  We are not all philosophers, but we can all embrace some philosophical methods.

Both the Dark Knight and Watchmen deal very much with what is essentially the “noble lie” referred to as far back as Plato.  Is civilization based upon a fiction, a “necessary myth?”  Both films respond in the affirmative to this question, though they do not gloss over the enormous personal consequences of this.

Using philosophical method, which is really the willingness to question, they invite everyone to grapple with that notion.

I know what I believe.  I wonder how many really understand what they believe?  Maybe movies like these will bring people closer to that understanding.

        

Though it is still very early to be pronouncing judgment on the newly installed Obama Administration, the very nature of the historical moment makes it more necessary than ever to examine its progress.

I posted a previous blog entry that indicated Obama was stocking his national security team with a virtual cornucopia of talent.  This process has definitely continued.  There is no doubt that his Administration is not loaded with overly pacifist thinkers.  While it certainly is not as nationalistic and rhetorically militant as the former Bush Administration, it has also, thus far, not come off as the second coming of a naïve Jimmy Carter.

While I question the movement by the Administration towards nuclear negotiations with the Russians that will reduce our stockpile for a variety of strategic reasons, am not sure Team Obama has been as friendly as it should with what ought to be a strong strategic partner in India, and believe hundreds of millions of reconstruction to Gaza is premature, overall, I am not shaking my head in amazement at poor choices.  Even the gambit, possibly inaccurately portrayed by the media, of a potential quid pro quo with Russia over Central European based missile defense systems vis a vis Russian assistance with the Iranian nuclear program does not trouble me at this point.  While we may learn that the move was a rash and naïve diplomatic gesture that needlessly threw Eastern Europe’s faith in America as an ally into question; we do not know the details or the overall strategic design and goal of the letter from Obama to Medvedev.  Consequently, we must wait before casting aspersions.

With an empowered National Security Council consolidating White House control over foreign and defense policy, Obama is actually making, in my opinion, a wise decision as the Executive Branch is the key element of government capable of real strategic thinking.  Additionally, by maintaining a solid grip on overall policy, the White House is hoping to avoid bureaucratic non-compliance through never ending discussion and protocol for protocol sake.

In a nutshell, while I by no means love Obama’s foreign policy yet, I am not nearly as horrified by it as I may have expected during the campaign last year.  It appears to be pragmatic and sober, something American foreign policy is in dire need of.

However, my fears of what Obama would do domestically are being realized.  I have written extensively about the “socialization” of the U.S.  Clearly, this is becoming the conservative line of attack on Obama and, it appears largely true.

Obama is using the current economic crisis as a way to push forward a laundry list of leftist domestic programs.  Raising taxes, raising energy costs, downgrading charitable giving, re-empowering unions are not what America needs today.

While a compelling case may be made for more activist government due the current nature of the economic crisis and as a result of three decades of constant deregulation in the financial sector that removed some pivotal safeguards, a full blown leftist grab bag of policies is not the solution.  Moderation is.  A thoughtful and appropriate regulation of banks, financial instruments, and futures markets makes sense.  Human nature all too easily succumbs to greedy impulses in the absence of some restraint.  However, Obama is not being moderate, despite his choice of words. 

When the stock market declines 20 percent since his inauguration there’s a message.

He may not completely be turning us into a complete European like state, but he certainly is pushing us in that general direction.  Unfortunately, America cannot afford to become as statist as Europe has become.  For all America’s flaws, it is still the great global stabilizer.  This requires a vibrant economy to afford the tools needed for power projection.

Sadly, I am firmly convinced that the end game of Obama’s plan will not be a vibrant economy.   It will be a slow growth behemoth with limited adaptability that will not yield the same creative sparks it has been so successful at engendering in the past.  Eventually, this will lead to weakness in the face of adversaries and allies.  If not today, then tomorrow. 

In a nutshell, I would say Obama is exceeding my expectations in foreign policy, though not without some reservation.  He is also confirming all my fears on domestic policy.

        

I came across the following articles regarding Obama's percolating relations with India.  One comes from those associated with former President Bush's policies towards India which were very friendly.

The other comes from a former Indian diplomat who examines worries within the Indian establishment about the new approach by the new Administration. 

Bottom line- India is the largest democracy in the world in terms of population.  They are a nuclear power.  They are a growing economic superpower.

We should continue along the path President Bush was going in our relations with them.

        

Of all the mainstream columnists, I find Charles Krauthammer to be the closest to my line of thinking.  While I differ with him on several points in the following critique on the early stages of President Obama's foreign policy, I think he makes a cogent overall point that Obama is not showing a sufficiently strong "spine."

I do think our overall strategic relationship with Russia outweighs many smaller considerations.  However, despite the need for Russian cooperation in Afghanistan and on the Iranian nuclear program, I do not think we should abandon missle defense in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Understanding Russia's concern to an ever expanding NATO that would include not just any former Soviet states (like the Baltic republics), but the former breadbasket of the the Soviet empire, the Ukraine, would be wise for western diplomats.  That said, while quid pro quos are part of any diplomatic wrangling, solid lines should be drawn.  It becomes too easy to forfeit hings of real value if those lines are clear.  Consequently, while Obama is right to want to establish better relations with Russia, he needs to be certain not to go too far in acquiesing to their desires.  So Krauthammer is somewhat right relative to the Obama's Russian policy, but I think he comes across as overly anti-Russian.

On the other points raised by Krauthammer relative to Iran and Pakistan, the critique is fair.  Obama is getting hit from many angles and seems reluctant to come off as "too tough." 

Its early and we are not privy to what folks like Richard Holbrooke are saying to Pakistan behind closed doors.  Therefore, criticism of Obama may be premature on this front.  However, if his current patterns don't change to show more will, these criticisms will become prophetic and entirely apt.

        

Since Obama's ascencion to the Presidency, there has been a renewed focus on many elements of foreign policy.  It is quite likely that few will equal in importance the new overtures being made towards Russia as it relates to new agreements on both nations' nuclear weapon stockpiles.

With the START Treaty expiring at the end of 2009, there is a unique opportunity to revisit the issue of how many nuclear weapons the US and Russia will maintain in their arsenals.  President Obama has made clear his desire to push for a dramatic reduction to the tune of 1,000.

President Obama clearly believes that by our limiting the number of weapons we have (which can only be done in conjunction with comparable Russian limits), the US will have the moral authority to reach out to would be nuclear weapons states and convince them that they need not continue moving down that path.

To that end, there has been some press coverage that then President-elect Obama essentially sent former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Russia to meet with Vladimir Putin and open the door to further conversations along these lines.  This article from a british paper details this rumour, which it must be made clear, both Obama and Kissinger deny.  Rather, Kissinger admits to meeting Russian President Medvedev, but never says he met with Putin, nor does Kissinger indicate that the conversations were in any way authorized by the President.

Of course, given Kissinger's long history of secretive diplomacy while serving President Nixon (see Paris Peace Talks with the North Vietnamese and, spectacularly, the opening to China where he feigned illness and secretly boarded a plane in Pakistan to  go to China without the press' knowledge), his protestations of Presidential intent may be viewed with some skepticism.

Clearly, Kissinger appears to want to cement his legacy as a peacemaker.  As I referred to previously, Kissinger is advocating heartily for a strong US-China relationship to manage economic issues.  Now, it appears, he is pushing just as hard to cement a strong US-Russian relationship in order to stem the seemingly inevitable tide of nuclear proliferation.  This article that Kissinger wrote for Newsweek, does an excellent job of outlining his positions on prolferation.  A few excerpts are in order:

"More than 200 years ago, the philosopher Immanuel Kant defined the ultimate choice before mankind: if world history was to culminate in universal peace, would it be through moral insight, or through catastrophe of a magnitude that allowed no other outcome?  We are approaching a point where that choice may be imposed on us. The basic dilemma of the nuclear age has been with us since Hiroshima: how to bring the destructiveness of modern weapons into some moral or political relationship with the objectives that are being pursued. Any use of nuclear weapons is certain to involve a level of casualties and devastation out of proportion to foreseeable foreign-policy objectives. Efforts to develop a more nuanced application have never succeeded, from the doctrine of a geographically limited nuclear war in the 1950s and 1960s to the "mutual assured destruction" theory of general nuclear war in the 1970s."

This paragraph is fascinating as it encapsulates so much of Kissinger's thoughts over the years.  He returns to Immanuel Kant, the philosopher that developed the concept of the "categorical imperative" and the notion of cosmopolitan, perpetual peace as a way to explain the juncture he feels we are at when it comes to the future of nuclear weapons.  Of course, Kissinger spent a lot of time with Kant in his younger days, writing his senior thesis at Harvard (the longest thesis ever written at Harvard) on the topic of the "Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee, and Kant."  Though by no means a Kantian in the sense that Kant is somewhat of a determinst (as are both Spengler and Toynbee), it appears Kissinger wanted to avoid the full blown pessism inherent in at least Spengler's views of the "Decline of the West."  Kant did accomplish this at a certain, though imperfect level.

Given that consideration, for Kissinger now to return to Kant so late in his career, and quite likely his life, is telling.  This is especially so given the issue of choice which has always been at the core of his thought.  Additionally in the paragraph above, you can also see references to the debates over the use of nuclear weapons from previous eras of the Cold War.  Kissinger was quite influential in those early debates.  In fact, the "nuanced application" was very much an idea he expounded upon in one of the books that brought him to the attention of a mass audience, or at least and audience of key policy intellectuals.

That he now embraces a Kantian choice and is critical of not just the theory of "Mutually Assured Destruction" but his own previous inclinations towards flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons, shows a man in a reflective mood pondering how to shape a legacy that will outlive his own immediate impact.

Is this, what is driving this push by Kissinger?  I know that other famous gray beards of foreign policy: Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and William Perry have signed on as supporters of renewed efforts at nuclear arms reductions.  But it is Kissinger who is most interesting.  For a man so often vilified as an unscrupulous "realpolitiker" who was more Machiavelli than Kant, it appears he is trying his hand at embracing a high morality that can be viewed favorable by those not inculcated by the dour spirit of European "realism."

In his Harvard thesis Kissinger has been quoted saying: "Transitoriness is the fate of existence. No civilization has yet been permanent, no longing completely fulfilled. This is necessity, the fatedness of history, the dilemma of mortality.”

It appears Kissinger is tempting fate by attempting to resolve one of the thorniest of moral dilemas.  He is much too intelligent to believe this to be an easy task, or even one that can be completed.  He states this in the Newsweek piece, "My colleague Sam Nunn has described the effort as akin to climbing a mountain shrouded in clouds. We cannot describe its top nor be certain that there may not be unforeseen and perhaps insurmountable obstacles on the way. But we are prepared to undertake the journey in the belief that the summit will never come into view unless we begin the ascent and deal with the proliferation issues immediately before us, including the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs."

I have long argued we are entering the "Golden Age of Proliferation."  Kissinger is making a last gasp effort to block this as he says it is not inevitable.  However, his own admonition, "Our age has stolen fire from the gods; can we confine it to peaceful purposes before it consumes us?" I believe betrays what he thinks will ultimately happen. 

Prometheus stole fire and suffered immensely for his hubris.  From the day we successfully developed nuclear weapons, we too stole fire.  Thus far, except for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, mankind has avoided a similar fate despite our trangression.   Can such fate be tempted indefinitely? 

History will be the judge.  I hope we choose wisely, not rashly and not naively. 

        

I came across two articles today that firmly encapsulate in my mind the direction our nation is moving in and I found myself deeply troubled.  I am troubled at a level that is visceral and almost makes me ill because I fear that the problems of the moment, as bad as they undeniably are, will usher in not a better world, but a worse one. 

The first article is from Newsweek.  The headline proclaims it all- "We Are All Socialists Now."  Rather than explain the full piece let me leave a quote from the piece that sums it well:

"A decade ago U.S. government spending was 34.3 percent of GDP, compared with 48.2 percent in the euro zone—a roughly 14-point gap, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In 2010 U.S. spending is expected to be 39.9 percent of GDP, compared with 47.1 percent in the euro zone—a gap of less than 8 points. As entitlement spending rises over the next decade, we will become even more French...

Now comes the reckoning. The answer may indeed be more government. In the short run, since neither consumers nor business is likely to do it, the government will have to stimulate the economy. And in the long run, an aging population and global warming and higher energy costs will demand more government taxing and spending. The catch is that more government intrusion in the economy will almost surely limit growth (as it has in Europe, where a big welfare state has caused chronic high unemployment). Growth has always been America's birthright and saving grace."

The second article comes from an author that I have always been deeply fond of, the Classical military historian, Victor Davis Hanson.  As I read his concluding paragraphs and thought about them in conjunction with the Newsweek story my fears of the past came back to me.  Hanson makes explicit how the post-modern, secularized man that refuses to reproduce and looks only for the pleasures of this world has led to statism.  Below is the relevant section.

"I had a conversation (an argument) recently with a European, about contemporary culture. I tried to explain the mutually reinforcing elements of socialism, atheism, utopianism, pacifism, and statism (he was giving America a second chance to morph into Euros under Obama). But if one believes in no transcendence, that there is nothing other than the present, then for too many satisfying the appetites becomes the prime directive. Childlessness, living at home in one's 30s, dependence on the state, all that derives from a system that ensures equality of result, and substitutes Logos and Ratio for any notion of a deity that sees sin and sacrifice, and reminds us that our souls are immortal and affected by their brief residences in our flesh. In other words, that Euros expect free health care, free care for their elderly parents, free schools, free defense from the USA, harbor little hopes for rising above the station of anyone else, find housing and jobs scarce, and don't feel they can or want to leave behind something for their children larger than what they inherited-- are all interrelated phenomena. European postmodern man offers mostly platitudes that he thinks please those who might be dangerous to him, and finds psychological recompense and solace by gratuitously trashing those who aren't. Note how such constitution peoples favor Hamas over Israel--and usually almost anyone over the US. Were Hamas a successful democracy that took no European aid and offered it in turn no threats, and Israel a failed fascistic terrorist movement that depended on Europe for aid and comfort, while engaging in terrorism and voicing postmodern platitudes about oppression, then we would expect Israel to be a strong European ally. (I think many Europeans are more sympathetic to the Palestinian Authority or Syria or Iran than the incipient democracy in Iraq)."

So how is "post-modern" man different from Nietzsche's terrible vision of the "Last Man."  Compare for yourself as Nietzsche's prophet, Zarathustra speaks:

"I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves.

Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man.

'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?' thus asks the last man, and blinks.

The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the flea; the last man lives longest.

'We have invented happiness, 'say the last men, and they blink. They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth...

One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion.

No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.

'Formerly, all the world was mad,' say the most refined, and they blink...

One has one's little pleasure for the day and one's little pleasure for the night: but one has a regard for health.

'We have invented happiness', say the last men, and they blink."

I see little difference.

Nietzsche said that God is Dead, by which he meant that WE have killed him in our desire to be "enlightened" during our push to become masters of our own fate in this world without transcendance.  Nietzsche saw that without God, nihilism, a lack of faith in anything, was inevitable.  He tried to replace God with a Godlike man- the notorious Ubermensch or Overman.

He may have been wrong in his solutions, but he clearly diagnosed the malady of modern man.  Today more than ever we stand on the precipice of America joining Europe and becoming "post-modern" which is really nothing more than becoming "Last Men."

The greatness of spirit that was such a constant through most of human history is intentionally being homogeneized with the vague, but discernable desire to enforce equality of outcome.  "Greatness" is scoffed at, ridiculed, and referred to as "selfish", "narrow-minded", and contrary to the communitarian ideals that supposedly will save this planet from our own evil born of ignorance.

There will not be a levelling up, there will only be a levelling down.  From where will come the next Plato, Aristotle, Alexander, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, or Dante?  Where will even be the next Washington, Lincoln, or Churchill?

Socialism breeds sloth.  I know that there is a need for government to restrain the excesses that are inherent in flawed man.  However, we are taking steps that go far beyond the necessary restraints and limited assistance that is needed to assure people don't "fall through the cracks."  We are choosing to make the world that our children (if we choose to have them) are born into a world of bland mediocrity that denigrates what has been so noble about humanity.

Yes, its true, the price for greatness and nobility is some instability, some danger, but the desire to eradicate that can only lead to a sterility that saps man of what has made him human. 

The religious societies are vastly more human than the experiment we are attempting to consolidate.  Ironically, there is disorder in those societies, but they are human.  Perhaps, that is not as bad a thing as so often we think it is.  Perhaps, we'll look more deeply before setting sail for a destination that is preordained to destroy our very souls and leave us empty husks that will over time be easy pickings for those that still understand how to be humans.

The Romans largely failed to do that and they became history.  America is not yet doomed for a repeat performance, but our Attila and Alaric is out there waiting for an opportune moment to strike at our cracked foundations.  We should defend those foundations and not become the "Last" Post-Modern Man.

        

In recent days, both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski have written op-eds that call on the US and China to continue a cooperative relationship so as to avoid the potential of global instability, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis.

While both are rivals, they also played pivotal roles in the establishment of modern Sino-American relations.  Kissinger and the President he served, Richard Nixon, opened the door to China as a way to create diplomatic flexibility vis a vis the Soviet Union within the context of the Cold War.  Brzezinski, while serving as President Carter's National Security Advisor played a key role in normalizing diplomatic relations with China which, he asserts in his piece, enabled Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, to liberalize China's economy.

The combined result of these policies has been the extraordinary rise of China, an economic miracle of almost unprecedented proportions.  It also opened the door to the very strange and symbiotic relationship the US and China now have where the US needs China to buy our debt in order to fund our domestic spending habits while they have required us to purchase their exports to maintain high employment so as to avoid political unrest.

The recent financial crisis undounbtedly puts this relationship in question.  It is not surprising that China is beginning to focus more on its own domestic consumption as a way to maintain what it perceives to be an adequate growth.  However, as Kissinger points out, without a global infrastructure of governance, actions like this could well become harbingers of a new wave of mercantilism.  This, in his view, would lead not to stability, but to a new age of chaos as the integration that has led to vast wealth creation comes apart.

At that point, it is inevitable that inward looking nations and frusterated populations may fall prey to nasty ways of thinking that we only think have been relegated to the dust bins of history. 

Both Brzezinski and Kissinger are unambiguous in their support for a new global architecture that will keep economic integration from breaking apart due to political contingencies.  At the core of this is the Sino-American relationship.  Indeed, it is the most important bilateral relationship in the world. 

There are no guarantees.  I am skeptical that a new infrastructure will be found because man continues to be a parochial creature.  However, for those who seek peace, some form of architecture must be found.  As strong a proponent of American exceptionalism as I am, America alone is incapable of maintaining global stability.  America has already been Atlas for half a century.  I hope we do not shrug.  The consequences will be a new age of instability married with amazingly destructive technology.  That is not a world one would want to leave to their children.

        

I came across this interesting piece from the Washington Post today.  I largely agree with what the author says regarding the inadvisability of attempting to prosecute Bush Administration officials for "war crimes."  While the author is far more critical than I of this aspect of the outgoing Administration, I agree that going on a political witch hunt is not in the national interest.

Fortunately, President- elect Obama appears to agree with that.

I would also like to mention, however, how problematic I think it is to have so much wanton criticism of this Administration.  Had there been another terror attack on par (or even less significant) than 9/11, this same Administration that is so thoroughly excoriated for being too aggressive would have been excoriated for not doing enough to protect the American public. 

It is so easy to criticize decisions when one does not have the facts and when one is not under the same pressure as those they are levelling the criticisms against.  Human rights advocates are not in charge of protecting the American public.  They are responsible for promoting what to them is a universl ideal.  However, human rights does not exist without order and stability.  Governmental actions that run the risk of allowing instability by not doing everything within its power to avoid it are derelict in their responsibilities.  Human rights advocates are derelict in their responsibilities if they fail to raise alarm bells over even the most necessary of actions.

The irony of all this is that, on occassion, acts that are rightly condemned from a pure moral and ethical standpoint, are also the only acts that can preserve the fertility of the ground for that very same morality and ethics to grow without becoming stunted by inordinate fear of instability and danger.  Sometimes, oftentimes, the "right" thing is not obvious and that which appears "right" is more dangerous than is ever  appreciated by those living under the protective blanket offered by those they prefer to pretend don't need to exist.

        

Given the season, I decided to be reflective on Christian thinking and decided to read a famous work by Reinhold Niebuhr, the Irony of American History.  Given how many American politicians claim to be inspired by Niebuhr, from President- elect Obama to his opponent Sen. McCain, it seemed wise to see what he says.

While this book is by no means an exhaustive look at his overall corpus, it was illuminating.  Written during the tumultous early years of the Cold War when nuclear annihilation was a possible outcome of the conflict, Niebuhr eloquently points to the serious flaws and dangers of Marxist-Leninism.  Yet, while defending America from much criticism (and generally supporting America in its conflict with Marxist-Leninism), he finds flaws in America.  He finds "irony" abounding throughout history.  He notes that man can transcend nature, but by being a creator as well as a creature of history, he finds it difficult to find ultimate meaning.

This can facilitate situations where even those who believe themselves to be doing the morally correct thing can actually become imperious and distrusted by their friends due to their blindness and unwillingness to examine their own limitations.  Niebuhr is clear that human life should not be seen as "tragic" where the great hero is evemtually toppled due to a conscience decision born of hubris, nor is he "pathetic" or trapped completely within a prison of circumstance wholly beyond his control.  Rather, man is "ironic" in that he is capable of transcendence, yet he often has his wings clipped as result of decisions made not so much through willful calculation, but almost by organic movement growth.

Unsurprsingly, he calls for humility and makes clear this is the cornerstone of Christian faith (though he wisely refuses to make the humility of the poor the be all and end all of morality, recognizing that the resentments of the poor are often as self-interested as the conceit of the rich).

Several snippets below I fond particularly insightful as we continue to struggle with determining how best to wield the power that we have. 

"Ironic contrasts and incongruitites have an element of the comic in them in so far as they exhibit absurd juxtapositions of strength and weakeness; of wisdom through foolishness; or foolishness as the fruit of wisdon; of guilt arising from the pretensions of innocency; or innocency hiding behind ostensible guilt.  Yet contrasts are ironic only if htey are not merely absurd, but have a hidden meaning.  They must elicit not merely laughter but a knowing smile.  The hidden meaning is supplied by the fact that the juxtapositions and contrasts are not merely fortuitous.  They are related to each other by some foible of the person who is involved in both.  The powerful person who is proved to be really weak is involved in an ironic contrast only if his weakness is due to some pretension of strength.  If 'pride cometh before the fall,' the fall is ironic only if pride contributed to it...

The Biblical interpretation of the human situation is ironic, rather than tragic or pathetic, because of its unique formulation of the problem of human freedom.  According to this faith man's freedom does not require his heroic and tragic defiance of the forces of nature.  He is not necessarily involved in tragedy in his effort to be truly human.  But neither is he necessarily involved in evil because of his relation to the necessities and contingincies of the world of nature.  His situation is, therefore, not comprehended as a pathetic imprisonment in  the confusion of nature.  The evil in human history is regarded as the consequence of man's wrong use of his unique capacities.  The wrong use is always due to some failure to recognize the limits of his capacities of power, wisdom and virtue.  Man is an ironic creature because he forgets that he is not simply a creator but also a creature."

I come away believing that one cannot ignore the power they have and turn inward, hoping to be merely "left alone" and allowed to return to the tranquility of times past.  This means, we must be engaged. 

I also recognize that we, in America, often do not appreciate how we are perceived by others.  This lack of appreciation yields anger and resentment when we are called to account by other nations and people for actions we take to be virtuous and necessary. 

We cannot escape our position and we cannot escape our condemnation for being in such a position.   The truth is we are not as noble as we wish to believe, though we are simultaneously far more noble than we are typically accused by others of being.  I suspect an ironic smile and acknowledgement of this would help us to not ignore the opinion of our fellow man, yet also not flagellate ourselves ceaselessly as some are so desirous of doing.

        

While America worries about its current economic malaise, a troubling trend is emerging in the Middle East that has great potential to eventually yield devastating results.  Namely, this is the increasing likelihood of the entire region arming itself to the teeth with nuclear weapons.  This article from the Wall Street Journal should be sobering. 

The real threat of Iran going nuclear is more than typically asserted.  There is no doubt the Arab nations will seek to counter the "Persian" bomb.  Once this happens, despite America's apparent efforts at incorporating Arab states into a new missile defense structure (see the recent deals betwen the US and the United Arab Emirates), there will be no good way to rationalize away their desire to obtain weapons comparable to what Iran will have.

Clearly, this has the potential to be greatly destabilizing to the region and global oil supplies.  I know that some strategists may believe that all the Middle East pointing nuclear warheads at each other may lend itself to stability akin to what was acquired during the US-Soviet faceoff of the Cold War, but I don't think we count on the same level of relative rationality to prevail under this scenario.  This makes this entire region, complete with the instability of the nuclear armed Pakistan, a true nightmare regarding nuclear non-proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism.  I have argued many times on this blog that we are entering the "Golden Age of Proliferation."  Nothing happening at this moment dissuades me from believing this is happening and even more rapidly than I would have initially envisioned.

        

The recent Mumbai terrorist attacks have opened up what amounts to a Pandora's Box.  The impacts of these well coordinated attacks likely will be large.  From reigniting Indo-Pakistani tensions to increasing the already significant challenges America faces in Afghanistan, a new landscape could quiote literally erupt.

As always, with excellent commentary is Stratfor.

Strategic Motivations for Mumbai Attacks

Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.

While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.

Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.

Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.

More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.

An End to New Delhi’s Restraint

The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.

India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.

This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.

What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.

The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

The United States used this crisis for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.

The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.

In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.

Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.

We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.

Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington

At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)

Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.

The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.

The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.

It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.

What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.

Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation

That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.

Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.

In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.

Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.

By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.

Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai."

        

Thus far, President-elect Barack Obama should be commended.  Many people, including me, were very concerned that he came from the far left wing of the Democratic party and would be unwilling to really look at all components of national power.  This included both diplomacy and that ubiquitous phrase “soft power” as well as the hard power of military arms.  My fear was that he would tilt too far from the willingness to use force when needed.  In most ways, I thought he would be a mirror image to President Bush who may have been too willing to use force.

However, President Obama’s national security team appears to not represent that type of turn.  Rather, it appears he is assembling an extremely competent team that will adjust the excesses of the Bush years and calibrate a shrewd foreign policy for a time when the waters of international relations seem especially troubled and magnified by the worst economic crisis in a generation.

Here, here, here, and here are several media accounts of this team.  Of course, much press goes to his selection of vanquished democratic primary rival Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State and his keeping President Bush’s second Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates.  However, his selection of retired Marine and NATO commander James L. Jones as National Security Advisor is no less auspicious in its own way. 

Each speaks to an understanding that we can and must upgrade our diplomatic efforts, but that we also cannot be perceived as “weak” by potential adversaries (a point well illustrated by the recent Mumbai terrorist attacks).

Obviously, time will tell how shrewd the incoming President is, however, thus far, he has been politically sensitive and wholly practical in his measured statements on major policy issues and his selection of national security advisors.  I hope the best for this Administration, it will have quite the canvas on which to paint as we are definitely in a historically meaningful time if for no other reason than that all certainty has been thrown out the window.  With capable ministers at hand, President Obama may be uniquely positioned to reap quite the reward and shape a new world.  While failure is always a possibility for any new administration, it is certainly not preordained in this case.

I wrote in a previous posting that Sen. Obama and his seeming “messianism” could be problematic and that empty rhetoric of “change” would not be enough to confront the dangers that really exist in the world, however, Obama seems to not want to fall into this trap.  He is showing that he does “get it” and is willing to do what is necessary to be a success in the real world as well as the campaign trail.

        

Spengler makes an intriguing connection between the new found push amongst many CHinese to study western classical music.  This does not seem a significant issue, until you delve deeper into possible long-term implications.  While I do not necessarily think this is quite as portentous as Spengler, is serves as another wakeup call that complacency for America is no longer an option.  Students must be educated far more than ever before and we must be aggressive to never become too comfortable.  We must retain an edge in all ways.

Here is a preview of the article:

"America outspends China on defense by a margin of more than six to one, the Pentagon estimates. [1] In another strategic dimension, though, China already holds a six-to-one advantage over the United States. Thirty-six million Chinese children study piano today, compared to only 6 million in the United States.[2] The numbers understate the difference, for musical study in China is more demanding. It must be a conspiracy. Chinese parents are selling plasma-screen TVs to America, and saving their wages to buy their kids pianos - making American kids stupider and Chinese kids smarter. Watch out, Americans - a generation from now, your kid is going to fetch coffee for a Chinese boss. The world’s largest country is well along the way to forming an intellectual elite on a scale that the world has never seen, and against which nothing in today’s world - surely not the inbred products of the Ivy League puppy mills - can compete."

        

This report  is getting  much press lately.  The result of the National Intelligence Council, it paints in the same general hues as much of the current "declinist" thought.  However, it is not ridiculously charged with political hyperbole.  Indeed, it represents a sober, but pragmatic view of a world that is becoming increasingly complex and is a must read for anyone looking towards the future or considering the framework likely to be used for analyzing future foreign policy.  This is especially so for the incoming Obama Administration.

        

This article outlines a nuclear threat that is actually not discussed often in general discourse, the threat of an electro-magnetic pulse (or EMP).  Essentially, a nuclear bomb exploding in the atmosphere could wreak astonishing levels of damage to our electrical infrastructure (in other words most of our infrastructure).

Below is a preview:

"Think about this scenario: An ordinary-looking freighter ship heading toward New York or Los Angeles launches a missile from its hull or from a canister lowered into the sea. It hits a densely populated area. A million people are incinerated. The ship is then sunk. No one claims responsibility. There is no firm evidence as to who sponsored the attack, and thus no one against whom to launch a counterstrike. But as terrible as that scenario sounds, there is one that is worse. Let us say the freighter ship launches a nuclear-armed Shahab-3 missile off the coast of the U.S. and the missile explodes 300 miles over Chicago. The nuclear detonation in space creates an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Gamma rays from the explosion, through the Compton Effect, generate three classes of disruptive electromagnetic pulses... All of our lights, refrigerators, water-pumping stations, TVs and radios stop running."

        

A good primer on what is now being considered the new "multipolar age" as American influence declines in relative terms.  Below is the most relevant quote and attempts to highlight what President Obama is looking at confronting.

While I think much of this "declinist" talk is premature, there are series issues to be dealt with, especially on the home, economic front. 

"Many have noted the perils of America's wars and recession and have dilated gravely on the courage and creativity they will require of the new president. But few have called attention to the deeper structural significance these challenges collectively hold. For of the many "firsts" that Obama will register in the history books, the most important but most frequently overlooked is that he will be the first American president to have to come to grips with the full-blown psychological reality of global multipolarity. This is neither the geopolitical straitjacket of bipolarity, with its furrowed map and hair-trigger standoffs, nor is it the permissive strategic environment of unipolarity, with its cooperative center and untamed periphery. Multipolarity has never existed on a global scale. The closest parallel we have to it is late 19th century Europe, with its narrow power differentials and multiple actors jostling for influence in the finely tuned regional balance of power."

        

Interesting look at the new rise of priacy originating from Somalia.  This is clearly an example of some degree of blowback, but while it is easy to point fingers, the fear at the time that America backed the Ethiopian intervention, the fear was of an "Afghanistan in the Horn of Africa."  That was not an attractive alternative.

What America appears to need is the ability to distinguish between different types of international actors.  Too often, a broad approach is used and disparate groups are lumped together to facilitate a superficial understanding of the problem at hand.  Looking beneath the surface and understanding competing motivations that might be used by various groups we might term "Islamist" is time consuming and leaves us in murky areas where friends are tough to point out and enemies even tougher.  However, this is a step that must be taken for better policy formulation, much less implementation.

        

Once more I turn to Stratfor for an excellent macroscopic view of what is going on in the world.  What is in teresting in this analysis is the role ascribed to the nation-state which has, as Stratfor makes clear, been much derided recently in our rush to embrace globalization and international institutions.

Perhaps, Westphalia does live in ways good and bad.  International anarchy will remain with us for a long time to come. 

"In 1989, the global system pivoted when the Soviet Union retreated from Eastern Europe and began the process of disintegration that culminated in its collapse. In 2001, the system pivoted again when al Qaeda attacked targets in the United States on Sept. 11, triggering a conflict that defined the international system until the summer of 2008. The pivot of 2008 turned on two dates, Aug. 7 and Oct. 11.

On Aug. 7, Georgian troops attacked the country’s breakaway region of South Ossetia. On Aug. 8, Russian troops responded by invading Georgia. The Western response was primarily rhetorical. On the weekend of Oct. 11, the G-7 met in Washington to plan a joint response to the global financial crisis. Rather than defining a joint plan, the decision — by default — was that each nation would act to save its own financial system with a series of broadly agreed upon guidelines.

The Aug. 7 and Oct. 11 events are connected only in their consequences. Each showed the weakness of international institutions and confirmed the primacy of the nation-state, or more precisely, the nation and the state. (A nation is a collection of people who share an ethnicity. A state is the entity that rules a piece of land. A nation-state — the foundation of the modern international order — is what is formed when the nation and state overlap.) Together, the two events posed challenges that overwhelmed the global significance of the Iraqi and Afghan wars.

The Conflict in Georgia

In and of itself, Russia’s attack on Georgia was not globally significant. Georgia is a small country in the Caucasus, and its fate ultimately does not affect the world. But Georgia was aligned with the United States and with Europe, and it had been seen by some as a candidate for membership in NATO. Thus, what was important about the Russian attack was that it occurred at all, and that the West did not respond to it beyond rhetoric.

Part of the problem was that the countries that could have intervened on Georgia’s behalf lacked the ability to do so. The Americans were bogged down in the Islamic world, and the Europeans had let their military forces atrophy. But even if military force had been available, it is clear that NATO, as the military expression of the Western alliance, was incapable of any unified action. There was no unified understanding of NATO’s obligation and, more importantly, no collective understanding of what a unified strategy might be.

The tension was not only between the United States and Europe, but also among the European countries. This was particularly pronounced in the different view of the situation Germany took compared to that of the United States and many other countries. Very soon after the Russo-Georgian war had ended, the Germans made clear that they opposed the expansion of NATO to Georgia and Ukraine. A major reason for this is Germany’s heavy dependence on Russian natural gas, which means Berlin cannot afford to alienate Moscow. But there was a deeper reason: Germany had been in the front line of the first Cold War and had no desire to participate in a second.

The range of European responses to Russia was fascinating. The British were livid. The French were livid but wanted to mediate. The Germans were cautious, and Chancellor Angela Merkel traveled to St. Petersburg to hold a joint press conference with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, aligning Germany with Russia — for all practical purposes — on the Georgian and Ukrainian issues.

The single most important effect of Russia’s attack on Georgia was that it showed clearly how deeply divided — and for that matter, how weak — NATO is in general and the Europeans are in particular. Had they been united, they would not have been able to do much. But they avoided that challenge by being utterly fragmented. NATO can only work when there is a consensus, and the war revealed how far from consensus NATO was. It can’t be said that NATO collapsed after Georgia. It is still there, and NATO officials hold meetings and press conferences. But the alliance is devoid of both common purpose and resources, except in very specific and limited areas. Some Europeans are working through NATO in Afghanistan, for example, but not most, and not in a decisive fashion.

The Russo-Georgian war raised profound questions about the future of the multinational military alliance. Each member consulted its own national interest and conducted its own foreign policy. At this point, splits between the Europeans and Americans are taken for granted, but the splits among the Europeans are profound. If it was no longer possible to say that NATO functioned, it was also unclear after Aug. 8 in what sense the Europeans existed, except as individual nation-states.

The Global Financial Crisis

What was demonstrated in politico-military terms in Georgia was then demonstrated in economic terms in the financial crisis. All of the multinational systems created after World War II failed during the crisis — or more precisely, the crisis went well beyond their briefs and resources. None of the systems could cope, and many broke down. On Oct. 11, it became clear that the G-7 could cooperate, but not through unified action. On Oct. 12, when the Europeans held their eurozone summit, it became clear that they would only act as individual nations.

As with the aftermath of the Georgian war, the most significant developments after Oct. 11 happened in Europe. The European Union is first and foremost an arrangement for managing Europe’s economy. Its bureaucracy in Brussels has increased its authority and effectiveness throughout the last decade. The problem with the European Union is that it was an institution designed to manage prosperity. When it confronted serious adversity, however, it froze, devolving power to the component states.

Consider the European Central Bank (EC, an institution created for managing the euro. Its primary charge — and only real authority — is to work to limit inflation. But limiting inflation is a problem that needs to be addressed when economies are otherwise functioning well. The financial crisis is a case where the European system is malfunctioning. The ECB was not created to deal with that. It has managed, with the agreement of member governments, to expand its function beyond inflation control, but it ultimately lacks the staff or the mindset to do all the things that other central banks were doing. To be more precise, it is a central bank without a single finance ministry to work with. Unlike other central banks, whose authority coincides with the nations they serve, the ECB serves multiple nations with multiple interests and finance ministries. By its nature, its power is limited.

In the end, power did not reside with Europe, but rather with its individual countries. It wasn’t Brussels that was implementing decisions made in Strasbourg; the centers of power were in Paris, London, Rome, Berlin and the other capitals of Europe and the world. Power devolved back to the states that governed nations. Or, to be more precise, the twin crises revealed that power had never left there.

Between the events in Georgia and the financial crisis, what we saw was the breakdown of multinational entities. This was particularly marked in Europe, in large part because the Europeans were the most invested in multilateralism and because they were in the crosshairs of both crises. The Russian resurgence affected them the most, and the fallout of the U.S. financial crisis hit them the hardest. They had to improvise the most, being multilateral but imperfectly developed, to say the least. In a sense, the Europeans were the laboratory of multilateralism and its intersection with crisis.

But it was not a European problem in the end. What we saw was a global phenomenon in which individual nations struggled to cope with the effects of the financial crisis and of Russia. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a tendency to view the world in terms of global institutions, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization. In the summer of 2008, none of these functioned. The only things that did function effectively were national institutions.

Since 2001, the assumption has been that subnational groups like al Qaeda would define the politico-military environment. In U.S. Defense Department jargon, the assumption was that peer-to-peer conflict was no longer an issue and that it was all about small terrorist groups. The summer of 2008 demonstrated that while terrorism by subnational groups is not insignificant by any means, the dynamics of nation-states have hardly become archaic.

The Importance of the State

Clearly, the world has pivoted toward the nation-state as the prime actor and away from transnational and subnational groups. The financial crisis could be solved by monetizing the net assets of societies to correct financial imbalances. The only institution that could do that was the state, which could use its sovereign power and credibility, based on its ability to tax the economy, to underwrite the financial system.

Around the world, states did just that. They did it in very national ways. Many European states did it primarily by guaranteeing interbank loans, thereby essentially nationalizing the heart of the financial system. If states guarantee loans, the risk declines to near zero. In that case, the rationing of money through market mechanisms collapses. The state must take over rationing. This massively increases the power of the state — and raises questions about how the Europeans back out of this position.

The Americans took a different approach, less focused on interbank guarantees than on reshaping the balance sheets of financial institutions by investing in them. It was a more indirect approach and less efficient in the short run, but the Americans were more interested than the Europeans in trying to create mechanisms that would allow the state to back out of control of the financial system.

But what is most important is to see the manner in which state power surged in the summer and fall of 2008. The balance of power between business and the state, always dynamic, underwent a profound change, with the power of the state surging and the power of business contracting. Power was not in the hands of Lehman Brothers or Barclays. It was in the hands of Washington and London. At the same time, the power of the nation surged as the importance of multilateral organizations and subnational groups declined. The nation-state roared back to life after it had seemed to be drifting into irrelevance.

The year 1989 did not quite end the Cold War, but it created a world that bypassed it. The year 2001 did not end the post-Cold War world, but it overlaid it with an additional and overwhelming dynamic: that of the U.S.-jihadist war. The year 2008 did not end the U.S.-jihadist war, but it overlaid it with far more immediate and urgent issues. The financial crisis, of course, was one. The future of Russian power was another. We should point out that the importance of Russian power is this: As soon as Russia dominates the center of the Eurasian land mass, its force intrudes on Europe. Russia united with the rest of Europe is an overwhelming global force. Europe resisting Russia defines the global system. Russia fragmented opens the door for other geopolitical issues. Russia united and powerful usurps the global stage.

The year 2008 has therefore seen two things. First, and probably most important, it resurrected the nation-state and shifted the global balance between the state and business. Second, it redefined the global geopolitical system, opening the door to a resurgence of Russian power and revealing the underlying fragmentation of Europe and weaknesses of NATO.

The most important manifestation of this is Europe. In the face of Russian power, there is no united European position. In the face of the financial crisis, the Europeans coordinate, but they do not act as one. After the summer of 2008, it is no longer fair to talk about Europe as a single entity, about NATO as a fully functioning alliance, or about a world in which the nation-state is obsolete. The nation-state was the only institution that worked.

This is far more important than either of the immediate issues. The fate of Georgia is of minor consequence to the world. The financial crisis will pass into history, joining Brady bonds, the Resolution Trust Corp. and the bailout of New York City as a historical oddity. What will remain is a new international system in which the Russian question — followed by the German question — is once again at the center of things, and in which states act with confidence in shaping the economic and business environment for better or worse.

The world is a very different place from what it was in the spring of 2008. Or, to be more precise, it is a much more traditional place than many thought. It is a world of nations pursuing their own interests and collaborating where they choose. Those interests are economic, political and military, and they are part of a single fabric. The illusion of multilateralism was not put to rest — it will never die — but it was certainly put to bed. It is a world we can readily recognize from history."

        

What will the new summit mean for America and the world?  In the below article from the Financial Times, the question looms as foreign and financial ministers look to convene in the US for what is being called "Bretton Woods II."  Here's a preview.

“Europe wants the summit before the end of the year. Europe wants it. Europe demands it. Europe will get it.” So said Nicolas Sarkozy – president of France, and (until January) of the European Union – before jetting off to Washington over the weekend. There he persuaded President George W. Bush to agree to an international summit dedicated, says Mr Sarkozy, to nothing less than “re-founding the capitalist system”. This trip to Washington was like a French fantasy come true: a successful attempt to push the US president into discussing global governance and the taming of capitalism. Now that visions of collapsing banks and soup kitchens are receding, the Europeans are enjoying the global financial crisis."

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c30faa84-9ebc-11dd-98bd-000077b07658,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fc30faa84-9ebc-11dd-98bd-000077b07658.html%3Fnclick_check%3D1&_i_referer=&nclick_check=1

        

"For the vast majority of Russians the idea of a global financial crisis remains entirely foreign and the shocking figures about the meltdown on the domestic stock exchange are meaningless. The legendary Klim Petrovich—the Russian cousin of Joe the Plumber created 40 years ago by dissident poet Aleksandr Galich—does not own shares, has neither debts nor savings, and therefore has no reason to doubt the wisdom of Vladimir Putin’s course as executed by the amiable Dmitry Medvedev. The proverbial but entirely real Roman Abramovich, on the contrary, has lost a half of his fortune and allegedly had to postpone his wedding. Every propaganda trick is being played in order to keep public opinion indifferent and hide the symptoms of the crisis in the real economy, but the elites who were massively enriched during Putin’s era know better than to put any trust in the “life-is-good” mantra and are searching for survival strategies (RIA-Novosti, October 16)."

        

From Foreign Policy magazine, an interview on global politics with famed thriller writer  Tom Clancy.

        

A look at how Iran is benefiting from Russo-American tensions.

"In the aftermath of the August Georgian-Russian confrontation, a new Caspian geopolitical reality is slowly emerging from the fog of war. The clash highlighted the vulnerability of Western-funded and built Caspian export pipelines, which, by transiting the Caucasus, avoided both Russian and Iranian territory. During the standoff, two days before the outbreak of hostilities, the 1,092-mile, $3.6 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, was crippled by a mysterious explosion. Azerbaijan, its major user, then saw its other Georgian export options stymied. The Baku-Suspa pipeline operator BP shut down the line as a precautionary measure, while Azeri railway oil exports to Poti's Kulevi oil export terminal were halted after the Russians bombed a railway bridge at Kaspi, which also interfered with Kazakh railway exports."

        

From Robert Kaplan on what a possible conflict with Iran may look like.

"The prospect of a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities has conjured up a variety of dire scenarios: a stratospheric rise in oil prices, further radicalization across Middle East, and the resumption of mass bloodshed in Iraq, as Teheran unleashes its terrorist agents there. But all this talk of catastrophe still gives short shrift to one of the gravest potential threats: Iranian attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. Iran is bringing 21st century warfare to the seas by planning small-boat suicide attacks that would resemble in some ways the aerial and naval suicide missions launched by Imperial Japan during its last desperate days in the Second World War."

        

Another good piece about how to keep the foreign and defense policy apparatuses moving during a transition from one Administration to the next.

        

A good, semi scholarly look at the the future.

        

Can Saudi Arabia help bring some resolution to the Afghan challenges?  It appears we will be cutting deals with some (I reiterate some) elements of the Taliban in order to bring stability.

http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1487&Itemid=166

        

From Der Spiegel.  The below article discusses likely Russian reactions to continued pushes for Ukraine to join NATO.  This issue is fundament to the Russians.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,584631,00.html

        

Francis Fukuyama discussing another "End", this time not of History (as he is famous for) but of America's essential brand. 

I think it is probably true that if America is to regain its position in the world it will be for different reasons than the past.  Unbridled capitalism and "Reaganomics" which have been the organizing principles of the past thirty years is going to give way to something new.  What that will be is the question.

http://www.newsweek.com/id/162401?tid=relatedcl

        

Great piece on Thomas Friedman that essentially states that America's ability to act in the world is going to be severely hampered because of our financial crisis.  The need for foreign money to get us through the crisis (like the $1 plus trillion is US bonds owned by the Chinese and Arab oil backed sovereign wealth funds) will mean that foreigners will eventually own more of America.  This will make our economy (and the power that the economy allows us to have) very dependent on cooperation and global engagement.

That means less capacity for unilateralism IF we don't figure our how to save more domestically.  This does not have to be the future, but it will be if America persists in failing to wake up...

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/opinion/05friedman.html?_r=1&ref=opinion&oref=slogin

        

A great philosophical examination of this summer's runaway hit, the Dark Knight.  Very interesting and worth looking at in depth.

I think we need a Batman to face down the threats of instability.  However, in now way is a "Batman" a "good" thing, it is merely that which is necessary.   Chaos can lead to nothingness, let us not be nihilists...

"Here, the Joker's violence is aimed at proving a very clear point: that deep down, we're all the same as him — "only as good as the world allows (us) to be". "I've demonstrated there's no difference between me and everyone else!" boasts the Joker in Alan Moore's classic comic The Killing Joke, on which Nolan's rendering of the villain is based. Hence the Joker's claim that those who proclaim rules and institute order, such as politicians or police officers, are simply hypocrites who pretend to uphold moral codes, which are promptly "dropped at the first sign of trouble". Far better to be consistent: "The only sensible way to live in this world is without rules." It is in this sense that the Joker is "an agent of chaos". Not mindless chaos, but the idea that those who would control society are contemptible.  They're schemers trying to control their worlds … I show the schemers how pathetic their attempts to control things really are."

He explicitly does not want to kill Batman ("What would I do without you?"), but he certainly wants Batman to kill him. This would violate Batman's "one rule" and prove the Joker's point. That is why Harvey Dent, the promised "White Knight" is so central. The Joker kills Dent's fiancee, not because he wants her dead, but because he wants to drive Dent to darkness. If he can transform the incorruptible district attorney into a murderer, the argument is won. Recall the Joker's delight as he hands Dent a loaded gun and presses it against his own head, enticing Dent to shoot him. When Dent leaves this decision to the toss of a coin, then exclaims: "Now you're talking!" he knows Dent has fallen.

Is that a political cause? In a very broad sense it is, though not in the sense we often use the phrase. He does not seek any clearly identifiable, concrete political outcomes. His politics are far more abstract, philosophical, even artistic. He argues not for a world ruled by him, but for one without rules altogether. Ideologically, he is not so much an anarchist as a nihilist. He is a terrorist, then, but one who advocates a belief in nothing."

        

More on a new world order, or as I believe it likely, a new world "disorder" highlighted by instability and proliferation of WMDs. 

"There is no new "Rome" to displace Washington's dominion. Instead, the microchip has given birth to a complete asymmetry of force, command, authority and economic muscle. The smallest group or cell under control of no one state or government can now become coordinated, weaponized and empowered to challenge the mightiest traditional military force. To its amazement, America's leadership has discovered that its titanic defense spending, missile arsenal and 13 carrier fleets cannot maintain its influence and ensure it gets its way. Although size and weight have increased, vulnerability has not diminished. Flabby international obesity has replaced giant global weight. Pax Britannica came and went, and now Pax Americana has truly gone as well. That this has been happening for a while was obvious to many outside Western government and ruling circles."

        

Another article  arguing for the rise of Asia in the wake of America's seeming decline.

"The unshakeable belief in the march of science to solve any problem, no matter how big, is an essential part of the American dream. This is why the credit crunch is such a blow. The finance sector was at the heart of the US economy – its profits accounted for 40% of all private companies, and top workers earned wages beyond the dreams of ordinary workers. Yet all those high-powered Phds could not say what their firms had been trading in, what their bankers were doing, what the risks were and how many bombs were ticking in the basement."

        

Again, we need to monitor Russia close here.  No better time to take advantage of American weakness and reassert control in their near abroad than now.

"The naval fleets of Russia and Ukraine share the port at Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. Some in Russia would like the Ukrainian city to return to the Russian fold. Many fear that a spark here could quickly lead to a larger conflagration."

        

An interview with the new Pakistani President.  I do question how successful the recent Pakistani "democracy" will turn out to be.  In the past it has been quite illusory.  Assuming it will be different this time, I believe, takes a near act of faith. 

        

And as America's economy struggles to remain afloat, the Golden Age of Proliferation continues to emerge. When even Myanmar starts looking for nuclear technology, you know that all bets are off.  Here is a story worth noting.

        

A reflection on how both global and domestic politics are being shaped by the financial turmoil.

"Endorsement of a flawed plan is now a necessary but not a necessarily sufficient condition for stability. The banks need new capital. Some will probably come from sovereign wealth funds. But taxpayers, Americans and Europeans will also have to stump up further in coming weeks and months. Whatever the future course of the crisis – and, in the words of one central banker, “no one bets more than a couple of hours ahead on this one” – it is clear that several sticks of Mr Paulson’s dynamite have already exploded under politics. Most immediately, the maelstrom on Wall Street has transformed the US election campaign. Three weeks or so ago it looked like the contest would be fought on John McCain’s chosen territory. Russia’s invasion of Georgia had put national security up in lights... That was then. We are back now to the economy, stupid. This must be Democrat ground."

        

Russia moves to lock in advantages during their time of prosperity due to being flush with oil wealth.

"Last week Medvedev proceeded by announcing a short and clear defense doctrine in line with the foreign policy one. The defense doctrine also came in five principles. First, the organizational structure and deployment of troops would be enhanced. All combat units had to achieve "permanent readiness status" by 2020. Second, the efficiency of command and control systems in the Armed Forces would be improved. Without this, "it is impossible to count on success in today's wars and other armed conflicts." Third, the system of military education and personnel training would be modernized. Fourth, procuring the most modern weapons was a "high priority." Russia needed "fundamentally new, high-technology weapons." Fifth, military pay would increase, housing would improve, and the social problems of the Armed forces would be addressed."

        

More on the purported (and possible) end of Pax Americana...:

"America is no longer up to shouldering the world’s crises. But who is going to take its place? Russia, Brazil, China and India are all rising, but they are also competing with Europe and the US for finite natural resources. Only a common future -- a "change through rapprochement" and not a "clash of futures" can carry us forward... We are living in an era without a single, dominant world power. The globe is beset by crises -- climate change, resource scarcity, food and financial crises, nuclear proliferation, and failing states. No one country can devise solutions to address these kinds of problems. Even the United Nations is not up to the task. Indeed, as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown admitted at the Progressive Governance Conference in April in London, the international organizations founded in the wake of World War II no longer meet today’s needs."

        

Looking at the Great Depression through the lens of the moment.  A preview of what ifs unlikely to fully materialize, but nonetheless, frightening to even consider.

"In the 1930s, the US Congress did more than its part in helping to turn a financial crisis into a global depression. Yesterday it looked as though it was auditioning to assume that role again. Back then, Congress's vote for protectionist legislation, the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which erected trade walls around America, almost brought to a halt the free movement of goods and services vital to the efficient functioning of the global economy. In rejecting a plan to help rescue the US financial system that had been constructed and reconstructed by the Bush administration in collaboration with the Democratic and Republican leaderships, the House of Representatives dealt a hammer-blow to an already almost immobilised global financial system. In the immediate aftermath of the vote, Washington and Wall Street were plunged into chaos."

        

While America struggles, Russia may continue  its game with a far more strategically important country at stake than Georgia- Ukraine.

        

Another view of the financial crisis from across the Atlantic.  At least in thsi case, they examine whether the world really will be better off if America retrenches in the face of its fiscal problems.

"But democratic capitalism is now on trial. It faces huge homemade problems and formidable competition. Fortunately, there are many variants of democratic capitalism, not just the one that is erupting in the US. For some Europeans, it will be tempting to say: "Ah, if only you Americans had adopted our nice, humane, equitable version of social democratic capitalism!" Indeed, when the dust cloud has cleared and the lava has stopped flowing, the role of the state in the US economy may look more like that in some European countries. But against any easy claim of superiority, we have to remind ourselves that most European economies are struggling to generate jobs, innovation and entrepreneurship as the American economy has succeeded in doing for much of this quarter-century. Anyway, there's not just one European model but many - and other variants elsewhere. That's a strength, the strength of pluralism."

        

This is what the implications could be of the financial crisis according to Victor Davis Hanson:

"The natural order of the world is chaos, not calm. Like it or not, for over a half-century the United States alone restrained nuclear bullies, kept the sea lanes free from outlaws and corralled rogue nations. America alone could provide that deterrence because we produced a fourth of the world's goods and services, and became the richest country in the history of civilization. But the bill for years of massive borrowing for oil, for imported consumer goods and for speculation has now has finally come due on Wall Street -- and for the rest of us as well. Should that heart of American financial power in New York falter -- or even appear to falter -- then eventually the sinews of the American military will likewise slacken. And then things could get ugly -- real fast."

Indeed, without Pax Americana, what happens next.  Do we think a chaotic world where any individual can be superempowered by the Internet and modern technology will be safe?  We may soon find out whether man preferes "freedom" or "order."

        

The Europeans seem convinced the recent financial crisis is the end of Pax Americana. Indeed it "may be." America needs to become wiser faster in order to remain dominant.  This Der Spiegel article highlights what appears to be becoming a part of conventional wisdom.

        

Fareed Zakaria interviews Chinese Premiere Wen Jiabao.

        

I have thought for awhile that we are careening to a "New World Disorder."  The financial crisis of recent weeks is rapidly making this come closer.  If our economy shrinks, it will hamstring our ability to provide global stability.  Either John McCain or Barack Obama will be dealing with this.

These are troubled times, far from the giddy days after the Fall of the Berlin Wall and unipolarity.

Sadly, I think America could have maintained itself.  It still can if wise leadership steps forward.  However, I do not know if that is forthcoming.

From a good piece in National Journal.

"When McCain and Obama eventually take the debate podium, the nation will have to weigh their responses to a world of troubles. Each crisis they will be asked about is linked to others: Falling markets. Rising energy costs. Global warming. Failed states. Nuclear proliferation. Terrorism. Listen carefully as the nominees make the connections, because to one of them will fall the task of avoiding the ultimate "game-changer" -- a rapidly accelerating chain reaction reaches critical mass, overwhelming the United States and creating a power vacuum and chaos where the established order once stood."

        

So how to deal with Russia? Here are some ideas.

Note this in particular:

"What is needed, instead, is a “stability league” that includes prominent actors like China, India, and other countries that are more interested in economic growth than in “rocking the boat” of the international system. Such a strategy implies, first of all, a solid partnership with China, not because it is evolving in the direction of democracy, but because it is a status-quo power."

        

Before the recent financial crisis, this kind of talk from a European leader would essentially be laughed off as inconsequential.  However, today, it holds real menace.  The key to American global power was always economic.  That allowed us to build military strength that has been unparalledled in American history.    This quote sums up a major challenge that combined with the rise of CHina, the resurgence of Russia, non-proliferation, global warming all combine in a toxic stew.  America has options, though not pretty ones.  A tough leader is needed who can make swift decisions on a range of issues.  Anythign less is inviting political stalemate and the sort of persistent procrastination that has led down a road to potential (though still far from) oblivion.

Woe be to the world the day America either loses its power to enforce global stability or when it decides to embrace its national interests in the coldest of calculations.  Unfortunately, this day may be closer than many may understand...

Here is a snippet from a Washington Post piece on French President Sarkozy's initiative to strip America of its power.


"President Nicolas Sarkozy warned Europe on Thursday that it cannot escape shock waves from the U.S. financial crisis and that to protect its future, it must take the initiative in rewriting worldwide banking rules to end the 'folly' of an under-regulated system he..." Sarkozy is calling for nothing less than the end of the US dominated global economic system. This is a challenge to US hegemony in the severest form."

        

Once more I turn to Stratfor.  Here is a wonderful analysis of the current array of geopolitical forces facing the US as we move towards our Presidential Election.

Following this excellent analysis are a few questions to ask John McCain and Barack Obama.  This is where the real rubber meats the road.  Also, let's not forget to include all the questions swirling about our financial system.

Truly challenging times.  Not unsurprisingly, as I have posted before, a real "New World Disorder."

But enough of me, here is Stratfor's initial context.

"It has often been said that presidential elections are all about the economy. That just isn’t true. Harry Truman’s second election was all about Korea. John Kennedy’s election focused on missiles, Cuba and Berlin. Lyndon Johnson’s and Richard Nixon’s elections were heavily about Vietnam. Ronald Reagan’s first election pivoted on Iran. George W. Bush’s second election was about Iraq. We won’t argue that presidential elections are all about foreign policy, but they are not all about the economy. The 2008 election will certainly contain a massive component of foreign policy.

We have no wish to advise you how to vote. That’s your decision. What we want to do is try to describe what the world will look like to the new president and consider how each candidate is likely to respond to the world. In trying to consider whether to vote for John McCain or Barack Obama, it is obviously necessary to consider their stands on foreign policy issues. But we have to be cautious about campaign assertions. Kennedy claimed that the Soviets had achieved superiority in missiles over the United States, knowing full well that there was no missile gap. Johnson attacked Barry Goldwater for wanting to escalate the war in Vietnam at the same time he was planning an escalation. Nixon won the 1968 presidential election by claiming that he had a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. What a candidate says is not always an indicator of what the candidate is thinking.

It gets even trickier when you consider that many of the most important foreign policy issues are not even imagined during the election campaign. Truman did not expect that his second term would be dominated by a war in Korea. Kennedy did not expect to be remembered for the Cuban missile crisis. Jimmy Carter never imagined in 1976 that his presidency would be wrecked by the fall of the Shah of Iran and the hostage crisis. George H. W. Bush didn’t expect to be presiding over the collapse of communism or a war over Kuwait. George W. Bush (regardless of conspiracy theories) never expected his entire presidency to be defined by 9/11. If you read all of these presidents’ position papers in detail, you would never get a hint as to what the really important foreign policy issues would be in their presidencies.

Between the unreliability of campaign promises and the unexpected in foreign affairs, predicting what presidents will do is a complex business. The decisions a president must make once in office are neither scripted nor conveniently timed. They frequently present themselves to the president and require decisions in hours that can permanently define his (or her) administration. Ultimately, voters must judge, by whatever means they might choose, whether the candidate has the virtue needed to make those decisions well.

Virtue, as we are using it here, is a term that comes from Machiavelli. It means the opposite of its conventional usage. A virtuous leader is one who is clever, cunning, decisive, ruthless and, above all, effective. Virtue is the ability to face the unexpected and make the right decision, without position papers, time to reflect or even enough information. The virtuous leader can do that. Others cannot. It is a gut call for a voter, and a tough one.

This does not mean that all we can do is guess about a candidate’s nature. There are three things we can draw on. First, there is the political tradition the candidate comes from. There are more things connecting Republican and Democratic foreign policy than some would like to think, but there are also clear differences. Since each candidate comes from a different political tradition — as do his advisers — these traditions can point to how each candidate might react to events in the world. Second, there are indications in the positions the candidates take on ongoing events that everyone knows about, such as Iraq. Having pointed out times in which candidates have been deceptive, we still believe there is value in looking at their positions and seeing whether they are coherent and relevant. Finally, we can look at the future and try to predict what the world will look like over the next four years. In other words, we can try to limit the surprises as much as possible.

In order to try to draw this presidential campaign into some degree of focus on foreign policy, we will proceed in three steps. First, we will try to outline the foreign policy issues that we think will confront the new president, with the understanding that history might well throw in a surprise. Second, we will sketch the traditions and positions of both Obama and McCain to try to predict how they would respond to these events. Finally, after the foreign policy debate is over, we will try to analyze what they actually said within the framework we created.

Let me emphasize that this is not a partisan exercise. The best guarantee of objectivity is that there are members of our staff who are passionately (we might even say irrationally) committed to each of the candidates. They will be standing by to crush any perceived unfairness. It is Stratfor’s core belief that it is possible to write about foreign policy, and even an election, without becoming partisan or polemical. It is a difficult task and we doubt we can satisfy everyone, but it is our goal and commitment.

The Post 9/11 World

Ever since 9/11 U.S. foreign policy has focused on the Islamic world. Starting in late 2002, the focus narrowed to Iraq. When the 2008 campaign for president began a year ago, it appeared Iraq would define the election almost to the exclusion of all other matters. Clearly, this is no longer the case, pointing to the dynamism of foreign affairs and opening the door to a range of other issues.

Iraq remains an issue, but it interacts with a range of other issues. Among these are the future of U.S.-Iranian relations; U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan and the availability of troops in Iraq for that mission; the future of U.S.-Pakistani relations and their impact on Afghanistan; the future of U.S.-Russian relations and the extent to which they will interfere in the region; resources available to contain Russian expansion; the future of the U.S. relationship with the Europeans and with NATO in the context of growing Russian power and the war in Afghanistan; Israel’s role, caught as it is between Russia and Iran; and a host of only marginally related issues. Iraq may be subsiding, but that simply complicates the world facing the new president.

The list of problems facing the new president will be substantially larger than the problems facing George W. Bush, in breadth if not in intensity. The resources he will have to work with, military, political and economic, will not be larger for the first year at least. In terms of military capacity, much will hang on the degree to which Iraq continues to bog down more than a dozen U.S. brigade combat teams. Even thereafter, the core problem facing the next president will be the allocation of limited resources to an expanding number of challenges. The days when it was all about Iraq is over. It is now all about how to make the rubber band stretch without breaking.

Iraq remains the place to begin, however, since the shifts there help define the world the new president will face. To understand the international landscape the new president will face, it is essential to begin by understanding what happened in Iraq, and why Iraq is no longer the defining issue of this campaign.

A Stabilized Iraq and the U.S. Troop Dilemma

In 2006, it appeared that the situation in Iraq was both out of control and hopeless. Sunni insurgents were waging war against the United States, Shiite militias were taking shots at the Americans as well, and Sunnis and Shia were waging a war against each other. There seemed to be no way to bring the war to anything resembling a satisfactory solution.

When the Democrats took control of Congress in the 2006 elections, it appeared inevitable that the United States would begin withdrawing forces from Iraq. U.S expectations aside, this was the expectation by all parties in Iraq. Given that the United States was not expected to remain a decisive force in Iraq, all Iraqi parties discounted the Americans and maneuvered for position in anticipation of a post-American Iraq. The Iranians in particular saw an opportunity to limit a Sunni return to Iraq’s security forces, thus reshaping the geopolitics of the region. U.S. fighting with Iraqi Sunnis intensified in preparation for the anticipated American withdrawal.

Bush’s decision to increase forces rather than withdraw them dramatically changed the psychology of Iraq. It was assumed he had lost control of the situation. Bush’s decision to surge forces in Iraq, regardless by how many troops, established two things. First, Bush remained in control of U.S. policy. Second, the assumption that the Americans were leaving was untrue. And suddenly, no one was certain that there would be a vacuum to be filled.

The deployment of forces proved helpful, as did the change in how the troops were used; recent leaks indicate that new weapon systems also played a key role. The most important factor, however, was the realization that the Americans were not leaving on Bush’s watch. Since no one was sure who the next U.S. president would be, or what his policies might be, it was thus uncertain that the Americans would leave at all.

Everyone in Iraq suddenly recalculated. If the Americans weren’t leaving, one option would be to make a deal with Bush, seen as weak and looking for historical validation. Alternatively, they could wait for Bush’s successor. Iran remembers — without fondness — its decision not to seal a deal with Carter, instead preferring to wait for Reagan. Similarly, seeing foreign jihadists encroaching in Sunni regions and the Shia shaping the government in Baghdad, the Sunni insurgents began a fundamental reconsideration of their strategy.

Apart from reversing Iraq’s expectations about the United States, part of Washington’s general strategy was supplementing military operations with previously unthinkable political negotiations. First, the United States began talking to Iraq’s Sunni nationalist insurgents, and found common ground with them. Neither the Sunni nationalists nor the United States liked the jihadists, and both wanted the Shia to form a coalition government. Second, back-channel U.S.-Iranian talks clearly took place. The Iranians realized that the possibility of a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad was evaporating. Iran’s greatest fear was a Sunni Iraqi government armed and backed by the United States, recreating a version of the Hussein regime that had waged war with Iran for almost a decade. The Iranians decided that a neutral, coalition government was the best they could achieve, so they reined in the Shiite militia.

The net result of this was that the jihadists were marginalized and broken, and an uneasy coalition government was created in Baghdad, balanced between Iran and the United States. The Americans failed to create a pro-American government in Baghdad, but had blocked the emergence of a pro-Iranian government. Iraqi society remained fragmented and fragile, but a degree of peace unthinkable in 2006 had been created.

The first problem facing the next U.S. president will be deciding when and how many U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq. Unlike 2006, this issue will not be framed by Iraq alone. First, there will be the urgency of increasing the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Second, there will be the need to create a substantial strategic reserve to deal with potential requirements in Pakistan, and just as important, responding to events in the former Soviet Union like the recent conflict in Georgia.

At the same time, too precipitous a U.S. withdrawal not only could destabilize the situation internally in Iraq, it could convince Iran that its dream of a pro-Iranian Iraq is not out of the question. In short, too rapid a withdrawal could lead to resumption of war in Iraq. But too slow a withdrawal could make the situation in Afghanistan untenable and open the door for other crises.

The foreign policy test for the next U.S. president will be calibrating three urgent requirements with a military force that is exhausted by five years of warfare in Iraq and seven in Afghanistan. This force was not significantly expanded since Sept. 11, making this the first global war the United States has ever fought without a substantial military expansion. Nothing the new president does will change this reality for several years, so he will be forced immediately into juggling insufficient forces without the option of precipitous withdrawal from Iraq unless he is prepared to accept the consequences, particularly of a more powerful Iran.

The Nuclear Chip and a Stable U.S.-Iranian Understanding

The nuclear issue has divided the United States and Iran for several years. The issue seems to come and go depending on events elsewhere. Thus, what was enormously urgent just prior to the Russo-Georgian war became much less pressing during and after it. This is not unreasonable in our point of view, because we regard Iran as much farther from nuclear weapons than others might, and we suspect that the Bush administration agrees given its recent indifference to the question.

Certainly, Iran is enriching uranium, and with that uranium, it could possibly explode a nuclear device. But the gap between a nuclear device and weapon is substantial, and all the enriched uranium in the world will not give the Iranians a weapon. To have a weapon, it must be ruggedized and miniaturized to fit on a rocket or to be carried on an attack aircraft. The technologies needed for that range from material science to advanced electronics to quality assurance. Creating a weapon is a huge project. In our view, Iran does not have the depth of integrated technical skills needed to achieve that goal.

As for North Korea, for Iran a very public nuclear program is a bargaining chip designed to extract concessions, particularly from the Americans. The Iranians have continued the program very publicly in spite of threats of Israeli and American attacks because it made the United States less likely to dismiss Iranian wishes in Tehran’s true area of strategic interest, Iraq.

The United States must draw down its forces in Iraq to fight in Afghanistan. The Iranians have no liking for the Taliban, having nearly gone to war with them in 1998, and having aided the United States in Afghanistan in 2001. The United States needs Iran’s commitment to a neutral Iraq to withdraw U.S. forces since Iran could destabilize Iraq overnight, though Tehran’s ability to spin up Shiite proxies in Iraq has declined over the past year.

Therefore, the next president very quickly will face the question of how to deal with Iran. The Bush administration solution — relying on quiet understandings alongside public hostility — is one model. It is not necessarily a bad one, so long as forces remain in Iraq to control the situation. If the first decision the new U.S. president will have to make is how to transfer forces in Iraq elsewhere, the second decision will be how to achieve a more stable understanding with Iran.

This is particularly pressing in the context of a more assertive Russia that might reach out to Iran. The United States will need Iran more than Iran needs the United States under these circumstances. Washington will need Iran to abstain from action in Iraq but to act in Afghanistan. More significantly, the United States will need Iran not to enter into an understanding with Russia. The next president will have to figure out how to achieve all these things without giving away more than he needs to, and without losing his domestic political base in the process.

Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban

The U.S. president also will have to come up with an Afghan policy, which really doesn’t exist at this moment. The United States and its NATO allies have deployed about 50,000 troops in Afghanistan. To benchmark this, the Russians deployed around 120,000 by the mid-1980s, and were unable to pacify the country. Therefore the possibility of 60,000 troops — or even a few additional brigades on top of that — pacifying Afghanistan is minimal. The primary task of troops in Afghanistan now is to defend the Kabul regime and other major cities, and to try to keep the major roads open. More troops will make this easier, but by itself, it will not end the war.

The problem in Afghanistan is twofold. First, the Taliban defeated their rivals in Afghanistan during the civil war of the 1990s because they were the most cohesive force in the country, were politically adept and enjoyed Pakistani support. The Taliban’s victory was not accidental; and all other things being equal, without the U.S. presence, they could win again. The United States never defeated the Taliban. Instead, the Taliban refused to engage in massed warfare against American airpower, retreated, dispersed and regrouped. In most senses, it is the same force that won the Afghan civil war.

The United States can probably block the Taliban from taking the cities, but to do more it must do three things. First, it must deny the Taliban sanctuary and lines of supply running from Pakistan. These two elements allowed the mujahideen to outlast the Soviets. They helped bring the Taliban to power. And they are fueling the Taliban today. Second, the United States must form effective coalitions with tribal groups hostile to the Taliban. To do this it needs the help of Iran, and more important, Washington must convince the tribes that it will remain in Afghanistan indefinitely — not an easy task. And third — the hardest task for the new president — the United States will have to engage the Taliban themselves, or at least important factions in the Taliban movement, in a political process. When we recall that the United States negotiated with the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, this is not as far-fetched as it appears.

The most challenging aspect to deal with in all this is Pakistan. The United States has two issues in the South Asian country. The first is the presence of al Qaeda in northern Pakistan. Al Qaeda has not carried out a successful operation in the United States since 2001, nor in Europe since 2005. Groups who use the al Qaeda label continue to operate in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they use the name to legitimize or celebrate their activities — they are not the same people who carried out 9/11. Most of al Qaeda prime’s operatives are dead or scattered, and its main leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are not functional. The United States would love to capture bin Laden so as to close the books on al Qaeda, but the level of effort needed — assuming he is even alive — might outstrip U.S. capabilities.

The most difficult step politically for the new U.S. president will be to close the book on al Qaeda. This does not mean that a new group of operatives won’t grow from the same soil, and it doesn’t mean that Islamist terrorism is dead by any means. But it does mean that the particular entity the United States has been pursuing has effectively been destroyed, and the parts regenerating under its name are not as dangerous. Asserting victory will be extremely difficult for the new U.S. president. But without that step, a massive friction point between the United States and Pakistan will persist — one that isn’t justified geopolitically and undermines a much more pressing goal.

The United States needs the Pakistani army to attack the Taliban in Pakistan, or failing that, permit the United States to attack them without hindrance from the Pakistani military. Either of these are nightmarishly difficult things for a Pakistani government to agree to, and harder still to carry out. Nevertheless, without cutting the line of supply to Pakistan, like Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Afghanistan cannot be pacified. Therefore, the new president will face the daunting task of persuading or coercing the Pakistanis to carry out an action that will massively destabilize their country without allowing the United States to get bogged down in a Pakistan it cannot hope to stabilize.

At the same time, the United States must begin the political process of creating some sort of coalition in Afghanistan that it can live with. The fact of the matter is that the United States has no long-term interest in Afghanistan except in ensuring that radical jihadists with global operational reach are not given sanctuary there. Getting an agreement to that effect will be hard. Guaranteeing compliance will be virtually impossible. Nevertheless, that is the task the next president must undertake.

There are too many moving parts in Afghanistan to be sanguine about the outcome. It is a much more complex situation than Iraq, if for no other reason than because the Taliban are a far more effective fighting force than anything the United States encountered in Iraq, the terrain far more unfavorable for the U.S. military, and the political actors much more cynical about American capabilities.

The next U.S. president will have to make a painful decision. He must either order a long-term holding action designed to protect the Karzai government, launch a major offensive that includes Pakistan but has insufficient forces, or withdraw. Geopolitically, withdrawal makes a great deal of sense. Psychologically, it could unhinge the region and regenerate al Qaeda-like forces. Politically, it would not be something a new president could do. But as he ponders Iraq, the future president will have to address Afghanistan. And as he ponders Afghanistan, he will have to think about the Russians.

The Russian Resurgence

When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the Russians were allied with the United States. They facilitated the U.S. relationship with the Northern Alliance, and arranged for air bases in Central Asia. The American view of Russia was formed in the 1990s. It was seen as disintegrating, weak and ultimately insignificant to the global balance. The United States expanded NATO into the former Soviet Union in the Baltic states and said it wanted to expand it into Ukraine and Georgia. The Russians made it clear that they regarded this as a direct threat to their national security, resulting in the 2008 Georgian conflict.

The question now is where U.S.-Russian relations are going. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union a geopolitical catastrophe. After Ukraine and Georgia, it is clear he does not trust the United States and that he intends to reassert his sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. Georgia was lesson one. The current political crisis in Ukraine is the second lesson unfolding.

The re-emergence of a Russian empire in some form or another represents a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world. The Islamic world is divided and in chaos. It cannot coalesce into the caliphate that al Qaeda wanted to create by triggering a wave of revolutions in the Islamic world. Islamic terrorism remains a threat, but the geopolitical threat of a unifying Islamic power is not going to happen.

Russia is a different matter. The Soviet Union and the Russian empire both posed strategic threats because they could threaten Europe, the Middle East and China simultaneously. While this overstates the threat, it does provide some context. A united Eurasia is always powerful, and threatens to dominate the Eastern Hemisphere. Therefore, preventing Russia from reasserting its power in the former Soviet Union should take precedence over all other considerations.

The problem is that the United States and NATO together presently do not have the force needed to stop the Russians. The Russian army is not particularly powerful or effective, but it is facing forces that are far less powerful and effective. The United States has its forces tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan so that when the war in Georgia broke out, sending ground forces was simply not an option. The Russians are extremely aware of this window of opportunity, and are clearly taking advantage of it.

The Russians have two main advantages in this aside from American resource deficits. First, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas; German energy dependence on Moscow is particularly acute. The Europeans are in no military or economic position to take any steps against the Russians, as the resulting disruption would be disastrous. Second, as the United States maneuvers with Iran, the Russians can provide support to Iran, politically and in terms of military technology, that not only would challenge the United States, it might embolden the Iranians to try for a better deal in Iraq by destabilizing Iraq again. Finally, the Russians can pose lesser challenges in the Caribbean with Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as potentially supporting Middle Eastern terrorist groups and left-wing Latin American groups.

At this moment, the Russians have far more options than the Americans have. Therefore, the new U.S. president will have to design a policy for dealing with the Russians with few options at hand. This is where his decisions on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan will intersect and compete with his decisions on Russia. Ideally, the United States would put forces in the Baltics — which are part of NATO — as well as in Ukraine and Georgia. But that is not an option and won’t be for more than a year under the best of circumstances.

The United States therefore must attempt a diplomatic solution with Russia with very few sticks. The new president will need to try to devise a package of carrots — e.g., economic incentives — plus the long-term threat of a confrontation with the United States to persuade Moscow not to use its window of opportunity to reassert Russian regional hegemony. Since regional hegemony allows Russia to control its own destiny, the carrots will have to be very tempting, while the threat has to be particularly daunting. The president’s task will be crafting the package and then convincing the Russians it has value.

European Disunity and Military Weakness

One of the problems the United States will face in these negotiations will be the Europeans. There is no such thing as a European foreign policy; there are only the foreign policies of the separate countries. The Germans, for example, do not want a confrontation with Russia under any circumstances. The United Kingdom, by contrast, is more willing to take a confrontational approach to Moscow. And the European military capability, massed and focused, is meager. The Europeans have badly neglected their military over the past 15 years. What deployable, expeditionary forces they have are committed to the campaign in Afghanistan. That means that in dealing with Russia, the Americans do not have united European support and certainly no meaningful military weight. This will make any diplomacy with the Russians extremely difficult.

One of the issues the new president eventually will have to face is the value of NATO and the Europeans as a whole. This was an academic matter while the Russians were prostrate. With the Russians becoming active, it will become an urgent issue. NATO expansion — and NATO itself — has lived in a world in which it faced no military threats. Therefore, it did not have to look at itself militarily. After Georgia, NATO’s military power becomes very important, and without European commitment, NATO’s military power independent of the United States — and the ability to deploy it — becomes minimal. If Germany opts out of confrontation, then NATO will be paralyzed legally, since it requires consensus, and geographically. For the United States alone cannot protect the Baltics without German participation.

The president really will have one choice affecting Europe: Accept the resurgence of Russia, or resist. If the president resists, he will have to limit his commitment to the Islamic world severely, rebalance the size and shape of the U.S. military and revitalize and galvanize NATO. If he cannot do all of those things, he will face some stark choices in Europe.

Israel, Turkey, China, and Latin America

Russian pressure is already reshaping aspects of the global system. The Israelis have approached Georgia very differently from the United States. They halted weapon sales to Georgia the week before the war, and have made it clear to Moscow that Israel does not intend to challenge Russia. The Russians met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad immediately after the war. This signaled the Israelis that Moscow was prepared to support Syria with weapons and with Russian naval ships in the port of Tartus if Israel supports Georgia, and other countries in the former Soviet Union, we assume. The Israelis appear to have let the Russians know that they would not do so, separating themselves from the U.S. position. The next president will have to re-examine the U.S. relationship with Israel if this breach continues to widen.

In the same way, the United States will have to address its relationship with Turkey. A long-term ally, Turkey has participated logistically in the Iraq occupation, but has not been enthusiastic. Turkey’s economy is booming, its military is substantial and Turkish regional influence is growing. Turkey is extremely wary of being caught in a new Cold War between Russia and the United States, but this will be difficult to avoid. Turkey’s interests are very threatened by a Russian resurgence, and Turkey is the U.S. ally with the most tools for countering Russia. Both sides will pressure Ankara mercilessly. More than Israel, Turkey will be critical both in the Islamic world and with the Russians. The new president will have to address U.S.-Turkish relations both in context and independent of Russia fairly quickly.

In some ways, China is the great beneficiary of all of this. In the early days of the Bush administration, there were some confrontations with China. As the war in Iraq calmed down, Washington seemed to be increasing its criticisms of China, perhaps even tacitly supporting Tibetan independence. With the re-emergence of Russia, the United States is now completely distracted. Contrary to perceptions, China is not a global military power. Its army is primarily locked in by geography and its navy is in no way an effective blue-water force. For its part, the United States is in no position to land troops on mainland China. Therefore, there is no U.S. geopolitical competition with China. The next president will have to deal with economic issues with China, but in the end, China will sell goods to the United States, and the United States will buy them.

Latin America has been a region of minimal interest to the United States in the last decade or longer. So long as no global power was using its territory, the United States did not care what presidents Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bo